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NATIONALISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: NORMS, FOREIGN POLICY,
and ENMITY

A Dissertation
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of
Yale University
in Candidacy for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

By
Douglas Richard Woodwell

Dissertation Director: Nicholas Sambanis
May 2005

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Abstract
Nationalism in International Relations: Norms, Foreign Policy, and Enmity
Douglas Richard Woodwell
May 2005

This dissertation analyzes the effect of nationalism on interstate relations. More specifically, it examines how the presence of ethno-national groups that are divided into separate states affects the relationship between those states. The theoretical discussion of the early chapters analyzes two primary factors: 1) how the development of competing international norms concerning state sovereignty and self-determination breed bilateral mistrust and instability between states that share common national groups; and 2) which domestic and situational factors contribute to higher levels of militant revisionism initiated by potentially irredentist states. The theoretical propositions of the early chapters are followed by a detailed econometric quantitative analysis. The conclusions drawn from the theoretical and empirical sections are then applied to three case studies, which comprise the second part of the dissertation. These case studies examine how nationalism has affected interstate relations in the Horn of Africa; among the countries of South Asia; and historically within the context of Greco-Turkish relations.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1 – Introduction	5
Transborder Nationalism and Transborder Nationalities	7
Transborder Nationality and International Conflict: A General Model	13
The Structure of this Work	16
Transborder Nationalism as a Major Correlate of Interstate Conflict – Final Introductory Thoughts	21
PART I	
CHAPTER 2 – Nationality, Nation, and Ethnicity	24
Ethnicity – An Inclusive Label	25
Distinctions between Nationality and Ethnicity	28
Perennialism and Modernism: How Nations Arise	30
The Defining Features of Nationalism and Nations	33
Making sense of Nationalism as a Political Phenomenon	36
Nationalism, Self-determination, and International Norms	38
The Implications of Failing to Reach a Common Normative Consensus	44
Conclusion	46
CHAPTER 3 – Sovereignty and Self-Determination: Conflicting Norms as the Basis for International Conflict	49
From Demographics to Foreign Policy Indeterminacy	53
From Foreign Policy Indeterminacy to Bilateral Mistrust	61
From Bilateral Mistrust to Bilateral Conflict	63
Hypotheses Associated with the Link between Norms, Demographics, and Conflict	64
Conclusion	75
CHAPTER 4 – The Determinants of Aggressive Behavior in Irredentist-type Situations	79
Affective Motivations and Homeland State Conflict Initiation – Diaspora Rebellion	82
Affective Motivations and Homeland State Conflict Initiation – Diaspora Discontent	84
Domestic Audiences and Domestic Structures	87
The Feasibility of Military Aggression	93
The Interaction of Domestic Factors	95
Conclusion	101
CHAPTER 5 – Empirical Assessment	104
Research Design	104
Models and Methods	116
Normative-Demographic Variable Results	123
Domestic Foreign Policy Formulation Results	130
Interactive Domestic Results	136
Summary of results and implications for theory	140
Conclusion	148
Appendices – Chapter 5	151
PART II	
Introduction to Case Studies	168
CHAPTER 6 – Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya	172
International Norms, Societal Pressures, and Irredentist-type Demographics	174
Domestic Influences on Somali Dispute Initiation	208
Conclusion	222
CHAPTER 7 – India, Pakistan, and China	226
International Norms in Transborder versus Non-transborder Situations	229

Domestic Influences on Pakistani Dispute Initiation	258
Conclusion	277
CHAPTER 8 – Greece and Turkey	279
Greece and Turkey: The rise and fall of Transborder Nationality	282
Domestic Influences on Greek and Turkish Dispute Initiation	319
Conclusion	328
CHAPTER 9 – Conclusions and Implications	333
Generalized Findings – The Quantitative Analysis	336
Case Study Findings and Corroborative Evidence – Normative-Demographic Aspects	338
Case Study Findings and Corroborative Evidence — Foreign Policy Formulation	342
Central Asia - Flashpoint of the Future?	348
Implications for Policymaking – Some Suggestions	350
Final Word	357
Bibliography (Works Cited)	360

List of Table and Figures

TABLE 1.1 –	Demographics and Associated Nationalism	8
FIGURE 1.2 –	Transborder Dyads in the International System	13
FIGURE 1.3 –	Theoretical Framework and Interrelation of Model	15
TABLE 1.4 –	Major Wars and Transborder Nationality (1946-1990)	22
FIGURE 3.1 –	Causal chain linking Transborder Demographics to Bilateral Instability	52
TABLE 3.2 –	International and Societal Norms, Predictive Relationships	55
TABLE 3.3 –	Predicted Effect of Norms on State Behavior	57
FIGURE 3.4 –	Irredentist-type and Contending Government Systemic Interactions	70
FIGURE 4.1 –	Foreign Policy Formulation in Homeland States	80
TABLE 5.1 –	Demographic/Normative Bilateral Model Results	124
TABLE 5.2 –	The Effect of Significant Systemic Variables on Bilateral MID and FATAL Probability	127
TABLE 5.3 –	The Effect of Significant Systemic Variables on TERRMID, POLMID and REGMID Probability	129
TABLE 5.4 –	Domestic Foreign Policy Formulation Model Results	130
TABLE 5.5 –	Core Models – (Domestic Foreign Policy Model)	133
TABLE 5.6 –	Domestic Foreign Policy Core Model – Baseline Probability Changes	134
TABLE 5.7 –	Classification Tree Regression Results	137
TABLE 5.8 –	Hypothesis Outcomes and Associated Variables	140
TABLE 5.9 –	Factors associated with increased Dispute Initiation solely within Irredentist-type Dads and within both Irredentist-type and “General” Dyads	145
FIGURE 6.1 –	Percentage of MID and fatal MIDs per Dyad-years in Global Regions	172
TABLE 6.2 –	Predicted versus Actual MIDs and Fatal MIDs in Dyads	172
TABLE 6.3 –	Somali Nationalism and Relations with Kenya	180
TABLE 6.4 –	Somali Nationalism and Relations with Ethiopia	195
TABLE 6.5 –	Somali Decision-making Factors and fatal MID initiation	208
FIGURE 6.6 –	GDP per capita: Kenya and Somalia	211
FIGURE 6.7 –	Somalia GDP per capita and MIDs initiated	212
FIGURE 6.8 –	Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya Capabilities	214
TABLE 7.1 –	Predicted versus Actual Bilateral MIDs and fatal MIDs in Dyads	228
FIGURE 7.2 –	Pakistani GDP per Capita	259
FIGURE 7.3 –	Ratio Indian-Pakistani Capabilities	260
FIGURE 7.4 –	Predicted Bilateral Dispute Propensities and Actual Pakistani Dispute Initiation	262
FIGURE 8.1 –	Greco-Turkish Bilateral Relations During Different Eras	280
TABLE 8.2 –	Military Interventions and Subsequent Greek and Turkish Foreign Policies	319
FIGURE 8.3 –	Capability Index Scores (pre-WWII)	325
FIGURE 8.4 –	Capability Index Scores (1945-1990)	326

CHAPTER 1 – Introduction

Geopolitical struggles surrounding the competing ideologies of communism, capitalism, fascism, and democracy heavily influenced the course-of-events in 20th century international relations. However, focusing on great powers, great wars, and great ideologies lends itself to the neglect of what has been the one consistent source of conflict throughout the century – the influence and destabilizing implications associated with the pursuit of nationalist objectives by revisionist states. From the Balkan Wars to the Gulf War, nationalist goals have led not simply to the fracturing of states and empires, but to conflict among pre-existing states as well.

As far back as the seventeenth century, Hugo Grotius wrote on the right of resistance and the right of secession for oppressed peoples (Neuberger 1986: 4). One of the fathers of modern nationalist thought, Jean Jacques Rousseau, presents perhaps the purest notion of self-determination in *Considerations on the Government of Poland* when he suggests in 1772 that the emerging Polish government should adopt customs that “make them strangers among men” while creating “barriers keeping them separate from their neighbors and preventing intermingling among them.” In one of the more prominent contemporary treatises of self-determination, Ronen (1979: 46) focuses on how a “ruler become[s] ‘alien’ and opposable on the basis of the right to self-determination”, how the common factor of all nationalisms is the “dissatisfaction of the ‘ruled’ with the ‘rulers’” (p. 51), and how nationalist violence is activated as a function of foreign oppression (p. 59).

The decline of dynastic forms of government in Europe and the emergence of liberal and romantic thought fostered the view that Providence intended political

structures to mirror the diversity of peoples brought about by God. Two distinct emphases can be discerned from the modern nationalist thought that originated from Enlightenment Liberals and Napoleonic Era Romantics. The liberal nationalist idea focused on popular consent as the antithesis of dynastism, and thus the idea of a nation could be seen as more culturally inclusive, based on a shared sense of belonging and purpose. This strand is typified by Mazzini, who once declared that:

The map of Europe will be redrawn. The countries of the peoples, defined by the vote of free men, will arise upon the ruins of the countries of kings and privileged castes, and between these countries harmony and fraternity will exist.¹

Romantic nationalism, generally associated with the German philosophers Fichte and Herder, focuses more on the rather nebulous *Geist*, or spirit, of people rather than the idea of consensual association. Nationalism is therefore less associated with the establishment of liberal democratic governance than it is with the political affiliation of cultural groups. In other words, the focus of romantic nationalism was on the delineation of culturally distinct states, while liberal nationalism's focus was on the source of authority within states themselves. It is an oversimplification, but essentially correct, to say that the two strands of nationalism, one focusing on democracy and the other on identity, are still present in modern discourse, which divides nationalism into strands of civic and ethnic nationalism.

These two strands can be reconciled into one broader category that presents an encompassing definition of nationalism. First one must begin by understanding what both paradigms have in common – namely, a rejection of that which is foreign to the nation. For civic nationalists, it is political structures that are unrepresentative of the

¹ Joseph Mazzini (1858), *An Essay On the Duties of Man Addressed to Workingmen* (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1898), p 59.

political culture of a nation that prevent the free will of peoples to be expressed. For ethnic nationalists, what is foreign involves the infiltration or forced introduction of foreign cultural norms into what is assumed to be a rather unified cultural community.

In both cases, however, *the nation, or part of the nation, is perceived as unduly and illegitimately subject to foreign influence and/or control.* Nationalism can be viewed as a doctrine advocating the empowerment of the nation and the reduction of foreign control over it. It represents behavior by actors within a nation seeking higher levels of self-determination for the nation. This understanding of nationalism, which is examined in greater depth in the second chapter, is important as a basis for grasping the motivations of individuals, groups, societies, and, ultimately, governments that pursue nationalist goals – often at the expense of more instrumental considerations.

Transborder Nationalism and Transborder Nationalities

This volume investigates the effect of nationalism on international relations by examining national groups that are divided by state boundaries. Demographic situations involving such *transborder nationalities* are hypothesized to have a systematically negative influence on the bilateral relationships of the states that are home to portions of these groups when a segment of the nationality holds sway over the foreign policy decisions of at least one of these states. Such demographic situations may lead to domestic nationalist politicking whereby nationalists stress the absence of a single, nationally representative state, and pressure state leadership to remedy the situation through an aggressive foreign policy. While all states are constrained within the context of their bilateral relations through military, economic, or even normative considerations,

nationalism arising from transborder situations provides one of the most common incentives to engage in policies that test the limits of those constraints.

There are three broad demographic situations that affect relationships between states by introducing the potential for nationalist preferences into the calculations of foreign policy decision-makers. The three demographic situations are referred to as: 1) *minority-majority* situations, wherein the majority of one state is constituted by one national group whereas another state has a sizeable, or politically notable, minority population of the same group; 2) *majority-majority* situations, wherein the majority of the population of two states is constituted by the same national group; and 3) *minority-minority* situations, wherein two states each have a sizeable, or politically notable, minority of the same national group.

TABLE 1.1 – Demographics and Associated Nationalism

Demographic Situation	Associated Nationalism
Minority-Majority (MINMAJ)	Irredentist-type
Majority-Majority (MAJMAJ)	Contending Government
Minority-Minority (MINMIN)	Minority-Minority

Each of these demographic constellations is associated with a different type of potential transborder nationalism: irredentist-type; contending government; and minority-minority nationalism. The three types of nationalism may breed instability and mutual suspicion between states, although to different degrees and in somewhat different manners. It is not always concrete manifestations of nationalist foreign policies that promote interstate instability, but also the *threat* presented by states targeted by such

policies that future nationalist preferences will grow stronger and present ever-increasing demands on diaspora²-inhabited territory.

The first type of nationalism, associated with minority-majority demographic clusters, is *irredentist-type nationalism*, which represents the preference of nationalists within a *homeland state* to seek higher levels of self-determination for co-nationals within a *kin state*.³ At its strongest, irredentist nationalism seeks to eliminate control of a foreign government (kin state) over a diaspora group and incorporation of that group and the territory it inhabits within the homeland state. I tend to employ the term irredentist-“type” nationalism, however, to connote the fact that policies short of overt territorial annexation may be employed in pursuance of higher levels of co-national self-determination.⁴

The term irredentism, as it is commonly used, generally implies that a segment of a national group exists in significant numbers in two or more states. For the sake of clarity, *the usage of the terms irredentism and irredentist-type nationalism in this work will only be associated with demographic situations in which the shared nation*

² I frequently utilize the term diaspora as short-hand for a co-national group that resides in a different state than the state being referenced. Although primarily used here to refer to “irredenta” groups, the term encompasses any co-national group abroad, regardless of its size or political status.

³ The term kin state will be used to refer to states that are the target of irredentist or contending government nationalist aspirations. The term implies the presence of a state that is home to a national group with “kinship” ties to a homeland state, which is presumed to be susceptible to transborder nationalist preferences. The national “kin” themselves may represent a majority or minority of the “kin state’s” population, and the two terms should not be confused.

⁴ Throughout this work I refer to “irredentist” circumstances, “transborder nationalist” situations, or other similar terminologies to indicate demographic patterns amenable to nationalism. The actual degree of nationalist sentiment driving potentially destabilizing policies naturally varies from case-to-case. One key to understanding the role that certain demographic patterns contribute to bilateral instability lies in the fact that the threat of the more extreme nationalist variants arising is always possible, *even if only gradually and/or indirectly*, within any circumstance involving transborder demographics. For instance, a homeland state may express rhetorical support for expanded group rights on behalf of national kin in another state; offer financial aid to political parties supporting greater autonomy; or even support an insurgent movement with secessionist goals. Each of these may be perceived by the foreign state as an infringement of its sovereignty and pose a future threat to its territorial integrity, even if none of these actions represents the most extreme examples of “irredentism” *per se*.

constitutes the majority of the population at least one state and a minority of the population of another (i.e. a “minority-majority” transborder demographic). Examples such as the Kurdish situation, whereby the nationality in question never forms the majority of a single state’s population, will be identified separately with “minority-minority” nationalism. The single largest focus of this work concerns the ramifications of irredentist-type situations, as just defined, on interstate relations.

The second type of transborder nationalism, associated with majority-majority demographic populations, is referred to as *contending government* nationalism. Contending government nationalism exists when two or more governments claim legitimate representation of the peoples and territories of the same nation. Concerned primarily with the division of state control within a larger national community, contending government nationalism can be broken down into stronger and weaker forms. Hechter (2001) refers to the stronger form as “unification nationalism”. Just as the end result of the most extreme irredentist-type policies entails the transfer of territory from one state to another, unification nationalism, brought to fruition, implies the transfer of power from two or more state authorities to a single state authority. Once again, like irredentist-type nationalism, however, unification nationalism may entail lesser forms of interventionist and subversive policies falling short of overt militarism that are conducted by one state on behalf of co-national groups in another state.

A form of contending government nationalism with more limited goals is hereto referred as “frontier” nationalism. In cases of frontier nationalism, a government may ideally wish to absorb the entire same-national population of another, but is willing to accept more limited gains as well. Within co-national frontier situations, governments

may fiercely contest the right-to-rule over contested local border territories and populations that are easily assimilated into one state or another due to national similarity. These situations are particularly common when common national identity has been eroded by more localized sources of identity – particularly associated with the long term existence of different administrative units such as the states of Latin America and, perhaps, those of the Arabic Middle East. When national affiliation among populations of two different states is weak there is a greater incentive for more limited forms of border revisionism, such as those pursuant of frontier rather than unification forms of nationalism.

Both forms of contending government nationalism occur between states that might be considered administrative divisions of a larger nation, meaning borders themselves lack the same strength of legitimacy accorded to states with borders dividing more divergent populations. While unification and frontier nationalism may differ somewhat in their scope and motivations, they occur under the same demographic-structural situations – namely, when two states share a common majority national population. Although these contending government situations are beyond the primary theoretical focus of this work, their importance in terms of the larger scope of transborder national issues will be frequently noted and periodically analyzed, where appropriate, alongside the primary focus on irredentism. As such, the somewhat cursory treatment of contending government dyads will provide an important starting point for further research investigating the highly destabilizing effect that such nationalism introduces into interstate relations.


A third form of transborder nationalism involves ties between minority groups within different states. Although such ties are interesting in their own right, the international implications of transborder minority-minority groups are less profound than those involving irredentist-type (as defined above) and contending government demographics, because, in most cases, one would not expect such shared minorities to have high levels of control over the foreign policy decisions within either of the states within which they reside. Thus, while irredentist-type and contending government transborder situations represent a systematic source of foreign policy grievance for states involved, these same states can not be expected to, under normal circumstances, be in contention over the political status of minorities which are jointly controlled. Because much of this work involves issues of state structure and foreign policy preferences, shared minorities are only given passing treatment due to their assumed lack of access to policy formulation and execution. Henceforth, when this paper refers to transborder nationalism (unless otherwise stated) it is referring to irredentist-type and contending government nationalism.

When examining all the pairs-of-countries (henceforth referred to as *dyads*) in the world, only a minority can be characterized as transborder dyads. Even when only contiguous dyads are counted, only about 40% of dyads can be characterized by any of the three types of transborder relationships if politically irrelevant minorities are excluded.⁵ The diagram below provides a visual representation of transborder

⁵ In chapter 5, the parameters of a “politically relevant” minority are discussed. The term here is issued here to emphasize the fact that minor groups with little hope of influencing state policy domestically or abroad provide little theoretical utility when analyzing transborder relationships.

demographics, as labeled throughout this work, within the larger context of all pairs-of-states.⁶

FIGURE 1.2 – Transborder Dyads in the International System



Transborder Nationality and International Conflict: A General Model

Two sets of causal mechanisms are related to heightened conflict rates among irredentist and contending government dyads. The first set of conditions involves the *influence of norms* in causing higher rates of conflict among these relevant transborder dyads during different periods and relative to non-transborder (and minority-minority) dyads overall. This work posits that three basic combinations of international and

⁶ While a single dyad cannot be logically represented as both an irredentist (MINMAJ) and contending government-type (MAJMAJ), such dyads may, at the same time, share a minority group (MINMIN) in addition to the MINMAJ or MAJMAJ classification. In total, MINMAJ and MAJMAJ dyad-years each represent approximately 15 percent of the total dyad-years, while MINMIN dyad-years represent approximately 19 percent of the total.

societal (or local) norms help explain what is described as the “baseline” level of dispute among dyads.

When the influence of *international norms of sovereignty*, which suggest peaceful interstate relations, impact executive foreign policy decision-making to a greater extent than *societal norms of self-determination*, which are associated with preferences for nationalist foreign policy goals, relations between states will tend to be peaceful. This is generally the case in dyads (pairs of states) that are *not* characterized by transborder demography.


When the opposite is true and domestic norms of national self-determination are clearly stronger than international norms of sovereignty, relations will tend to be very conflictual. This is most evident in irredentist-type dyads when a diaspora group is involved in rebellion against a kin state – a situation which invokes very high levels of nationalist sentiment among domestic audiences in a homeland state.

The last combination concerns situations when international norms of sovereignty and domestic norms of nationalism/self-determination are either both strong or both weak – roughly “canceling one another out”. In this situation it is difficult to determine what policies a state will pursue (a situation referred to later as foreign policy “indeterminacy”), creating high levels of intra-dyadic distrust. This situation characterizes the most frequent state-of-affairs within transborder dyads.

Under conditions involving roughly equivalent international and societal-level normative pressures, it is important to understand how decision-makers decide whether to pursue more aggressive or more passive policies. According to Saideman (2001: 219), when “the norm of territorial integrity competes with the norm of self-determination,” the

situation is such that it “allows states to consider other factors, so domestic political concerns may become more important.” Along this line-of-analysis suggested by Saideman, this work examines normative issues in international relations, but also seeks to understand some of the domestic considerations that may “tip” policies toward either peace or aggression in situations when normative prescriptions for action are muddled.

FIGURE 1.3 – Theoretical Framework and Interrelation of Models



The second part of the model attempts to unravel the processes associated with uncertain foreign policy outcomes in transborder states by focusing on the particular circumstances and domestic structures within irredentist-type homeland states that affect decision-making. Although such dyads are expected to be more conflictual in general than non-transborder dyads, specific factors, such as the presence of military influence over homeland state policy or the relative political and economic conditions of diaspora groups, may provide a greater impetus for dispute initiation within the greater framework

of already tense bilateral relations. Thus the general model of this work has both 1) a normative-demographic component, which explains how an overall pattern of bilateral relations can be derived by examining the nature of transborder demographics within a dyad, and 2) a domestic component, which deals specifically with situations wherein it is unclear how foreign policy will be manifested due to conflicting international and domestic pressures on executives. This general model is analyzed and explained in greater depth in Chapter 2 (the normative-demographic model) and Chapter 3 (the domestic foreign policy formulation model).

The Structure of this Work

This volume begins by establishing the conceptual framework necessary to understand the theoretical mechanisms that cause transborder nationalist preferences to manifest themselves in international relations. Chapter 2 describes alternate group and individual conceptions of the nation and their universal applicability. The goal of this chapter is to help the reader understand how nationalism, or the drive for national self-determination, creates bottom-up, or “societal”, pressures on executive decision-makers to adopt aggressive policies that translate into bilateral hostility among transborder states. The chapter introduces a working definition of nationalism and describes how individual nationalist sentiment ultimately helps foster collective action, creates domestic pressures on executives, and translates into foreign policy preferences for aggression in situations of transborder nationality. Furthermore, the chapter explores the international normative environment within which state interactions take place, particularly focusing on self-determination versus state sovereignty. As a term largely synonymous with nationalism, self-determination represents the antithesis of international norms of state sovereignty,

because the idea of state sovereignty validates the rule of a state controlled by foreigners over members of other nationalities.

Chapter 3 introduces the “normative-demographic” model that explains why irredentist and contending government demographics are associated with higher dispute rates among states sharing similar nationalist groups. When nations are divided by state borders, state leaders will be pressured from below by societal norms of nationalism and self-determination and from above by international norms of sovereignty. This tension often results in unpredictable foreign policies enacted by “majority” national states, and distrust and defensive forms of aggression by states sharing a national group with them. This chapter suggests a series of testable hypotheses examining the link between demographics and interstate relations, with the understanding these two observable factors are bridged by normative factors that affect bilateral affairs.

While norms condition state behavior, policies can be expected to vary depending upon mediating domestic considerations, particularly in terms of how political structures channel the interests of various domestic audiences. Chapter 4 examines factors influencing the decision-making processes of homeland state leaders within irredentist contexts, including: the role of military influence on decision-making; the degree to which executives are insulated from foreign policy failures; how diaspora rebellion affects public pressures on an executive; and how relative balances-of-power constrain potential policy options. The “domestic foreign policy formulation model” presented in this chapter suggests factors that are particularly useful in understanding foreign policy behavior by homeland irredentist states in particular circumstances for which the normative-demographic model does not account.

Chapter 5 presents a series of empirical tests of the theories presented in the earlier chapters. It begins by defining how key concepts are operationalized into a series of key and control variables that are used to test the hypotheses of previous chapters. Next, the chapter describes the econometric methods through which these variables are tested. Last, the empirical results of the models are presented and the implications of the findings are discussed with an eye toward utilizing the findings as the theoretical basis for the case studies found in the following chapters.

The findings indicate that one can predict markedly higher levels of conflict between such states when a transborder nationality represents the majority of the population of at least one state. Thus, in the presence of irredentist (minority-majority) or contending government (majority-majority) demographics, a higher overall “baseline” of bilateral hostility can be expected to exist. When diaspora groups engage in armed conflict against their governments in irredentist situations, very high levels of bilateral enmity are also evident. The results further indicate that under conditions of diaspora rebellion, most other factors have little or no effect on dispute initiation rates. In the absence of such rebellion, military influence is systematically related to higher levels of aggression (a result not found when assessing non-transborder dyads), particularly when the economic and political conditions of kin states are inferior to those in the homeland state. It is also clear from the results that realist considerations of relative power must also be considered to the extent that a homeland state is unlikely to provoke confrontation when it is clearly outmatched.

Chapters 6-8 introduce several case studies to illustrate the domestic and international mechanisms characterizing cases in which transborder nationalism is a

factor influencing international interactions. Each case study involves a focused comparison of the relations among two or three states, and the underlying national dynamics involved in these relations over several decades. The frequency and degree to which these states find themselves in conflict are assessed by examining alternate values of the key explanatory variables found significant in Chapter 4.

Chapter 6 examines the role of irredentist-type nationalism in the trilateral relations of Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia. The bilateral relations of Somalia and Ethiopia are contrasted with those of Somalia and Kenya. In both cases a significant Somali diaspora groups resided over-the-borders in Ethiopia and Kenya. However, due to factors such as the relative economic conditions of these diaspora and the timing of diaspora rebellions, relations between Somalia and these two states took different paths. Relations between Ethiopia and Kenya, which lack a transborder nationality, are also contrasted with the irredentist-type dyads. Finally, the chapter also examines differences in Somali policies during different time periods fostered by changes in domestic normative pressures, government structures, and international constraints.

Chapter 7 examines relations among India, Pakistan, and China over the past decades. While China and India went to war in the early sixties, the depth of hostility between these two states has paled in comparison to that existing between India and Pakistan. Clearly, a major part of the reason for continued Pakistani hostility lies in the outstanding irredentist grievances held by the Pakistani state concerning Kashmir. Even India and Pakistan have witnessed periods of relative peace during the last decades, however, and this chapter will explain why different foreign policy stances have been adopted by Pakistani leadership during different time periods.

Chapter 8 traces the bilateral relationship of Turkey and Greece during the period since the First World War. The relations between these two states are particularly interesting because the subject of interest – the presence of transborder national groups and their effect on interstate affairs – actually varies during the century. Prior to the 1920s, both states had a large diaspora from the other present within their borders. Due to forced expulsion, and, in the middle of the decade, a more orderly population exchange under the auspices of the League of Nations, the diaspora within each state was greatly reduced. The elimination of outstanding issues surrounding treatment of each state's diaspora brought about an era of peace between the two states that lasted thirty years. Friendly relations, however, have been absent for much of the last half century due to the Cyprus issue, which it will be argued essentially introduced many of the same diaspora-oriented conflicts that had existed before the 1920s.

Finally, Chapter 9 summarizes the findings and suggests some possible implications for the future, including suggesting some potential emerging international trouble spots. The chapter also suggests potential steps that might be taken by states involved in irredentist disputes or outside actors that would mitigate the explosive nature of these situations. The recommendations represent a direct extension of the theoretical and empirical findings of earlier chapters, as well as more nuanced lessons derived from the case studies. With creative and forceful international diplomacy, the destabilizing impact of transborder nationalism on international affairs can be mitigated – at least to some degree.

*Transborder Nationalism as a Major Correlate of Interstate Conflict –
Final Introductory Thoughts*

While transborder dyads only represent a minority of all possible pairings of states, a disproportionate number of international military crises – large and small – witnessed over the last two centuries have been manifestations of irredentist-type and contending government nationalism. The drive toward the unification of national groups under singular representative governments have had a profound effect on the course of international events – from the unification of Italy and Germany through the fall of the Ottoman and Habsburg empires to the de-colonization movement of the postwar period and the regionally explosive aftermath of the Cold War. The vitriol accompanying disputes in the Middle East, Kashmir, the Korean peninsula, and many other regional hotspots simply cannot be readily explained by any of the major contemporary international relations paradigms – because they are qualitatively different from most interactions within the state system.

The role of nationalism in provoking international crises has been pronounced in the latter half of the twentieth century, the period upon which this volume primarily focuses. Of the major wars that took place between 1945 and 1990, most can be at least partly attributed to the effects of demographic patterns interacting with nationalist motives. In other words, the Cold War did not “bottle up” nationalism, as is commonly assumed, in many regions of the world.

The following Table (1.4), taken from the Correlates of War database project, displays the major international wars that occurred between the end of the Second World War and the end of the Cold War and codes these conflicts according to the type of

transborder relationship existing between the major antagonists⁷. Irredentist-type demographics are indicated by the letters MINMAJ, indicating the presence of a national minority in one state and a related national majority in another. Similarly, contending government situations are indicated by the letters MAJMAJ. Although one could certainly argue that transborder demographics were not always the primary causal mechanism leading to every war below, the correlation between transborder demographics and international wars is striking.

TABLE 1.4 – Major Wars and Transborder Nationality (1946-1990)

First Kashmir	7/17/1948	1/1/1949	MINMAJ
Palestine	5/15/1948	7/18/1948	MINMAJ
Korean	6/24/1950	7/27/1953	MAJMAJ
Russo-Hungarian	10/23/1956	11/14/1956	-----
Sinai	10/29/1956	11/6/1956	MINMAJ
Assam	10/20/1962	11/22/1962	-----
Vietnamese	2/7/1965	4/30/1975	MAJMAJ
Second Kashmir	8/5/1965	9/23/1965	MINMAJ
Six Day	6/5/1967	6/10/1967	MINMAJ
Israeli-Egyptian	3/6/1969	8/7/1970	MINMAJ
Football	7/14/1969	7/18/1969	MAJMAJ
Bangladesh	12/3/1971	12/17/1971	MINMAJ
Yom Kippur	10/6/1973	10/24/1973	MINMAJ
Turko-Cypriot	7/20/1974	7/29/1974	MINMAJ
Vietnamese-Cambodian	5/1/1975	1/7/1979	MINMAJ
Ethiopian-Somalian	8/1/1977	3/14/1978	MINMAJ
Ugandan-Tanzanian	10/30/1978	4/12/1979	-----
Sino-Vietnamese	2/17/1979	3/10/1979	MINMAJ
Iran-Iraq	9/22/1980	8/20/1988	MINMAJ
Falklands	3/25/1982	6/20/1982	-----
Israel-Syria (Lebanon)	4/21/1982	9/5/1982	MINMAJ
Sino-Vietnamese	1/5/1987	2/6/1987	MINMAJ
Gulf War	8/2/1990	4/11/1991	MAJMAJ

⁷ I code the transborder relationships – the remainder of the information is from the Correlates of War project.

Considering that the “MINMAJ” and MAJMAJ” characterizations in the above chart can only be applied to approximately one third of the contiguous state pairings in the international system, one cannot ignore the fact that over three-quarters of the major wars in the five decades following the Second World War were sparked between states that may be described as such. As will be argued in this work, major wars only represent the most extreme examples of what turns out to be consistently hostile and militant interactions among states sharing national groups. Correlation does not necessarily indicate causation, however, and the following chapters seek not only to establish transborder nationality as a major influence in determining the behavior of states, but also to tease out a more complete story of how and why nationalist preferences are developed and made manifest through aggressive foreign policies around the globe.

PART I

CHAPTER 2 – Nationality, Nation, and Ethnicity

Situations involving transborder nationalism are characterized by patterns of increased hostility between states. This chapter reviews competing definitions of ‘nation’ and ‘nationalism’ in order to understand how nationalist preferences come to play a role in government decision-making.

In reviewing alternate understandings of nationalism, this chapter seeks to extrapolate the central common elements that make the concept an important causal factor in modern international relations. In particular, it seeks to provide an understanding of nationalism that is both parsimonious enough to be analytically useful, yet broad enough to provide explanatory leverage over a wide variety of situations. Ultimately, the most important understandings of nationalism are those that stress the culturally engrained and reinforced norms of reciprocal obligation that affect individual preferences and facilitate collective action based on the drive to mitigate foreign influence over the nation or part of the nation.

Nationalist politics are the politics of identity. *Webster’s New Dictionary and Thesaurus* lists one definition of identity as “who or what a person is”. Such a broad conception, however, does not do justice to the perceptive aspects of social identity – or, more important, self and other identification. As a social construct, identity is necessarily a relative term – one cannot form self-identity without gauging ones traits vis-à-vis others whom one observes. Views of identity concerning ones self and others are formed through a process of social comparison that result in perceptions of distinctiveness as well as similarity and connection.

Some group identities, such as those based on political affiliation or class, are apt to change from generation to generation – or within a given generation. What makes ethnic identity unusual is the degree of stability involved in national group membership. Born into an ethnic group, one almost certainly dies a member of the same ethnic group. Nationality, on the other hand, is a more fluid identity, due to the fact that it melds relatively fixed cultural identities with political ones.

Ultimately, this chapter establishes working definitions of nation and nationalism in a manner that incorporates a variety of scholarly opinions into a relatively parsimonious and inclusive concept. Before seeking to define contentious terms such as nation and nationalism, it is useful to begin with a brief look at the related term ‘ethnicity’ in order to establish an alternate identity with which we can compare national identity.

Ethnicity – An Inclusive Label

Scholars tend to be more united in their conceptions of ethnicity than their conceptions of nationality. What ties most modern descriptions of ethnicity together is the inclusiveness of the term. Ethnicity might be perceived as a kinship relationship among members of an ethnic group, but ethnic groups need not be based on blood ties or even the perception of blood ties. For instance, Hungarians base the concept of Hungarian ethnicity, above all else, on lingual continuity. The major differences separating Serbs, Croats, and Moslem “ethnic groups” is religious identity – including, of course, the differential elements of culture that religion introduces into a group. Connor (1994: 105) notes the danger of describing “linguistic, racial, or religious” in such a way

that “there is a risk of concluding that each term is describing a separate phenomenon.” Similarly, Smith (1991: 8) notes: “the similarities between religion and ethnic identity need to be stressed” because they both “stem from similar cultural criteria of classification.” Closely related to this idea is the concept of kinship and the view that an integral part of the ethno-national psyche is the perception that national groups represent “indefinitely stretchable nets of kinship” (Anderson 1983: 6).

While agreeing with the kinship perception, Horowitz (1985:69) downplays the role of culture, claiming that it is not an “ineluctable prerequisite for identity to come into being”. This view is due to the fact that he views ethnicity as a fundamentally ascriptive label bestowed more-or-less at birth based upon factors that may have little to do with culture (such as physiognomy). Horowitz’s ascriptive critique is important because it warns against relying too much on culture as the sole defining feature of ethnicity. Someone traveling to another land might adopt another culture, for instance, but yet still be branded a member of the ethnic group from which he or she originated.

The degree of subjectivity involved in ethnic identity⁸ is a disputed topic among academics. Along the objective-subjective continuum, identities of this nature range from primordial group identity to ration-choice individualism. Few, if any, scholars adhere to the primordialist doctrine in its purest sense, which views ethnic national ties as fundamentally innate. Even Clifford Geertz, the anthropologist most associated with the doctrine, describes national ties as primordial *sentiments* rather than intrinsic biological attachment (Connor 1994: 103). The large majority, if not all, scholars subscribe to the

⁸ The objective-subjective continuum applies to national as well as ethnic identity for many scholars. Unfortunately, many scholars do not draw a strong line between these two concepts.

original tenet of Max Weber that an ethnic group is, at least, a “subjective belief” in “common descent . . . whether or not an objective blood relationship exists” (1968: 389).

Rational-choice approaches stress the ways in which ethnicity and nation are utilized as organizing concepts that bestow individual benefits while overcoming collective action dilemmas. Rational-choice approaches often involve some form of formal modeling and arguments such as “nationalism will ebb and flow with permanent changes in long-term real interest rates. . . because the ability of governments to raise the needed revenues to finance [projects in national communities] will be. . . affected” (Breton and Breton 1995: 113) and “maintaining a continuous supply of [joint goods] requires the establishment of social *controls* – monitoring and sanctioning institutions – that discourage free riding” (Hechter 2000: 22)⁹. For the rational choice theorist, ethnicity and nationality (which is actually their primary focus¹⁰) are not so much identities than organizing mechanisms. Therefore, rational choice analysis lends itself readily to arguments suggesting instrumental uses of nationalist rhetoric by agents who engage in “the manipulation of collective identity . . . to achieve power or to enforce social discipline” (Tilly 1997: 507). Thus, the prime motivation for the objective paradigm lies primarily in material self-interest, while the subjective paradigm considers identity a source of motivation unto itself. In both cases, however, the term ethnicity encompasses a wide variety of groups that may be motivated by different factors of identity.

⁹ While the Hechter example is fundamentally individualist and rational, his work as a whole contains a great deal of leeway for group identity and loyalties.

¹⁰ While the subjective-objective debate involving nationality can be applied to nationality to some degree, the widespread recognition of the political nature of nationalism necessarily skews most arguments toward the subjective-instrumental paradigms. The fact that nationality is a more subjective concept than ethnicity is actually crucial to understanding the nature of nationalism – as will be described in greater depth below.

Constructivists emphasize subjectivity and the endogenous nature of identity formation in the context of “intersubjective understandings” that create insider-outsider divisions. However, the range of potential constructivist arguments is vast due to differences in opinions concerning the sources from which inter-subjective understandings arise. Ethnic consciousness may arise from instrumentalist elite manipulation, as emphasized by Anderson (1983), or through a series of historical social interactions which are perhaps best understood through anthropological study (Tilly 1997: 512). Due to the generality of constructivism, it often tends also to be cited as the approach utilized, if not necessarily by name, by those who shy away from philosophical and semantic debate in order to concentrate attention more on the behavior of ethnic groups.¹¹

Distinctions between Nationality and Ethnicity

In order to untangle the differences between ethnicity and nationality, it is important to first come to an understanding of what a nation is. However, in order to define a nation, we must first define its distinguishing feature – namely, the pursuance of national self-determination, or, simply put, nationalism. While the connection between nationality and ethnicity is questionable to some, most scholars would concur with the assertion of Breuilly (1982: 35-36) that nationalism, at least, “clearly builds upon some sense of cultural identity” and that it represents a “political ideology.”

¹¹ Good examples include Gurr (2000: 4): “The ‘constructivist view, which underlies the Minorities at Risk project, is that national identities are enduring constructions . . . The criteria by which people are judged to be group members also can change by usually around the margins” or Saideman (2001: 23): “There is a long-running debate about whether national identity is a given in society (primordial) or created by politicians as they see fit. I follow the moderate position: multiple national identities frequently co-exist, and the political context determines the salience of particular identities.”

Yet it is clear that ethnicity and nationality need not coincide. Kohn (1944) is particularly credited with emphasizing the difference between “Western” nationalism, historically the dominant paradigm in Great Britain, France, the United States, and Canada, and “Eastern” nationalism, which most heavily influences thought in Eastern Europe and, implicitly, the rest of the world. Despite the seemingly dated terminology and simplified schema, Smith (2001: 40) argues against dismissing Kohn on the grounds that the basic “kernel of truth”, that nations might either be conceived of as “voluntarist” or “organic,” continues today in the concepts of “civic” and “ethnic” nationalism that are employed today. Similar to the thoughts presented in the introduction of this work, Smith states that:

Whereas the Western concept laid down that an individual had to belong to some nation but choose to which he or she belonged, the non-Western or national concept allowed no such latitude. Whether you stayed in your community or emigrated to another, you remained ineluctably, organically, a member of the community of your birth and were forever stamped by it (p. 11).

Connor (1992: 42) provides one criteria for differentiating ethnicity from nationality by stressing the aforementioned difference between ascription and self-awareness:

We can describe the nation as a self-differentiating ethnic group. A prerequisite of nationhood is a popularly held awareness or belief that one’s own group is unique in the most vital sense. In the absence of such a popularly held conviction, there is only an ethnic group.

Connor’s statements suggest an important point. While national groups naturally differ from one another, it is the process of differentiation itself that makes nationality so salient. Establishing the boundaries of ethnicity lies largely in the realm of anthropology, while establishing the boundaries of nations lies largely in the realm of politics.

A nation can be said to differ from an ethnic group in three fundamental ways. First, because the concept of nation is political in nature, a nation is much more voluntarist in nature than an ethnic group. Thus, whereas membership in an ethnic group tends to be ascribed, membership in a nation is much more a question of self-identification. Second, members of a nation desire high levels of self-determination for the group, whereas members of an ethnic group may seek little or none. Without nationalism there can be no nation. Third, members of a nation must share certain cultural referents and group cultural norms, whereas this is not necessarily true for an ethnic group (although it usually is). Ethnicity may be ascribed by others according to criteria other than culture, such as physiognomy or language, to a group whose members may not view themselves with a singular group identity. No one, however, ascribes national status to groups – groups become nations through the development of collective preferences to pursue higher levels of group self-determination.

Perennialism and Modernism: How Nations Arise

What is the relevance of the history of nation formation to contemporary politics? The answer lies in understanding mechanisms of national mobilization that can still be witnessed today, and how they come about. Modernists describe nationalism as outside-in, while perennialists describe an inside-out mechanism. For modernists, national consciousness is aroused by environmental factors such as political elites and processes, economic modernization, and improved communication networks. Perennialists, being somewhat close to a primordial view, see nations as shared and felt communities that have fought against foreign domination throughout history.

Although disagreements surrounding the nature of ethnic identity take place around the margins, disagreements about the distinguishing features of nationalism and nations are much more fundamental. Philosophical debates concerning the nature of contemporary nationalism often draw upon centuries-old historical developments to explain the persistence of the phenomenon. Scholars that focus less on the connection between state formation and nationalism, and more on affective linkages allowing for the conscious mobilization of national groups against foreign rule or on identification of such groups with a national homeland, often find themselves arguing for the existence of nations centuries earlier than the advent of 19th century nationalism. However, even one of the most well known accounts of “nations before nationalism” (Armstrong 1982: 4) argues that the nations of old might better be thought of as extensions of “national consciousness” rather than a phenomenon intrinsically related to the state.¹² Although the word nation has existed in some form since Roman times, most would agree with Hobsbawm (1990: 17) that “whatever the ‘proper and original’ or any other meaning of ‘nation’, the term is clearly still quite different from its modern meaning.” However, as argued below, modern meanings of nationalism can be more easily reconciled with earlier historical notions if the modern coupling of nation with nation-states is somewhat loosened.

Modernism holds that nationalism is a distinctly modern phenomenon that has come about since the late 19th century. Smith (2001: 47-48) divides modernists in five

¹² Some scholars, particularly those who argue for the presence of nations long before the spread of nationalism as a major ideology, argue that terms such as governance unit (Hechter 2000: 7) are more appropriate than state when discussing the goals of national self-determination. Even pre-eminent modernist Ernest Gellner suggests a broader definition of nationalism as: “a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that national boundaries should not cut across political boundaries” (1983: 1-2). Since this study is largely concerned with this century, however, there is little utility in belaboring this argument, and the working definition of nationalism will remain attached to the drive for coterminous national and state boundaries.

different categories: socioeconomic, focusing upon “relative deprivation between regions or classes across states”; sociocultural, focusing upon “sociologically necessary phenomenon of the modern, industrial era”, political, which focuses on the role of the modern state; ideological, which focuses on Enlightenment and Romantic thought; and constructionist, which includes a range of “socially constructed events” associated with modernity. In most each of these categories, however, it must be emphasized that, whether nationalism derives from political, economic, or social influences, the modernist paradigm is predicated on the existence of an expanding, more omnipresent, modern state.

Perennialists, on the other hand, view the organization of political life into nations as a universal and largely temporally unbounded phenomenon. Some perennialists argue that medieval Spain, England, and France were the first nations to emerge as such, while others would see the drive toward nationhood as an impulse present since ancient times. Perennialism is not so much an analytical doctrine as it is one based on empirical historic research that focuses on establishing the presence of national identity in pre-modern times, and its continual manifestation up until the present.

Both perennialism and modernism are useful concepts in understanding how modern-day nationalism is manifested within domestic societies. Perennialism emphasizes nationalism as a sentiment that exists within like-cultural groups across the globe and across history. The problem with perennialist arguments lies with the fact that such nationalism has only rarely manifested itself in history before modern times, and only in cases in which national groups pre-existed before being conquered by outside powers. Modernism emphasizes the importance of environmental or political conditions

that transform latent national affinities into political action. Without organization, information, and specific issues around which to rally, national affinities have little chance of transforming into the mobilizing force that modern nationalism represents.

The Defining Features of Nationalism and Nations

Defining nationalism has traditionally been a tricky business because the focus placed on obtaining a nation-state has obscured other manifestations of nationalism that lie short of the maximalist desire to alter state borders or occur within rather unified nation-states. *Nationalism, in the broadest sense, is the drive to reduce the degree of foreign influence and control over the members and perceived territory of a nation.* Obtaining control over the institutions of a state is certainly a goal of many nationalists – but once a state is “captured”, are we to say that members of a nation can no longer be nationalist? Absolutely not. The erection of trade barriers and the nationalization of industries, for instance, are acts taken to mitigate foreign influence over the nation, and thus, represent measures that are nationalist in nature. Nationalism can range from the harmless efforts of the French to prevent the incorporation of foreign syntax into the French language to the genocide against Jews and Gypsies (and others) committed by the Nazis. The common thread tying together nationalism throughout the ages is not simply the drive for statehood, but rather the mitigation of that which is alien.

Governments formed as the result of nationalist processes can be either democratic or non-democratic – a source of confusion for many attempting to define the precise nature of the ideology represented by nationalism. Like freedom of speech or many other liberal values, nationalism is best thought of as the promotion of a negative

right. Just as understanding the content of free speech is not a necessary condition of understanding the right itself, neither is understanding the nature of government acceptable to nationalists necessary to understand nationalism. Nationalism entails the rejection of what is foreign, just as freedom of speech rejects that which is censorious. However, like free speech, nationalism entails a continual process of debate – particularly in regard to the form and nature of the nation and what is foreign to it.

Charles Tilly is well-known for his quotation describing the nation as: “one of the most puzzling and tendentious terms in the political lexicon” (1975: 6). Despite rough agreement on the key aspects of concepts of nationality, nation, and nationalism, there remains great latitude for disagreement among scholars. If, as I have suggested, nationalism entails defense of the nation against that which is foreign, how might the nation be defined?

A nation is a *self-defined multi-generational cultural group seeking to acquire or preserve a high degree of self-determination vis-à-vis powers and influences not considered part of the nation*. Self-definition is important because it is an essentially ingredient for collective action. A nation is multi-generational because the development of the symbolic referents that underpin cultures, and facilitate collective action (as described below), take multiple generations to form and become second-nature to social interactions among a community. The drive toward self-determination has been discussed, although the degree to which this needs to take place for a cultural community to become a nation is not necessarily easy to pin down. Fortunately, the “threshold” degree of nationalism necessary for deeming groups “nations” is not particularly important in comparison to the observable political actions that a group undertakes due to

preferences for self-determination. In other words, it is not so important that one concur with the exact definition above as it is to understand that nations exist as collective self-defined political entities that sometimes act collectively to promote greater group autonomy from the influence and control of other peoples or states.

While it can be said that nationalism is the drive to mitigate that which is foreign, what is foreign can be in the eye-of-the-beholder. Mann (1995: 59) points to the Spanish Civil War, where “Nationalists” claimed to be fighting for the nation, while Republicans claimed to be fighting for “the people” – and each essentially propagated the idea that they were the standard-bearers of the Spanish nation. Although under conditions of civil violence it is generally accepted that “anyone could repent and join the nation”, authoritarian governments and movements at the time of Spanish civil war and up to the present often adopt views whereby “opposed class and political movements, religious deviants and troublesome regionalists” are seen as “‘foreign’, outside the nation.” Thus, the idea of what is foreign to the nation can be stretched from ethnic groups such as Jews to political groups that are seen as standard-bearers of foreign ideas. There are many historical examples in which “definitions of the nation were fundamentally political rather than national” (p. 62).

Mann’s emphasis on melding nationality with ideology is crucial to understanding why nationalism should not be thought exclusively as a desire to eliminate the rule of one national group over another – it represents a generalized desire to eliminate not only direct foreign control, but also cleanse the nation of “alien” governance. When differing ideologies of national governance and accompanying state structures representing those ideologies are installed by outside powers and can be

portrayed as legacies-of-colonialism¹³ (which is most of the time), interstate battles for the hearts and minds of the nation can be particularly intense.

Making sense of Nationalism as a Political Phenomenon

Although the content of nationalist motivation can vary dependent on the foreign elements toward which they are directed, the role of the nation in promoting *a desire for* collective behavior is indisputable. Nationalism promotes collective action in a manner unparalleled by most “belief systems” due to the intensity of *norms of reciprocal obligation*.¹⁴ These norms are so intense because they are instilled from birth as part of the culturally communal setting which characterizes a nation. This sense of obligation entails defending one’s co-nationals against that which is foreign, and the expectation that one will be protected in turn. The obligation to defend the nation means defending fellow nations against physical, political, or cultural repression – against government by foreigners and foreign forms of government. It means an obligation to protect not only life and liberty, so to speak, but also property – property conceived of as the national property – a given set of territory considered historically connected to the people. In essence, the scope of this shared obligation also defines the scope of the nation. Despite instilling a preference for collective action on behalf of co-nationals, nationalism itself does not create collective action. Collective action also requires leadership, organization, coordination as well as the material means for executing desired policies.

¹³ Similarly, most transborder nationalist situations involve the rejection of the principle of *uti possidetis* – namely, that post-colonial territories should inherit the colonial administrative borders that they possessed at the time independence (Ratner 1996, 590).

¹⁴ Miller (1995: 77-80) makes the argument that the reciprocal obligation among co-nations to preserve one another’s basic rights is an important ethical foundation of nationalism. Here, I argue that it is precisely the norm of reciprocal obligation that pervades national communities that can be seen as fundamental preferences underlying collective action.

States can be used as the tools for overcoming potential collective action difficulties, and thus become valuable tools for promoting and pursuing nationalist goals. At the same times, well organized groups within the state, such as the armed forces, can pressure state leaders to mobilize the population as a whole in the pursuance of nationalist objectives abroad. Thus, while nationalist preferences within a populace can be tapped by state leaders to pursue aggression abroad, it is equally likely that well organized groups in society holding nationalist preferences and an ability to influence executive decision-making can pressure executives into more risk-acceptance foreign policies than would otherwise exist.

Finally, collective action on behalf of nationalist goals is facilitated by the existence of specific referents that provide goals toward which nationalist efforts may be directed. As has been noted, nationalism can take many different forms and exist to different degrees, depending upon the nature of the alien “threat” that nationalist seek to redress. Latent nationalist sentiments are most easily transformed into an active political mechanism when a specific source of foreign influence can be identified and countered through collective effort. As will be explained in greater depth in the next chapter, the existence of co-nationals under alien rule adds an element of specificity to nationalist sentiment – representing a concrete cause around which nationalists may rally. On the other hand, the next section describes how, absent a common and specific interest in addressing particular nationalist situations, the international community has only arrived at a vague consensus concerning how nationalism should be addressed within the international system.

Nationalism, Self-determination, and International Norms

Nationalism represents behavior by actors within a nation seeking higher levels of self-determination for the nation. Interestingly, scholars who frame their arguments in terms of self-determination rather than nationalism focus more on the negative right implied in the term (freedom from foreign control and influence) rather than attempting to define things in the affirmative manner of nationalist scholars (attempts to obtain a state, unified economy, etc.). Writing on self-determination, Buchheit (1978:2) asserts that “the moral appeal of the principle seems to arise from a recognition of the harsh treatment and exploitation that have historically been the fate of groups ruled by ‘alien’ people” and that those seeking self-determination do so in the belief that “‘alien’ government will always be harsher, less receptive . . . and supportive of alien values.”

Nationalism is often viewed as a local phenomenon – a phenomenon that threatens the international system by challenging traditional state-centered constituent norms of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Self-determination, on the other hand, is viewed as a constituent norm advocated by the international community, even though it largely suggests the same basic goals as local nationalism – namely, that cultural similar peoples be accorded freedom to pursue their own political destiny. Thus, as commonly employed, the main difference between self-determination and nationalism lies not in the content of the concepts, but rather whence the principle is argued. In this sense, nationalism represents an affective preference of members of various nations, whereas self-determination suggests an international normative prescription for appropriate governance that is validated by the international community.

Self-determination as an international norm gained prominence from the “bottom-up” as a legitimization of localized nationalism by liberal and Marxist scholars and leaders during the period surrounding the First World War. The bottom-up derivation of nationalism as an international norm is important to grasp because, as the following discussion will argue, self-determination remains only an incompletely realized international norm and offers only vague prescriptions of appropriate international behavior. The concepts of sovereignty¹⁵ and territorial integrity, on the other hand, are largely “top-down” norms conceived by international society in order to maintain order in the international system. As such, these norms have filtered into society only to the degree that publics tend to demand respect for the borders of their own states, while not necessarily acknowledging the universality of the abstract concept of sovereignty when more tangible issues are involved. *While self-determination, a norm emanating from below, remains only partially realized as a norm at the international level, respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, somewhat abstract norms emanating from above, are only partially realized within domestic political cultures as relevant prescriptions for state behavior.*

Although the contemporary international community provides certain sanction to the idea of self-determination, a long-running tension between norms of self-determination and state sovereignty has existed through much of the past century. This tension has been most apparent during the periods after the World Wars, including the era of decolonization, when the greatest changes to the state system were evident and state

¹⁵ Sovereignty, as utilized in this work, refers to the internationally recognized norm that allows a state government to exercise control over a given territory in a matter that is free from outside interference. Sovereignty, in this sense, is broken down into two major elements – one stressing the importance of territorial integrity, the other the importance of non-interference. Norms of self-determination are suggested in this work to pose a threat to both elements of sovereignty.

leaders engaged in spirited debate over accepted behavioral norms between states and the degree to which the international community may interfere with affairs within states.

Ironically, the first noteworthy calls of the 20th century for the elevation of the norm of national self-determination to the international level were made by internationalist leftist groups. Lenin, not surprisingly, viewed the right of national self-determination as an intermediate step to the achievement of international socialism. As an extension of his anti-imperialist views, Lenin saw the right to secede, specifically, as the method through which nations could achieve the equitable status upon which international socialism could be built (Cassese 1995:17). Although Lenin clearly subordinated the drive for national self-determination to the needs of the global socialist movement, his widespread appeals on the national question greatly affected the arguments put forth by the USSR and other Marxist-Leninist states throughout the century and, therefore, played a major role in the international process of developing international norms of self-determination.

At the same time that Lenin was openly propounding his views on the matter of national self-determination, Woodrow Wilson was developing his own philosophy on the subject. For Wilson, national self-determination was an extension of democracy, which primarily entailed the right of peoples to freely choose their own government (Cassese 1995: 19). The difference between Wilsonian and Leninist views closely mirrors the same historical split that has been noted throughout this work – namely, that between national/Romantic and civic/liberal conceptions of nationalism. The divide between national and civic conceptions of nationalism is often similarly referred to as “external self-determination” versus “internal self-determination”. External self-determination

focuses on the freedom of nations from the governance of foreigners, while internal self-determination refers to the freedom of nations from foreign governance – i.e. the right to freely choose a government most representative of the people.

After the Second World War, the concept of self-determination was increasingly included in international treaties. With the establishment of the UN, the lack of specificity reflected in the emerging norm of self-determination was evident in Article 1(2) of the UN charter itself, which simply stated the UN goal of developing “friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.” Even this statement of principle was watered down considerably by other provisions – particularly Article 73, which provided for colonial rule of “non self-governing territories” in the “interests of the inhabitants.” Clearly, inclusion of the principle of self-determination in the UN Charter meant little in concrete terms, and served mainly to perpetuate the norm of self-determination as a vague, easily-manipulated rhetorical device. With the acceleration of the de-colonization process of the late fifties and sixties, however, the idea of self-determination was never far from the center of international debate.

In international legal terms, much of the discussion concerning self-determination took place following the announcement of the UN Covenant on Human Rights of 1948 and during the drafting processes, until 1966, of the associated UN Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the UN Covenant of Civil and Political Rights.¹⁶ Following in a tradition established by its early leaders, the USSR was the first major advocate of including national self-determination in these treaties. Although the

¹⁶ The covenants were intended as formalized treaties based upon the principles of the UN Covenant on Human Rights.

Commission on Human Rights, where much of this debate took place, rejected early Soviet-sponsored resolutions suggesting the inclusion of self-determination in further treaties, the scope of the norm of self-determination came under increased scrutiny throughout the early fifties.

In a telling pattern concerning the flexibility of the term self-determination, various states in the debate defined their position on the scope of the norm through the lens of their own specific interests. Debates on the council were split roughly between the states that argued for a narrow definition of self-determination that would only apply to colonial territories, and those who supported a broader definition that would include any large national group governed by another. A handful of colonial states, including Great Britain, France, and Belgium opposed any provision. Still other states, such as Chile, argued the norm should extend far enough to include the idea of economic self-determination, including rights to expropriation and nationalization of state resources (Cassese 1995: 51). States with national minorities but no colonial holdings, such as the Soviet Union, supported a narrow definition focusing on the imperial question. Other states, such as Afghanistan, which was engaged at the time in an irredentist dispute with Pakistan over Pashtun territories, supported broader interpretation of the norm.

Supporters of the incorporation of the broader, yet vaguer, definitions of self-determination eventually won out, at least on paper. Many Western states, in the end, supported the broader definitions of self-determination in order to dilute what otherwise would have been a more pointed attack on colonialism as well as to head off any serious consideration of provisions that would extend the norm so far as to include the economic principles of self-determination advocated by some states. What emerged from the

decade-and-a-half process of debate are two Covenants that express the right of self-determination, although with several caveats – particularly in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – which most directly addresses the issue. The centrality of the self-determination issue in the establishment of an internationally agreed upon normative structure is evident in the fact that it appears up front, in Article 1 of both treaties, which reads:

1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

It is readily apparent how the process of compromise led to caveats such as the extension of the right of self-determination with the explicit understanding that it would be exercised “without prejudice” to international economic obligations. Article 4 of the Covenant of Civil and Political Rights allows states to derogate from any deference to self-determination (as well as the rest of the terms of the Covenant) in times of national emergency which “threaten the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed.”

Other international agreements ratified since 1960 mention the concept of self-determination¹⁷, but none have been as influential as the Covenants in establishing the concept of self-determination as a *right*. At the same time, none has been particularly illuminating in defining precisely how far self-determination can be extended. No treaty

¹⁷ Major examples include the 1960 UN Declaration on the Independence of Colonial Peoples and the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations.

directly denies the extension of self-determination to national minorities – thus leaving the door open for national groups to claim self-determination within established states.

The Implications of Failing to Reach a Common Normative Consensus

State sovereignty and the associated ideals of non-interference and territorial integrity remain the dominant norms of the international system – of this there is little doubt. However, the lack of common agreement on the precise meaning of self-determination has important implications for both the international community as well as within domestic politics. While the international community has generally refused to grant recognition to national movements seeking their own states, one cannot assume that calls for self-determination by governments have no affect on transborder situations. Although territorial conquest or interference in the affairs of the territory of one state by another is likely provoke an international backlash when that territory is occupied by a foreign population, greater international tolerance exists when a co-national population is present within that territory.

A good example involves differing international sentiments toward the Israeli occupied territories in the Golan Heights versus those in the West Bank and Gaza strip. While the international community is relatively indifferent to the annexation of the sparsely populated Golan Heights, Israeli occupation of territories with large populations of Palestinians draws frequent international protest. In other words, international opinion is more concerned with the occupation of foreign peoples than foreign territory. In the same vein, one would expect the occupation of territories predominately populated by co-nationals to draw less international ire than other types of conquest. As will be described

in the case study examining India-Pakistan-China, for example, international reaction to Pakistani aggression against India has been surprisingly muted on many occasions due to international sympathy for Pakistani calls for self-determination of Kashmiris.

There exists a hierarchy of international acceptability concerning the permissibility of aggression by one state against another. Conquest and occupation of territory inhabited by a population which considers itself a different nation is universally condemned except under the most extreme of circumstances. Conquest of territories inhabited by willing co-nationals is also generally viewed as a violation of international norms, but is less likely to provoke a major international backlash.

The ceding of territory and populations willingly from one state to another is the most internationally acceptable path to irredentist or transborder nationalism goals. This fact lends itself to strategies of subversion pursued by revisionist states against neighbors that are home to co-national populations. The most common and regular method of pursuing irredentist-type and contending government nationalist goals entails the incitement of secessionist or revolutionary movements within a state targeted for aggression rather than overt military force. For instance, Pakistan has frequently infiltrated militants into Kashmir in the hope of aiding secessionist forces. This strategy, referred to as *secessionist-merger*, is designed to promote the independence of a coveted territory, whose inhabitants will presumably choose at a later date to voluntarily merge with a homeland. The contending government version, which I label *overthrow-merger*, was the longstanding strategy of the North Vietnamese government, which sought to install a communist government in the South which would eventually choose unification

with the North (which, in fact happened, although with more overt intervention than Hanoi's leadership would have originally preferred).

Just as secessionist movements continue to pursue their goals despite a poor global track record of success, the relative paucity of concrete examples of territorial transfers does not mean that such strategies are not pursued or feared. When nationalist objectives are pursued by states in spite of prevailing international opinion concerning the sanctity of territorial boundaries, it is often possible to find at least a handful of supportive, and perhaps influential, allies. The possibility of obtaining a modicum of support for international aggression, which is generally considered taboo, often presents as acceptable a gamble on the diplomatic front for some states as the possibility of defeating the enemy does on the military front.

As has been emphasized in this chapter, self-determination and the related idea of nationalism encompassed a wide range of phenomena within national societies. United only by a rejection of foreign influence, self-determination and nationalism often lack concrete referents within domestic politics, rendering the concept an important latent source of political mobilization, although one that requires a specific "threat" to be made fully manifest. As will be discussed in the next chapter, the concept of self-determination will be perceived much more clearly by domestic groups as a prescription for political action when co-nationals are ruled by an alien government.

Conclusion

The preceding discussion differentiated nationality from ethnicity in order to emphasize the political role played by nationalism. Nevertheless, as a self-defined political attribute and attitude, nationality is very difficult to empirically characterize

beyond the local and individual level. Ethnicity, on the other hand, is more amenable to description by outsiders, as it is primarily an “ascribed” label bestowed from without. The empirical section in Chapter 5 of this work utilizes ethnicity to proxy nationality, with the understanding that while not entirely congruent, the politicized manifestations of ethnicity generally result in a group that views itself as a national entity – especially in the non-Western world. Although the later empirical analysis uses politicized ethnicities as “units of analyses”, the political mechanisms underlying group interactions, in lieu of a better term, can best be described as nationalist.

A major purpose of this chapter has been to establish why actualizing nationalist goals becomes a common preference among a national group. Nationalism represents the drive of culturally similar and politically active groups to mitigate the influence of foreign influence upon them. These interchangeable concepts remain a powerful rallying point for national movements, many of which continue to wage war in the name of national grievances or freedom. The drive to self-determination, which begins under varied historical circumstances when national awareness comes about for different groups, is perpetuated culturally from generation to generation through norms of reciprocal obligation, which allow collective action to take place.

The chapter also discussed how nationalism is viewed by the international community through the lens of “self-determination”. Although recognized variously as a right and a principle, the norm of self-determination remains vague, allowing for different interpretations both internationally and domestically. Due to the rhetorical power and lack of specificity of norms of self-determination, states invoking self-determination

within the context of interstate disputes often achieve a measure of international and domestic support for aggressive policies that infringe upon the boundaries of other states.

The juxtaposition of nationalist preferences arising within society and the generally, but not absolutely, constraining influence of international norms stressing sovereignty and territorial integrity sets the stage for the next chapter, which posits a model linking demographics to normative causality. The model argues that transborder nationality leads to the growth of domestic nationalism, which places political pressure on foreign policy decision-makers, who must weigh the preferences of domestic constituents against the prescriptions of international normative considerations. Similarly, in some situations, particularly those characterized by contending government demographics, international constraints on aggressive behavior may be perceived as weaker, once again leading to greater instability among states with co-national populations.

CHAPTER 3 – Sovereignty and Self-Determination: Conflicting Norms as the Basis for International Conflict

This chapter explains why norms of self-determination associated with nationalist preferences are likely to break down respect for norms of sovereignty by potentially revisionist states within transborder dyads. It argues that conflictual bilateral relations will develop between states sharing a common national group due to the fact that norms of sovereignty are perceived as selectively and circumstantially vulnerable to transgression by nationalistically-oriented states. As Carment and James (1998: 79) suggest, issues involving self-determination may lead to “the breakdown of certain clearly defined norms in the international system.” Unlike Chapter 4, which examines specific domestic conditions that help explain variation in foreign policy aggression by homeland states in irredentist situations, this chapter addresses the underlying conditions that foster bilateral instability and mistrust within transborder dyads.

The presence of conflicting norms in transborder states at the international and societal levels increases the chances for interstate conflict. In non-transborder situations international norms of sovereignty do not conflict with societal/local norms of self-determination, and, therefore, systematically tends to dampen aggressive behavior among states striving to behave legitimately in the eyes of the international community. But in transborder situations, the local norm of self-determination places public pressure on an executive¹⁸ to make decisions that are at odds with international norms of sovereignty.

¹⁸ This work adopts the common political science assumption that leaders are primarily motivated by a desire to retain office – thereby requiring leadership to respect both the demands of state constituents as well as avoid censure by the international community, which is likely to yield negative consequences to the domestic political position of the executive due to his or her association with the diminished international status of the state (or as a consequence of punitive measures such as sanctions that the international community might consciously adopt with the aim of undermining the position of state leadership).

The dissidence between these norms leaves leaders the option of pursuing either aggressive or passive policies, which translates into unpredictable foreign behavior that contrasts sharply with the generally peaceful state of affairs existing between most states.

The most specific attempt to reconcile the relationship between conflicting norms and bilateral international conflict is undertaken by Kacowicz (1994), who finds that a lack of congruence on basic normative understandings between states hinders the prospect of peaceful territorial exchanges. Much of this chapter relates to the findings of Kacowicz as applied to states that share common national groups. However, as admitted by the author himself, operationalizing a variable indicating normative incompatibility through “content analysis” techniques is an imprecise process heavily dependent on researcher judgment (p. 228). Furthermore, the author includes a variety of conflicting norm types, including some overly broad categorizations such as “reciprocity versus peaceful settlement”. Although Kacowicz draws attention to the key role played by normative incompatibility in fostering difficulties in bilateral state relations, the following pages address this question in greater depth.

To begin, it is important to understand how the term “norm” is employed in this work. Goertz and Diehl (1992: 638) suggest that the term may be used variously to describe behavioral regularity or the *normative* role played by “issues of justice and rights”. The term norm, as used here, refers primarily to the second deontological meaning. At the same time, however, norms are powerful enough, even in the more subjective senses of the word, to bring about systematic behavior, or at least the expectation thereof. For instance, due to the rhetorical power of national unity, leaders of

contending government states can be expected to systematically and aggressively seek to undermine one another in a bid for increased influence over the nation.

Goertz and Diehl also assert that international norms must be considered entirely separate from questions of state interest or that “self-interest is the null hypothesis of the study of norms” (1992: 644). In other words, the presence of a link between norms and behavior can only be established in the absence of self-interest. Unfortunately, self-interest is far from an objective term, and such a neat divide is hard to draw under many circumstances. More appropriately, ascription to and invocation of norms can be said to vary according to the circumstance of a particular state. Norms do not only influence state preference – selective invocation of norms may also correlate with pre-existing state interests. Norms serve not simply to discourage aggressive behavior that a state might otherwise prefer, but, rather, also encourage such behavior under circumstances within which they may be rhetorically employed as justifications for aggression.¹⁹

The measurement of norms is frustratingly elusive because norms are intangible, requiring them to be theoretically anchored to other, more objective, factors in order to be assessed. In this work, the impact of norms of territorial integrity on international

¹⁹ To expand on the tension between normative and interest-based causality further, it may be most appropriate to say that causality is unclear when a tension exists between these two influences *within a particular case*. In other words, when norms suggest a certain course of state action and “traditional” conceptions of state interest (land, wealth, strategic interest, etc.) suggest a similar course of action, it is impossible to establish conclusively that either factor played a definitive role in influencing decision-making – although further “thick” research might reasonably point the body of evidence in one direction or another (or, most likely, that both factors serve to reinforce one another).


Over a larger number of cases, however, one can establish a role for norms if a *systematic* association between norms and behavior occurs in the absence of any systematically similar association between the presence of state interests (defined narrowly) and state behavior. Similarly, even in the presence of a systematic role for interest-based behavior, one can statistically control for the role of interests over a larger number of cases in order to determine whether normative causality operates independently. Later in this work, the role of economic and strategic interests in promoting state aggression is assessed alongside other factors precisely in order to ensure that the key theoretical constructs are not simply masking concrete, “instrumental”, state interests. The results indicate that strategic and economic interests promote foreign policy aggression – but no more so in irredentist cases than in non-transborder dyads.

relations are argued to arise from demographic realities that foster differing perceptions of international morality among different nations and state populaces. Thus, while the fact of transborder nationality itself does not directly translate into conflict, the demographic circumstance of nations being divided by state borders fosters the normative understandings that do. In short, *where a state stands normatively is directly influenced by where it sits demographically.*

The chain of causality underlying the basic demographic-normative model describing bilateral relations within transborder dyads (in the absence of diaspora rebellion – which will be noted later) can be conceived as indicated below:

FIGURE 3.1

Causal chain Linking Transborder Demographics to Bilateral Instability



Since one cannot readily measure the direct connection between norms and conflict except in the contextual sense that is undertaken in the chapters addressing specific cases, the first task is to establish the intermediary links between:

1) demographics and conflicting norms; 2) conflicting norms and distrust; and 3) distrust and heightened levels of conflict. In doing so, the theory makes a case for the viability of an empirical approach that treats demographic variables as proxies for underlying

normative considerations that breed varying levels of conflict. The following subsections discuss the linkages shown above:

1). From Demographics to Foreign Policy Indeterminacy

In their efforts to clarify the causal mechanisms linking the presence of international and societal norms to state behavior, constructivist minded scholars have, in recent years, sought to characterize the relative strength of norms based on at least two factors: *specificity* and *commonality* (Legro 1997).²⁰ Specificity refers to the degree of clarity with which a norm can be said to prescribe (or proscribe) state behavior. *Commonality* indicates how widespread a norm is held, whether among state leaders or domestic societies. Generally speaking, norms of low specificity or commonality are considered useless as theoretical constructs, as they allow for a wide range of behavioral options to be considered without transgressing the norm itself. As a continuous and intangible element, however, it is obviously somewhat an *ad hoc* process when it comes to defining what precisely is meant by high, medium, or low levels of normative commonality and specificity. Still, when considering the *relative* strength of norms vis-à-vis one another, the terms specificity and commonality can be quite useful.

Boekle et al. (1999) present a model through which the impact of norms as causal variables affecting foreign policy decisions may be assessed. According to the model, leaders stand at the nexus of international and societal normative expectations. For the authors, international norms are defined as those “expectations of appropriate behavior which are shared within international society or within a particularly subsystem of

²⁰ Durability, a measure of the persistence of a norm within international law/society, is also a common indicator utilized to assess normative strength. Since the two primary norms discussed here, self-determination and territorial integrity have both been invoked throughout much of the twentieth century, it is safe to assume that each can be considered durable.

international society by states, its constituent entities” (p. 13). Societal norms, or at least those with a high degree of commonality, are likened to the concepts of “political culture” and “national identity” and defined as “expectations of behavior, which can be said to be shared not only by individual societal groups but by ‘society’ as a whole” (p. 17). Societal, or local, norms are, however, consummately nation-centered in their orientation, rather than the more universalistic norms created and propounded on the international level through international organizations and repeated state interactions.

The predictive capability of constructivist theory is high when international norms and societal norms are congruent and both have at least “medium” levels of specificity and commonality. In this case, the behavioral prescriptions of norms on foreign policy can be expected to reinforce one another and have a strong causal effect. According to their model, norms can also be used to predict foreign policy behavior when a norm is weak or absent on either the societal or international level, but present (with at least medium levels of specificity and commonality) on the other level. In these cases, however, the predictive capability of norms is lower than the case of normative congruence on both levels.

Two instances, however, can be expected to yield little predictive capability regarding the affect of norms on foreign policy behavior. The first instance occurs when no clear norms exist at either the international or societal level. The second instance occurs when international norms and societal norms are in conflict. In these cases, leaders are torn between two polar opposite sets of expectations, rendering prediction “just as impossible as when these expectations of behavior are completely absent” (Boekle et al., 1999: 10). Their basic model is summarized below:

TABLE 3.2 – International and Societal Norms, Predictive Relationships

International level	Societal level	Relationship	Predictive Capability
norm present	norm present	Congruent	High
norm present	norm absent		medium
norm absent	norm present		medium
norm present	norm present	Contradictory	None
norm absent	norm absent	<i>Neither</i> ²¹	None

This model has important ramifications for the role of sovereignty and self-determination norms in assessing international relations behavior. As has been discussed, self-determination represents a contradictory norm to territorial integrity and sovereignty. As a norm propounded for centuries by international organizations and agreements, territorial integrity and sovereignty can generally be characterized as strong international norms due to their high degree of both specificity and commonality. Self-determination, however, tends to represent a weak international norm, with a high degree of commonality – indicated in multiple international agreements as a desirable right and goal – but characterized by a low degree of specificity, as reflected within the continual international debates concerning the extent and nature of the right.

The existence of a transborder national group, however, promotes the specificity of self-determination as a norm *on the societal level*, because it provides a concrete contextual referent towards which the norm can be applied. The previous chapter emphasized the broad-based nature of nationalism and self-determination – how it can mean many things to many people with only the rejection of foreign influence as a common element. The existence of co-nationals under alien rule, however, provides a

²¹ This is my addition to the model – clearly if a norm is absent on both levels, it can not be considered contradictory or congruent.

rallying point in society around which the specific application of the norm of self-determination may be applied. For instance, while the average Italian might have a difficult time defining self-determination in precise terms, the average Pakistani is quite likely to cite Kashmir when addressed the same question. Thus, while self-determination remains an underspecified norm on the international level, it represents a very specific principle to those groups with co-nationals abroad.

Nationalist policies seeking the actualization of higher degrees of self-determination of national groups will, by nature, pose a threat to norms of sovereignty within transborder situations. As has been noted, the international community rarely favors, in practice, norms of self-determination over those of sovereignty and territorial integrity as legitimate constituent bases of the international system. What might represent a specific nationalist grievance among a particular society is rarely accorded much legitimacy among the international community in general, where the norm of self-determination offers only vague prescriptions for international action in comparison to the more specific idea of state sovereignty, which, as a general rule, represents the overriding norm of the international system.

Norms of sovereignty, as described in the last chapter, emanate from the international level downwards into societies, where they are incompletely realized in comparison to norms of self-determination, which are requisite for the existence of a nation. As the specificity of self-determination goals increase on the societal level, the specificity of norms of territorial integrity/sovereignty correspondingly decrease as they are no longer considered absolute in their prescriptions of appropriate action. An increase in nationalism, therefore, is directly related to a decrease in respect for

sovereignty at the societal level. Thus, nationalism/self-determination tends to override respect for international norms at the societal level *when* there is actually a specific nationalist cause around which to rally. As a consequence, state leaders initiating aggressive conflicts are rarely at a loss for public support, at least at the outset.

Table 3.3 illustrates the predicted contours of a state’s foreign policy in transborder versus non-transborder contexts. The first example in the table reflects the relatively muted role of self-determination norms within a non-transborder state. Here, self-determination (or similarly speaking, nationalism) is a largely unspecific term, which equates to the “absence” of the norm as a causal mechanism. The second example illustrates the role of norms in an irredentist-type transborder state, where the circumstance of a divided nation adds a high degree of specificity to the idea of nationalist self-determination within society, making it a relevant causal variable that is addressed by the model. The third example illustrates normative considerations in a contending government state, within which societal nationalism and international normative constraints can be expected to be lower than in an irredentist-type state for reasons discussed later.

TABLE 3.3 – Predicted Effect of Norms on State Behavior

<u>Non-transborder state</u>		
<i>International level</i>	<i>Societal level</i>	<i>Prediction</i>
Territorial integrity norm overriding (high specificity)	Self-determination norm “absent” (low specificity)	Territorial integrity dominant (pattern of less conflict)
<u>Irredentist-type State</u>		
<i>International level</i>	<i>Societal level</i>	<i>Prediction</i>
Territorial integrity norm overriding (high specificity)	Self-determination norm overriding (high specificity)	Indeterminate

Contending Government State

<i>International level</i>	<i>Societal level</i>	<i>Prediction</i>
Territorial Integrity Norm weakened vis-à-vis self-determination (medium specificity)	Nationalist norm weaker than within irredentist-type situations (medium specificity)	Indeterminate

The model indicates that the context of bilateral relations will assume different dimensions depending upon whether or not a transborder group is present. The absence of specific referents around which to express self-determination among non-transborder nations yields a situation within which state leaders will systematically tend to yield to the dictates of the international norms and respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of other nations. In the presence of an irredentist-type transborder group, the self-determination norm has a much higher degree of specificity on the societal level, both mutually constraining an executive while, at the same time, allowing that decision-maker the freedom “to choose the norm which best justifies his or her behavior” (Boekle et al, 1999: 10). Similarly, when contending government nationalism is involved, the weakening of perceived international constraints on aggression is coupled with weaker societal-level nationalism, which creates a similarly indeterminate outcome. *It is the very indeterminacy of foreign policy expectations in this instance which sets transborder situations apart from non-transborder situations.* The factors that might influence a decision-maker’s ultimate course of action under such a circumstance are numerous – and several of these factors are explored in the next chapter – but the main point is that as local self-determination pressures increase, international norms of territorial integrity and respect for sovereignty are weakened as a constraining factor, which fosters an overall higher propensity to engage in aggressive behavior.

To illustrate the point further, one might apply an analogy frequently cited when analyzing the effect of norms on behavior. Were a motorist to pull up to a traffic light on an empty road with no police in sight, it is likely that, despite a certain urge to run the light, the motorist would respect the legitimacy of the law and wait for the light to change. What if the motorist were in a hurry, however, because he or she was late for an event? In this case, respect for the law would conflict with the specific value the motorist placed on punctuality. Some motorists would wait for the light to turn, others would not – but overall more motorists would run the light in such a situation than they would in the absence of a pressing engagement.

The foreign policies of states wherein the dominant nationality (if one exists) lacks significant transborder ties can be expected to be systematically more peaceful due to international proscriptions against the violation of the territorial sanctity of a foreign state. The indeterminacy of foreign policy within transborder situations, on the other hand, translates into a breakdown of the territorial integrity norm as a systematically stabilizing influence. Whether or not a particular norm plays a role in formulating decision-maker preferences or is simply cited to justify pre-existing interests is not the relevant question in this situation, because either may be the case. It is the lack of predictable causality attributable to the clash of international and societal expectations within homeland states that ultimately renders bilateral relations within transborder dyads unstable over the long term.

As a final thought, however, it should be noted that the idea of foreign policy “indeterminacy”, the lack of patterned behavior, characterizes the state-of-affairs for policymakers in transborder situations most, but not all of the time. Both international

and societal normative pressures are subject to change under certain circumstances, which may cause them to become “unbalanced”. For instance, during periods of diaspora rebellion within irredentist dyads, as will be noted later in association with hypothesis 1N, nationalist pressures within society are expected to strongly increase, and will tend to outweigh international normative considerations. In other cases, it is possible for nationalist pressures from below to dramatically decrease. As described in the case study of Chapter 6, the fracturing of Somali society during the eighties led to a drastic reduction of societal pressures on Somali decision-makers, leading to a dominant role for norms of sovereignty and the opportunity for Somali leaders to pursue more peaceful policies than in the past.

International normative pressures may wax and wane as well. For instance, Ambrosio (2001) suggests that the inattention of the international community (i.e. weakness in the application of international norms) in situations such as the Azerbaijan-Armenia dispute represents the primary condition facilitating irredentist conflict. Later, in the Chapter 8 case study examining Greece and Turkey, it is suggested that international norms not only failed to suppress Greek irredentist aggression during the First World War, but actively encouraged it. Thus, Figure 3.1 and the accompany theory suggests the normal, but not exclusive, course of events associated with transborder nationality.

2). From Foreign Policy Indeterminacy to Bilateral Mistrust

While it is in some sense mentally awkward to think of “indeterminate” foreign policies as resulting in relatively more conflictual outcomes those that are systematically

peaceful, the essence of international “instability” lies with that idea that certain potentially revisionist states are, in fact, unpredictable in their behavior. Bilateral mistrust exists between states sharing national groups because the “targeted” state, which is home to part of the national population that comprises another state’s dominant nationality, recognizes that its borders and sovereignty may not be respected. Such a state can be expected to appeal consistently to international norms of territorial integrity as both a means of currying international support and so as to remind putatively revisionist states of their obligations to the international community.

Thus, leaders within transborder states will be presented with increased incentives and opportunities to threaten or take military action against kin states, while kin states will adopt aggressive foreign policies that are influenced by the perceived threat posed by the homeland state. In other words, the mere presence of a transborder group may lead not only to higher levels of aggression by homeland states but may also be sufficient to lead to increased levels of counter “defensive” aggression by kin states whose leaders are wary about the threat that nationalist pursuits may pose to common norms of territory integrity.

Strict Walzian neorealist interpretations suggest that the primary factor states consider when assessing the intentions of their neighbors is the difference in material (particularly military) capabilities (Brooks 1997: 135). Attempting to refine realist theory, however, Walt (1987) focuses attention on the role of relative threat, rather than relative capability, as the central focus of state security-seeking behavior. Walt claims that one cannot determine systemically “which sources of threat will be most important in any given case” (p. 22). If state leadership in a country that is home to a portion of a

national group perceives a strategic threat emanating from a state dominated by the same group, however, it is likely they will adopt a more aggressive foreign policy in order to deter potential irredentism. National demographic patterns, like patterns of geography or military capabilities, have an effect on bilateral interactions across the globe because they lend themselves to the breakdown of territorial integrity as a systematically restraining norm.

Just as outright military aggression poses a threat to the security of the targeted state, so too does the potential threat posed by milder forms of subversion. Often states aid and abet dissident or insurgent groups in an effort to actualize higher levels of self-determination for co-nationals abroad. In its most extreme, these strategies seek to achieve “secessionist-merger” outcomes in the irredentist context and “overthrow-merger” outcomes in the contending government context. While a revisionist state attempts to realize its foreign policy preferences by aiding national kin in an inflammatory manner, a state that is the target of such policies may defend against such threats with equally conflictual responses in order to deter support for insurgent groups. Thus, a continuum of policies exist that may lend themselves to bilateral distrust and instability in transborder national dyads, from milder subversive forms to full scale wars.

3). From Bilateral Mistrust to Bilateral Conflict

Defensive aggression rises from perceived balances of threat suggested by Walt (1987). In other words, due to the perception among the potential “target” states within transborder dyads that their neighbor may be relatively unrestrained behaviorally by

norms or territorial integrity and sovereignty, the state that is the potential target of revisionism will greatly elevate its threat assessment of its neighbor and act accordingly.

Wendt (1999: 257) suggests that the prevailing “culture” of international relations within specific “sub-systems” may be crucial to understanding the nature of interactions between states within particular regions. Within his writings, mutual respect (or lack thereof) for state sovereignty – described exclusively in terms of the right of other states to exist – is the defining characteristic of international cultures. When international norms are absent, a Hobbesian kill-or-be-killed state of mutual enmity exists between states, as one might expect to witness in some contending government dyads within which states desire the destruction of other contending governments and the absorption of same-national populations and territory. However, Wendt would characterize most conflicts arising from transborder national situations as disputes between “rivals” rather than “enemies” due to the fact that contention centers on geographically limited territories rather than the existence of a foreign state (p. 284).

The main point to be taken from Wendt is that given the absence of the perception that international norms will restrain conflict, one would expect higher levels of aggression to be pursued by all states. In either the severe competition of Hobbesian regional subcultures or the more limited rivalry involved in “configurative” disputes, the prevailing international climate is one of self-help realpolitik and the shared understanding that one’s neighbors will seek benefits at the expense of one’s own state. Such understandings force states that may not otherwise hold revisionist interests (such as kin states in irredentist dyads) to “*behave* ‘as if’ [they] were deep revisionists[s]” in order to protect their own security (p. 262). Due to the challenge posed to international norms

of sovereignty and territorial integrity by popular nationalism, constructive theory suggests that few areas of the world better reflect neorealist “dog-eat-dog” assumptions than those within which transborder demography impacts state policies.

The presence of outstanding nationalist disputes limits cooperation between states and hinders them from transcending enemy/rivalry type relationships because leaders in revisionist and target states alike understand the cultural “rules of the game” and the potentially conflictual implications once national self-determination is invoked as a source of state grievance. Those rules involve the potential disregarding of norms of territorial integrity by revisionist states at opportune moments, or the pursuance of pure power politics when the demarcation of territories is unclear to all sides.

Hypotheses Associated with the Link between Norms, Demographics, and Conflict

Having established how dyadic demographics and international conflict are linked by normative considerations, the next section poses a series of hypotheses that may be tested in order to find out whether transborder dyads tend to represent a particularly conflictual subset of relationships within the international system. The first set of hypotheses suggests relationships between transborder nationality and disputes in general. The second set refines this relationship somewhat by suggesting relationships between specific types of international disputes (territorial, political, or regime-change) and transborder nationality.

Thus far I have argued that nationalism, and the related idea of national self-determination, are norms that are shared throughout entire nations and within the international community as a whole. The desire to minimize alien influence over the

nation is shared at the societal level and reinforced through culturally ingrained norms of reciprocal obligation, which are passed on through different generations. Absent a concrete referent around which to rally nationalism, these norms tend to be latent and non-specific. When transborder groups are absent, nationalism at the societal level will tend to be unspecific in nature, and will be overshadowed within decision-making circles by norms of territorial integrity and sovereignty at the international level, which tend to promote systematically more peaceful relations.

In irredentist-type transborder situations (I deal with contending government situations below), there exists a concrete transborder grievance around which nationalist may rally, increasing the specificity of the norm in such a manner that it becomes relevant to decision-makers representing the nation. In such situations, decision-makers are “trapped” between international norms calling for the respect of territorial integrity and sovereignty of other states and societal norms pressing for the maximization of self-determination for all parts of the nation. Within such situations, decision-making can be expected to be perceived as random and indeterminate in comparison to situations where transborder groups are absent.

Although the model has suggested that foreign policy outcomes, conditioned by normative considerations, will be more indeterminate in cases of transborder nationality than those without, under certain circumstances societal pressures for self-determination will clearly outweigh international normative considerations. Nationalism in irredentist homeland states, in particular, can be expected to increase in intensity most when diaspora groups seem most endangered or most desirous of self-determination. The clearest signals of such circumstances are sent by diaspora groups engaged in rebellion

against the kin state within which they reside. Within contending government situations, however, the effect on public nationalism of a domestic uprising among co-nationals against the “alien” government is less clear, as the benefits of liberating co-nationals must be weighed against the harm that conflict would inflict upon the group.

In the context of irredentist-type dyads witnessing diaspora rebellion, the calculus of normative causality differs from those situations in which no rebellion exists. Instead of a situation in which international norms tend to outweigh societal norms in their causal influence, such as non-transborder situations (international norms > societal norms), or a situation in which the outcome is more-or-less indeterminate (international norms = societal norms), as is the general state of affairs within transborder situations, one might suggest that within cases involving irredentist diaspora rebellion nationalist pressures from society would often tend to outweigh international considerations (international norms < societal norms). Reconsidering Figure 3.1 in this instance, one might replace the term “indeterminacy” with “hostility” and “mistrust” with “enmity”. Thinking back to the analogy of the traffic light on an empty road, one might consider what a motorist would do in a crisis situation – for instance were a passenger being taken to a hospital for emergency care. Under such conditions, the pressing desire to help one’s passenger would almost inevitably outweigh the more abstract normative prescription calling for the motorist to wait for the light to change. Thus, the first hypothesis suggests:

Hypothesis 1N: Contiguous states containing a state with a majority national group in one state and a same-national minority in the other (irredentist-type, MINMAJ) will tend

to experience more international militarized disputes than similar dyads if the same-national minority population is or has recently engaged in armed rebellion.

The above hypothesis suggests a pattern of systematic conflict within irredentist-type dyads witnessing diaspora rebellion. The next hypothesis brings us back to the idea of systematic “indeterminacy”, which lends itself to bilateral instability even in the absence of diaspora rebellion. Homeland states will, as a general policy orientation, seek “protection” of co-nationals through the pursuance of policies designed to elevate diaspora self-determination, while kin states will seek to defend themselves against threats to state sovereignty. Both states will suspect the intentions of the other because normative disagreements hinder mutual understanding and promote distrust of one another’s intentions. Thus:

Hypothesis 2N: Contiguous dyads containing a state with a majority national group in one state and a same-national minority in the other (irredentist-type) will tend to have more militarized international disputes than other dyads even in the absence of rebellion.

While most of the preceding section concerns irredentism-type demography and nationalism, the logic concerning the creation of distrust under normatively ambiguous circumstances can extend to transborder “contending government” situations. Nationalist/self-determination norms *within society* are weaker within contending government situations than irredentist ones, due to the fact that aggressive policies are

likely to harm co-nationals. However, *international* norms stressing sovereignty and territorial integrity may be perceived weaker as well.

International norms of self-determination present a particular threat to international norms of sovereignty under such circumstances because international self-determination norms stress the common governance of like peoples and the removal of imperialist legacies – concepts that may be invoked by leaders in contending government states attempting to garner international support. The goal of a revisionist contending government leader is to portray aggressive policies to the world community in the context of an intra-national rather than inter-state dispute. In contrast to irredentist situations, contending government aggression resulting in the destruction of a neighboring state does not leave behind an aggrieved rump state that might plead its case before the international community – only governments-in-exile that gradually lose legitimacy and visibility as the annexation gains international acceptance. Furthermore, even in situations of limited annexations, any populations that are occupied are more easily assimilated into a co-national state – and thus will, in time, no longer be viewed internationally as occupied peoples in the same manner that a foreign national group would be were it conquered.

Contending government dyads may well be expected to be the most “Hobbesian” in the world due to the perceived lessening of international constraints in such disputes and the consequent challenge to norms of territorial integrity and sovereignty they present. Varying levels of international constraint tend to play a central role in promoting or dissuading aggression in contending government cases than in irredentist-type disputes.²² North Korea’s invasion of South Korea, North Vietnam’s invasion of South

²² This is not to say that the role of international constraints does not vary within irredentist-type disputes. Chapter 7 describes, for instance, the key role played by varying levels of international constraints on

Vietnam, and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait were all undertaken by leadership that calculated that the international community would view such action in context of an intra-national more so than an inter-state dispute.

Within contending government situations, states not only behave "indeterminately" themselves, but also expect their co-national majority neighbors to do so as well. Contending government foreign policy interactions theoretically mirror one another in terms of the preferences of state leaders for territorial conquest or regime change.²³ A different dynamic takes place within irredentist dyads, whereby one state claims territory and populations within another state without having to be as concerned about security threats posed by the kin state, which is not as likely to hold counter claims on the homeland's territory as is the case within contending dyads.

While both types of dyads are affected by the threat that norms of self-determination pose to norms of territorial integrity, irredentist-type dyads contain a unilaterally revisionist (homeland state) and, by a unilaterally defensively oriented (kin state), while the states within contending government dyads are better characterized as both bilaterally revisionist and defensively oriented. Even though the systemically unstable bilateral outcomes that result may seem similar due to the fact that kin states in irredentist-type dyads will initiate many disputes for defensive reasons, one would expect

Greek foreign policy and how different irredentist conflicts occurred or were deterred in part because of these constraints. Ambrosio (2001), as mentioned earlier, views international constraints as the primary variable affecting levels of irredentist aggression. His argument applies better to contending government dyads, however, within which public nationalist pressures are more muted, and thus less likely to challenge international normative constraints as a causal factor. In irredentist-type situations, international constraints might be high, but domestic pressures might nevertheless overwhelm these constraints in the calculations of a leader wishing to remain in power.


²³ Even if differences in state size and material capabilities indicate that one state is better able to threaten the security of a co-national state more than another, such factors have to do with opportunity structures more than underlying preferences. Furthermore, on a *systemic* level, such imbalances of power are equally likely across all dyads, thus not biasing patterns-of-behavior in one direction or another.

the causality to be somewhat different. *While irredentist situations promote relatively high levels of foreign policy revisionism on a more purely “nationalist” basis due to societal pressures on leadership, contending governments are faced with severe bilateral strategic dilemmas deriving from the weakness of international norms concerned with sovereignty and territorial integrity and the consequent threat this poses to the territory and existence of both states.*


Figure 3.4 below provides a graphic representation of the fundamental systemic difference in interactions in irredentist versus contending government situations.

FIGURE 3.4 – Irredentist-type and Contending Government Systemic Interactions

Irredentist-type Systemic Interactions



Contending Government Systemic Interactions



Based on the preceding discussion describing the inherently unstable bilateral relations that one would expect to exist systematically among contending government (majority-majority) dyads, the next hypothesis suggests:

Hypothesis 3N: Contiguous dyads that share an ethnic group, and in which members of that group form a majority of the population in both states (contending government), will tend to have more militarized international disputes than other dyads.

For the sake of comparison with the first hypothesis, which suggest that diaspora rebellion within irredentist dyads will lead to greater interstate conflict, it is useful to assess whether the presence of ethnonational²⁴ rebellion in dyads that are not necessarily characterized by transborder ties leads to higher rates of international disputes. This assures that one is not simply witnessing results based solely on the presence of rebellion, but also the hypothesized unique nature of rebellion within irredentist-type dyads. More than simply a control variable, however, the question of domestic ethno-national rebellion is of interest enough in itself to merit the presence of a hypothesis suggesting its role in international conflict. Whether rebellion encourages leaders to engage in foreign policy adventurism in order to foster national unity and divert attention from other domestic issues, or whether an embattled domestic situation encourages outside states to take advantage of a “soft target”, liberal and realist theory both seem to suggest that ethnic rebellion²⁵ would increase dyadic conflict propensity. Therefore, the next hypothesis states:

²⁴ Rebellion is tested in these cases as ‘ethnonational’ rebellion for these hypotheses. See the coding section of the next chapter for further details and justifications.

²⁵ One could apply similar logic to ANY domestic rebellion – whether ethnic-based or not. Due to the suggested theoretical interaction between ethnic demographics and ethnic-based rebels, this paper focuses on ethnic-based rebellions. Nevertheless, general rebellion was also tested with the analysis, and the effects of a non-interacted general rebellion variable were found to be quite similar to those of the ethnic-based rebellion variable – in large part due to the fact that so many civil conflicts involve a strong ethnic component.

Hypothesis 4N: Ethnic rebellion will increase dispute rates among contiguous dyads regardless of the presence of a transborder group..

The following hypothetical linkages refine the relationship between nationalist international politics and conflict by suggesting that the issues involved in transborder national dyads systematically differ than those fostering conflict among non-transborder states. The first major issue that separates nationalist conflict from other types of interstate conflict is the territorial aspect of such conflicts. Irredentist-type conflicts are not fostered merely by the desire of homeland states to extend state control over co-nationals in another state, but also to retrieve the territories their co-nationals inhabit. Contending governments desire either to annex other national territorial states in their entirety, or to absorb disputed territories that are more readily controlled due to the similarity of the population that lives therein to the national majority. While Huth (1996: 22) finds that irredentist-type situations only make up about 15 percent of the cases in his ongoing territorial dispute dataset, his coding does not indicate the intensity of such disputes or the frequency of military conflicts within such ongoing feuds. Indeed, he (p. 109) and Huth and Allee (2002) find that ethnic ties are a specific determinant of military disputes within their broader categorization of interstate territorial disputes. Thus, the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 5N: The presence of militarized territorial disputes between pairs of states will be positively associated with the presence of a transborder nation group that is a

either a majority of the population in both states (contending government, MAJMAJ) or a majority in one and a minority in the other (irredentist-type, MINMAJ).

The most acrimonious Hobbesian type disputes described by Wendt (1999) are those that seek to completely destroy the state apparatus of a neighboring country. Aggressors in these instances do not even recognize the legitimacy of another state's government, and, in adopting such a view, often claim their own right to rule the population and territory of the foreign state. One would not generally associate such conflict with irredentist-type disputes, whereby one state may claim the territory and associated population of part of a foreign state, but recognizes the right of the kin state to govern other territories and populations not claimed by the homeland.

The situation is different with contending government scenarios. When two different states govern different sections of a larger national population and each offers a different perspective on the appropriate governance of that nation, conflict may result as a result of mutual competition and mutual fear. Furthermore, the ability to wholesale absorb the population of another state, coupled with a certain hesitation on the part of the international community under some circumstances to intervene in intra-national affairs, provides one of the few practical opportunities in the international system for leaders desirous of pursuing large-scale annexations.

At the same time, questions of ideology often become central within contending government situations due to issues of legitimate governance. Incentives for bilateral aggression derive from the view of a "competing government" as a rival for both national legitimacy and strategic dominance. Rivalry for national legitimacy is based on the idea

that one government must better represent national preferences than the other – meaning that the existence of one government represents a threat to the other’s claim to legitimate national authority. Strategically driven aggression takes place as a result of each state’s desire to enhance its sphere of authority over the nation and national territory while mitigating or eliminating the power of the other state. Both the struggle for legitimacy and strategic supremacy are driven by ideological differences that promote rivalry among such governments. As the ideologies of contending governments converge, one would expect distrust and instability to decline to the point at which the two states may decide to merge voluntarily if the leaders of one the states can be convinced to give up power willingly. Thus, the very fact that contending governments dyads exist indicates a likelihood that ideological differences that can not be worked out in a democratic context exist between the governments. Thus:

Hypothesis 6N: The presence of militarized disputes relating to the forced overthrow of one state government by another will be positively associated with contending government dyads, but not irredentist-type dyads. Furthermore, joint-democracy should greatly reduce the tension inherent in these dyads.

A last broad categorization of militarized disputes involves clashes over policy, rather than over territories or the legitimate governance of those territories. Such disputes are hypothesized to be more amenable to negotiated settlements than those involving territory or the populations that inhabit them. While territorial disputes render it difficult for democratic leaders to make concessions and seek negotiated settlements (Huth and

Allee 2002: 285-6; Walter 2002: 82), disputes centering around “policy” matters can be expected to be more responsive to the presence of joint-democracy and the structural and normative processes that underlie democratic peace theory. At the same time, leaders of states in transborder dyads are unlikely to react to disputes involving non-territorial and non-governmental issues any differently than leaders within non-transborder dyads as such issues do not relate to nationalist preferences. Thus:

Hypothesis 7N: Unlike the impact of shared democracy (democratic peace), which is expected to have a significant pacifying effect on international conflict involving political disputes, the presence of a transborder nationality will not be associated with militarized conflict stemming from (non territorial/non governance) policy disagreements.

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that a direct pathway exists between transborder national demographics and international conflict. Heightened levels of conflict exist because the presence of transborder demographics lends itself to the development of conflicting norms concerning the legitimacy of state borders versus those of national unity. In the absence of transborder demographics, nationalism and self-determination norms among societies will tend to be muted due to the lack of a concrete referent upon which to focus nationalist sentiments. When a portion of the nation is separated from the homeland state by interstate borders, however, self-determination norms within society are much more specific in their applicability. The rise of nationalism in such a manner places pressure on decision-makers, who are also influenced from above by international norms of

territorial integrity and sovereignty. The resultant indeterminate role played by the influence of norms lies in contrast to the systematically peaceful role of international norms given the absence of transborder nationality. Consequently, mutual bilateral distrust develops as a consequence of shared understandings associated with the expectation of future threatening behavior conducted by neighboring states that interpret legitimate governance in an alternate manner.

The first hypotheses presented above (1-4) suggest that transborder dyads are systematically be associated with higher levels of conflict than other, non transborder dyads. The final hypotheses (5-7) suggest a series of propositions concerning the types of disputes with which one would most expect transborder dyads to be associated. The hypotheses suggest that territorial disputes are associated with both irredentist and contending government dyads, whereas regime-change type disputes are only associated with contending government situations. Furthermore, the hypotheses suggest that democratic peace theory is comparably poorly suited for understanding territorial disputes. On the other hand, democratic peace theory is most useful in understanding the most prevalent forms of militarized disputes, which involve differences in policies rather than territory or governance.

Having examined the normative issues that create the background conditions for higher levels of international disputes in transborder dyads, I move in the next chapter to establish a better understanding of specific conditions under which one would expect homeland states to act more or less aggressively. As we have noted in this chapter, normative incongruence on the societal and international level breeds indeterminacy in a manner such that homeland states may essentially act, over the long term, as if norms of

territorial integrity and sovereignty did not exist at all. However, even in such a hypothetical situation, states would still engage in greater or lesser amounts of aggression during different periods. We now turn to the sources of such variation among the foreign policies of irredentist homeland states.

The next chapter focuses primarily upon political processes within homeland states of irredentist-type dyads, largely to the exclusion of contending government situations. The reasons for focusing on irredentist-type situations are primarily methodological, including: 1) the fact that majority-majority dyadic relations are primarily undirected and interactive (i.e. there is no distinct revisionist and targeted states), with specific domestic structures and issues likely playing less of a role promoting conflict than mutual perceptions of insecurity attributable to the potential breakdown of international norms; 2) the difficulty in categorizing contending government dyads as a unified whole in terms of domestic casual preferences and mechanisms – particularly regarding the divide between “unification” and “frontier” nationalist mechanisms described in the introduction; and 3) the scope of this work is simply too small to consider the causal similarity between irredentist and contending government dyads while utilizing case studies to illustrate both instances. In future work, however, the domestic processes in contending government states merit consideration.

CHAPTER 4 – The Determinants of Aggressive Behavior in Irredentist-type Situations

The preceding chapter argued that when transborder national groups are shared between two states and the population of at least one state consists of a majority of that national population, one might expect overall higher levels of bilateral hostility.

Ultimately, this hostility rests upon the instability caused by the indeterminate behavioral expectations of potentially revisionist state leadership, who are pressured by international norms calling for the respect of territorial integrity and sovereignty, while, at the same time being subject to public pressures to act to maximize national self-determination for all segments of the national population. This indeterminacy suggests a higher baseline level of hostility among transborder dyads in comparison to those without transborder groups, which will tend to be systematically peaceful as international norms remain relatively unchallenged by societal pressures.

However, the fact that norms create a situation of indeterminacy for decision-makers leads to the question: How are policies formulated under conditions dominated by conflicting normative prescriptions for aggressive and non-revisionist courses-of-action? Even among transborder dyads, which one would expect to be more conflictual in general than non-transborder dyads, there exist periods within which potentially revisionist states pursue more peaceful or more aggressive patterns of behavior. This chapter examines structures, processes, and factors that influence decision-making outcomes in irredentist states in an effort to analyze how, even under conditions of normative incongruence and indeterminacy, foreign policy preferences may manifest themselves aggressively or passively under different circumstances.

The basic model of domestic processes includes three major factors, namely: affect; domestic structure; and international military constraints. By the term “affect” I mean the conditions of a diaspora group and whether domestic audiences are likely to regard the diaspora as threatened, repressed, or otherwise discontent relative to conditions in the homeland state. A diaspora that enjoys favorable political and economic conditions relative to those of homeland co-nationals is less likely to attract appeals for self-determination by homeland groups due to the fact that members of the diaspora may find secession or incorporation into a homeland state unappealing.

Domestic structures influence decision-making by imposing constraints or providing incentives for certain on executive decisions. Some domestic structures may encourage aggressive behavior by leaders by exposing leaders to the influence of domestic nationalist pressure groups while other structures may hinder aggressive behavior by presenting a series of checks-and-balances or veto points that obstruct executive preferences for aggression.


International military constraints are the last consideration and the most straightforward. A homeland state with irredentist designs on territory controlled by a much stronger kin state will think twice before adopting policies that could potentially provoke reprisals by the stronger state. Efforts to “protect” or liberate the nation may not only lack feasibility under such circumstances, but might also pose a threat to the continued security of the homeland itself.

The model is interactive up to this point. In other words, the presence of all three conditions – diaspora discontent, domestic structures amenable to aggression, and military feasibility are expected to encourage aggression when all three factors are

“favorable”. One factor, however, that is not expected to be interactive is that of diaspora uprising, or rebellion. As argued in the previous chapter, diaspora rebellion changes the general calculus of behavior expected from a state by changing the relative pressures emanating from the international community and society from a state of indeterminacy to one that generally favors aggression. Therefore, the effect of diaspora rebellion is expected to operate independently of the other factors in the model.

The foreign policy formulation model appears as such:

FIGURE 4.1 – Foreign Policy Formulation in Homeland States



In this chapter, the above conditions are discussed theoretically and refined according to what one would expect would best characterize each consideration. As in the preceding chapter, a series of testable hypotheses is developed in order to test the model’s assumptions. The next chapter will test the theoretical assertions by examining each of

the factors interactively and separately in order to understand the most likely pathways associated with aggressive homeland state behavior within irredentist dyads.

The sections below first argue how the factors in the model may act independently. A hypothesis illustrating the potential causal impact on state conflict of each factor accompanies each description. After describing the main considerations of affect, structure, and military feasibility, a further section suggests how one might expect these factors to work in tandem with one another.

Affective Motivations and Homeland State Conflict Initiation – Diaspora Rebellion

Diaspora rebellion was discussed in a bilateral normative context in the previous chapter. Here it is addressed in the context of dispute *initiation*, because rebellion is expected to supercede other considerations in foreign policy decision-making processes. Chapter 2 described the concept of “reciprocal obligation” that underpins the affective desire to aid co-nationals that are perceived as oppressed. This cultural component of nationalism is fundamental in the development of affective preferences that lead publics and leadership alike to support ethno-national “rescue” strategies when diaspora groups become engaged in military operations with foreign governments. Just as many rationalist theorists begin with the understanding that individuals are motivated by power or wealth, I make the assumption that individuals are motivated by the desire for *nationalist actualization* – i.e. the desire to successfully protect one’s co-nationals from harm from outside groups through the support of policies that would entail the reduction or elimination of out-group influence over the nation.

Although rationalist theorists shy away from the idea of affective motivations, one need not necessarily consider nationalist preferences irrational. Efforts taken on behalf of

one's nation are important to individuals because of the sense of self-esteem garnered through altruistic measure that benefit in-group members (Druckman 1994: 44-45). In the end, the drive for enhanced self-worth can be said to affect individual nationalist preferences just as the same quest for status lies within rationalist assumptions of power or wealth seeking behavior.

Affective motivations for aggression are strengthened among homeland populations as it becomes clear that a diaspora group is desirous of self-determination. As discussed in the previous chapter, ethno-national rebellion clearly indicates that at least a portion of a diaspora seeks greater self-determination. One would also surmise that diaspora rebellion mitigates perceptions surrounding the living conditions of diaspora in that the preferences of the diaspora, and just as importantly, the threat to the diaspora are clearly signaled.

As kin group preferences are signaled to domestic groups, domestic groups will demand leadership to take action on behalf of those abroad. At the same time, the greater the reservoir of nationalist sentiment among domestic audiences, the smaller any potential domestic resistance to policies supporting an aggressive leader's preferences for revisionism – even if the leader's preferences are truly based on more instrumental-type motives. If a nationalist rebellion takes place next-door to a state controlled by co-nationals, it can be expected that broad support for aid to rebel groups will develop in a homeland state. This chapter's first hypothesis deals with extreme forms of kin discontent manifested in armed uprising and its anticipated propensity to elicit "rescue" behavior by homeland states:

Hypothesis 1D: A homeland state is more likely to act aggressively toward a kin state when a national kin are engaged in rebellion against the kin state.

It should be further emphasized that the above hypothesis differs from the earlier normative hypothesis (1N) in that it is unidirectional, dealing with conflict initiation by irredentist homeland states, rather than bilateral. While it is likely that both conflict initiation and bilateral relations are harmed by diaspora uprisings in irredentist dyads, it is important for the model to test the effect on conflict initiation because the effect of such rebellion is expected to be dramatic enough to strongly influence other factors involved with conflict initiation. For instance, diaspora discontent (described below) and diaspora rebellion are likely to be strongly related to one another. Failing to control for diaspora uprisings would, therefore, provide a false impression concerning whether the objective economic and political conditions of a diaspora are an important causal factor leading to dispute initiation. In fact, the model in Figure 4.1 suggests that diaspora rebellion represents a qualitatively different, and much more direct, factor encouraging dispute initiation than other factors – something which becomes clearer in the interactive model described later in this chapter.

Affective Motivations and Homeland State Conflict Initiation – Diaspora Discontent

Stories of mistreatment at the hands of state authorities or preferences for greater autonomy may be transmitted from national diaspora to homeland audiences through peaceful protest even in the absence of rebellion. Were a government to control a state's media in such a way as not to inflame nationalist sympathies, inevitably refugees, exiles,

and other ex-patriot kin would nevertheless be able to spread word of unfavorable conditions to homeland audiences.

National diaspora and homeland audiences alike are likely aware of their basic relative economic and political positions. In terms of economics, it means that national kin in a wealthier state²⁶ are less inclined to oppose their state or prefer retrieval by a homeland. Homeland audiences and leaders, realizing this, are less likely to seek revisionism abroad – at least in irredentist situations. In many, and probably most, kin states, national diaspora – being ethnic “outsiders” – are further economically marginalized when compared to the dominant group in their state. Unfortunately, specific sub-national data actually describing the conditions of diasporas themselves, other than the overall conditions of the state in which they live, does not exist in many cases. Still, the relative economic conditions of a homeland state compared to a given diaspora-inhabited kin state may provide a rough idea as to whether that diaspora group would benefit or suffer economically were it to be incorporated into the homeland state.

The exclusion of co-nationals from political processes in kin states is also a strong motivation for nationalist grievance among homeland audiences. Mousseau (2001) and Hegre *et al* (2001) find an inverted U-shape association between ethno-national insurgency and democracy, suggesting that democracy mitigates the potential for ethnic uprising, but repression does as well. Political repression, however, only suppresses the means of expressing discontent through rebellion – not discontent itself. Sambanis (2001) finds that domestic ethnic conflict is strongly influenced by democratization in a

²⁶ Admittedly, national kin could also exist in a poverty stricken area of an otherwise wealthy state or live under conditions of generalized economic discrimination. Unfortunately, no data exists to measure the relative wealth of different ethnonational groups within states on a global basis over an extended time frame.

standard linear-type manner. Although these studies focus on ethno-national rebellion, it is logical to assume that even in the absence of such rebellion that higher levels of political oppression and nationalist discontent among minority groups are linked. If it is perceived by audiences in a homeland state that a diaspora group is not particularly desirous of “liberation”, domestic nationalist pressures are likely to become less pronounced and intervention is less likely to be sought on nationalist grounds.

It thus seems a reasonable assumption that diaspora who live in states that are politically more repressive or economically less developed than their homeland state will desire incorporation into the homeland state more so than groups living in states that are both politically freer and economically better-off than their homeland. On the other hand, the fear of impoverishment or government repression can serve to mitigate calls by diaspora groups for a closer relationship with their homeland. As will be described in Chapter 6, for instance, the relative success of the Kenyan state compared to the deteriorating conditions in Somalia muted the voices of Somali separatists in Kenya.

Finally, from an instrumental point of view, subversive activities embarked upon by homeland states in regions inhabited by co-national diaspora groups may rely on the support of such groups. Although the theory herein suggests that affective factors concerning the status of diaspora groups are the primary motivation for conflict initiation, a lack of support for homeland intervention can nevertheless present an important constraint. This lesson was learned by Pakistani leadership in 1965, as described in Chapter 7, when Kashmiri Moslems cooperated with local authorities to apprehend their would-be liberators in large numbers.

Thus, the next hypothesis suggests that homelands will act more nationalistically when the political and economic conditions in the homeland state are favorable to those in the kin state targeted by homeland nationalists:

Hypothesis 2D: A homeland state is more likely to act aggressively toward a kin state when either the relative economic wealth or level of political freedom in the kin state is less than that of the homeland.

Domestic Audiences and Domestic Structures

The preferences of domestic groups and the nature of the political structures which channel these preferences are both important in determining expected foreign policy outcomes. The two main points of investigation concerning irredentist-type dyads involve the role of potential domestic audiences in influencing leadership decisions to pursue greater or lesser degrees of military aggression, and the general institutional environment within these interactions take place.

The model hypothesizes that the final foreign policy decision-maker will be an executive leader²⁷. Leaders may be more or less nationalistically inclined, making it difficult to assume they will pursue any systematic choice of action in irredentist-type situations on their own. What leaders have in common, however, is a preference to stay in power. This common assumption in political science, which relegates the leader to somewhat of a political “weather vane” role by assuming he or she is beholden to the

²⁷ The assumption of this section is that almost, if not all, states have an single executive at the head of government with final responsibility on questions of foreign policy – particularly questions of war and peace. While this executive might at times be heavily constrained and have to share authority on matters, such as spending, that might be related to foreign policy, final decisions on foreign policy is considered to be driven primarily by a single individual.

preferences of domestic audiences, will be held as an underlying assumption in this work as well.

Leaders face potential audience costs (Fearon 1994) based upon their foreign policy performance.²⁸ The fairly straightforward concept of audience costs suggests that the failure to stand firm or escalate matters militarily during a crisis will lead to a diminished political position at home. Although Fearon's examination of audience costs takes place in the context of temporally limited international crisis situations, he does not address the fact that bottom-up pressures exist in the absence of such crises as well. Leaders may provoke crises themselves when they fear that the domestic benefits of initiating a potentially risky crisis outweigh the costs of doing nothing. In this sense, crises develop not necessarily through a process of rational self-selection based on potential success, as suggested by Fearon, but rather because international or domestic events raise the potential costs of inaction by increasing the amount of political pressure placed on an executive.

The potential influence of different bottom-up linkages is associated with the nature and strength of the institutions through which a country is governed. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) suggest that the "political survival" of executive leaders is contingent upon the adoption of appropriate policies that best suit the size of the "selectorate".²⁹ By selectorate, the authors refer to those upon whom an executive

²⁸ Fearon (1994) examines audience costs during crises, but his model only assumes a nebulous audience cost of some-kind, without specifying any particular sources of these costs. He concludes that democracies will likely have the highest audience costs, although he also briefly mentions military generals in autocracies and the role of the Politburo in the Soviet Union (p. 583) as potential alternate audiences. In their empirical examination of his findings, Partell and Palmer (1999) suggest that Fearon's focus on democracies may be overstated, and that the potential for strong audience costs may exist in autocracies as well.

²⁹ Bueno de Mesquita et al. consider not only "selectorate" size, but the size of "winning coalitions" within the selectorate. The authors would likely argue that autocracies are better described as having small

potentially relies to retain power. In highly autocratic situations the selectorate will be a relatively small group of politically connected individuals while in full democracies the selectorate will include most citizens of voting age. While the selectorate model is useful, it suffers from the common rationalist assumption that audiences will only be satiated by material gain as a trade-off for the continued support for their leadership.

In states where a leader's support base consists of a narrow selectorate, a country's military establishment may exert major influence over the continued tenure of the executive. The placation of this domestic audience may or may not involve material gain for military elites, but it almost always involves satisfying nationalist preferences that can be expected to be more intense than the rest of society. The audience cost paid by an executive that does not satisfy the preferences of an influential military can be severe, including forcible removal from office.

While one would normally associate a strong military role in government policy with autocratic government, it is possible in certain democratic states for a weak civilian-military divide to exist. Such situations often involve military meddling in democratic processes at opportune times, followed by a subsequent retreat to the background of politics. Pakistan and Turkey are two examples of states in which democracy has coincided to a certain extent in recent historical periods with strong military influence – influence that has been made most manifest during occasional periods of military rule. Altogether, however, cases of weak civil-military divides in democratic states can be expected to be rather rare.

winning coalitions rather than small selectorates – with the sizes of selectorates varying more widely within both autocracies and democracies. However, this work takes a somewhat less dogmatic approach, and assumes a strong correlation between both selectorate and the basic characterization of a state's polity with the understanding that the word selectorate generally assumes a small winning coalition.

Due to their clear hierarchal organization and their possession of the means of violence, militaries are potentially the most able actors in almost any society to influence leadership decisions. The central questions involving irredentist-type national situations are whether militaries will choose to involve themselves in foreign policy decision-making and, if so, whether those pressures tend to be more aggressive or passive. While one may argue that militaries frequently regard their role as apolitical in the strictest sense (Huntington 1957: 68), protecting the nation is generally seen as “above politics” and the main calling of a state’s armed forces.³⁰

By controlling the means of violence in society all militaries at least present the threat of forcing civilian adherence to military preferences on political issues. Any state with a military will be influenced by the policy preferences of military officers to some degree. However, the degree of military influence in policy making varies widely across the globe – from almost non-existent in secure states with strong distinctions in civil-militaries spheres of authority to almost exclusive in states run by military officers that exclude civilian authorities.

Most writers on civil-military relations stress the important role that nationalism plays in the armed forces and regard the armed forces as a strong bastion of continuing nationalist sentiment (Perlmutter 1969: 403; Janowitz 1977: 139). Finer (1962: 9) presents one of the starkest pictures of the role of nationalism in the military, suggesting that “the inculcation of extreme nationalism . . . is universal in the training of all but the very few ideological or religious armies . . . This accompanied by systematic

³⁰ One may argue whether the primary allegiances of militaries and its members tends to belong to the nation or the state. This question is largely avoided in this analysis due to the fact that the states that are analyzed are those with a majority national population. Even in contending government situations, militaries would tend to regard their state as the more legitimate representative of the entire nation.

disparagement of the foreigner.”³¹ Posen (1993: 81,121) suggests that political elites consciously seek to inculcate a nationalist ideology in the armed forces that stresses “the uniqueness and inclusiveness of one’s own collective relative to next door” in order to “increase the intensity of warfare and specifically the ability of states to mobilize. . .the spirit of self-sacrifice of millions of soldiers.”

While military sentiment often “opposes reckless, aggressive, belligerent action” by civilian leaders (Huntington 1957: 79), soldiers are particularly motivated and receptive to using force in *defense* of the nation, even when such force represents aggression against another state. Posen (1993: 124) focuses on the “defensive impulses of nationalism” and suggests that as military influence on public policy increases, so to does the tendency to “inflate” enemy-images and foreign threats to the nation. Schofield (2000: 135) similarly notes the propensity of military leaders to overstate the existence of foreign threats and to recommend “a rapid escalation of hostilities” if conflict should break out.

“Praetorian” states are those in which the military tends to intervene heavily in politics and potentially dominate political decision-making (Perlmutter 1969: 383). Due to the strong nationalist preferences of modern militaries³²; their hierarchal structure, which lends itself to collective action; the societally ‘ordained’ role of soldiers in defending the nation; the propensity of military perspectives to inflate threats; exaggerated perceptions of “windows of opportunity” for the successful application of

³¹ The fact that strong nationalism exists within most armed forces does not imply that one could liberally apply the term ‘facism’ to such sentiment. Huntington (1957: 91) provides a good contrast between what he considers the model of the military mind and how it differs greatly from typical fascist ideals.

³² When speaking of the military in general, it is implied that we are primarily concerned with those in the officer corps most capable of directing collective military action. As Huntington (1957: 3) notes, the appropriate focus on civil-military relations involves the relation of military officers to the state.

force (Schofield 2000: 135); and a preference for rapid escalation of disputes, one would expect that “praetorian” states react more aggressively towards kin states in irredentist-type dyads. Thus:

Hypothesis 3D: Periods within which military influence over policy-making is strong within irredentist-type homeland states will tend to be more conflictual than periods when military influence is weaker.

I discussed above the consequences of a weak civil-military divide within irredentist-type homeland states without regard to whether or not the overall selectorate size of a state matters – the above hypothesis essentially regards military influence as a similar phenomenon in states with narrow selectorates and those with wide selectorates.

Because military regimes generally limit public input into decision-making, the independent effect of political unrepresentative political structures – those associated with the presence of narrow selectorates – need be analyzed. The above hypothesis suggests that the breakdown of the civil-military divide plays an important role in promoting aggression in the absence of other factors. However, when military leaders exert significant control over decision-making, it is also very possible that the decision-making process is largely isolated from the general public and other government authorities. Thus, it is useful to assess whether there is something unique about military control over foreign policy decision-making or whether it is the simple insularity of such governance that lends itself to aggression in the presence of other factors.

Furthermore, narrow selectorates are associated with weak institutions with few veto points designed to check executive power. Therefore, if a leader decides that his or her domestic situation is best furthered through aggression (i.e. I have assumed such action would be normally taken on behalf of the leader's narrow group of supporters) there will not likely be significant roadblocks posed by institutional constraints or other segments of society. Audience costs resulting from the potential failure of aggressive policies are also more limited in autocracies due to the restriction of the political process (although the threat of assassination or revolution naturally exists), and this may make an executive more risk acceptant.

In comparison to more open systems, political systems consisting of a narrow selectorate tend to face lower audience costs in the event of foreign policy failure fostering more risk acceptant policies on the part of leaders. Thus, our second "domestic" hypothesis states:

Hypothesis 4D: Irredentist (homeland) states within which a leader is more able to insulate himself from public opinion and institutionalized "veto-points" will tend to be more conflictual than systems within which a leader faces greater public accountability.

The Feasibility of Military Aggression

The last condition conditioning decision-making behavior in irredentist-type homeland states, military feasibility, is rather straightforward. Realist/neorealist theory suggests that power imbalances are most likely to lead to international conflict (Morgenthau 1948; Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001). Under classic realist theory,

homeland states would thus be more likely to act aggressively if they possessed greater military capabilities than neighboring kin states.

While considerations of relative military power are relevant in any situation involving the potential for state aggression, however, it may not be military imbalance *per se* that leads to aggression. Organski and Kugler (1980) suggest a theory of “power transition”, whereby opportunities for attempted militaristic revisionism are generally absent in terms of the general *status quo* balance of state capabilities. However, when an aggrieved state finds its capabilities increased relative to its neighbors for one reason or another, the potential for conflict increases as the aggrieved state finds itself more able to project power at its neighbor’s expense. At the same time, the stronger status quo state encounters increasing incentives for a pre-emptive strike in order to prevent being eclipsed militarily.

Balance of power, whether of the static realist-neorealist or power-transitional variety, may not be strictly determined by the military capabilities that each state controls. Geographic considerations, such as the presence of the Taiwan straits separating Taiwan from mainland China, may hinder the potential for aggression and serve to equalize power imbalances. What is most important when considering whether military threats or actions initiated by a homeland state toward a kin state are feasible is whether such actions are *perceived* as feasible. In other words, the objective realities of military power are often impossible to determine, except in the broadest sense.

According to Vasquez (1993), the prime underlying condition that determines whether states go to war concerns the inability to accurately assess relative capabilities.

In respect to a situation wherein there is a clear discrepancy in military power; one would expect war to be rare – especially when the potential initiator is the weaker state. This work focuses primarily upon conflicts involving much lower levels of violence than war. In order to justify lesser degrees of aggression, a weaker state need not be able to militarily best a strong state. Rather, the weaker state must merely be able to deter overt military retaliation that is taken in response to more limited aggression. *Limited forms of aggression become more “feasible” if homeland state leadership feels that retaliation would be costly for a stronger neighbor.* If the balance-of-power heavily tilts in favor of a kin state, however, retaliation can be expected to become less costly, meaning that even low levels of violence initiated by weaker states become a markedly unwise gamble– and unfeasible from a common sense standpoint. Thus, the next hypothesis suggests:

Hypothesis 5D: A homeland state is more likely to act aggressively toward a kin state when it possesses a feasible deterrent to military retaliation by the kin state.

The Interaction of Domestic Factors

Figure 4.2 suggests that aggression is likely when three basic conditions: 1) preferences; 2) domestically conducive structures; and 3) military feasibility fall into line. In terms of domestic preferences, it has been suggested that diaspora uprisings will independently affect conflict initiation while the relative economic/political conditions of diaspora will be important in conjunction with other variables. In terms of domestic structure, the focus was upon whether a narrow or wide “selectorate” exists and whether the military is influential in policy-making. Military feasibility addresses whether the

potential for military aggressiveness by homeland states exists in a manner such that massive retaliation would not be feared. Above, I suggest that these different factors may act independently of one another. In this section a series of logical propositions is offered to suggest how different factors may work in conjunction.

Considered as dichotomous variables, the five major factors that are analyzed are: diaspora uprising (yes or no); diaspora conditions (better or worse); selectorate size (narrow or not narrow); military influence (high or not high); and military feasibility (yes or no). These variables can be combined in thirty-two different ways, each with a potentially different outcome. The task at hand involves simplifying those thirty-two different outcomes in a manner that takes into account the relative importance of each of the factors in relation to one another.

The first and most basic variable conditioning the level of conflict initiation that one would expect from an aggrieved homeland states concerns military feasibility. It certainly stands to reason that the sixteen combinations of variables within which military threats or action are not feasible will tend to be associated with low levels of dispute initiation – no matter the value of the other variables. Only in select situations wherein a state receives promises of large-scale military support from another state, would one expect a homeland state to court trouble with a powerful neighbor. Therefore, my next hypothesis suggests:

Hypothesis 6D: When considering combinations of variables associated with irredentist-type behavior, dispute initiation by irredentist homeland states will be less common when military feasibility does not exist.

Along with military feasibility, the most important factor to consider concerns whether or not a diaspora is engaged in rebellion. Domestic politics that influence foreign policy decision-making may be divided into two circumstances: crisis and non-crisis situations. Brecher (1977: 42) defines a foreign policy crisis as “a situational change in the external or internal environment which creates in the minds of the incumbent decision-makers of an international actor a perceived threat from the external environment to [the] basic values to which a responsive decision is deemed necessary.” In the context of this discussion, a responsive decision is required due to the perception that the fate of a co-national group hangs-in-the-balance due to the presence of violent confrontation between that group and a foreign government. Diaspora rebellion creates a foreign policy “crisis” situation that fosters widespread bottom-up domestic audience pressures on leaders in homeland states.

A leader during such a crisis situation must weigh the relative cost of inaction versus the potential for foreign policy failure. Whether or not a large or small selectorate exists, it is almost certain that the potential cost of inaction will be large as different segments of society “rally around the nation”. To the self-interested executive, it is largely irrelevant whether domestic audience pressure is exerted from other elites, from potential revolutionaries or assassins, from parliaments, or from civilian interests groups. Because audience pressures will be widespread across most segments of society in crisis-situations, one would expect that domestic structures and the specific nature of domestic audiences matter less during situations of diaspora rebellion. At the same time, because a diaspora (or segment, at least, thereof) has clearly signaled a desire for greater self-

determination, one would also not expect the relative political/economic conditions of diaspora to be a particularly important consideration under such circumstances. Finally, risk-acceptant behavior associated with diaspora rebellion “crisis” may even override considerations of military feasibility – although it is somewhat unclear under what conditions the domestic costs of inaction would outweigh the potential costs of reckless endeavors abroad. In general, however, one would largely expect that crisis situations associated with diaspora uprisings and the concurrent rise of widespread, intense nationalism across a variety of domestic homeland audiences would largely represent a category unto itself that renders other variables largely mute. Thus:

Hypothesis 7D: The presence of diaspora rebellion will be associated with higher dispute initiation rates regardless of the values of other factors.

Having addressed “crisis” situations brought about by diaspora rebellion, I now turn to factors associated with non-crisis situations. The next two hypotheses address the interactive, left side of Figure 4.2 that associates the joint presence of diaspora discontent, domestic structural conditions favorable to nationalist aggression, and military feasibility with higher levels of conflict initiation.

The first factor in determining whether aggressive policies of conflict initiation are likely to be pursued once again concerns the relative status of states that are home to diaspora groups in comparison to the conditions within homeland states. In the absence of an uprising, the relative socio-economic and political conditions faced by diaspora become a determining factor in whether or not leaders face domestic pressures to adopt a

confrontational posture with neighboring kin states. Since conflictual behavior by a homeland state is undertaken in support of co-national self-determination, the presence of widespread desire for self-determination on the part of a diaspora is a key motivator for aggression.

Another factor addressed in the model concerns military feasibility. Once again, this factor rests on the idea that, absent a crisis situation, homeland state leadership will consider the relative strength of their military versus that of a state that is home to a co-national population. When the balance of power heavily favors the potential target of aggression, it is likely that decision-makers will largely forsake any aggressive designs on behalf of diaspora groups.

If militarized aggression is feasible and a diaspora group is desirous of self-determination, the question then becomes whether certain domestic structures will promote higher levels of aggression than others. The theory has suggested two factors that might provide a nationalist impetus to foreign policy making. The first factor concerns the weakness of the civil-military divide in decision-making processes in irredentist homeland states. The preceding section noted how most theory and research suggests that nationalist preferences in the armed forces of most states exceed those of the general population. High ranking members of the armed forces are also aware of the general opportunities for military aggression, and prefer to adopt offensive postures when times of military feasibility present themselves – with the understanding that in the future balances of power may sway against the homeland state. For military leaders, diaspora discontent enhances the prospect of future conflict which may or may not take place on favorable terms – and, as such, military leaders will prefer to act sooner rather than later.

When diaspora discontent and military influence over policy dovetail, states will more frequently initiate aggressive foreign policies as long as such policies are militarily feasible. In other words:

Hypothesis 8D: When relatively poor economic/political conditions exist in a kin state, but diaspora rebellion is absent, a homeland state is more likely to act aggressively toward the kin state when military influence over policy within the homeland state is high and aggression is militarily feasible.

A second domestic structural factor that may influence the rate of conflict initiation by homeland states in irredentist-type situations concerns the size of the “selectorate” to which an executive is accountable. Rather than (or in addition to) the influence of the military over policy, states with insulated decision-making processes may tend to act more aggressively (when a diaspora is perceived as desirous of a higher degree of self-determination and when military feasibility is present). Assessing the role of higher levels of government insularity allows us to determine whether the degree of accountability to state citizens affects conflict initiation rates, and whether one can primarily attribute potentially higher dispute initiation rates to this insularity. Thus, in contrast to the above hypothesis (8D), which suggests a weak civil-military divide as the main impetus for aggression in irredentist-type situations, the next hypothesis suggests that the restriction of executive accountability to a small group of citizens is mainly responsible for increased nationalist aggression within irredentist-type situations:

Hypothesis 9D: A narrow selectorate will enhance the propensity for conflict initiation by a homeland state when relatively poor economic/political conditions exist in a kin state; diaspora rebellion is absent; and military action is feasible.

Conclusion

This chapter has established a theory of conflict initiation by homeland states in irredentist dyads. The chapter began with a model that suggested that three conditions affect the propensity of homeland states to adopt militarily aggressive foreign policies. These three conditions include: 1) the perceived status of diaspora groups within foreign states and the level of desire for greater self-determination; 2) the presence or absence of domestic structures and audiences leading to the enhancement or mitigation of conflict likelihood; 3) the military feasibility of conducting aggressive policies without fear of successful overwhelming retaliation by the target of such policies.

Diaspora preferences for greater levels of self-determination are most clearly signaled when militant diaspora rebellion exists, an event is expected to influence conflict initiation largely independently of other considerations. The economic and political conditions of diaspora relative to the kin state are also expected to act as important indicators of the desirability of self-determination by diaspora groups.

Certain domestic structures are expected to lead to potentially more aggressive policies by homeland states in irredentist-type dyads. The first structure leading to higher conflict initiation propensities concerns the degree of military influence over policy. The second concerns the public accountability of executive decision-making and whether or not a narrow “selectorate” exists.

The importance of military “feasibility”, defined as the ability of a potentially aggressive state to impose substantial costs upon another state seeking military retribution in response to aggressive policies, was discussed as an important consideration in decision-making. The threat that would be engendered by the pursuance of aggressive policies launched against an overwhelmingly superior enemy is suggested to outweigh nationalist preferences in the calculations of decision-makers in situations characterized by military infeasibility.

Although the model implies a set of interactive conditions, the five factors are assessed both independently and interactively. Hypotheses 1D – 5D suggest that homeland states within irredentist dyads will initiate disputes more commonly when 1) an uprising occurs among a kin group in a neighboring state; 2) the state in which a kin group resides is more politically repressive or economically underdeveloped; 3) military influence over policy making within a homeland state is high; 4) a homeland state has a “narrow selectorate”, or 5) military action is feasible. Hypotheses 6D-9D suggest a series of logical interactions among these variables, which include:

- 1) The preeminence of military feasibility. In the absence of military feasibility, other factors are expected to be largely irrelevant.
- 2) The presence of diaspora rebellion is expected to largely eclipse the influence of other considerations. In these “crisis” cases, domestic audience costs are extremely large across most segments of society, forcing an executive to

formulate aggressive policies no matter what the form of domestic political structure or constellations of political audiences within the state.

- 3) In the absence of diaspora rebellion, the relative political and economic condition of diaspora groups will assume an essential ingredient to the formulation of homeland foreign policy. Kin groups must be perceived as desirous of self-determination or merger with homeland states in order to attract aggressive policies on their behalf. This condition is often not met when the conditions in a kin state are relatively better than those in the homeland.
- 4) When the relative conditions of a kin group are poor, but no diaspora rebellion is present, high military influence over policy will increase the propensity of a homeland to initiate disputes (when militarily feasible).
- 5) The ability of executives within narrow selectorates to “buy off” their bases of support in the event of foreign policy failure makes such leaders more risk-acceptant and increases the propensity for conflict initiation (when militarily feasible).

The next section tests the hypothetical propositions of the previous two chapters through a series of regression analyses. The results obtained from the regression analyses will determine the analytical foundation for the case studies that comprise the second part of this work.

CHAPTER 5 – Empirical Assessment

This chapter tests the hypotheses of the previous chapters in order to determine whether patterns emerge concerning the nature of transborder national politics. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section explains the research methodology and design used to assess the hypotheses of the preceding chapter. In this section, I address the coding of key independent and dependent variables and the reasoning behind the inclusion of numerous control variables in the empirical models. The second section reveals the results obtained from the empirical testing. The third section provides an expanded discussion of the implications of the statistical findings. Appendices found at the end of this chapter describe coding decisions in greater depth and provide additional methodological information.

Research Design

The model presented herein examines the time period from 1951-1991. The time frame represents an historical era that is often characterized in terms of suppressed or “bottled up” ethnic tensions among states. The era covered includes the entire Cold War period with the exception of the earliest years. The immediate post-War period was marked by Allied occupations and population transfers that render data from the period particularly suspect.

Each case in the data represents a dyad-year (i.e. a pair of states during a given year). Data is organized using two different types of dyadic frameworks. The earlier hypotheses concerning bilateral relationships among states sharing national groups are analyzed using undirected dyads. Such dyads are insensitive to issues concerning which

state initiated given conflicts. Thus, the analysis focuses on the overall relations of states with the assumption that both revisionist and (status quo-oriented) defensive types of aggression will take place in roughly equal proportions – rising and falling in tandem with the causal variables in question. This undirected dyadic framework examines all sets of contiguous dyads in the world with the intention of establishing whether transborder dyads represent a uniquely conflictual subset of all international dyads in accordance with the theory presented in Chapter 3.

Theories concerning factors associated with irredentist-type homeland state initiation (Chapter 4) are assessed with a restricted dataset that only includes dyads associated with irredentist-type (minority-majority) demographics. In order to examine levels of dispute initiation within irredentist-type dyads, I utilize a directed dyad format. Directed dyads are useful because monadic mechanisms can be examined within potentially revisionist states in order to determine why one state initiates a dispute against another state.

Demographic Independent Variables – Concepts and Operationalization

Up until this point, theoretical discussion has centered upon nationality and nationalism as the factors underlying political action. Unfortunately, because nationality is largely self-defined (see Chapter 2), it is not possible to code transborder nationality *per se* for use in empirical testing. One can, however, utilize the proximate concept of politicized ethnicity, a term which is much more ascriptive in character, to help us understand how nationalism functions in transborder situations.

All nations do not have a particular ethnic identification, but most do. The larger and more geographically concentrated an ethnic group, the more likely its members are to

regard themselves as a nation. Ethnic groups that form a majority of a population in a state will almost certainly view themselves as a nation or at least as part of a larger nation divided into separate states. Since this analysis primarily concerns itself with groups that form the majority of the population of states – and the relationship of those groups with kin groups in other states – those who identify themselves as a nation will generally be identifiable by the fact that they are also the majority ethnic groups in a state.

Appropriately operationalizing data involving ethnicity also poses a challenge, however, because, alternate conceptions of ethnicity exist.³³ Shared language, physical attributes, religion, culture, symbols, and historical understandings all have greater or lesser relevance for group identity depending upon the unique circumstances of each community. Since many of the characteristics that define ethnicity are largely perceptual, the salient features identifying ethnic groups range widely depending on time, setting, and context. Our primary interest in ethnicity, however, is to mirror nationality as closely as possible while still retaining objectivity. Thus, relevant politicized ethnic groups are those that are, at least potentially, able to “make demands in the political arena . . . in a form of interest group politics” (Brass, 1991: 19).

When establishing the role of ethnicity in domestic and international affairs it is essential to remain rooted in politics. Thus, when considering how to define “ethnicity” as a useful term for this study, it is important to focus on the politically relevant aspects of identity. Groups such as Hindus and Moslems in India and Pakistan, while not literally “ethnic” groups, share a common communal identity in many areas and are united by common political bonds. The idea of a political ethnic identity represents the

³³ For an extended exposition on the difficulties of coding ethnicity (including some remarks on the sources used herein), see Fearon (2002).

linkage between the neutral anthropological traits of a group and the potential for that group to exercise political pressure and influence.³⁴

Since any operationalization of ethnicity for applied research and modeling is susceptible to researcher bias, it is useful to utilize data collected by third parties for purposes other than the specific questions being addressed. Relevant ethnic groupings for this study are chosen based upon their inclusion in major research efforts that are aimed, in large part, toward better understanding the political dynamics within states, and therefore focus on the inclusion of ethnic groups that merit attention due to their potential political influence. By strictly adhering to the data presented in these well-established research efforts, potentially haphazard operationalization of “relevant” political ethnic groupings is mitigated.

The existence of a transborder group is coded from four sources. If a minority is listed as part of the Minorities at Risk dataset (1999), it is considered an ethnic group.³⁵

The criteria for including an ethnic group are that the group consists of at least one percent of a population of 500,000 or greater and meets one of four “at risk” criteria.³⁶

The major advantage of utilizing the Minorities at Risk coding lies in the fact that many

³⁴ One of many more recent discussions about narrow versus broader ethnic criteria can be found in Varshney (2001). Many would argue that an ethnic group that expresses territorial claims is no longer simply an ethnic group, but a “national” group (for instance, Brass 1991). I use the terms ethnic, national, and ethno-national interchangeably when referring to a group itself – but utilize the term nationalist when referring to the political goals of ethnic group leaders that emphasize state control of territory. Thus, while a group must at least have a potential role in politics to be included in the study as a politically relevant ethnicity, not all such groups are necessarily represented by expressly nationalist leaders.

³⁵ The dataset labels minorities according to a number of ethnic, linguistic, religious, or identity-based cleavages. In order to maintain consistency, I alter/eliminate two of the codings. The data treats Palestinians and Arabs separately, I consider them one group. The coding of “Southerners” in Chad is also eliminated as an overly broad coding.

In addition, a small number of majority groups exist in the Minorities at Risk dataset. These cases are easily identified by cross-checking other data sources, and are coded appropriately in the dataset utilized for this study.

³⁶ A minority fits the four “at risk” criteria if that minority is currently subject to discrimination; disadvantaged from past discrimination; challenging an advantaged ethnic group; or supports a political organization that advocates expanded group rights.

smaller, geographically concentrated groups are represented in the database that might otherwise fall “under-the-radar” when examining the relative population size of groups within states. The disadvantage lies in the fact that only groups that meet specific political factors are included, which may result in the omission of groups that lack a history of political activism but have the potential of coalescing into important political actors.

Therefore, several other sources are drawn upon in establishing the presence of relevant transborder groups. A group is also considered a relevant ethnic group if it is listed by either the *CIA World Factbook* (2000) or Vanhanen’s ethnic/linguistic/religious/racial division data (1999). Finally, if a transborder linguistic group is found to exist in the year 2000 *Ethnologue* that has not already been coded, it is included in the list of transborder groups.³⁷ A group is considered to be politically relevant only if it consists of at least three percent of a country’s population³⁸ in Vanhanen (1999), the *CIA World Factbook* (2000), or the *Ethnologue* (2000). Inclusion in the Minorities-at-Risk dataset is considered sufficient evidence of political relevancy itself, so there is no minimum percentage requirement for such groups.

Key Demographic Variables

Majority-Majority (MAJMAJ), Minority-Majority (MINMAJ), and Minority-Minority (MINMIN): The MAJMAJ variable reflects contending government demographic

³⁷ Linguistic criteria, when conflicting with other criteria, are given weaker status. For example, the Ireland-Great Britain dyad is coded as minority-majority, due to the Catholic/Irish minority in Northern Ireland, rather than majority-majority because of linguistic commonality.

³⁸ Three percent is, admittedly, a fairly arbitrary cutoff. This decision implies that about three percent of a population is enough for a minority’s presence to be a factor in political life, even if that minority is not considered “at risk”.

situations, while the MINMAJ variable represents irredentist situations. A MINMIN variable is also included in the model. Although dyads containing transborder minorities (without a majority in either state) are not theorized to be generally more conflictual than other variables, it is worth assessing as a basis of comparison with the MAJMAJ and MINMAJ variables.

The three types of transborder dyads are coded using three criteria: 1) whether a transborder ethnic group is present (i.e. – does one group exist in two contiguous states³⁹); 2) whether the group is politically relevant in both states; and 3) whether that group represents a majority or minority of the population in each state of a dyad. Each transborder group represents the majority of the population of both states of a dyad (MAJMAJ); a majority in one state and a minority in the other (MINMAJ); and/or a minority in both states (MINMIN).⁴⁰ The MAJMAJ variable is simply coded 0 or 1, depending on whether a majority of an ethnic group exists in both states. The MINMAJ variable is coded 0, 1, or 2, depending on whether a minority-majority cluster exists – and whether it exists once or twice in a dyad.⁴¹

The minority-minority variable is coded as a dummy variable (0 or 1) in the broad-based ethnic model rather than an ordinal variable indicating the actual number of shared minorities. The reason for this coding decision is twofold. First, minorities can be aggregated and disaggregated in various ways, rendering a concrete numeric value rather

³⁹ The criteria defining “contiguous” are describe in the Model and Methods section

⁴⁰ In rare cases in which it is questionable whether a group represents a minority or majority of population, a consensus of the four sources is considered. Fortunately, there were no cases in which at least three of the four sources were not in agreement.

⁴¹ Only two cases receive a ‘2’ – Sweden-Finland and India-Pakistan. Both states in each dyad have an ethnic majority, while both states are also home to a significant ethnic minority of the other state. Recoding this variable as a 1 in these cases increases the coefficient and significance of the key transborder explanatory variables to a small degree while decreasing the coefficients and significance of the control variables indicating joint democracy and capability-ratios (in both the MID and FATAL models). Because the resulting estimates are more conservative, I retain the original coding as the primary coding.

imprecise. For example, one might describe Thailand and Burma as sharing a minority of Hill Tribes. As suggested in the Minority-at-Risk project, these tribes can be described as a coherent, but loose ethno-political units. However, one could also disaggregate those Hill Tribes into Karen, Hmong and other specific ethno-lingual groups. Or one could continue to disaggregate these groups into their subunits, and consider Pwo Karen, Pao' Karen, S'Gaw Karen, Hmong Daw, Hmong Njua, etc. to be included in the total. Depending on how one aggregates such groups, one could say that one, six, or twenty transborder minorities exist. Without the information to finely distinguish how tightly-knit such ethnic associations are, one is forced to accept the minimal level of relevant information – namely, whether a transborder presence exists or not. These variables are used to assess the hypotheses contained in Chapter 3. Following the theory of Chapter 4, the directed dyads utilized to assess conflict initiation patterns among irredentist states are restricted to dyads characterized as MINMAJ.

Other Key Independent Variables⁴²

The preceding chapters have argued the importance played not only by transborder demographics, but by potential rebellion by diaspora groups within irredentist-type dyads. Diaspora rebellion solidifies the domestic consensus regarding the importance of nationalist action within the bilateral context as well as increasing preferences for national “rescue” strategies when focusing upon foreign policy formulation in irredentist homeland states. Thus within both the bilateral demographic-normative models and the dispute initiation models, a dummy variable indicating a

⁴² The coding of the italicized-boldfaced variables indicated in the following sections is explained in greater detail in the appendix.

national *kin uprising* (RELEVANT) is coded 1 when a diaspora group within the minority state of a MINMAJ dyad is engaged in armed resistance against its government, and 0 otherwise.⁴³

The presence of an ethnic rebellion may lead to increased intra-dyadic hostility even without the presence of a transborder dyad, making the inclusion of a dichotomous *ethnic uprising* (UPETHNIC) variable both necessary and theoretically interesting in its own right. Ethnic uprisings may affect bilateral stability as states may pursue more aggressive foreign policies to divert attention from domestic ethnic struggles. “Hot pursuits” of rebels into adjacent states can lead to increased friction between neighbors. Neighboring states might also seek to exploit rebel movements for politically opportunistic reasons (to pressure another government, divert its resources, seek to exploit resources within rebel territory, etc.). This variable is used within the demographic-normative bilateral model to assess hypothesis 4N.

Several important variables are expected to impact the incidence of dispute initiation. Each of these dichotomous variables is tested within two econometric models

⁴³ Endogeneity note: The presence of *kin uprising* in the regression model poses a potential problem for analysis due to the potential role played by government material support of rebels in affecting both the existence of bilateral conflict (left side of the regression equation) and the existence of rebellion in kin states (right side variable). This seems unlikely, however, given the nature of the coding of the dependent kin uprising variable, as described in Appendix A. This variable codes “uprisings” that may consist of as few as 25 deaths during a year. Such a rebellion could easily be sustained in the absence of homeland government support, which should be more associated with the *intensity or level* of rebellion, rather than the *presence* thereof. However, the variable only indicates the latter, rather than the former.

However, in order to verify that the results of this section are valid, several measures are taken to ensure that endogeneity does not fundamentally affect the results. Woodwell (2004) conducts tests using similarly coded variables in order to show that the initiation of homeland state aggression (MIDs and fatal MIDs) does not affect the onset of diaspora rebellion. In order to assess whether the *continuation* of rebellion is affected by the model used, I conduct an analysis that drops all “rebellious” dyad-years subsequent to the first year of rebellion in a dyad.

The results are very similar to the original results in the FATAL model, except that the coefficient of the kin uprising variable actually increases greatly in strength (the MINMAJ remains very close to the value displayed in the results). In the MID model, the results for kin uprising largely remain the same, but the coefficient for MINMAJ increases from .49 to .85. Thus, when eliminating the possibility of endogeneity, the results of the key variables are actually more prone to strengthening, rather than weakening. The results presents herein therefore represent the more “conservative” findings.

– one examining their individual effects and the other assessing the interactive effects of the variables together. The first of these variables describes the role of *military influence* (MILITARY) over foreign policy of homeland states in irredentist contexts. Military influence is assumed present when 1) a military government exists; 2) a civilian head of state represents a figurehead for a military government; or 3) a civilian government is in control, but a military coup has occurred during the previous half decade (representing the potential for renewed military intervention in politics). The potential effect of military influence over foreign policy is examined in the discussion preceding hypothesis 3D in the preceding chapter.

Another variable concerning domestic structures that potentially impact foreign policy outcomes is that of selectorate size, or more specifically, as coded, the presence of a *narrow selectorate* (SELECTORATE). In general, political systems consisting of a narrow selectorate are expected to face lower audience costs in the event of foreign policy failure fostering more risk acceptant policies on the part of leaders. The presence of a narrow selectorate is coded as a 1 if a state is coded as less than a -5 within the Polity IV dataset project. Such a coding distinguished states with publicly insulated leaders from leaders of democracies or of systems with mixed characteristics, such as those characterizing weakly autocratic states.

Another variable hypothesized to influence dispute initiation by homeland irredentist states is that of expected *diaspora discontent* (DISCONTENT). The coding of this variable assumes that diasporas will be more desirous of retrieval by a homeland state if the kin state in which they reside is either 1) relatively more politically repressive or 2) relatively worse off economically. The presence of either one of these conditions is

expected to increase the nationalist preferences of decision-makers, as described by the theory preceding hypothesis 2D.

Lastly, the dispute initiation concerns the matter of *military feasibility*. The lack thereof is assumed to present an important constraint on aggressive dispute initiation, whether an irredentist issue is at stake or not. Although irredentist disputes are heavily influenced by affective factors, basic rationality dictates that a leader will hesitate to engage in aggressive behavior without the ability to credibly deter conventional retaliation. Aggressive policies are considered military feasible only so long as the state initiating such policies possesses at least 1/5 of the material military capabilities possessed by the target of such policies.

Control Variables⁴⁴

A number of control variables are included into the model in order to assess potentially alternate explanations for conflict that are not described in the primary models and theories. Some of these control variables are important in order to mitigate problems of spatial and temporal serial correlation associated with pooled time-series data sets. The inclusion of a *peace-years* variable mitigates serial correlation in the data by controlling for unobserved variation in dyadic behavior that may be associated with past values of the dependent variable. *Regional variables* are also included in each regression to control for unobserved causal factors associated with the geographical region of the dyad. Regional variables are included in each regression, but the results are not displayed.

⁴⁴ The theoretical reasons underlying the inclusion of these variables, as well as more specific coding information, are provided in Appendix A.

Several variables assess the role of liberal and realist paradigms in determining the nature of international conflict, with a particular eye toward comparing these variables with the normative-demographic variables used in the undirected dyad regressions. Two key realist concepts reflected in the bilateral model concern whether the existence of a *dyadic alliance* (ALLIES) or the ratio of *relative military capabilities* (CAP) influence bilateral conflict. Variables utilized by liberal scholars of international relations are utilized as controls as well, including a variable testing the concept of *democratic peace* that indicates the lower Polity score within a dyad (DEMAUTLO) as well a variable assessing the role of *economic interdependence* (DEPENDLO) that indicates the degree of trade engaged in by the more economically isolated member of each dyad.

Several variables are included in the bilateral model because they relate to theories of ethno-national conflict, although are not considered central to the theories presented herein. *Interaction terms* assessing the presence of ethnonational rebellion within contending government (MAJMAJ) and transborder minority (MINMIN) dyads are assessed alongside the primary focus on diaspora rebellion in irredentist dyads. The effect of high levels of *ethnic heterogeneity* within at least one state (of a dyad) are assessed for a variety of interesting theoretical reasons (see Appendix A for further explanation) as well as the fact that such dyads may be expected to be more likely to contain transborder groups, making the variable a useful control on the variables of primary theoretical importance.

Other control variables are mainly associated with the directed dyad model. A main reason several of these variables are included involves the desire to test for

instrumental motivations for conflict initiation – factors that have thus far not been described in terms of their potential relation to conflictual preferences among homeland states within irredentist dyads. Homeland state leaders may engage in aggressive behavior, for instance, when engaged in a rivalry over territories containing *economically importance resources* (ECONHUTH) or if such territories are regions of *strategic importance* (STRATHUTH). Furthermore, leaders may engage in diversionary aggression in order to shore up their position among their constituents, especially during periods of economic decline. The concept of diversionary aggression, and the opposite theory of “encapsulation”, which suggests that states will be debilitated during times of domestic turmoil and act less aggressively, is assessed by examining recent economic performance, or, more specifically, the recent *three year change in GDP* (GDP3).

Lastly, the relative constraints and opportunities present by the presence or absence of economic ties and large-scale rebellion are also assessed as control variables. Similar to the idea of economic interdependence and the potential restraints posed by higher levels thereof, the effects of overall *intra-dyadic trade* (BITRADE) as well as the general *economic openness* (and thus susceptibility to international sanctions) of homeland irredentist states are also assessed (TRADEGLOBE). In order to control for the idea that aggressive policies fostered by diaspora rebellion may be initiated due to the vulnerability of the state engaged in civil conflict, a variable indicating (not necessarily ethno-national based) *large-scale rebellion* (UPBIGK) within a kin state is included.

Models and Methods

This subsection is divided into two sections. The first sections assesses the bilateral (undirected) and monadic (directed) hypotheses that focus primarily on non-interactive variables. The second section assesses hypotheses 6D-9D, which deal primarily with interactive variables. The above variables are used in the construction of the following general models designed to test the effects of hypotheses 1N-7N and 1D-5D:

Demographic—Normative Dissonance Model

$$\text{MID, FATAL, TERRMID, POLMID, or GOVMID} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{MAJMAJ} + \beta_2 \text{MINMAJ} + \beta_3 \text{MINMIN} + \beta_4 \text{UPETHNIC} + \beta_5 \text{RELEVANT} + \beta_6 (\text{UPETHNIC} \times \text{MAJMAJ}) + \beta_7 (\text{UPETHNIC} \times \text{MINMIN}) + \beta_8 \text{EHET} + \beta_9 \text{ALLIED} + \beta_{10} \text{CAP} + \beta_{11} \text{DEMAUTLO} + \beta_{12} \text{DEPENDLO} + \beta_{13} \text{PYMID or PYFAT} + \beta_{14...18} \text{REGIONAL controls or } \beta_{14} \text{RGDPPC}$$

Homeland Dispute Initiation Irredentist Model (restricted to dyads that are characterized as MINMAJ)

$$\text{MID or FATAL} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{RELEVANT} + \beta_2 \text{DISCONT} + \beta_3 \text{MILITARY} + \beta_4 \text{SELECT} + \beta_5 \text{FEASIBLE} + \beta_6 \text{HUTHECON} + \beta_7 \text{HUTHSTRAT} + \beta_8 \text{UPBIGK} + \beta_9 \text{GDP3} + \beta_{10} \text{BITRADE} + \beta_{11} \text{OPEN} + \beta_{12} \text{PYMID or PYFAT} + \beta_{13...17} \text{REGIONAL controls or } \beta_6 \text{RGDPPC}$$

The models are analyzed utilizing population-averaged (or marginal) logit models through the use of generalized estimating equations.⁴⁵ As a population-averaged model, the GEE “models . . . the average response over the sub-population that shares a common value X” (Diggle, et al. 1994 quoted in Zorn 2001: 474), rather than examining case-specific trends. This is particularly useful for pooled time-series data, where the object is

⁴⁵ When no further conditions are stipulated, the GEE approach achieves the same results as a population-averaged logit regression. Utilizing GEE, however, has the advantage of facilitating, through *Stata 7.0*, the use of robust standard errors. Furthermore, utilizing a GEE enables the use of an AR(1) correlation scheme, one of the three methods employed to mitigate serial correlation in the data.

to establish patterns among subgroups over the entire period, rather than to track temporal changes in specific variables. Since the key demographic variables employed in this study do not fluctuate within dyadic clusters, the implicit assumption is that (all other factors being equal) a minority-majority dyad, such as India-Pakistan, or a majority-majority dyad, such as North and South Korea, will not have a different conflict propensity in 1985 than they did in 1955. The GEE approach is appropriate because the goal is to show whether or not dyads with certain demographic characteristics (i.e. possessing transborder ethnic groups) differ systematically from dyads lacking those characteristics. In his recent article (2001: 475), Zorn provides an example of why a population-averaged model, such as the GEE, is more appropriate for the type of research conducted in this study:

If one were interested in, say, the effect of democratization on the propensity for a particular nation or pair of nations to go to war, then the conditional approach would be more appropriate. If, instead we wished to assess the general propensity of autocracies and democracies to engage in interstate conflict, a marginal approach (such as the GEE) would be called for.⁴⁶

Each equation utilizes Huber robust standard errors. These standard errors are further adjusted for dyadic clustering, which, along with the utilization of a peace-years variable, mitigates the lack of statistical independence within among the dyad-years.⁴⁷ All independent variables are lagged one year in order to assure that they represent values that are assessed as temporally prior to the outbreak of a dispute that might occur during the same year.

⁴⁶ For further information about the technical aspects of General Estimating Equations, their applications, and suggested utilization *vis-à-vis* conditional models, I highly recommended Zorn's (2001) very concise and readable article.

⁴⁷ See *Stata 7.0* reference manual for a full explanation of Stata's *xtgee* command.

Contiguous Dyads as the Basis of Analysis

Only contiguous dyads are included in the analysis. The criterion for contiguity is the standard condition that two states either share a border or are connected by a relatively small stretch of water (under 200 miles). In addition, any state adjacent to a colonial holding of another state is considered contiguous with the home country.⁴⁸

The sample is restricted to contiguous dyads for several reasons. Since a prime cause of the escalation of ethnic demographics into international conflict is hypothesized as involving border disputes – whether they are public inter-governmental disagreements or whether they are incidental spillover effects from otherwise internal conflict – it is borders themselves that are generally at issue. Second, while only a handful of major powers are able to project themselves militarily over long distances⁴⁹, “politically relevant dyad” datasets are characterized by a disproportionately large number of non-contiguous dyads composed of at least one major power (approaching two-thirds, usually). Although such effects can be controlled for with a contiguity variable, including major powers within the framework of this study would pose large analytical and theoretical problems. Analytically, it is also difficult to convincingly code politically salient ethnic groups from the myriad of overlapping identities that particularly characterize the large “civic” democracies of the U.S., France, and Great Britain.⁵⁰ If, for

⁴⁸ The contiguity-by-sea and contiguity-by-colony criteria are only utilized in the “broad” model. The linguistic data only contains dyads directly contiguous by land and does not take into account colonial holdings. Although the results do not seem drastically affected by these coding differences, they should be born in mind when assessing the alternate findings.

⁴⁹ There are rare circumstances when this is obviously not the case – for instance, when a small power is part of a grand alliance (such as Iraq’s participation in wars against Israel or the participation of numerous small nations in the Gulf War). Still, non-contiguous confrontations must generally involve an unusual set of circumstances.

⁵⁰ Without, once again, stretching the term diaspora too far, the Soviet Union only had small, contiguous diaspora populations. While China has several non-contiguous diaspora groups, its lack of a deep water navy has largely rendered it unable to project military power overseas.

instance, one were to code Americans of African descent as an African “diaspora”, one would seemingly have to do the same with the tens of millions of Americans of Irish ancestry – even though their influence on U.S. policy towards Ireland (and Northern Ireland) has been marginal (Guelke, 1996) due to the fact that few Americans would hold their Irish-ness to be a primary identity. Theoretically, considering that the Irish ancestral population in the U.S. is a minority, one would also expect the Republic of Ireland to view regions of the United States (Massachusetts?) in a similar manner as it does Northern Ireland – an absurd proposition due to the factor of distance, the lack of any true territorial referents, and the nature of overlapping identities within the United States.

Furthermore, while some self-identified minority ethnic groups residing in major powers might wield some influence on foreign policy, the salience of the regional issues with which they are concerned will not be as high for most of the population. Such influence might lead to greater attention and diplomatic or financial support for one country or another, but, unless the great power has an accompanying strategic interest, it is unlikely to bear the potential costs of military confrontation. Carment and James (1995) note that, while occasionally attempting to use ethnic conflict to their advantage, superpowers often went to great lengths to help manage ethno-nationalist disputes and prevent their international escalation. The interests, nature, and capabilities of the major powers were qualitatively different from much of the rest of the world, which continued to be as, or more, concerned with age-old ethnic nationalism as it was with geopolitics or Cold war ideology.

Interactive Analysis – Simplification through the use of a Classification Tree

The regression methods described above are also used to test the effects of the interactive variables that are used to test hypotheses 6D-9D. While the variables described above (Military Influence; Narrow Selectorate; Diaspora Discontent; Diaspora Uprising; and Military Feasibility) are hypothesized to affect dispute initiation separately, it is useful to see the effect of these variables in tandem with one another. In other words, we would like to know how these variables interact when they occur (or do not occur) concurrently.

Simply including all the possible combinations of interactions within a standard regression model either with one another or with the individual variables, however, causes two major statistical problems. The lesser of these problems concerns the difficulty involved in analyzing an “inefficient” regression equation given the presence of 32 variables and only slightly less than 2000 cases. The presence of numerous variable combinations containing few cases, in particular, prevents the convergence of statistical estimates. Since many of these combinations yield little explanatory power, modeling is facilitated by narrowing the field to the more relevant variables.

The larger of the statistical problems associated with including numerous interaction terms within a standard regression model involves the issue of multicollinearity. If several interactions involving a particular variable are analyzed simultaneously with that variable, a higher degree of multicollinearity may occur if the interaction primarily takes one value. For instance, if only ten percent of dyad-years characterized by military influence are also characterized by diaspora discontent, then analyzing military influence (coded as a 1) simultaneously with an interactive variable

that is similarly coded as a 1 in the ninety percent of cases characterized as military influence/no discontent causes an extremely high degree of multicollinearity. Multiply this problem by the five potential variables used in each interactive combination, and the difficulty of including the interactions in a standard regression becomes clear.

By establishing combinations of variables that are associated with the highest levels of conflict initiation by homeland states, one can look for such combinations during particular time periods and observe their effects. Without such interactions, one is left with the simple assumption that the presence of a greater number of conflict-associated variables translates into a cumulatively greater risk of conflict, which may not always be the case. For example, while relatively poor diaspora conditions may lead to higher levels of conflict initiation by homeland states, diaspora conditions may not matter if diaspora are engaged in rebellion. Similarly, low polity (narrow selectorate) levels may matter in the absence of heavy military influence in government decision-making, but be less relevant when military influence is strong. By examining the interactions among the variables one can better establish exactly what pathways leading through affective preferences, domestic structures, and international constraints are most conducive to aggressive behavior.

The interactive analysis of decision-making outcomes may be facilitated through the use of a classification tree that examines different combinations of variables. Classification trees represent the division of ordinal or (in this case) dichotomous variables into sub-trees representing the all different possible combinations of the

variables.⁵¹ Variables combinations are represented in terminal nodes that are formed when the data is organized in an efficient manner.

Utilizing tree-modeling software (found in the program *SPLUS*, version 6.2), a classification tree is constructed and “pruned.” The construction and pruning of the tree model organizes the variables efficiently so that a certain combinations end in terminal nodes when subsequent variables are deemed to have little effect on the overall model. The two major conditions causing a tree to end in a terminal node are: 1) that further division of a variable would result in less than 20 cases in the a subsequent node, which is deemed to small for further statistical estimation, and 2) cross-tabulated analysis suggests high numbers of false predictions for further nodes, indicating that adding further variables to a combination would have little influence.

The resulting terminal nodes each represent a series of dichotomous variables that are coded 1 during particular dyad-years that represent a particular combination of key variables and 0 otherwise. For instance, the U.K.-Ireland dyads during the sixties represent the variable combination: No Uprising; No Discontent; No Military Influence; No Narrow Selectorate; and No Military Feasibility. The terminal node variable representing this combination of factors would be coded 1 during the 1960s for the U.K.-Ireland dyads, while all the other variables representing other combinations would be coded 0 for these dyads. The variables that are included in the subsequent regression model are, thus, similar to those indicating geographic region – i.e. for each case one variable combination (representing a single interactive variable) will be coded as a 1, and all other variable combinations are coded as zeroes.

⁵¹ Note: Unlike many tree diagrams associated with game theory, there is no sequential organization to such a tree.

The following subsections address the results obtained when the hypotheses of the previous chapter are tested utilizing the variables and methods described above. The descriptions of each model's results are rather brief, as further discussion will follow concerning the final core model that is obtained after the significant variables from the individual models are combined.

Normative-Demographic Variable Results

The results of the empirical tests conducted in order to test the normative-demographic bilateral hypotheses of Chapter 4 are found in Table 5.1. Examining the first columns, the MID and FATAL models reveal strong associations between shared ethnicity and conflict. The choice of dependent variable appears to matter little, as the results of both models are roughly similar. Only the control variable indicating levels of bilateral trade achieves significance at $p < .10$ in one model (FATAL) but not the other (MID), which suggests that in more serious disputes the potential for disrupted trade relations becomes more of a factor than in less serious ones.

The MAJMAJ (contending government) and MINMAJ (irredentist) variables are both highly significant at $p < .01$ in both models. The MINMAJ variable is significant in the absence of specific ethnic uprisings among diasporas within kin states, but the presence of such uprisings is both significantly associated with conflict at $p < .01$ and yields a much higher coefficient.

In contrast to earlier findings (Woodwell 2004), ethnic uprisings accompanying shared minority groups are also significantly related to increased intra-dyadic hostility, indicating that spillover-type effects may indeed be intensified in such situations.

Uprisings in general are not associated with higher dispute rates in either model, suggesting that interstate instability arising from civil conflict is most associated with the presence of a shared ethnic group rather than the simple presence of conflict itself.

Among other control variables, increased ethnic heterogeneity (in at least one state), as suggested by Marshall (1997), is significantly ($p < .05$) associated with the mitigation of hostility within dyads. The same holds true for the presence of higher levels of joint-democracy, which is associated with lower levels of disputes as well ($p < .01$). The variables indicating balance-of-capabilities is similarly significant ($p < .01$), although not in the way that strict realist theory would suggest. Rather than enhancing the propensity for conflict, increasing differences in military capabilities are actually associated with lower levels of hostilities – suggesting perhaps greater support for theories of power transition, when state capabilities are roughly equal, rather than strict balance-of-power considerations. Surprisingly, alliances seem to have no significant impact at all in any of the models (although all the signs are negative, indicating, at least, what one would assume is the appropriate causal direction). While democratic peace theorists (see, for instance, Maoz and Russett 1993; Oneal *et al* 1996) and realist-minded scholars (Farber and Gowa 1997) alike have generally found a pattern between alliance ties and peaceful relations, the results of this analysis suggest that nationalist issues may inflame interdyadic relations to the degree that even alliance ties often become subsidiary.

Overall, the results suggest that international relations may be understood in terms of demographic-normative considerations as well as in terms of both liberal and realist factors. The demographic variables that were hypothesized to be associated with

TABLE 5.1 – Demographic/Normative Bilateral Model Results

	MID	FATAL	TERRMID	POLMID	REGMID
KEY VARIABLES					
Minority-Majority Dyad (irredentist scenario)	.493 (.180)***	.694 (.241)***	1.031 (.264)***	.060 (.249)	.101 (.645)
Minority-Majority Dyad w/ Diaspora Rebellion	1.295 (.344)***	1.382 (.363)***	1.408(.404)***	-.063 (.382)	1.912 (1.21)
Majority-Majority Dyads (contending government)	.715 (.265)***	1.189 (.329)***	.764 (.434)*	-.410 (.335)	2.246 (.564)***
Minority-Minority Dyads	-.064 (.233)	-.254 (.309)	.231 (.393)	-.295 (.373)	-.528 (1.02)
Ethnic-based Uprising _(t-1)	.107 (.118)	.054 (.162)	-.001 (.293)	.345 (.172)**	-.809 (.524)
CONTROL VARIABLES					
Majority-Majority Dyad X Ethnic-based Uprising _(t-1)	-.295 (.351)	-.205 (.817)	.201 (.698)	.384 (.571)	-.743 (1.01)
Minority-Minority Dyad X Ethnic-based Uprising _(t-1)	.467 (.205)**	.707 (.270)***	-.007 (.449)	.474 (.355)	----- (!)
Ethnic Heterogeneity (higher level)	-.005 (.002)**	-.007 (.003)**	-.004 (.004)	-.006 (.003)**	-.008 (.006)
Allied States _(t-1)	-.011 (.154)	-.251 (.197)	-.164 (.252)	-.111 (.214)	-.821 (.444)
Capability Ratio _(t-1)	-.004 (.002)***	-.011 (.005)**	-.038 (.018)**	-.002 (.001)	-.000 (.003)
Democracy-Autocracy _(t-1) (lower score)	-.058 (.013)***	-.049 (.019)***	-.019 (.028)	-.065 (.020)***	-.143 (.052)***
Trade Dependency _(t-1) (lower score)	-16.6 (11.8)	-24.6 (14.5)*	4.269 (12.6)	-33.12 (20.2)	-6.76 (29.6)
Peace Years	-.129 (.012)***	-.089 (.013)***	-.206 (.033)***	-.069 (.011)***	-.267 (.072)***
CONSTANT	-1.546 (.237)***	-2.836 (.355)***	-2.387 (.492)***	-2.597 (.354)***	-5.061 (.763)***
N	11604	11604	11604	11604	11604
Wald Chi-Sq	386.06	262.36	215.91	130.94	74.56

* p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01 All tests are one-tailed regional controls utilized in all models

(!) No ethnic uprisings occurred in cases of shared minority dyads engaged in REGMIDs.

interstate conflict are found to be consistently significant in the models. At the same time, liberal variables involving joint-democracy and, to a lesser degree, joint-trade display a tendency to mute conflict as their value increases. The two realist variables perform the least well, although the association of power *balance* with conflict is highly significant.

While the first two columns examine all types of disputes in the international system, the third, fourth and fifth columns disaggregates disputes into territorial, policy, and regime-change conflicts. A clearer picture of the relationship between demographic-normative and liberal variables within the international system emerges when viewing the results of these models.

The TERRMID, POLMID, and REGMID models yield intriguing results. Irredentist and contending government situations are both significantly associated with territorial disputes ($p < .01$ and $p < .10$, respectively). Once again, MINMAJ situations are particularly associated with higher levels of intra-dyadic hostility when a diaspora uprising is present ($p < .01$). GOVMID disputes, wherein the very legitimacy and right-to-rule of a particular government is in question, are significantly associated with contending government situations (MAJMAJ, $p < .01$), but not irredentist-type ones. The tendency of jointly democratic “contending governments” to either merge or coexist peacefully is manifested in the significance of joint-democracy in the REGMID model as well ($p < .01$).

POLMID disputes, that may involve a variety of policy disputes not related to territory or governance, are not related to either irredentist-type or contending government dyads. To what, then, are policy disputes related? Most importantly, these

disputes are related to shared democracy ($p < .01$), although ethnic heterogeneity and ethnic uprisings in the absence of transborder groups also yield significant, negative results ($p < .05$ for both). However, whereas shared ethnicity is not associated systematically with policy disputes⁵², neither is shared democracy related to territorial disputes in any significant manner.

The results suggest that international politics is essentially guided by three sets of relationships: 1) issues involving policy differences (POLMID), which are unaffected by nationalist/normative mechanisms, but strongly related to the presence or absence of joint democracy; 2) questions of territorial control (TERRMID), which may be strongly affected by nationalism and normative issues, but seem not to be affected by the presence or absence of joint-democracy; and 3) governance issues, which are associated with both shared (majority) national groups and the level of joint-democracy. *In other words, liberal variables concerning the effects of joint-democracy are only systematically associated with conflicts in the world related to policy and governance, not territorial disputes.* The relationship between polity and conflict is relatively weak when disputes occur over territory – territory which often inhabited by diasporas that invoke strong nationalist emotions in homeland states.

In order to clarify the specific effects of significant variables found in the models in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 reveal how such coefficients can be expected to translate into higher or lower propensities of disputes in terms of percentages. Starting from a baseline level of conflict, each significant variable is altered in turn in order to assess its effects. All

⁵² This statement should not be misinterpreted to mean that policy disputes are uncommon in transborder dyads. Policy disputes are actually more common than “territorial disputes” in transborder dyads. However, policy disputes are not systematically more common in transborder dyads than in dyads that do not share ethno-national groups.

TABLE 5.2 – The Effect of Significant Systemic Variables on Bilateral MID and FATAL Probability

	MID Proportional Baseline Change	FATAL Proportional Baseline Change
Majority-Majority Dyad (MAJMAJ = 1)	+ 98%	+ 224%
Minority-Majority Dyad – No Rebellion (MINMAJ = 1 and RELEVANT = 0)	+ 61%	+ 99%
Minority-Majority Dyad – w/ Rebellion (MINMAJ = 1 and RELEVANT = 1)	+ 659%	+ 663%
MINMIN = 1 and Ethnic Uprising = 1	+ 63%	+ 65%
Ethnic Heterogeneity + 1 Standard Dev.	- 14%	- 21%
Capability-Ratio x 2	- 22%	- 43%
Democracy raised + 1 Standard Dev.	- 32%	- 28%
Bilateral Trade + 1 Standard Dev.	Not significant	- 22%
Peace Years + 1 Standard Dev.	- 71%	- 63%

continuous variables are set at their mean, and all dummy and ordinal variables are set at zero (thus, I assume no ethnic rebellion, transborder ethnic groups, or alliance are present). The dyad is also assumed to be divided between regions – the benchmark variable for the regional controls used in these models. Such a “typical” dyad is predicted, for instance, to have a baseline dispute probability of 3.9% for any type of MID and .9% for fatal MIDs. The tables reveal the predicted changes in absolute and relative probability from the baseline as each variable is altered either from 0 to 1 (for

dummy) or one standard deviation (for continuous and ordinal variables, with the exception of capability ratio, which is simply doubled due to the extremely high value of its standard deviation).

More than anything else, these tables drive home the degree to which contending government and irredentist demographic situations increase intra-dyadic hostility. Dispute rates multiply when transborder national groups are present, by a factor of as much as six-and-a-half times when a diaspora uprising occurs within an irredentist situation⁵³. Within territorial disputes, the percentage increases to over one thousand percent. Even in the absence of uprising, the tables reveal that, across all dyads one might anticipate about 60-100 percent more disputes in MINMAJ and MAJMAJ dyads than one would encounter in other contiguous dyads. While joint-democracy has a more modest but more widespread impact on interstate relations, transborder demographics have a more explosive but less common impact.

Lastly, it is important and interesting to note the role of the peace-years control variables in the results found in Table 5.3. The effect of adding one standard-deviation of peace-years (about 11 years for MIDS and FATAL) is particularly strong in the TERRMID (-89%) and REGMID (-94%) models. This indicates how particularly amenable such issues are to enduring rivalries. However, once conditions change such that stability is able to take hold for a significant period of time between two states with transborder issues, one can expect a major reduction of potential inter-dyadic hostility in the future.

⁵³ The marginal effect of diaspora uprisings within irredentist dyads is extremely large due to the consistently conflictual relationships between states within a relatively small number of dyads-years. Altogether, dyad-years witnessing diaspora uprisings in irredentist contexts represent about 2.6% of the dyad-years in the sample, or about 19% of the total minority-majority dyad-years.

TABLE 5.3 – The Effect of Significant Systemic Variables on TERRMID, POLMID and REGMID probability

	TERRMID Proportional Baseline Change	POLMID Proportional Baseline Change	REGMID Proportional Baseline Change
Majority-Majority Dyad (MAJMAJ = 1)	+ 114%	Not significant	+ 843%
Minority-Majority Dyad – No Rebellion (MINMAJ = 1 and RELEVANT = 0)	+ 180%	Not significant	Not significant
Minority-Majority Dyad – w/ Rebellion (MINMAJ = 1 and RELEVANT = 1)	+1035%	Not significant	Not significant
Ethnic Heterogeneity + 1 Standard Dev.	Not significant	- 18%	Not significant
Ethnic Uprising = 1	Not significant	+ 40%	Not significant
Capability-Ratio x 2	- 86%	Not significant	Not significant
Democracy raised + 1 Standard Dev.	Not significant	- 35%	- 62%
Peace Years + 1 Standard Dev.	- 89%	- 51%	- 94%

Domestic Foreign Policy Formulation Results

Table 5.4 displays the results obtained when testing variables associated with the homeland dispute initiation hypotheses found in Chapter 4. Once again, the MID and FATAL models display similar results, with the major difference being that military feasibility is significantly associated with MIDs ($p < .05$), but not fatal MIDs – a result that defies ready explanation. Perhaps disputes that are serious enough to merit the initiation of larger scale violence on the part of homeland states create larger audience costs that make such states more risk-acceptant – however, this is largely conjecture, because one

would not expect such states to march to full scale war under circumstances of certain defeat.

TABLE 5.4 – Domestic Foreign Policy Formulation Model Results

KEY VARIABLES	MID	FATAL
Military Influence _(t-1)	1.472 (.279)***	.891 (.388)**
Narrow Selectorate _(t-1)	-.011 (.455)	.704 (.429)
Diaspora Discontent _(t-1)	-.023 (.316)	.273 (.310)
Diaspora Uprising _(t-1)	.615 (.285)**	1.026 (.477)**
Military Feasibility _(t-1)	.935 (.458)**	.311 (.566)
CONTROL VARIABLES		
Global Trade _(t-1)	1.204 (1.16)	1.496 (1.03)
Intradynadic Trade _(t-1)	1.345 (1.89)	-3.016 (3.42)
Strategically Valuable Territorial Dispute _(t-1)	1.400 (.358)***	.788 (.650)**
Economically Valuable Territorial Dispute _(t-1)	1.118 (.433)***	1.341 (.365)***
Economic Growth 3 yrs. _(t-1)	2.263 (1.12)**	2.054 (1.57)*
Large Uprising in kin state _(t-1)	-.365 (.353)	-.214 (.333)
Ethnic Heterogeneity	.002 (.006)	.004 (.006)
Peace Years	-.194 (.070)***	-.103 (.040)***
CONSTANT	-2.689 (1.04)***	-5.750 (1.06)***
N	1681	1678
Wald Chi-Sq	286.63	609.15

* p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01 All tests are one-tailed

regional controls utilized in all models

The two key variables significantly associated with disputes in both the MID and FATAL models are military influence over policy ($p < .01$ and $p < .05$, respectively) and diaspora uprising (both $p < .05$). When either or both of these factors exist, one would expect an increase in the propensity of a homeland state to initiate disputes with neighboring kin states. Surprisingly, variables associated with narrow selectorates and diaspora discontent are not found to be significant at $p < .10$. However, it must be noted that in the FATAL model, narrow selectorate is significant at $p = .101$, indicating a rather systematic association between dispute initiation and narrow selectorates in fatal disputes.

Several of the control variables are significantly associated with dispute initiation as well. Instrumental-type factors including the strategic ($p < .01$ and $p < .05$) and economic value (both $p < .01$) of a territory are strongly associated with dispute initiation rates among homeland states, clearly indicating that even in irredentist-type disputes, homeland preferences cannot be entirely explained in terms of affective attachments to ethno-national kin. Diversionary theories, at least in the context of irredentist-type dyads, are not supported by the results. Quite the opposite seems true, with economic growth actually associated with higher conflict propensity ($p < .05$, and $p < .10$). Although the effect is somewhat modest, the results suggest conversely that “encapsulation” effects, whereby a state encountering economic stagnation or decline is less likely to initiate conflict, seem more valid in irredentist situations. In addition, the modest positive association between global trade and dispute initiation in the MID and FATAL models ($p = .30$, $p = .15$) suggests that dispute initiators tend not to be “hermit kingdoms” in any sense but, rather, relatively open, modernizing states.

While several of the key and control variables are found significant, this fact alone tells one little about what makes the domestic politics of irredentist situations different than those of other dyads. The next table (5.5) pairs down the domestic politics model into a core model encompassing only significant and jointly significant variables and compares these variables to conflict initiation by all other non-transborder states (because sometimes similar issues of nationalism and self-determination are thought to exist in contending government dyads as well, such dyads are not included in the “other dyad” columns).

By comparing the first and second columns with the third and fourth columns, one notices that three of the variables are similarly significant across-the-board. This is true of variables concerning the strategic and economic value of disputed territory as well as the question of the military feasibility of aggression. Thus, the case studies will consider these variables, but it should be kept in mind that while they hold explanatory power for the actions of irredentist homeland states, the same factors affect the actions of revisionist (transborder or non-transborder) states in general.

Two of the key variables differ significantly in the irredentist context when compared to other dyads. The first is military influence. While the affect of military influence over policy is strongly associated with increases in homeland state dispute initiation in irredentist dyads, no such association exists in dyads-in-general (the sign even indicates a negative influence). Narrow selectorates, while only weakly associated with fatal conflict initiation by homeland states ($p=.13$), are strongly associated with dispute initiation in other cases ($p<.01$ for MIDs, $p<.05$ for fatal MIDS).

In terms of the control variables examining economic growth and global trade, there is also a marked discrepancy between irredentist homeland dispute initiation and other dyads. While global trade and economic growth, in particular, are found to be related to increases in conflict initiation propensity in irredentist situations, in other cases these factors are found to be insignificant (and display negative signs).

TABLE 5.5 – CORE MODELS – (Domestic Foreign Policy Model)

KEY VARIABLES	Irredentist -- MINMAJ		ALL DYADS except transborder dyads	
	MID	FATAL	MID	FATAL
Military Influence _(t-1)	1.341 (.264)***	.932 (.379)**	-.193 (.227)	-.197 (.339)
Narrow Selectorate _(t-1)		.619 (.417)	.740 (.237)***	.988 (.460)**
Diaspora Uprising _(t-1)	.613 (.258)***	1.122 (.444)**	-----	-----
Military Feasibility _(t-1)	.883 (.409)**	-----	1.110 (.361)***	1.418 (.484)***
CONTROL VARIABLES				
Strategically Valuable Territorial Dispute _(t-1)	1.311 (.302)***	.852 (.320)***	1.614 (.387)***	1.721 (.310)***
Economically Valuable Territorial Dispute _(t-1)	1.101 (1.13)***	1.229 (.327)***	.846 (.344)**	1.216 (.408)***
Global Trade _(t-1)	1.204 (1.16)	1.760 (.98)*	-.837 (1.12)	-1.364 (2.49)
Econ. Growth 3yrs. _(t-1)	2.400 (1.18)***	1.967 (1.10)***	-.840 (.589)	-.543 (1.28)
Peace Years	-.195 (.065)***	-.111 (.042)***	-.161 (.019)***	-.106 (.022)***
CONSTANT	-2.547 (1.18)***	-5.434 (.489)***	-3.341 (.459)***	-6.081 (.66)***
N	1729	1728	14485	14485
Wald Chi-Sq	110.44	355.14	199.22	319.03

* p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01 All tests are one-tailed

All models use regional controls

Once again, the coefficients in the table found above are difficult to interpret as displayed. Transformed in the same manner as the results shown in Tables 5.2 and 5.3, Table 5.6 below indicates the baseline probability changes for the variables found in the above models.

TABLE 5.6 – Domestic Foreign Policy Core Model – Baseline Probability Changes

	IRREDENTIST DYADS		ALL Non-Transborder DYADS	
	MID Proportional Baseline Change	FATAL Proportional Baseline Change	MID Proportional Baseline Change	FATAL Proportional Baseline Change
Military Influence = 1	+ 273%	+ 154%	Not significant	Not significant
Narrow Selectorate = 1	Not significant	+ 86%	+ 109%	+ 168%
Diaspora Uprising = 1	+ 83%	+ 206%	-----	-----
Military Feasibility = 1	+ 139%	Not significant	+ 315%	+ 312%
Strategic Territorial Rivalry = 1	+ 262%	+ 134%	+ 394%	+ 458%
Econ. Territorial Rivalry = 1	+ 195%	+ 241%	+ 132%	+ 237%
Global Trade + 1 SD	Not significant	- 19%	Not significant	Not significant
3 yrs GDP change + 1 SD	+ 26%	+ 21%	Not significant	Not significant
Peace Years + 1 Standard Dev.	- 94%	- 71%	- 82%	- 69%

Interactive Domestic Results

Utilizing tree modeling software, as described in the methods section of this chapter, a tree with 20 terminal nodes is created representing potentially significant combinations of key variables⁵⁴ (Military Influence; Narrow Selectorate; Diaspora Discontent; Diaspora Uprising; and Military Feasibility). Of these 20 terminal nodes, three nodes are not associated with any MID initiation, leaving 17 combinations of variables that may be analyzed. When analyzed through similar statistical methods as the earlier analysis (including the use of a peace-years variable) I find that of these 17 combinations, 7 are found to be statistically significant – 6 in a positive direction and 1 in a negative direction. In total, there are 6 variable combinations associated with higher rates of dispute initiation than one would normally expect from homeland states in typical irredentist dyads and 4 combinations (including the three with no MIDs) can be said to be associated with fewer disputes.

The three interactive variables that witness no MIDs⁵⁵ represent the following combination of factors:

- 1: No Uprising; Discontent; Low Mil. Influence; Not Narrow Selectorate; Not Feasible
- 2: No Uprising; Military Influence; Not Narrow Selectorate; Not Feasible
- 3: Uprising; Low Military Influence; Not Feasible

⁵⁴ The classification tree is presented in Appendix C following this chapter. Terminal nodes in Table 5.7 that are associated with significant positive, significant negative, and “No MIDs” outcomes are indicated.

⁵⁵ Due to the similarity of the MID and FATAL models displayed in earlier regression, the tree modeling concept is only used in order to test for non-fatal MIDs.

The clearest pattern among these cases is the lack of “feasibility” in dispute initiation. Even in the presence of a diaspora uprising, military feasibility plays a strong role in dissuading leaders from pursuing aggressive policies. The remaining variable combinations representing each terminal node are tested and the results are shown in Table 5.7. The regression analysis examines the effect of these variable combinations of MID initiation by homeland states (see footnote below).

The one significantly negative variable ($p < .10$) is not particularly surprising, because it represents the pathway associated with values of each variable associated with a decreased chance of dispute initiation (No Uprising; No Discontent; No Military Influence; not Narrow Selectorate; and Not Feasible).

Six nodes represent statistically significant combinations of variables that are associated with an increased propensity for homeland state conflict initiation. The first four are associated with the presence of a diaspora uprising:

1: Uprising; No Discontent; Military Influence (coefficient = 2.17 $p < .00$;

example: Syria -> Israel 1970-1990)

2: Uprising; Discontent; Military Influence (coefficient = 2.62 $p < .00$;

example: Somalia -> Ethiopia 1976-1980)

3: Uprising; No Discontent; Low Military Influence; Narrow Selectorate; Feasible

(coefficient = 2.39 $p < .00$; example: Egypt -> Israel 1966-1975)

TABLE 5.7 – Classification Tree Regression Results

	MID
<i>UP; D; MI</i>	2.174 (.626)***
<i>UP; D; nMI; NS; F</i>	.872 (.766)
<i>UP; D; nMI; nNS; F</i>	.194 (.488)
<i>UP; nD; MI</i>	2.636 (.349)***
<i>UP; nD; nMI; NS; F</i>	2.400 (.844)***
<i>UP; nD; nMI; nNS; F</i>	.919 (.467)**
<i>UP; nMI; nF</i>	NO MIDS
<i>nUP; MI; nNS; nF</i>	NO MIDS
<i>nUP; D; MI; NS; F</i>	2.700 (1.24)**
<i>nUP; D; MI; NS; nF</i>	2.064 (1.77)
<i>nUP; D; MI; nNS; F</i>	1.600 (.514)***
<i>nUP; D; nMI; NS</i>	.306 (.638)
<i>nUP; D; nMI; nNS; F</i>	-.083 (.680)
<i>nUP; D; nMI; nNS; nF</i>	NO MIDS
<i>nUP; nD; MI; NS; nF</i>	-.378 (.949)
<i>nUP; nD; MI; NS; F</i>	-.579 (.952)
<i>nUP; nD; MI; nNS; F</i>	.393 (.865)
<i>nUP; nD; nMI; NS</i>	-1.518 (1.15)
<i>nUP; nD; nMI; nNS; F</i>	-.477 (.757)
<i>nUP; nD; nMI; nNS; nF</i>	-1.456 (.778)*
Peace Years	-.262 (.060)***
CONSTANT	-1.518 (.415)***
N	1945
Wald Chi-Sq	220.02

UP = Diaspora Uprising, nUP = no Diaspora Uprising; D = Diaspora Discontent, nD = No Diaspora Discontent; MI = High Military Influence, nMI = no High Military Influence; NS = Narrow Selectorate, nNS = Not Narrow Selectorate; F = Militarily Feasible, nF = Not Military Feasible
 * p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01 All tests are one-tailed

The “No MIDS” outcomes were found in the use of the classification tree – they are provided in the regression results above for illustrative purposes (i.e. because of the perfect prediction of these categories, they were not included in the regression)

4: Uprising; No Discontent; Low Military Influence; Not Narrow Selectorate; Feasible
(coefficient = 0.92 $p < .05$; example: Pakistan -> India 1990-1991)

The results of these variable interactions reveal one very clear fact – in the presence of a diaspora uprising, other factors, including domestic structure, matter less. This is evident in the variety of factors represented within the significant variable combinations. Combinations 1 and 2 above reveal the interesting pattern that in the presence of diaspora uprising and military influence, questions of military feasibility or selectorate size are so irrelevant that they are “pruned” from the tree. Considering these are the only significant outcomes not requiring the presence of a positive military feasibility value, they seem to indicate a particular risk acceptance on the part of military influenced governments during crisis situations. The only other conclusion that one may draw is that while selectorate size seems irrelevant in terms of statistical significance, the presence of a much smaller coefficient in combination 4 compared to combination 3 might indicate that wider selectorates at least dampen the level of elevated conflict, even if such heightened aggression can be expected to exist.

Perhaps of even greater interest are the two nodes significantly associated with higher conflict levels in the absence of rebellion:

1: No Uprising; Discontent; Military Influence; Not Narrow Selectorate; Feasible
(coefficient = 1.60; $p < .00$; example: Turkey -> Greece, 1980-1985)

2: No Uprising; Discontent; Military Influence; Narrow Selectorate; Feasible

(coefficient = 2.70; $p < .05$; example: Iraq -> Iran, 1970s)

Here one notes that in the absence of rebellion, the presence or absence of a narrow selectorate once again does not particularly matter. However, when compared to other cases within which a diaspora uprising has *not* occurred, the pattern of: *Military Influence + Discontent (+ Military Feasibility)* stands out as an important combination of variables associated with higher dispute initiation rates for homeland states. Thus, as opposed to the earlier finding suggesting that relative kin state political or economic conditions (discontent) were a largely insignificant factor, the results of the interactive analysis indicate these factors are important under particular circumstances when military influence over policy is strong. Similarly, while military influence was found to have a strong influence across all cases in earlier non-interactive regressions, the classification method reveals that military influence is particularly important in situations when diasporas are not engaged in rebellion, but suffer under relatively poor economic or political conditions compared to those of the homeland.

Summary of results and implications for theory

Table 5.8 lists the hypotheses from Chapters 3 and 4 that are confirmed by the preceding analysis. Following the table, discussion will be divided into two sections. The first section will discuss the implications of results obtained from testing the normative-demographic hypotheses. The second section will discuss the results obtained from testing hypotheses associated with irredentist homeland state behavior.

TABLE 5.8 – Hypothesis Outcomes and Associated Variables

Hypothesis	Variable	Relation to Disputes found as variable increases
Demographic-Normative Hypotheses (undirected dyads)		
1N Irredentist dyads and Diaspora Rebellion	RELEVANT	Increase in MID, FATAL, and TERRMID models
2N Irredentist-type Dyads (controlling for Diaspora Rebellion)	MINMAJ	Increase in MID, FATAL, and TERRMID models
3N Contending Government	MAJMAJ	Increase in MID, FATAL, TERRMID, and GOVMID models
4N Ethnic Rebellion (in general)	UPETHNIC	Increase in POLMID model
5N Territorial Disputes – association with MINMAJ and MAJMAJ	MAJMAJ MINMAJ (DEMAUTLO)	Increase Increase (Not Significant)
6N Regime Change Disputes – association with MINMAJ and MAJMAJ	MAJMAJ MINMAJ (DEMAUTLO)	Increase Not Significant (Decrease)
7N Policy Disputes – association with DEMAUTLO	(MAJMAJ) (MINMAJ) DEMAUTLO	(Not Significant) (Not Significant) Decrease
Domestic Irredentist Hypotheses (directed dyads)		
1D Diaspora Rebellion	RELEVANT	Increase
2D Diaspora Discontent	DISCONT	Not Significant
3D Military Influence	MILITARY	Increase
4D Narrow Selectorate	SELECTORATE	Increase (but results are weak in FATAL, not significant in MID)
5D Military Feasibility	FEASIBLE	Increase
6D Military Feasibility in interactive model outcomes	Combinations including FEASIBLE = 1	Absent military feasibility, none of the interactive combinations is positive and significant
7D Diaspora rebellion will increase dispute initiation while other	Combinations including RELEVANT (=1)	Diaspora rebellion increases dispute initiation in 4 of 6 interactive outcomes with

factors will be largely irrelevant within interactive model		no systematic pattern among other variables
8D No Uprising + Poor Diaspora Conditions + Military Influence + Military Feasibility	Combination including RELEVANT (=0); DISCONT (=1); MILITARY (=1); and FEASIBLE (=1)	Increase
9D No Uprising + Poor Diaspora Conditions + Narrow Selectorate + Military Feasibility	Combination including RELEVANT (=0); DISCONT (=1); SELECTORATE (=1); and FEASIBLE (=1)	Not significant

Normative-Demographic Implications of Transborder Nationality and Nationalism

The results of the demographic-normative hypotheses highlight the important role that transborder national demographics play in international relations. National⁵⁶ demographic spillover into bordering states yields much higher rates of dyadic conflict if at least part of a national group constitutes a majority of the population in one of the states. According to the results of this analysis, in cases where two contiguous states share a majority group (MAJMAJ), or one state is home to a majority and the other a minority of the same population (MINMAJ), marginal dispute rates increase greatly over their benchmark values, particularly when fatalities are involved. This is borne out throughout this study in the both case of contending government (majority-majority) and irredentist-type (minority-majority) dyads,

An important factor differentiating irredentist and contending government dyads is the manner in which kin state populations are viewed. Whereas irredentist-type nationalism increases in intensity when diaspora groups are viewed as oppressed, nationalism in contending government situations is muted by the fact that aggressive policies may bring harm upon co-nationals. This mitigates the instinct to engage in militant “rescue” strategies in the presence of kin state rebellion, as it requires conflict to

⁵⁶ I will continue to utilize the term “nation” in this discussion with the understanding that, more specifically, it was “politicized ethnicity” that was tested.

be directed at co-national populations rather than foreign nationalities. This distinction is reflected in the results of the systemic analysis. It is clear that diaspora rebellion in minority-majority dyads significantly increases the chance of international disputes. On an undirected dyadic level, a similar effect is not noted within contending government states.

Surprisingly, uprising with shared minority situations was found to significantly, albeit somewhat modestly, increase MID and FATAL dispute propensities within dyads sharing rebellious minority groups. Contrary to the findings of Woodwell (2004), the results suggest that spillover effects from ethno-national domestic rebellion may play a role in disrupting normal state relations.

The types of disputes involving irredentist and contending dyads differ somewhat as well. Irredentist-type dyads are only systematically related to territorial disputes, whereas contending government dyads are associated with both territorial and regime change disputes. This is significant in terms of the shared understandings, expectations, and fears of states involved in these different categories of transborder dyads, because irredentism represents the prospect of territorial transfer that Wendt (1999) describes as a “Lockean” rivalry relationship, whereas contending governments may be engaged in a kill-or-be-killed “Hobbesian” relationship. Both types of dyads are involved in disputes, however, that tend to be less common, but more inflammatory, than the “policy” type disputes most associated with democratic peace theory and the associated lack of joint democracy.

Overall, the results suggest that ethno-national demographics play a strong role in international relations. Although norms of sovereignty and territorial integrity tend to

outweigh those of self-determination as a guiding international principle, the weakness of traditional status quo international norms vis-à-vis self-determination allows for the selective invocation of nationalist rhetoric as a situational pretext for interstate aggression. More than simple rhetoric, norms of self-determination appeal in fundamental ways across broad audiences in homeland states, and the desire to unite with kin populations in neighboring states often becomes a cultural mantra that ultimately guides many foreign policy choices.

The next section discusses the results concerning the domestic political structures and issues underlying the cultivation of territorial revisionist aims in irredentist dyads. While constructivist-type interactions and understandings are important for both irredentist and contending government interstate relations, specific domestic structures and issues are considered to be particularly important within homeland states with irredentist designs. While the theoretical background and results just discussed suggest that irredentist homeland populations will almost always hold preferences for unification with kin populations, the intensity of those preferences and the manner in which they are manifested in foreign policy outcomes can be expected to vary depending upon a number of institutional and situational factors.

Homeland revisionist behavior within irredentist-type dyads

The analysis of factors related to dispute initiation by homeland states in irredentist dyads confirms the broad contours of the theoretical arguments of Chapter 4, while sharpening understanding of the model presented in Figure 4.2. In terms of the *interactions* presented in the model, the empirical analysis indicates that the presence of

diaspora rebellion represents a category-of-its-own, which, when it exists, largely overrides the consideration of other factors. I have suggested this is likely due to intense and widespread domestic audience costs that necessitate action by executives in almost any homeland state, no matter what domestic structures are present.

At the same time, the coupling of diaspora discontent, state structures favoring aggression, and the presence of military feasibility is shown to be an important combination leading to systematically higher levels of aggression when the “state structure favoring aggression” involves a weak civil-military divide. On the other hand, the presence of an insulated executive decision-maker, as described in the concept of a narrow selectorate, represents a very weak link in the causal schema when compared to the role of military influence.

When examined individually (and controlling for other factors), several variables stand out as systematically influencing the initiation of international disputes within irredentist-type dyads. Some of these variables are influential in the initiation of disputes no matter the demographic context; others are influential only within irredentist-type situations. Table 5.9 summarizes the factors associated with both irredentist (homeland) dispute initiation and non-transborder state dispute initiation as well as those factors associated uniquely with homeland state dispute initiation.

The effect of military influence on dispute initiation within irredentist-type dyads is one of the most important findings of this study. The greater the influence of the military over policy within a homeland state, the greater the potential for violence within irredentist dyads. As mentioned in Chapter 4, military influence differs from the

TABLE 5.9 – Factors Associated with Increased Dispute Initiation Solely within Irredentist-type Dyads and within both Irredentist-type and “General” (Non-Transborder) Dyads

Irredentist Dyads	Both Irredentist and General Dyads
Uprising of National Diaspora in kin state	
Military Influence over Foreign Policy	
Economic Growth - Last three years	
Higher Global Trade (weakly supported)	
Strategic Territorial Rivalry	Strategic Territorial Rivalry
Economic Territorial Rivalry	Economic Territorial Rivalry
Military Feasibility	Military Feasibility
Narrow Selectorate (weakly supported)	Narrow Selectorate (much more strongly supported in general dyad than irredentist dyads)

influence of other domestic audience due to several major factors: 1) the fact that militaries represent bastions of strong nationalist sentiment, sentiment that is constantly reinforced by the state in order to increase combat effectiveness by inculcating a spirit of self-sacrifice (Posen 1993: 81); 2) the enhanced ability of military decision-makers to organize collective action to pressure for aggressive policies abroad; and 3) the preferences of military leaders for taking decisive aggressive action within the context of military crises in order to gain quick military advantage on the battlefield.⁵⁷ Because the

⁵⁷ The last two conditions also apply to the role of military influence in contending government dyads, within which the MILITARY value was found to be significant (results not displayed). Although the role of militaries within contending dyads is not explored in this study, I suggest that their role in such dyads more strongly reflects their role as state security providers than as seekers of national unification. As

degree of military influence within a homeland state can be expected to wax and wane over time, military influence is particularly amenable to examination within the case studies that follow this chapter. When the military-civilian divide in a state is weak or non-existent, homeland irredentist states pursue more aggressive foreign policies towards kin states. The results of interactive tests suggest that military influence is particularly important in the absence of diaspora rebellion, but with the presence of a “discontent” diaspora residing in a relatively politically repressive or economic underdeveloped state.

Two economic control variables uniquely associated with irredentist dyad homeland dispute initiation involve recent economic growth and higher levels of global trade (economic growth is a much stronger result). Although not the primary focus of this analysis, these results suggest that economic modernization and nationalist politics may be integrally related. Alternately, the results may simply indicate that states undergoing periods of economic stagnation may find themselves concentrating on internal problems to the exclusion of foreign policy issues (however, if this were so, it is hard to imagine why the effect would not be similar for non-transborder dyads). Either way, the results indicate that nationalist-driven foreign policies do not arise due to desires from homeland leaders to divert attention from economic problems at home and are, in fact, related to the presence of relative economic growth.

Lastly, the foreign policies of homeland states in irredentist dyads are affected by several of the same factors affecting other states. While the presence of a narrow selectorate may influence conflict initiation to some degree, this effect is actually weaker in the irredentist context than in non-transborder dyads. Economic and strategic

mentioned, contending dyad states tend to be particularly security oriented, and state aggression abroad under conditions of higher military influence is likely to be pre-emptive in nature rather than power- or territory-seeking.

considerations play a role in dispute initiation, although there is little evidence suggesting that leaders employ nationalist rhetoric as a pretext for pursuing such instrumental preferences. In addition to economic and strategic considerations, homeland states are also influenced by questions of military feasibility. Like all states with potentially aggressive preferences, leaders of homeland states have little stomach for embarking on policies doomed to failure, no matter what the domestic consequences of inaction.

Conclusion

The preceding discussion section reviewed many of the findings of this chapter. However, with an eye toward applying the empirical findings to the case studies that follow, a quick recapitulation of the findings follow.

In terms of the demographic-normative hypotheses and econometric models, it was shown that:

- 1). Dyads with irredentist and contending government-type demographic patterns are associated with higher levels of intradyadic hostility when compared with other contiguous dyads.
- 2). Irredentist-type dyads witnessing diaspora rebellion are particularly prone to conflict.
- 3). Territorial disputes are associated with irredentist-type and contending government dyads, with relative polity levels representing an insignificant factor. Regime-change disputes are associated with contending government-type demographics as well as a lack

of joint-democracy. Policy type disputes are only significantly related to questions of joint-democracy and are not found to be strongly related to demographic considerations.

While the theory discussed in Chapter 3 suggested a connection between the existence of competing norms and ethno-national demographics, this relationship is not directly assessed in this chapter. The case studies that follow will examine in greater depth the relationship between international norms and state preference in irredentist situations.

In terms of the domestic irredentist hypotheses, it was shown that:

- 1). Diaspora rebellion increases the likelihood of dispute initiation by homelands states. In the presence of such rebellion, most other factors seem to have only marginal influence on the level of aggression pursued by a homeland state. Even military feasibility seems particularly irrelevant when military influence is coupled with diaspora rebellion, suggesting perhaps a greater potential for military-influenced leadership to overestimate homeland capabilities during crises.

- 2). High levels of military influence over foreign policy in homeland states in irredentist dyads increases the likelihood of dispute initiation by homeland states. This is particularly evident in the presence of a “discontent” diaspora residing in a relatively repressive or economic undeveloped state.

3). Positive economic growth is positively associated with homeland dispute initiation, suggesting a possible connection between modernization and nationalist foreign policies, while contradicting diversionary theory.

4). Considerations of strategic and economic territorial rivalry as well as the military feasibility of aggression are factors associated with higher levels of dispute initiation in all dyads, including irredentist-types ones.

5). The existence of a narrow selectorate state structure has less an effect on irredentist homeland state behavior than it does the behavior of other states.

APPENDICES – CHAPTER 5

APPENDIX A – Codification of Variables from Chapter 5

Kin uprising (RELEVANT): Simply interacting MINMAJ and UPETHNIC does not directly address the theoretical proposition that minority groups engaged in armed rebellion will draw nearby like-ethnic majority states into increased international disputes, requiring two further coding restrictions. First, the variable is restricted such that an uprising must actually take place in the “minority” half of the dyad. Second, the group that has rebelled must be of the same ethnic group as the majority state in the dyad. This variable is used in the undirected dyad models and the directed dyad affective models to assess hypotheses 1N, 1D, and is involved in the interactive processes underlying hypotheses 6D-9D.

Ethnic Uprising (UPETHNIC): The UPETHNIC variable is coded from the Uppsala Armed Conflict dataset (v. 1.0), which lists all armed uprisings within states that were responsible for at least 25 battle-related deaths. Deciphering which uprisings are full or partly ethnic in nature is fairly straightforward – usually an ethnically based armed group will include some ethnic or territorial label in their name. For questionable groups, the Minorities at Risk dataset was consulted in order to determine whether an ethnic group was engaged in rebellion against their government during the period of the uprising.⁵⁸ In the undirected dyad models, the variable is coded ‘1’ if one state had an ethnic uprising the previous year and ‘2’ if both states witnessed one. This variable is only used in the undirected dyad models to assess hypothesis 4N.

⁵⁸ Generally speaking, any armed ethnic group has likely drawn enough attention to itself to merit inclusion in the MAR dataset.

Military (MILITARY): This variable is intended to indicate whether a state's military can be expected to be influential in a state's policy decisions. MILITARY is coded 1 if one of two criteria is met: 1) if a government is headed directly by a military leader or primarily through military leaders (military-civilian type) or 2) if a military coup has been successfully attempted during the previous five years. The first criterion includes situations in which the role of military leaders in policy-making is clear and direct. The second criterion represents situations in which military rule no longer exists – but its potential return provides a powerful coercive influence over policy. The two criteria are combined due to the fact that many recent coups will result in the continued presence of direct military rule – cases which add no explanatory power to the model because military government is already coded. By combining the variables, I create one single variable that encompasses both direct military leadership plus instances when militaries turned power over to civilian regimes following a coup. The presence of a coup over the last five years and the type of government (REGIME-type) are coded in Banks' (2002) cross-national dataset. This variable assesses hypothesis 3D and is involved in the interactive processes underlying hypotheses 6D-9D.

Selectorate Size (SELECT): Although the degree of state democracy versus autocracy is considered a control variable in the first, undirected regression (where the presence or absence of joint-democracy is assessed), it is theorized to be a key factor in determining the final foreign policy outcomes in homeland states in irredentist dyads. Under the assumption that selectorate size and the presence or absence of democracy are related,

this variable draws from the Polity IV dataset, which codes each state government according to its level of democracy and authoritarianism (ranging from -10 for the most extreme authoritarian states, to +10 for the most democratic). Newer versions of the Polity IV dataset also provide interpolated DEMAUTLO values in cases of regime transition and anarchy. These values are utilized in this study in order to mitigate the effect of systematically eliminating dyads associated with weak states.

The variable is reclassified into a dichotomous variable which suggests either the presence or absence of a narrow selectorate, which is assumed to exist for Polity scores under -6. While such a dichotomy may seem *ad hoc*, the variable is operationalized as such with the understanding that the relevant theoretical factor affecting a leader's foreign policy behavior is the ability to isolate him or her from the consequences of foreign policy failure. Even within the somewhat-autocratic states that would be represented in the Polity database around the numeral 0, a variety of audience groups may still exist that would be in a position to punish executives for foreign policy failure.⁵⁹ Thus, the value is dichotomize to be 1 in the case of a narrow selectorate (*low values* of Polity) and 0 in cases in which the selectorate is not considered narrow. This variable is used to assess hypothesis 4d and is involved in the interactive processes underlying hypotheses 6D-9D.

Diaspora Discontent (DISCONT): One would expect that the economic and political grievances of national kin would foster louder calls for self-determination and provide

⁵⁹ Many of these groups might not be considered in the current "winning coalition", a term described by Bueno de Mesquita et al (2003) as an important determinant of political behavior alongside selectorate size. The restriction of the variable to very low polity values should help ensure that both selectorate size and winning coalition sizes are small.

homeland audiences with affective motivations for interventionist activity on behalf of kin abroad. This variable assesses the relative wealth and political freedom in kin states with homeland states. If a kin state is either poorer or more politically repressive than a homeland state, than the variable is coded as a 1, otherwise as a 0. Economic comparisons are assessed by comparing the average GDP per capita (constant 1996 \$US) of homeland states to kin states based on data found in Gleditsch (2002). Political repression is compared utilizing the Polity variable found in the Polity IV dataset. This variable is used to assess hypothesis 2D and is involved in the interactive processes underlying hypotheses 6D-9D.

Military Feasibility (FEASIBLE): Military feasibility is based on three factors contained in the Correlates of War capabilities index. The first, most direct, indicator of military capability reflects the total number of soldiers in a state's military⁶⁰. The second and third indicators consider a country's population and energy production, which are considered to proxy the human and industrial resources within a state that represent a greater or lesser ability to mobilize for conflict. The three factors are normalized so that they represent similar measurements (essentially transformed so they contain the same number of digits, so that one factor does not tend to subsume another) and added together.

A survey of the dataset suggests that in most cases, the composite measure seems to comport to reality in a sensible manner (for instance, the U.S., Soviet Union, and

⁶⁰ In most cases in political science when such a capability index is used, military expenditures play a role in the construction of the index. Unfortunately, due to the imprecise reporting of, or lack of data concerning such expenditures, we feel that inclusion of military spending in a capability index adds additional measurement error to an already imprecise concept.

China have roughly equal capabilities in the final years of the Cold War). However, recognizing that this “objective” measure will not conform entirely to reality (as is the case with any purported objective measure of power) and the fact that *perceived* capabilities are the basis of executive decision-making, I adopt a fairly loose coding of what be considered a militarily “feasible” opportunity for military aggressive behavior. Within the data, military feasibility is coded as a 1 as long as a homeland state has at least 1/5th the measured capabilities of the kin state within a dyad. Otherwise, the variable is coded as a 0. This variable is used to assess hypothesis 5d and is involved in the interactive processes underlying hypotheses 6D-9D.

Control Variables

Peace Years (PYMID, PYFAT): Pooled time-series datasets require special methods to mitigate serial correlation due to the fact that the behavior of particular observations (dyad-years in this case) is strongly related to the behavior of those observations in preceding or following years. Perhaps the most popular method in international relations for enhancing the temporal independence of observations is through the use of a “peace-years” variable, which controls for unobserved variation in dyadic behavior attributable to the past behavior of the dependent variable. The peace-years variable measures the length of time since a dyad experienced a MID (PYMID) or a fatal mid (PYFAT). Using such a method closely approximates the results one would obtain utilizing a survival model (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998). Adding a variable indicating how many years a dyad has remained at peace since it entered the dataset is the simplest way of modeling the effect of long stretches of war or peace on conflict propensity.

Regional Control Variables: The models utilize regional control variables as a method for mitigating spatial dependence among dyads. Spatial dependence is a phenomenon which suggests that the “neighborhood” within which a dyad exists plays a role in conditioning that dyad’s behavior. The use of regional control variables helps control for unobservable causal influences that are attributable to a dyad’s geographic location and the behavior of regional neighbors. The regional controls employed include: the Americas, Europe, Africa, the Middle East (and North Africa); and Asia. The “benchmark” variable, against which these regions are compared, codes states that are split between different regions.⁶¹ The results from regional variables have little theoretical significance for this work, and are thus not reported with the results. See below for the use of RGDPPC as a control variable for fatal disputes.

Alliances (ALLIES): Common state interests, possibly coupled with affective normative ties, may lead states to join in common defense alliances. The presence of alliance ties between states within a dyad can be expected to provide a powerful disincentive to conflict. ALLIES is a dichotomous variable coded 0 if no alliance exists and 1 if the states in a dyad are formally allied. The measurement is derived from alliance data compiled as part of the Correlates of War project (Singer and Small, 1993).

Capability-Ratio (CAP): The importance of maintaining a balance of military capabilities is a key realist concept. The LCAP variable assesses the capabilities of a state based

⁶¹ In order to avoid a “dummy variable trap” whereby perfect multicollinearity exists among a series of dichotomous variables, one such variable must be dropped and used a benchmark against which the others may be measured.

upon the same formula used to determine military feasibility (manpower + population + energy) derived from the Correlates of War capabilities index. Unlike the FEASIBLE variable, this variable is continuous rather than dichotomized. This variable is utilized exclusively in the undirected dyad models.

Democracy-Autocracy (DEMAUTLO): The independent variable DEMAUTLO represents the classic “polity” variable employed by democratic peace scholars to measure regime type in a state. I draw from the Polity IV dataset, which codes each state government according to its level of democracy and authoritarianism (ranging from -10 for the most extreme authoritarian states, to +10 for the most democratic). The DEMAUTLO score represents the lower of the two polity scores in the dyad (the “less constrained” state) in the undirected dyad models in which it is employed.

Trade Dependence (DEPENDLO): Another cornerstone of liberal theory promotes the value of economic interdependence in fostering peaceful relations between states. The DEPENDLO variable examines bilateral commerce within a dyad by dividing total trade (exports plus imports) with a dyadic partner by a GDP for each state. Assuming that the state with the lower trade dependency is the lesser constrained of the two, the variable indicates the level of dependency for the lesser dependent state in the undirected dyad models. In the instrumental directed dyad model, the level of trade of a particular state with its dyadic partner is represented. Trade data derives from Gleditsch (2002). In the

relatively few dyad-years in which trade data is not available, an average is taken of the last and next years of available data.⁶²

Interaction Terms (UPETHNIC x MAJMAJ and UPETHNIC x MINMIN): Two interaction terms are utilized to examine the specific effects of ethnic rebellion within two of the three different types of dyads. Dyads are coded non-zero only if they experienced ethnic rebellion the previous year and fit either the category of MAJMAJ or MINMIN. These variables are only used in the undirected dyad models.

Ethnic Heterogeneity (EHET): This variable assesses whether ethnic heterogeneity in a state mutes state aggression. Marshall (1997) suggests that states may have a power difficult time marshalling resources to project power abroad in ethnically fractionalized states. In terms of conflict initiation by homeland states, Marshall's theory suggests that large minority groups in states controlled by a majority population of a different group may not wish to see their power further diluted by the prospect of an increase in the size of the majority group. Furthermore, leaders may be reluctant to set a precedent for forceful territorial change in fear that it might lend itself to minority secessionist desires at home. Ethnic heterogeneity also represents a useful control variable in undirected dyads due to the fact that bordering states are more likely to share ethnic groups when those states are more ethnically heterogeneous.

⁶² Although this represents a bit of a sloppy fix, the effect on the data and results turns out to be minimal. The only variable significantly affected by the process of filling-in the missing dyad-years is the trade variable itself, which shifts from insignificance to weak significance in several equations. A similar process is utilized with the IGO variable, which remains equally insignificant after missing dyad years are added.

The variable EHET is drawn from Vanhanen's (1999) ethnic heterogeneity dataset. As a composite index of race, language, and religion, it is the most appropriate measurement for this study due to its inclusive definition of ethnicity. The measurement ranges from 0 (North Korea) to 177 (Suriname). The coded variable represents the higher value of the two states in a dyad in the undirected dyad models, and simply the coding for a particular homeland state in the directed dyad instrumental model.

Economic or Strategic Territorial Claim (ECONHUTH; STRATHUTH): Leaders may use nationalist issues as justifications for aggression that is intended in, at least part, to garner economic power or strategic advantage for the state. The incentive to acquire territories of strategic value is straightforward in terms of realist/neorealist reasoning. Such acquisitions will increase the power and security of a state by allowing for future power projection abroad or by establishing a more defensible geographical periphery that would enhance future state defense. The domestic political implications for leaders acquiring strategic territory are somewhat unclear, but one might expect that general political approval among domestic audiences would increase due to perceptions that state leadership was carrying out a successful foreign policy and security agenda. Furthermore, the more secure a state's geographical position, the less threat outside powers represent to a leader's position.

Huth (1996: 52) offers two major reasons why the economic value of territory also provides incentives for foreign policy revisionism. First, the acquisition and development of such resources would benefit certain sectors of the domestic economy, creating additional political support for the leader. Second, income generated through the

export of acquired resources would generate future state revenue, which could be used to support domestic programs and defense needs. In addition, one might expect the procurement of additional economic resources to be particularly appealing when a leader's support is based upon a narrow group, or "selectorate", which may trade political support for private gain (Bueno de Mesquita, *et al*, 2002).

These variables are derived from data utilized in Huth (1996) and Huth and Allee (2002)⁶³. The variables are coded 1 if a given state claims a strategically or economically valuable piece of territory within a bordering area of its dyadic partner. According to Huth (p. 256-257) strategic value is coded 1 when territory is near major shipping lanes; would provide an outlet to the sea for a landlocked country; contains military bases or threatens military bases of the claimant; could be used to establish a second front against the target state; or blocks a principal route of attack that would be used against a target in a conflict. Economic value is determined by the presence or absence of valuable minerals, fossil fuels, or other natural resources.

3-year GDP change (GDP3): Diversionary theory suggests that leaders use foreign policy initiatives, particular conflict, in a manner such as to deflect attention from domestic problems. Due to the emergence of an "out-group" threat to the nation, leaders seek to create internal domestic solidarity through a "rally-around-the-flag effect" when their popularity sags (Simmel 1955; Coser 1956). Gelpi (1997) suggest the effect is particularly acute in democracies, whereby autocracies may suppress domestic discontent directly. Heldt (1999) finds little association between government-type and diversionary tactics, but suggest that they are employed when international structural opportunities

⁶³ My appreciation goes out to Todd Allee for providing me with this data.

arise. Others argue that rather than diversionary effects that high levels of domestic turmoil tend to cause “encapsulation” effects, whereby leadership is less likely to become involved in foreign disputes due to their weak position at home (Hazlewood 1975: 225; also see Salmore and Salmore 1973)⁶⁴.

This variable assumes that recent economic success or failure should have a strong correlation to public support of state leadership. Thus, this variable measures the change in GDP that a state has experienced over the preceding three years under the assumption that a finding associating GDP decline with aggressive foreign behavior would support diversionary theories while an association between economic decline and reduced aggression would tend to support encapsulation theory. GDP data is derived from Gleditsch (2002).

Bilateral Trade and Global Trade (BITRADE; OPEN): These variables are used to examine whether states are restrained in their revisionist behavior through direct bilateral trade ties or through susceptibility to global trade sanctions that may result from aggressive behavior

Ambrosio (2001) argues that the degree of permissiveness displayed by the international community vis-à-vis particular irredentist situations is *the* primary factor determining the likelihood of militant irredentism. As Huth (1996: 111) points out, however, domestic incentives can often override a perceived lack of international support. While perhaps not representing the same degree of constraint as relative military power might, international constraints lead not only to perceptions that the citizens of a

⁶⁴ Hazlewood (1975) suggests that non-violent domestic strife is associated with diversion, whereas violent domestic strife is associated with encapsulation.

homeland state will pay a price not only for failing in any aggressive endeavors, but also for succeeding.

An even more likely cost to aggression than international sanctions is the potential disruption of trade relations with states that is the target of military revisionism. It is now standard liberal international relations theory that economic interdependence “gives each party a stake in the economic well-being of the other – and in avoiding militarized disputes” (Russett and Oneal 2001: 129). Thus, levels of trade among partners within a dyad as well as a homeland state’s overall openness to the global economy may affect the propensity of a homeland state to initiate a conflict with a kin state. These variables are monadic indicators of a state’s trade/GDP with its dyadic partner (BITRADE) and with the world as a whole (also divided by GDP). This data is derived from Gleditsch (2002).

Large Uprising (UPBIGK): When assessing instrumental opportunities for aggression, one would expect that larger insurrections in target states would lead to greater state vulnerability. This variable eliminates civil conflicts found in the Uppsala database that are considered “minor” (less than 1,000 deaths in course of a conflict). While there may be affective reasons for greater homeland aggression resulting from minor uprisings in kin states, the instrumental military implications are likely to be less significant. Thus, this more restricted view of uprisings (not necessarily ethnic ones, however) is utilized to assess whether homeland states systematically avail themselves of opportunities resulting from the weakened security status of kin states that are confronting domestic strife.

APPENDIX B – Specific Codification of Transborder Variables

Minority-Majority Dyads

<u>Ethnic Group</u>	<u>Majority State</u>	<u>Minority State</u>
Haitian blacks	Haiti	Dominican Republic
American Indians	Bolivia	Peru Paraguay Chile Argentina United States United States United States Great Britain Belgium Belgium Switzerland Luxembourg Switzerland Yugoslavia Romania Czechoslovakia Yugoslavia
Latin (Spanish descent)	Mexico	
Latin (Spanish descent)	Cuba	
Latin (Spanish descent)	Panama	
Irish (N. Ireland Catholics)	Ireland	
Dutch/Flemish	Netherlands	
French/Walloon	France	
French/Swiss	France	
French	France	
Italian/Swiss	Italian	
Hungarians	Hungary	
Albanians	Albania	
Greeks	Greece	
Turks	Turkey	
Turks	Turkey	
Swedes	Sweden	
Finns	Finland	
Hausa	Niger	
Mande	Mali	
Arabs	Libya	
Hutu	Burundi	
Hutu	Rwanda	
Somalis	Somalia	
Arabs	Saudi Arabia	
Arabs	Egypt	
Arabs	Iraq	
Arabs	Syria	
Arabs	Lebanon	
Arabs	Jordan	
Arabs	Sudan	
Farsi (-speaking peoples)	Iran	
Chinese	China	
Hindus	India	
Moslems	Pakistan	
Bengals	Bangladesh	
Malays	Malaysia	
Vietnamese	Vietnam & North and South Vietnam	
Papuans	Papua New Guinea	
Sotho	South Africa	

Tswana

Botswana

South Africa

Majority-Majority Dyads

Ethnic Group

English-speakers

Latino (Spanish descent)

Latino (Spanish descent)

Latino (Spanish descent)

Latino (Spanish descent)

Latino (Spanish descent)

German

Greek

Fang

Arab

Arab

Arab

Arab

Arab

Arab

Arab

Shi'ites

Chinese

Korean

Vietnamese

Malay

Majority State

United States

Guatemala

Costa Rica

Columbia

Peru

Argentina

Germany (&GFR)

West Germany

Greece

Gabon

Algeria

Libya

Egypt

Iraq

Syria

Saudi Arabia

North Yemen

Iran

China

North Korea

N. Vietnam

Malaysia

Majority State

Canada

Honduras

El Salvador

Mexico

Panama

Nicaragua

Venezuela

Panama

Chile

Ecuador

Paraguay

Chile

Uruguay

Austria

Switzerland

East Germany

Cyprus

Equatorial Guinea

Morocco

Tunisia

Libya

Tunisia

Egypt

Sudan

Sudan

Syria

Jordan

Kuwait

Saudi Arabia

Jordan

Lebanon

Jordan

Oman

Yemen

Bahrain

Egypt

UAE

South Yemen

Iraq

Taiwan

South Korea

S. Vietnam

Brunei

Minority-Minority Dyads

Ethnic Group

American Indians

Minority State

United States

Minority State

Canada

American Indians	Mexico	Mexico
American Indians	Honduras	United States
Blacks	Panama	Guatemala
American Indians, Blacks	Venezuela	Guatemala
Blacks	Ecuador	El Salvador
American Indians	Ecuador	Costa Rica
American Indians	Argentina	Columbia
Basques/Roma	France	Columbia
Roma	France	Brazil
Roma	Hungary	Brazil
		Peru
		Paraguay
		Chile
		Spain
		Italy
		Czechoslovakia
		Yugoslavia
		Romania
Roma	Greece	Bulgaria
		Turkey
Azeris/Kurds	USSR	Iran
Tajiks/Uzbeks	USSR	Afghanistan
Buriat	USSR	Mongolia
Mande/Susu	Guinea	Guinea-Bissau
Tuareg/djerema-songhai	Mali	Niger
Fulani	Mali	Guinea
		Burkina Faso
Pulaar	Senegal	Guinea
Yoruba	Benin	Nigeria
Mande	Cote d'Ivoire	Guinea
Mossi-dagomba	Ghana	Burkina Faso
Ewe	Ghana	Togo
Sara	Chad	Central African Republic
Bakongo	Congo	Zaire
Bakongo	Congo	Angola
Tutsis	Zaire	Burundi
		Rwanda
Bankongo/Cabinda	Zaire	Angola
Lunda/Yeke	Zaire	Zambia
Fulani, Mandinka	Guinea-Bissau	Senegal
Fulani, Wolof	Gambia	Senegal
Fulani	Benin	Burkina Faso
Aja-Gbe	Benin	Togo
Fulani, Yoruba	Benin	Nigeria
Fulani	Niger	Cameroon
Dan	Cote d' Ivoire	Liberia
Kisi, Kpelle	Guinea	Liberia
Dagaara, Frafra	Burkina Faso	Ghana
Gourmachea	Burkina Faso	Togo
Ndau	Mozambique	Zimbabwe
Nyanja, Tumbuka	Zambia	Malawi
Urdu (speakers)	India	Pakistan
Rendille-borana/Somalis	Kenya	Ethiopia
Tutsi	Rwanda	Burundi
Afars	Djibouti	Ethiopia
		Eritrea

Afars
Whites

San Bushmen
Berbers

Kurds

Kurds

Kurds
Baluchis
South Asian workers
Tamils
Hill tribes
Chinese

Chinese

Ethiopia
South Africa

Namibia
Algeria

Iran



Iraq

Turkey
Iran
UAE
India
Thailand
Malaysia

Indonesia

Eritrea
Zimbabwe
Namibia
Botswana
Morocco
Tunisia
Turkey
Iraq
Turkey
Syria
Syria
Pakistan
Oman
Sri Lanka
Myanmar (Burma)
Singapore
Indonesia
Singapore

Appendix C



Classification Tree
 (in order to fit the page, the subtrees following “No Diaspora Uprising” and “Diaspora Uprising” have been separated)

+++++++ = terminal node yields positive, significant ($p < .05$) results in regression model

////////// = terminal node has no MIDs

----- = terminal node yields negative, significant ($p < .10$) result in regression model

PART II

Introduction to Case Studies

The theory and findings of the first part of this work represent the bases of the case studies that follow. The case studies analyze irredentist situations that have occurred over the last century and suggest how the presence or absence of conflictual norms affects long term bilateral relations between states and how shorter term decision-making outcomes are affected by issues and structures within irredentist-type homeland states. The three main findings to be examined in the context of the case studies are that: 1) the presence of irredentist-type demographics will cause long term bilateral instability due to normative conflict that leads to mutual distrust; 2) military influence over policy will lead to higher levels of conflict initiation by homeland states, particularly if a diaspora is viewed as discontented; and 3) diaspora rebellion will increase both bilateral dispute rates and unilateral dispute initiation.

The first two studies will involve a focused comparison of the relations among three states, and the underlying dynamics involved in these relations. The bilateral relations of these states are characterized by alternate values of the key explanatory demographic variable (MINMAJ, or the presence or absence of an “irredentist situation”) discussed earlier. In order to avoid the pitfalls associated with an indeterminate design, the cases are chosen by including dyads that are as similar as possible in respect to geographical region and contiguity, general economic development level, and other “fixed” factors not involving demographics that might influence relations over a long period of time. Each set of three states can be disaggregated into three different sets of the bilateral relations among the three states, which are examined in turn. In addition to

analyzing the bilateral relations between the three states involved in the case studies, I also examine variation in foreign policy outcomes related to an irredentist homeland state in each dyad.

The following table summarizes the major results reflected in the previous chapter that will be examined within the case studies:

<u>Factor</u>	<u>MID sig.</u>	<u>FATAL sig.</u>
Military Influence	p<.01	p<.05
Diaspora uprising	p<.01	p<.05
Economic Growth (3 yrs.)	p<.01	p<.01
Military Influence + Discontent + Feasible (interactive model)	p<.01	
Military Feasibility	p<.05	not sig.
Strategically valuable territorial claim	p<.01	p<.05
Economically valuable territorial claim	p<.01	p<.01


Of the above factors, Military Influence, Diaspora uprising and the interaction of Military Influence-Discontent-Feasibility are the most theoretically central factors in this work. The surprisingly strong, and somewhat unanticipated, strength of the economic growth variable will also be addressed in respect to the cases. It is important to recognize that military feasibility, strategic territorial value, and economic territorial value are factors that were shown to affect all states, not simply those involved in irredentist situations. In contrast to those variables that might be expected to vary frequently within the case study (or statistically speaking, the “panel”), the strategic and economic value of territories are generally constant, making these factors less interesting within a particular case (although still relevant across cases).

The first set of trilateral relations will analyze Somalia-Kenya-Ethiopia. The case study examines the root causes of conflict by examining conflicting (Somalia-Kenya; Somalia-Ethiopia) and complimentary (Kenya-Ethiopia) interpretations and employment

of international norms of territorial integrity and self-determination brought about by the presence of a divided Somali nation. Furthermore, the study focuses particularly on the role of nationalist rebellion among Somali diaspora and military rule in Somalia in producing greater or lesser levels of aggression in Somali foreign policy behavior.

The second case study involves the relations among Pakistan, India, and China. The general state of relations between these countries closely parallels those of the first case in that one dyad was highly conflictual (Pakistan-India, as compared to Somalia-Ethiopia); one mutually suspicious (China-India, as compared to Somalia-Kenya); and one quite cordial, despite large ideological differences (Pakistan-China, as compared to Ethiopia-Kenya). Once again, I examine the general roots of conflict and the differences in the “baseline” levels of enmity existing among these three states. Only one of the pairs, Pakistan and India, shares significant transborder national populations. The two other pairs, India-China and Pakistani-China do not share such groups, and offer a basis of comparison with the nationalist type politicking and instability that has existed between India and Pakistan. The focus on domestic politics then turns to Pakistan, with a particular eye towards understanding the role of military influence in foreign policy decision-making.

To summarize, the first two case studies involve these trilateral relations:




The third case will examine bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey throughout much of the twentieth century. This case merits particular attention due to the fact that a variable of primary interest in this study – namely, the MINMAJ variable, actually changes values for these two states. Until the mid-1920s, both states were home to large minorities of the other ethnic group. Due to ethnic cleansing as well as more orderly population exchanges during the twenties, the transborder minorities were largely eliminated from within each state. As would be hypothesized from this work, three decades of peaceful relations ensued after the elimination of the transborder nationality issue. However, during the 1950s and after, the independence of Cyprus introduced a new and powerful destabilizing influence on the bilateral relations of these states. It will be argued that this is due to the fact that the transborder national question once more was rearing its head – this time by “proxy” due to the independence of Cyprus, but more-or-less through the same mechanisms described herein.

CHAPTER 6 – Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya

Contrary to the perceptions of many, the colonial powers did not demarcate sub-Saharan African state boundaries with a blatant disregard for the ethno-national tribal boundaries of its inhabitants. African boundaries, for the most part, did not divide large nations – rather, many small ethnic groups were bound together in larger states. This fact has complicated domestic politics, but not necessarily had a major destabilizing effect on international relations in the region. Due largely to the relatively small number of transborder (not including transborder minority) demographic situations, relations amongst African states have, until recent years, been more peaceful than most global regions. The chart below displays the relative number of MID and fatal MIDS occurring within each global region among the dyads included in this study (divided by total regional dyads). The (sub-Saharan) Africa region, as displayed below, represents all the African dyads except those involving Somalia, which accounts for 23 of 153 regional MIDS and 17 of 54 fatal MIDS. The chart indicates that Africa was one of the most peaceful areas of the world during the Cold War, at least in terms of interstate relations. One major exception to the pattern of relatively peaceful coexistence, however, involved one of the very few irredentist situations in the region – namely, the relations between Somalia and its neighbors that have been home to large Somali diaspora.⁶⁵

⁶⁵ Another important, and recent exception, has been the imbroglio in the Republic of the Congo – sparked, in large part, by the transborder presence of Hutu and Tutsi diaspora in the Congo.

FIGURE 6.1 – Percentage of MID and fatal MIDs per Dyad-years in Global Regions



This chapter is broken into two parts that largely reflect the structure of the earlier empirical analysis. The major reasons for *bilateral* hostility within dyads that contain potential irredentist conflicts involve threat perceptions to states and nations created by conflicting international norms of self-determination and sovereignty. The first part of this case study will examine the normatively conflictual elements of the relationships between Somalia and its neighbors, Ethiopia and Kenya, as well as the relationship of the more normatively congruent policies of Kenya and Ethiopia toward one another. I examine the role played by irredentist demographics in the Somalia-Ethiopia and Somalia-Kenya dyads, and how such demographics have ultimately affected their intradyadic interactions in a different manner than the Kenya-Ethiopia dyad, where no such demographic pattern exists. As ideological polar opposites from the fall of the Selassie regime onward, one would expect, from a Cold War perspective, that Kenya and Ethiopia would have represented the hostile dyad among these three states. As will be described, however, irredentist nationalism trumped political ideology as the major factor determining the course of international relations between these three states.

The second part of this chapter will analyze, with respect to the Somali case, the factors derived from the earlier empirical analysis that were found to be related to rates of

dispute initiation by irredentist-type homeland states. Although, due to the irredentist situation facing Somali leaders, one would expect foreign policy to be more aggressive overall than most other states, the level of foreign aggression undertaken by Somali leaders differed in scale during different time periods.

International Norms, Societal Pressures, and Irredentist-type Demographics

The following section details the bilateral relations between Somalia and Ethiopia; Somalia and Kenya; and Ethiopia and Kenya. Of particular interest is how the interaction of the political norms of territorial integrity and national self-determination played out in the political arena, and how it influenced the course of events throughout the period 1960-1990. In essence, when we are examining the systemic interplay of events among these states, we are analyzing how the presence or absence of irredentist minorities affected expectations and subsequent initiations of conflicts between these states.

Utilizing the systemic regression model displayed in Chapter 5 (Table 5.1)⁶⁶, the following chart shows how many disputes are predicted by the systemic regression model versus the actual number of disputes within these dyads over the period 1960-1990.

TABLE 6.2 – Predicted versus Actual MIDs and Fatal MIDs in Dyads

	MID – actual	MID – predicted	FATAL – actual	FATAL predicted
Somalia-Ethiopia	65%	24%	48%	11%
Somalia-Kenya	11%	12%	7%	7%
Ethiopia-Kenya	0%	7%	0%	3%

The chart reflects how the predicted ordinal relationship of dispute propensities is similar to that found in reality. However, whereas predictions for the Somalia-Kenya dyad are very close to reality, the systemic model greatly underestimates the number of MIDs and fatal MIDs in the Somalia-Ethiopia dyad. Clearly, factors were involved in the Somalia-Ethiopia relationship that caused the relationship to be particularly violent, even for an irredentist relationship. The difference in conflict levels between Somalia and Ethiopia versus Somalia and Kenya is an important issue that is explored in greater detail below. As predicted, however, both of these dyads are more violent than the Ethiopia-Kenya dyad – even though Ethiopia and Kenya would normally have been expected to be major rivals (after the mid-seventies) in the context of the Cold War divide.

At the heart of hostility between Somalia and its neighbors lies the presence of contending, largely incompatible ideological norms, which alternately stress the value of self-determination versus that of territorial integrity and non-interference. Often, public pressures weigh on executive decision-makers, causing them to selectively advocate the promotion of diaspora self-determination, even if such policies threaten traditional international norms. States, such as Somalia, which pursue aggressive foreign policies designed to promote self-determination of diaspora groups abroad are by nature revisionist in comparison to those states that are more responsive to other, more inherently *status quo* norms. However, states targeted by nationalist foreign policies can be expected to engage in their own forms of defense aggression directed at homeland

⁶⁶ The regression used to calculate these figures is slightly different than that found in Table 5.1 due to the fact that the results reflect out-of-sample predictions (i.e. the relevant dyads are removed when calculating the regression used to make predictions).

states due to suspicions arising from the potentially nationalist motivations of homeland state leadership.

The next section begins by giving a brief overview of the development of Somali nationalism in the period before independence in 1960. The drive to obtain independence for territories divided between different colonial powers later morphed into Somali foreign policies that pressed for the realization of self-determination for Somali regions assigned to other African states during the decolonization process.

The Roots of Somali Nationalism

Like most national movements, Somali nationalism in the Horn of Africa predates the establishment of the Somali state. However, despite its later prominent role in domestic politics, a sense of nationhood and its accompanying nationalist drive occurred relatively late in the history of the Somali “ethnic” group. Somalis, although united by linguistic ties and a common Islamic religion, were strongly divided along tribal, one might even say ethnic,⁶⁷ lines – the dominant cultural, social, and political cleavage until the post-World War II period. Despite uprisings against British rule in 1893, 1898, 1901, 1913, and 1916, it is “doubtful that Somali resistance was undertaken with any clear goals in mind” (Turton 1972:125), while tribal (and intra-tribal) divides led various factions to side both for and against imperialist powers.⁶⁸ This is not to say that no sense of nationalist solidarity (particularly based along religious lines) existed among certain

⁶⁷ Debate still exists as to whether the Somalis should be considered one or many ethnic groups. Somalia is one of the rare cases in which ethnicity is more difficult to pin down than nationality. It is clear that most Somalis, with the possible exception of the Isaaq people, regard themselves as a nation, despite the ascribed differences between them linked to family lineage.

⁶⁸ The three main imperialist powers were Britain, Italy, and Ethiopia – which steadily expanded its frontiers under the reign of Menelik II (1889-1913). The roots of the 1977-1978 Somali-Ethiopia war lay in the recognition by colonial powers of Ethiopian sovereignty in the Somali-inhabited Ogaden region during the 1890s.

elites in the early part of the century – only that this nascent nationalism did not translate into any sense of mass political nationalism or sense of national obligation.

Like Ethiopia, Somalia was recovered from the Italians by British forces in 1941. The modern Somali nationalist movement can be traced to 1943, and the establishment of the Somali Youth Club – later renamed the Somali Youth League (SYL). The SYC/SYL was formed with the support of the British administrators in the region, who saw the emergence of Somali lobbying groups as a powerful hedge against Italian-national groups opposed to the presence of the British.

The SYC/SYL expanded rapidly, and, by the end of the forties, had opened offices in all of the four main British occupied territories – traditional British Somaliland (in the North), Italian Somalia (on the Indian Ocean), the Northern Frontier District (later part of Kenya), and the Ogaden⁶⁹ region. The SYL's stated objectives were to unify all Somali territories; to create opportunities for universal education; to develop the Somali language by instituting a common written language; and to oppose the restoration of Italian rule (Lewis 1963:149). Another avowed goal of the SYL was to supplant clan-based individual identities with a wider Somali-based national identity. Nationalist leaders viewed clanism as a primary factor that had “facilitated the partition of their people by foreign powers” (Lewis 1980: 167), and, thus, sought to diminish clan identity in order to maximize the prospects of national unity.

One pillar of the SYL agenda was frustrated when the Ogaden region was granted to Ethiopia in 1948 – although a British military presence remained. In 1949, insult was added to injury for the SYL, when the UN General Assembly voted for an Italian

⁶⁹ The Ogaden is a geographic, rather than administrative, region. It encompasses the entire lowland of the Harar and Bale provinces of Ethiopia (Hoskyns 1985: 28).

trusteeship in Southern Somaliland. Thus, coupled with French control of “French Somaliland” (Djibouti), Somalis were again divided amongst four different powers within five different regions.

The finalization of the trusteeship arrangement, and the prospect of eventual independence, muted Somali nationalism to some degree in the fifties. However, in a sign of things to come, the biggest source of nationalist anger revolved around the final abandonment of the Ogaden region by the British in 1954, a scenario that was to be repeated in the Kenyan NFD in Somalia’s post independence period.

Although the evacuation of the Ogaden stirred nationalist sentiment in the other Somali territories, the pressing tasks surrounding the impending independence of British Somaliland and the Italian trusteeship in (southern) Somalia hindered any more potentially violent manifestations of nationalism among Somalis while necessitating continued cooperation with the British. The SYL government led by Abdullah Issa⁷⁰ that came to power in 1956 in (Italian) Somalia was more immediately concerned with economic and social affairs than with the Ogaden situation (Lewis 1980: 156-157).

British Somaliland became independent on June 26, 1960, and Somalia followed suit on July 1st. Having concluded agreements with the Italian and British governments on the matter, both governments quickly agreed to unite into a common state. Within a week, a single Republic of Somalia was formed from the former colonial territories. The first administration, headed by Aden Abdullah Osman as President and Abdul Rashid Ali Shermarke as Prime Minister, was quickly approved the new National Assembly.

⁷⁰ Multiple spellings exist in the Latin alphabet for most of the proper Somali names. I tend toward using the most “Anglicized” usages.

The international context

While Somali foreign policy was notably more militant in regard to Ethiopia than it was to Kenya, many of the same international principles were at stake in both these relationships. Of particular interest are the opposing principles cited by the antagonists in these disputes to justify their positions. Conflicting normative rhetoric, not surprisingly, revolved around competing interpretations and citations of international agreements such as the OAU and UN charters.

As described in Chapter 2, the UN charter and Universal Declaration for Human Rights both recognize self-determination as a desirable goal. Although the right of self-determination came to be commonly understood as principally associated with anti-colonial efforts, the very definition of anti-colonial was also open to interpretation. This was particularly relevant to the case of Ethiopia, which Somali leaders always argued was itself an imperial state in the same way that European states had been. Unlike other African states, Ethiopia had never been colonized itself (except for its brief occupation by Italy during the Second World War), and had instead steadily expanded its own “Empire” by conquering numerous other ethnic groups in the region.

The OAU charter, in particular, provided plenty of rhetorical fodder for Ethiopian and Kenyan leaders eager to paint Somali leadership as aggressors. While Somali leaders frequently pointed to provisions proclaiming the “the inalienable right of all people to control their own destiny” or the need to “fight against neo-colonialism in all its forms”, such calls were rarely received by the OAU or its member-states as legitimate. Provisions frequently invoked by Ethiopian and Kenyan authorities were mainly found in Article III of the OAU charter, which laid out the principles of the OAU including: “respect for the

sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state”; “non-interference in the affairs of States”; and “Unreserved condemnation of . . . subversive activities on the part of neighboring states” (Article III). Much of the following discussion reveals how the contours of the relationships between Somalia and its neighbors can be seen as driven by the contrary international ideals of self-determination and territorial integrity, and how the clash of norms led to long-term diplomatic acrimony and, ultimately, the clash of armed forces in Ethiopia.

The last point that should be made before examining the specifics of the relationships between the states involved concerns the nature of Somali irredentism in each case. Often referred to as a “classic” case of irredentism, it is important to note that Somalia never actually laid direct territorial claims to the territory of its neighbors. Instead, Somalia always advocated the right of national diaspora to freely decide whether or not to remain part of the states into which they had been absorbed. Although, in the end, it seems rather clear that support of secession was conducted with the expectation that secession would be followed by voluntary merger with Somalia proper, the tactic of supporting this *secessionist-merger* path was clearly the preferred diplomatic choice of each Somali administration.

Somalia, Kenya, and the minority Somalis of the Northeastern Province

Kenyan and Somali relations were generally characterized by instability bred by the presence of a significant Somali diaspora in the Northeastern Province. The period of greatest enmity occurred during the early and mid-sixties, in the immediate wake of Kenyan independence, when Somali rebel activity, public nationalist pressure, and,

ultimately, Somali rhetoric pressing for greater self-determination in the NEP were at their peak. Answering to Somali militancy, Kenyan leadership consistently invoked the principle of territorial integrity when addressing both the international community and Somali leadership directly. Appeals to Somali leadership and the international community by Kenyan leaders stressing norms of territorial integrity were loudest during the rebellion of Somali diaspora in the sixties and during the high points of Somalia-Ethiopian tension during the seventies. Much of the rest of the era covered in this case was characterized by bilateral mistrust, which gradually gave way to better relations during the eighties as Somali domestic nationalist pressures on leadership waned in the face of increasing tribal divisions and strife at home.

Since international normative pressures advocating the abandonment of Somali policies of interference and subversion of its neighbors was strong throughout this period, the main factor affecting general direction of Mogadishu's policies was the degree of societal pressures placed upon executives during different periods. In the case of Kenya, nationalist advocacy from "the street" waxed and waned during four distinct periods, as summarized by the chart below.

TABLE 6.3 – Somali Nationalism and Relations with Kenya

Period	Societal Pressure	Main conditioning factor	Policy Outcome
1964-1967	Strong	Diaspora Rebellion	Aggressive Diplomacy
1967-1969	Medium	Loss of rebel legitimacy	Détente
1970-approx. 1982	Medium	<i>Status Quo</i> irredentist situation ⁷¹	Somewhat tense relations
approx. 1982-1991	Absent	Fracturing of domestic society	Rapprochement

⁷¹ By "status quo" irredentist situation, I am referring to the hypothesized state of "foreign policy indeterminacy" that is expected to occur when an irredentist situation exists in the absence of rebellion.

The tensest period in Somali-Kenyan relations occurred during the mid-sixties. Beginning in 1963 with the approach of Kenyan independence, increasingly vocal demands for the independence of Somalis in the NFD were given wide publicity in the Republic of Somalia (Lewis 1961: 154) and fueled the flames of domestic nationalism. Despite continuing calls from Mogadishu for Ethiopia to relinquish the Ogaden, the Kenyan NFD became the first diplomatic focal point for the Osman-Shermarke administration. Somali representatives of the NFD made their preferences clearly known when they brought up the issue of potential secession at major conference meetings that were convened to draft a Kenyan constitution. The British government turned down requests for a UN plebiscite, but agreed to a fact-finding mission in order to determine the state of public opinion in the region. The final British report suggested that 80% of the population of the NFD could be characterized as pro-Somali. Nevertheless, the British government withdrew any hint of support for any pre-independence territorial changes in March 1963. The Somali government subsequently cut off diplomatic relations with Britain, and nationalist rioting broke out throughout both the NFD and the Somali Republic (Lewis 1980: 156).

What had been a spirited and sometimes tense debate between Somali representatives and leaders of the main Kenyan parties devolved into an increasingly hostile exchange of recriminations. The Kenyan delegation formally submitted to the African Summit Conference in May 1963 a memorandum on the NFD issue which stated empathetically that: "We in Kenya shall not give up even one inch of our country to the Somali tribalists, and that is final" (Hoskyns 1969:39). At the same summit, Somali President Aden Abdullah Osman argued, citing both norms of self-determination while

emphasizing the importance of recognizing Somalis as a national, rather than tribal or ethnic group:

Those who oppose the reunification of the Somali territories attempt to portray the Somali people's desire for unity as a form of tribalism. Such opponents use every means at their disposal to rank the Somali people as an ordinary tribe without any rights to nationhood. The Somali people are a nation in every sense of the word (p. 32).

The irredentist pressures facing Somali leaders were magnified even more due to events occurring within the NFD. The emergence of a Somali-based rebellion signaled the preferences of radical Somalis in the region, while also displaying the overlap between secessionist movements and irredentism. With the regional rebellion taking place, Somali leaders were able to extend their arguments beyond irredentist territorial claims, and point to a desire within Kenya for self-determination by Somalis.

When Kenya came into being in 1963, the Kenyan government countered the growing Somali rhetoric of self-determination by repeatedly and specifically citing the importance of territorial integrity norms. At the 1963 summit meeting of independent African states held shortly before Kenyan independence, Kenyan representatives argued specifically in favor of the "territorial integrity of all states" while arguing that "the principal of self-determination has relevance [only] where foreign domination is at issue" (Hoskyns 1969: 39).

In addition to calls for maintaining territorial integrity, the Kenyan government also stressed the importance of the idea of Pan-Africanism, which entailed the sublimation of ethnic and national identity to a common regional identity. Such appeals to African unity were particularly powerful in the early, more idealistic, days following the founding of the OAU. Kenyatta stressed both the norm of territorial integrity and the ideal of Pan-Africanism in a memorandum to the OAU conference of 1963:

. . . seeking to create new African nations on the basis of tribal or religious identities is a sin against Pan-Africa and a most dangerous weapon for destroying African solidarity. The Somalis are Africans. Those who live in Kenya are Kenya Africans. . .if every territory to which people of the Somali tribe migrate is to become part of the Republic of Somalia, in accordance to Pan-Somalism and the policy of creating Greater Somalia, then the concept of territorial integrity of any other state becomes meaningless (Hoskyns 1969: 37)

A new Somali Prime Minister, Abdirizaj Haji Hussein, was selected in 1964.

Hussein was widely considered the voice of Somali hawks, and the nationalist rhetoric under the Osman-Hussein government was particularly hostile (Sauldie 1987: 26).

Much of Somali foreign policy was influenced by the presence of Somali rebellion in Kenya. Although what was later termed the *shifita* rebellion by Kenyan leaders – with the word *shifita* denoting banditry – was a low-level and poorly documented civil conflict, Somali rebels destabilized the NFD during the middle part of the decade and only faded to a scattered guerilla movement in the latter part (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 135). In the end, however, Somali policy-makers refused to support a policy of ethno-national “rescue” by supplying Somali rebels in Kenya with significant arms.

Like the previous civilian administration, the so-called “hawkish” Osman-Hussein government chose a path of aggressive diplomacy over a course of aggressive militancy. The delicate tightrope walk undertaken by the Osman-Hussein government witnessed Somalia raising its irredentist claims internationally, without overtly breaching international norms and causing an international backlash. At the same time, the push for greater self-determination by domestic audiences was placated to some degree by the administration’s tough rhetoric, although even during this period members of the Somali National Assembly attempted to remove the government with a no-confidence on the grounds that it “lacked courage” (Lewis 1980: 156).

International normative restraints on aggressive Somali behavior during this period were strong, as 1964 meetings of both the OAU and Non-Aligned states reaffirmed their support for the present African borders and Kenyan claims to territorial integrity and state sovereignty. Somali delegates fought against these motions, while the Somali National Assembly passed a motion outright rejecting the resolutions of the conferences stating:

Both our peoples and territories have been unjustly and brutally partitioned, and they are being denied the basic and inalienable right to self-determination. . . Neither walls nor weapons can ever permanently separate a family or nation (Adar 1995: 108).

Somali Prime Minister Hussein argued that the pre-existing borders were a legacy of colonial influence and charged that while “no other part of the colonial legacy” had gone unquestioned at the conference, “it appears that members at the conference are prepared to accept the artificial political frontiers” (p. 106-7).

By early 1966, relations between Kenya and Somalia had hit their nadir, with a Kenyan spokesman declaring that Kenya had adopted a “war footing” with Somalia (Hoskyns 1969: xi). In the wake of failed talks that had taken place in Arusha in December 1965, the emergency security zone that had been established on the Kenyan border with Somalia was widened from five to fifteen miles. Nevertheless, the battle between Kenya and Somalia remained one of words and never escalated into any serious armed conflict.

After July 1967, Somali diplomacy became more conciliatory after the Osman-Hussein government was replaced by one led by former Prime Minister Shermarke (as President) and Mohamed Ibrahim Egal (as Prime Minister). Somalia and Kenya agreed on a framework proposal at the September 1967 Kinshasa OAU summit for future

negotiations. The resultant joint declaration stated that both governments would: 1) respect each other's territorial integrity; 2) resolve future disputes peaceably; 3) ensure peace and security on their mutual border; and 4) refrain from conducting hostile propaganda campaigns against one another through mass media outlets (Adar 1995: 117).

Based on the framework agreement, Egal met with Kenyan President Jomo Kenyatta in October and signed the Arusha Memorandum of Understanding – which paved the way for a quick “normalization” of relations between the two states. The new détente led to the restoration of trade ties, the lifting of the state of emergency in the NFD, and an amnesty for all shifta guerillas – the remainder of which mostly disbanded. Somali leaders never again pursued a policy of sustained hostility towards Kenya in the wake of the new relationship.

The Egal-Shermarke government was willing to undertake its diplomatic initiatives because domestic views toward events in the NFD had been gradually softening. Widespread demonstrations and support for shifta rebels had largely dissipated as Somali rebels turned to questionable tactics after being largely defeated by the mid-sixties. In particular, shifta tactics aimed at those allegedly collaborating with the Kenyan government alienated Somalis within the region and the Republic. The murder of a well-known regional “chief”, Omar Shuria, particularly garnered widespread attention, with major Somali parties in the region offering a joint condemnation. In essence, nationalist pressures within the Somali republic were greatly reduced as condemnation by mainstream Somali parties within the NFD of the shifta rebels increased.

Nevertheless, the perception of the Egal-Shermarke regime that a new foreign policy track could be undertaken without major public backlash was overly optimistic, as the government's policies still alienated many segments of Somali society. Although the National Assembly subsequently supported the Shermarke-Egal administration with a vote of confidence, the government experienced "bitter opposition from those who saw the Arusha memorandum as a sellout" (Farer 1979: 108). With relations with Kenya on the mend, the administration re-established diplomatic contacts with Great Britain and attempted to strike a more Pro-Western attitude in order to "balance the impression inevitably conveyed by the Somali Republic's increasing military dependence on the USSR" (Lewis 1980: 203). However, as Egal sought improved relations with the West, the Soviet Union began holding back expected military aid. The nationalistically-oriented Somali military thus witnessed two blows – one to the Pan-Somali national cause and one to its own growing power, which was threatened by Egal's pro-Western policies.

In October 1969 President Shermarke was assassinated by one of his guards. The military, led by General Siad Barre, took advantage of the ensuing disorder, launching a coup and assuming power several days later. While the perceived corruption and nepotism of civilian authorities was the primary justification of the move by military leaders, Lefebvre (1991: 50) suggests that because Shermarke and Egal

seemed to be backing away from the Ogaden issue and striking a deal with Ethiopia by tacitly renouncing Mogadishu's irredentist claim on the region, Shermarke was assassinated, and a new and perceptually more nationalistic military-led government took control.

The Arusha memorandum, however, put the NEP issue to rest in a manner such that Barre's military government had no desire to reopen the issue and increase public expectations. Furthermore, because the agreement had been signed under the civilian government of Shermarke-Egal, Barre could dissociate himself from the lingering sentiments that Arusha had represented a sell-out of the nationalist cause. The impact of the peace pact and its affect on Somali resistance in the NEP held lasting importance, however, as much for its role in raising tensions with Ethiopia as it had in lowering tensions with Kenya. With the NEP issue settled, at least temporarily, the nationalist aspirations of Somali leadership and domestic audiences, particularly the military, were free to focus almost upon the Ogaden issue which took on dimensions of "monumental importance"— even more so after the question of French Somalia⁷² was settled in the mid-seventies (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 141).

Nevertheless, Kenyan leaders still feared that Somali revisionism would once again turn in their direction – a view backed by a former high-ranking Somali official who suggests that Barre "naively believed, that after he [defeated] Ethiopia, he would then be able to focus his martial attention to Kenya" (Dualeh 1994: 86). The 1970s were to be characterized by mistrust and suspicion between the two states, which contrasted both with the near-war state of affairs of the mid-sixties as well as the previous period of *détente*. Projecting a sense of *indeterminacy* in his foreign policy statements, Barre wove a series of *mixed messages* within his public speeches that alternately assuaged and worried Kenyan observers, who were comforted by Barre's continued emphasis on peaceful negotiations, but threatened by frequent allusions to the right of self-

⁷² A plebiscite was conducted in French Somalia in 1977 leading to the colony's independence as the state of Djibouti. The Somali government, largely satisfied that "self-determination" had indeed been exercised by the people of the region, dropped all further claims to the colony's territory and Somali population.

determination for all Somalis. When Barre spoke of the necessity of knowing “our friends from our enemies”, listing his friends as all forces against “imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism” (Barre 1971: 87), the implication was not lost that the “enemies” might be thought to include those supporting the remnants of colonialism (Kenya) or were perceived colonial powers themselves (Ethiopia). At the same time, Barre would assert that “Somalia will not nurture hatred for its African brothers, Somalia wants to regain what has been taken from it, through peaceful means; it does not gain anything from the gun” (p. 36).

While Kenyan authorities understandably nursed continued suspicions toward their Somali neighbors, it became increasingly obvious that Somali attention had turned towards Ethiopia when the military government emerged from the diplomatic shell that characterized its early foreign policy. As will be discussed in greater depth in the section dealing with Ethiopian-Kenyan relations, Kenya offered strong diplomatic support to Ethiopia during the period of greatest Somali militarism. As early as the OAU conference of 1973, Kenya’s vice president declared:

Kenya cannot be party to opening up issues concerning territorial claims against sister states. Kenya . . . cannot and shall not recognize or even consider boundary claims by any African country against its sister country (quoted in Adar 1974: 177).

Nevertheless, trying to “lighten his load of enemies” Barre repeatedly assured the Kenyans that Somalia had no plans to re-initiate support of dissidents in the NEP (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 140).

When open wartime hostilities erupted between Somalia and Ethiopia in 1977, Somali-Kenya relations accordingly declined. Fearful of contagion effects, Kenyan authorities increased security in the NEP while largely cutting off trade to Somalia

(Sauldie 1987: 53). Relations hit “rock bottom” in November 1978 when Kenyan authorities charged that Somalia was “recruiting Somalis in the NFD to fight against Ethiopia ‘and eventually against Kenya itself’” (Legum and Lee 1979: 82). Only two months later, a border clash apparently took place between Kenya and Somalia near Ethiopian territory, one in which Kenyan authorities claimed 23 Kenyans had been killed. The next month, as the war wound down in February 1978, the Kenyan planes forced an Egyptian airliner carrying a clandestine arm shipment to Somalia to land in Nairobi. The subsequent withdrawal of Somali forces from Ethiopia was greeted with “great relief” in Kenya (p. 82).

The years immediately following the war in the Ogaden were marked by continued tension between Kenya and Somalia, whose leadership was particularly angered by Kenya’s support of Ethiopia during the conflict. However, from the beginning of 1981 until the end of the decade, relations steadily improved between the two states. A combination of factors contributed to the improvement in relations, including: 1) the ideological reorientation of Somalia away from the socialist camp; 2) the diminishment of Somali military capacity and subsequent inability to pose a threat to its neighbors; 3) the clear preferences of the Somali population of the NFD to remain part of a now economically vibrant Kenyan state, which will be discussed in the next section; and 4) the eruption of civil strife in Somalia, which prompted Barre to seek outside pledges of support or, at the very least, non-intervention. Furthermore, *the fracturing of the Somali nation and descent into tribalism that characterized the 1980s brought a final and decisive end to the nationalist pressures within society* that had constrained Somali executives from pursuing more conciliatory foreign policies.

In June 1981, President Barre and Moi (of Kenya) met and signed a major cooperation agreement intended to further normalize relations. During the next year, a general of Somali descent in the Kenyan army played a major role in putting down an attempted coup against the Moi government, an event that subsequently led to expressions of goodwill by the government to Somali Kenyans, and, as a result, better relations with Somalia (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 150). By the end of 1984, Somali had agreed to completely disavow any claims to Kenyan territory.

Somali-Kenyan relations, never as severely strained as those between Somalia and Ethiopia, mended more quickly in the eighties. In 1985, Barre stated that “with the exception of [Kenya’s relationship with] Ethiopia, we greatly value the good relations which exist between Somalia and Kenya” (Adar 1994: 193). By the end of the decade, Kenyan views had shifted far enough in a favorable direction that there is plausible evidence suggesting that the Kenyan government supplied the Somali government with arms in the late eighties for use against the growing Somali insurgency (Woodward 1996: 161-162).

Summary – Kenyan-Somali Relations

Somali-Kenyan relations can be divided roughly into four eras. The first era, stretching from Kenyan independence to 1967, was characterized by high levels of bilateral hostility and tension. This period witnessed widespread public pressures on Somali leadership to pursue hawkish policies towards Kenya, and anti-Kenyan demonstrations were commonplace. Seeking to balance the need to accommodate strong nationalist impulses emanating from domestic audiences with a desire to avoid

transgressing international norms, the civilian governments of the period pursued aggressive diplomatic postures that focused on the concept of “self-determination”, while resisting the urge to challenge the situation militarily.

The second era of Somali-Kenyan relations occurred between 1967 and 1969, and can be characterized as a brief period of *détente*. The decline of *shifita* legitimacy in the view of regional parties in the NFD and within the republic correlated with a decline of nationalist pressures within Somali society, which presented a perceived window-of-political-opportunity for the Egal administration to pursue more accommodating policies with Kenya.

A third era can be said to have existed during the seventies, when Kenya had ceased to be a primary focus of Somali foreign policy designs. Nevertheless, Siad Barre’s public statements alternately assuaged and aggravated relations with Kenya. This era can be said to represent a classic case of foreign policy indeterminacy breeding mistrust under conditions of transborder nationality. Kenyan suspicions were only magnified by the fact that Somalia continued to pursue its irredentist designs toward the Ogaden region of Ethiopia.

The last era is one of warming relations during the 1980s. It is unlikely that this process would have been possible a decade earlier, when Somali nationalism played a major role in unifying the Somali public around common foreign and domestic causes. As the domestic consensus shattered in the wake of civil strife in Somalia, however, Barre was freer to pursue conciliatory policies toward its neighbors due to the diminished public saliency of nationalist issues abroad. In this sense, nationalism as a societal norm largely vanished during the eighties, allowing the Somali government to pursue a process

that culminated in the permanent abandonment of Somali claims to Kenyan territory in 1984.

Somalia, Ethiopia, and the minority Somalis of the Ogaden

Kenyan-Somali relations were never marked by the “instinctive animosity” of those between Somalia and Ethiopia (Legum and Lee 1979: 82). Even the European powers were rarely viewed with such fear and loathing among Somalis as the Ethiopian empire. As a matter of fact, one of the primary arguments employed by Somalis during the decolonization period was that Ethiopia, which had remained independent throughout almost all of its history, was an imperial power equivalent to the Western imperial powers in the region – and that its territorial holdings should be granted freedom in a similar manner as those in the region that had been colonized by white men. Its proximity to its territorial acquisitions, as well as the racial undertones that the international self-determination debate had taken on, however, meant that Ethiopia was not generally viewed by the international community in the same way as other colonial powers in the region.

Unlike Somali views towards Kenya and its control of the NEP, there were two forces in particular that intensified the hold of nationalism towards the Ethiopian enemy on Somali public consciousness. The first, as mentioned earlier, was the fact that tribal ties to Ogaden Somalis were stronger than those to Somalis in the NEP. The second factor involves the role that religion has played in both Ethiopian and Somali identity. In essence, “typical” ethno-national nationalism is reinforced by what might be described as a mini “clash-of-civilizations” between predominately Christian Ethiopia and Islamic

Somalia. Since the 1897 transfer of the Ogaden region to Ethiopian control Somalis have regarded the Christian “encroachers” as the prime regional threat to Somali territory and culture. As explained by Lewis (1961: 269):

Somali nationalist aims tend to be associated with the ideal of Muslim solidarity opposed to Christian government. This aspect of Christian influence in inspiring nationalist aspirations is particularly strong in what Somali regard as the imperialist policies of the Ethiopian government.

Similarly, the Selassie regime in Ethiopia referred to their empire as a “Christian island” and the prospect of “Muslim encirclement” meant that fears of Somali revisionism simply reinforced a pre-existing siege mentality in Ethiopia (Legum and Lee 1979: 3). Although the religious dimension of the rivalry somewhat diminished after the rise of socialist rule in Ethiopia, the contribution it had made to Somali-Ethiopian enmity was lasting.

While pointing frequently to “territorial integrity” norms, as did Kenyan leaders, the views of Ethiopian leaders, particularly under the Selassie regime, was somewhat more complicated. Ethiopian leaders justified the existence of their multi-ethnic state, including Somali-inhabited regions, on principles of historical continuity. Although dropped in the sixties, Selassie frequently called, in the pre-colonial period for the incorporation of the entirety of Somalia into Ethiopia. Following Ethiopia’s liberation from Italian control in 1941, Selassie spoke of the need to restore “the independence of my country including Eritrea and Benadir (Somalia)” (Neuberger 1986: 46). As late as the 1963 OAU conference, Ethiopia’s prime minister declared:

Ethiopia has always existed in history for centuries as an independent state and as a nation for more than 3,000 years. That is a fact. The second fact is that the historical frontiers of Ethiopia stretch from the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean, including all the territory between them. Third fact: there is no record in history either of a Somali state or a Somali nation (Hoskyns 1969: 34).

Although no longer countering Somali claims to Ethiopian territory with counter-claims to Somalia, Ethiopian leadership under Mengistu continued to defend its control of the Ogaden with a measure of historical argumentation. At the OAU summit of 1977, Mengistu dismissed Somali calls for self-determination in the Ogaden as “historical fiction” (Sauldie 1987: 12).

While Ethiopia was accused by Somali leadership of representing an African imperialist state, Ethiopia countered by drawing a thick line between European colonialists and their state. According to Ethiopian authorities, the Ethiopian empire had offered “staunch political and military resistance to colonialism” while Somali tribal chiefs had remained “indifferent and quiet while they were being sold cheaply” (Healy 1983: 106). During the early sixties, the Ethiopian government suggested a racially-oriented “coming home” for not just Ogaden Somalis, but for all Somalis:

In view of the abject misery of the Eritrean and Somali populations under the fifty years of Italian occupation which forced them to suffer the indignity of being treated legally as an inferior race in their own country . . . it cannot be suggested that their lot would be worse under the regime of their Ethiopian brothers. . . To provide for such a return would be merely to recognize the realities of the existing historical and other ties which bind them integrally to Ethiopia (quoted in Healy 1983: 98).

Thus, the Ethiopian government countered growing Somali irredentism with rhetoric suggesting that cultural bonds and race constituted the national ties binding all Somalis, not just those in the Ogaden, to a central Ethiopian state.

In addition to the arguments presented above, Ethiopian authorities made appeals to territorial sovereignty similar those of Kenyan leaders. Appeals to norms of territorial integrity and non-interference were particularly favorite rhetoric of the socialist regime, which tended to distance itself somewhat from the historical-cultural appeals of the

Selassie government. However, claims based on the sanctity of colonial borders placed the Ethiopian government in somewhat of a dilemma due to its continued claim to Eritrea, which had a different colonial history and yet been forcibly annexed in 1962. While the Mengistu regime insisted on the sanctity of colonial borders in the Ogaden while denying them in the Eritrea, it argued the question in the context of Marxist-Leninism. While supporting “progressive” self-determination, the regime argued that the question of self-determination need be assessed case-by-case according to whether or not a particular instance “promotes or retards, strengthens or weakens, advances or modernizes the revolutionary struggler of the proletariat” (Neuberger 1986: 115). Needless to say, none of the ethno-nationalist uprisings in Ethiopia met these conditions in the eyes of the Ethiopian leadership.

Although almost always at a high level, public interest in the Ogaden issue varied somewhat in a manner similar to issues associated with Kenya. Roughly, speaking, one can divide the degree of public pressure on Somali leadership into three eras.

TABLE 6.4 – Somali Nationalism and Relations with Ethiopia

Period	Societal Pressure	Main Conditioning Factor	Policy Outcome
1964-1967	Medium	<i>Status quo</i> irredentist situation	Aggressive Diplomacy
1967-1969	Medium	<i>Status quo</i> irredentist situation	Détente
1970-1974	Medium	<i>Status quo</i> irredentist situation	Mixed Messages
1974-approx. 1982	High	Diaspora rebellion	Conflict
approx. 1982-1991	Absent	Fracturing of domestic society	Rapprochement

The attitude of Somali leadership towards the Ogaden question was similar, although more strongly felt, than the issue of Kenyans in the NEP. In describing the

unification of Somaliland and Somalia during 1962, SYL Prime Minister Abdirashid 'Ali Shermarke foreshadowed future Somali foreign policy aims and their justification:

This was not an act of 'colonialism' or 'expansionism' or 'annexation'. It was a positive contribution to peace unity in Africa and was made possible by the application of the principle of the right to self-determination (quoted in Lewis 1963:151).

Somali politicians also pursued a course of aggressive diplomacy toward Ethiopia, rarely missing an opportunity to call for the self-determination of Ogaden Somalis within international forums. Somali nationalism ran particularly high in the wake of independence, and even before the public focus shifted to the Kenyan separatists, the presence of the sizeable Somali population in Ethiopia commanded public attention. Public nationalist pressures, coupled with a poorly demarcated border, coupled to promote aggressive frontier policing that sometimes spilled over into "accidental" border clashes.

During this period, Somali and Ethiopian military units fought in a series of skirmishes along their common, ill-defined border. A "major armed clash" between state militaries took place in 1961 in the wake of an abortive coup attempt against Haile Selassie (Selassie 1980: 105). In late 1963 the Ethiopian government alleged incursions by Somali regular troops, while, in February 1964, according to the Somali government Ethiopian military aircraft attacked Somali villages (Castagno 1964: 187). Following the alleged aircraft attack, fierce skirmishing erupted along the border, resulting in a death toll that perhaps reached into the hundreds (*Africa Digest*, April 1964 quoted in Hoskyns 1969: 48). UN Secretary U-Thant was brought in to mediate, resulting in a temporary reduction in tensions.

By the mid-sixties, Somali policies towards Ethiopia were roughly similar as those directed at Kenya, even though public opinion was focused more upon Kenya at the

time. As was the case in Kenya, the Ogaden region was home to rather disorganized armed groups that seemed to pose more of an annoyance than a threat to the regime.⁷³ These groups received a material support, although hopes for rebel victory in the region were limited. Unlike the issue of Somalis in the NFD, however, insurgency in the Ogaden did not provoke a surge of nationalist sentiment at home. This is largely due to the fact that the rebellion in the Ogaden, which was comprised of several ethnic groups, was not primarily associated with Somali rebels.

The bilateral enmity between the two states thawed somewhat during the Egal tenure. In the OAU summit held in September 1967, Somali and Ethiopian delegates engaged in several “encouraging exchanges” (Lewis 1980: 203) leading to an eventual “modus vivendi” between Emperor Haile Selassie and Somalia’s Prime Minister Egal (p. 52). By September 1968 Somalia and Ethiopia agreed on establishing commercial air and telecommunications links and the state of emergency that had existed in the Ogaden was lifted (Rinehart 1982: 32).

As was described earlier, the takeover by the Barre military government resulted in an inward turn in priorities as the new government consolidated power. By the time of the OAU summit of 1974, however, Somali leaders had clearly adopted a policy of increasing antagonism towards Ethiopian authorities. Somali calls for reexamination of the Ogaden issue during the 1973 OAU summit in Addis Ababa had led to the

⁷³ The preponderance of sources suggest that Somali resistance in Ethiopia during this period was quite limited, although the scope of both rebel activity and Somali aid remains in dispute. According to Leis (1980: 232), any scattered resistance that existed in the early 1960s, was forced underground as a result of Ethiopian successes in the clashes of 1964. Henze (1985: 31) paints an entirely different picture when he suggests that Ethiopian insurgents were not only large and reasonably successful, number as many as 15,000 in 1969, and were supplied “liberally” with weapons by the Republic. Part of the discrepancy in the accounts is likely due to the fact that rebels in the Ogaden were not organized under any central group, and *many were not even ethnic Somalis*. For this reason, the subversive activities of the Somali government in the region may have represented more of an instrumental policy of destabilization than a nationalistically-driven policy of ethno-national “rescue”.

appointment of a special OAU mediation committee, which had little to report a year later. In the wake of “hot words” that were exchanged between President Barre and Emperor Selassie, as well as the presence of provocative pamphlets circulated by a group calling itself the United Liberation Front of Western Somalia, Emperor Selassie “left the [1974] summit in anger” (Sauldie 1987: 34). The renewed vigor of Ogaden dissidents, coupled with the overthrow of Selassie a mere three months after the summit, both mark the beginning of a long march to war by Somali leaders.

Societal pressures on the Barre government during this period became more and more intense. In an indication of how widespread nationalist impulses were in Somali society during this point, “now famous Somali songs” ridiculing the Barre regime’s inaction in Ethiopia began to be heard during this period (Selassie 1980: 110).

Nevertheless, a lack of replacement parts, widespread drought, and continued international pressure fostered a sense of caution on the part Barre’s government, despite the direct pressure applied by military advisors advocating a more decisive stance on Ethiopia. Subsequent events, however, were to place even more pressure on the government to intervene militarily on behalf of insurgents in the Ogaden.

As Somalia’s military grew in strength, as a consequence of Soviet aid, Ethiopia seemed on the brink of collapse. The overthrow of Selassie facilitated rebellion not only in the Ogaden, but across much of the multi-ethnic country. At one point in the mid-seventies, ten of the country’s fourteen provinces were engaged in armed rebellion against the central government (Lefebvre 1991: 35). By the end of 1976, it was widely reported that Somalia was providing substantial material support to the WSLF, as well as other rebel groups associated with other ethnic minorities. Earlier in the year, Ethiopia

had informed several Arab states that Somalia had become engaged in a “war of subversion” in anticipation of a full-scale war (Sauldie 1987: 43). With WSLF rebels scoring increasingly large victories in the Ogaden, the situation was “slipping out of hand with the passing of each day” (p. 47).

By July, the Somali government had committed to a “full-scale invasion”, albeit with many regular troops “thinly-disguised” as WSLF rebels (Henze 1985:55) out of a desire to avoid antagonizing the international community. In September, the Somali forces achieved their deepest penetration into Ethiopian territory, capturing the major town of Jijiga. However, the offensive began to bog down as waves of Ethiopian militia flocked to the area, in a surprising show of patriotic solidarity in the face of the invasion.

In November 1977, increasingly disillusioned Somali leaders attempted a desperate ploy to garner domestic and international support by canceling Somalia’s 1971 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union. The move turned out to be counterproductive, however, as the Soviet Union used the occasion to throw its full support behind the Ethiopian regime. At the same time, widespread international perceptions of Somali aggression meant support from other sources turned out to be limited. Saudi Arabia and Iran were the only states that pledged to support Somalia, but only in the case that Ethiopia would attempt to overrun the country’s borders as the tide of battle turned.

The threat to Somali itself became reality in early 1978, after the Ethiopian army, heavily supported by Russian resources and Cuban troops, smashed and routed the Somali forces in the Ogaden. On March 9, Barre announced the withdrawal of all Somali regular forces in Ethiopia – even though, recognizing international sensitivities, he had

always denied the existence of such troops in the first place (Henze 1985: 56). Just as the Soviet Union had played a role in restraining Somali aggression during the mid-seventies, Soviet pressure on Ethiopia subsequently played an important part in preventing an invasion of the Republic itself.

The loss of the war brought Barre's legitimacy and political survival into question, and the very clanism that he had sought to eliminate in the early years of military rule began to emerge again. Shortly after the conflict, a "civil war" broke out within the armed forces, in April 1978, when officers of the Majeerten clan (Barre belonged to the Darod clan) attempted to overthrow the government (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 92). Although the coup failed, its clan-based nature strongly foreshadowed events to come.

The early eighties represented the last gasp of Somali irredentist designs. At the beginning of the period the Republic's military was in shambles; by the end of the period the state itself was beginning to collapse. What followed in the wake of the war was somewhat of a return to the status quo in terms of Somali policy toward Ethiopia. With the Somali military in disarray and the Ethiopian military stronger-than-ever, policy reverted back from outright aggression to more discrete forms of subversion. At the same time, Ethiopia embarked on a policy to subvert the Somali state by supporting new dissident groups that sprung up in the aftermath of the failed war and seizing on growing clan divisions.

By the end of 1981, however, the Ogaden issue was rapidly declining in relative importance to the Somali leadership. Mogadishu's concerns "had been diverted from pursuing irredentist claims in the Ogaden to waging a counterinsurgency campaign inside

Somalia to ensure the survival of an authoritarian regime” (Lefebvre 1991: 236). The “shoe-was-on-the-other-foot” as Ethiopia pursued a strategy within Somalia of supporting a growing rebel movement known as the Somalia Salvation Front (renamed the Somali Salvation Democratic Front, or SSDF, in October 1981) – a group most associated with the Majeerteen clan. A group associated with the Isaaq clan, known as the Somali National Movement (SNM), also attracted support from Ethiopia and grew in strength throughout much of the eighties.

In June 1982, Somali and Ethiopian forces engaged in their last major clash. Somali forces accompanying WSLF rebels attacked Ethiopian forces in the Ogaden. In retaliation, as many as 9,000 Ethiopian troops moved to support the SSDF in occupying two border towns in Somalia. The Ethiopian move sparked an emergency airlift of military supplies by the US to the Somali government, a measure which helped dissuade the Ethiopian military from taking any further action.

Barre’s regime weakened even further in 1986, following a car accident which severely injured the president. The accident set off a power struggle among “assorted factions” within government, and almost led to the disintegration of central authority (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 168). Although Barre recovered from the accident, he faced a domestic situation that was increasingly spiraling out-of-control and reduced to a certain “beggar” status on the international front – especially vis-à-vis Ethiopia, whose material support kept rebellion within Somalia afloat. As was the case with Kenya, the fracturing of the domestic consensus in Somalia lent itself to such policies, as such rapprochement was unlikely to inflame an already chaotic internal situation.

Barre eventually had little choice but to abandon any further claims to Ethiopian territory in exchange for a cessation of Ethiopian support to rebels in Somalia. In February 1988, a formal peace accord was signed between Barre and Mengistu, within which Barre allowed for a formal demarcation of the border; a renunciation of further claims in the Ogaden; and opening of formal diplomatic relations – receiving in exchange only a pledge to evict SNM bases from Ethiopian territory. Ethiopia had, in essence, won the decades-long battle with Somalia over the Ogaden by engaging in subversive tactics similar to those long pursued by Somali leadership in Ethiopia. Hussein Ali Dualeh writes that, following the agreement, Barre confided in him, “Mengistu Haile Mariam personally defeated me because he had the Isaaq and the SNM support. I have only one objective now, to seek vengeance against the Isaaq” (Dualeh 1994: 115).

Barre proceeded to undertake a series of brutal measures against the Isaaq population of northern Somalia. However, Barre’s repression did little to stem the tide of rebellion, and probably encouraged it. By 1990, members of the Hawiye clan had revolted as well, forming a major rebel group known as the United Somali Congress (USC), which brought the fighting to the central and southern parts of the country. Barre’s fate was thus largely sealed, and he was ousted from power on January 26, 1991. Somalia further disintegrated into the collapsed state that it remains today – its irredentist designs of the past long forgotten by most.

Summary – Ethiopia-Somali relations

Relations between Ethiopian and Somalia were poisonous from the start – and only became worse through the following decades. Like the relationship between

Somalia and Kenya, the contours of the relationship were largely defined by the events within Somalia and the policies of Somali leaders. Public nationalist pressures on leadership during the seventies were much higher than that of the sixties, facilitating the full-scale conflict with Ethiopia. This is not to say that domestic audiences ignored the Somali diaspora of Ethiopia during the sixties. On the contrary, civilian leaders were obliged to maintain an aggressive diplomatic posture throughout much of the sixties in order to placate domestic audiences. When the Egal government failed to pursue aggressive policies towards Kenya and Ethiopia during the late sixties, widespread public discontent erupted. By the eighties, however, the domestic situation in Somalia had deteriorated to the degree that nationalist projects abroad had faded from public imagination, providing the Barre government and opportunity to work towards solving outstanding disputes.

The ascension of a communist regime in Ethiopia, rather than soothing relations in the name of international socialist solidarity, instead presented Somalia an opportunity to take advantage of Ethiopian instability. The war clearly signaled the lengths to which Somalia would go in realizing its irredentist (or secessionist-merger) ambitions, and the message was not lost on Ethiopian leadership. What followed was the period of “duel subversion” pursued in the early eighties as each state leadership attempted to undermine the position of the other through the support of rebel insurgents. The bilateral enmity came to full fruition in the eighties, as Somalia territorial desires were countered by Ethiopian strategies designed to promote a regime change in Mogadishu.

Ironically, it was the success of insurgent movements in both countries that ultimately led their rapprochement in the late eighties. Mutual interest trumped mutual

antagonism when the very existence of both regimes came into question, as confrontation rather rapidly shifted towards conciliation. In the end, it was too late for both governments, however, as both Mengistu and Barre met similar fates in 1991.

Ethiopian and Kenya – unlikely Cold War allies

Given the presence of a common rival with common claims on national territory, it is hardly surprising that Ethiopia and Kenya sought to maintain a close relationship with one another throughout the period covered by this case study. The two countries signed a mutual defense treaty in 1964 that was renewed in 1980 and 1987. Not surprisingly, the provisions of the agreement displayed the clear “concern for respect for the principle of territorial integrity” (Adar 1994: 143). While the closeness of their relationship during the sixties and early seventies should come as little surprise given both states’ ties to the United States and mutual antipathy toward the Soviet Union, the fact that the relationship continued practically undisturbed once Ethiopia adopted a hard communist line is a tribute to the power of interest over ideology.

The primary factor explaining this close relationship is the fact that both states were forced to deal with the mutual threat presented by Somali calls for self-determination for Somali minorities within their borders. The threat concerned both the prospect of outright Somali militarism and the “contagious” spread of native Somali rebellion at the encouragement of Mogadishu.

Since neither state shared any significant national group with the other⁷⁴, similar antagonism was not shared between them and their mutual border was held to be inviolable. Without the presence of a mutual threat, one would have expected relations between the two states to be somewhat warm during the Selassie regime and somewhat cold during the Mengistu years – but largely comparable to other pairs-of-states. The Somali factor and its effect on Ethiopian-Kenyan relations, however, displayed how regional politics during the Cold War often failed to meet the expectations of more geopolitically-minded thinkers due to the role of nationalist politics.

The rapidity with which Kenya and Ethiopia signed their mutual defense treaty in the wake of Kenyan independence indicates how strongly Kenya, in particular, viewed the threat to its frontier. While the treaty itself was kept secret⁷⁵, Kenya and Ethiopia, led by prominent leaders in the anti-colonial movement⁷⁶, provided strong diplomatic support for one another throughout. During the Ethiopian-Somali border dispute in 1964, a Kenyan representative declared to the Council of Ministers that Kenya would have assisted Ethiopia in the battle “if the Ethiopian government had asked for assistance” (Hoskyns 1969: 60). In cultivating support for anti-secessionist forces in the NFD – support which was quickly forthcoming – Kenyan diplomats stressed the historical

⁷⁴ My research has shown that the largest transborder group shared between Ethiopia and Kenya is the Oromo. While the Oromo are the largest single ethnic group in Ethiopia, they only represent a very small percentage of the Kenyan population (approximately numbering 55,000) (<http://www.ethnonet-africa.org/data/kenya/genpop.htm>).

⁷⁵ Because it was kept secret until 1979 (Sauldie 1987: 27), the mutual defense treaty was clearly not meant to deter Somalia from aggression – and thus was not addressed as a potential factor affecting the degree of Somali revisionism in the first section.

⁷⁶ Part of the reason that Kenyan and Ethiopian diplomacy was so much more successful than that of Somalia undoubtedly involved the fact that its leaders during the sixties, Jomo Kenyatta and Haile Selassie, were among the most respected members of the Africa community. At the same time, Somali leaders had risen from relative obscurity.

appeals preferred by Selassie by claiming that the region had historically belonged to the Oromo – the largest national group in Ethiopia (Adar 1994: 58-59).

Relations between Ethiopia and Kenya were uneventful throughout the late sixties and early seventies as Somali governments alternately sought détente (Shermarke-Egal) and relative isolation (Barre's early years). With the shift in Somalia's military government towards greater assertiveness in 1974, Ethiopia and Kenya once again grew closer in common cause – both governments roundly criticizing the events of the 1974 OAU summit. After the highpoint of instability following the overthrow of Selassie in Ethiopia ended, Kenya was the first black African state to openly ally itself with the Ethiopian government (Legum and Lee 1979: 58-59). Early in the Ogaden conflict, Ethiopia and Kenya issued a joint statement condemning Somalia's "brazen and naked aggression" (Lewis 1980: 234). During the war, Kenya's ministry of foreign affairs openly admitted its assistance to Ethiopia, stating "Kenya gave Ethiopia material support and if the Ethiopians now required transport including trucks and tanks, Kenya was ready to supply them" (Adar 1994: 155). At the conclusion of the war, President Moi of Kenya, hosting Mengistu at a dinner declared:

The excellent relations that exist between Ethiopia and Kenya started long before Kenya's independence. It is founded on geographical, historical and political realities . . . We are concerned that inter-African wars based on territorial claims must be avoided at all costs (p. 34).

Even though Somali-Kenyan relations warmed more quickly during the eighties than relations between Somalia and Ethiopia, Kenya and Ethiopia maintained both strong relations and a common front toward Somalia. As late as 1987, Kenya and Ethiopia issued a joint statement criticizing Somalia's threat to territorial integrity norms in the region, indicating a lingering sense of distrust of Somali intentions despite recent moves

toward détente. Although Somali's military impotence became increasingly clear quickly after the Ogaden War, continued Somali subversive activities in the Ogaden were not only a concrete threat to Ethiopia, but also one perceived in Kenya. With the eventual collapse of the Somali government, Ethiopia and Kenya no longer faced the common threat that once existed. Relations to this day have, however, remained warm, due largely to the fact that the two states, like most African neighbors, face many more threats from within stemming from heterogeneous ethno-national demographics than they face with one another in the absence of transborder nationalism.

Domestic Influences on Somali Dispute Initiation

Factors hypothesized to affect varying levels of Somali militant revisionism

Although Somalis in general have always held widespread irredentist grievances regarding territories inhabited by Somalis governed by other states, these grievances were addressed differently under different leadership and different circumstances. In this section, I examine the effect, on Somali foreign policy outcomes, of variables that were found in Chapter 5 to significantly influence dispute initiation by homeland irredentist states. The following chart illustrates the correlation of three of the four major variables hypothesized to relate to homeland state aggression and the initiation of fatal MIDs by Somalia against Ethiopia and Kenya. Although no one variable can alone be said to relate to conflict initiation, the chart below suggests an additive effect. Overall, the presence of diaspora rebellion, military rule, and military feasibility all seem to enhance the potential for MID initiation.

TABLE 6.5 – Somali Decision-making Factors and fatal MID initiation

COUNTRY	Period	FATAL MID %	Diaspora Rebellion	Military Infl.	Feasible
Ethiopia	61-69	33%	no	no	no
	70-72	0%	no	yes	no
	73-74	50%	no	yes	yes
	75-85	100%	yes	yes	yes
	86-91	0%	no	no	no
Kenya	64-69	17%	yes	no	yes
	70-91	10%	no	yes	yes

Percentage of dyad-years with a Somali FATAL MID initiation:

Total = 31%

Diaspora Rebellion = yes: 71%

= no: 14%

Military Influence = yes: 32%

= no: 27%

Military Feasibility = yes: 35%

= no: 17%

FATAL MID% = percentage of years during period witnessing MID initiation by Somalia

Note: Several questionable database codings, such as the lack of rebellion in Kenya during the sixties, have been altered for the above graph based on the more detailed findings of the case study.

The above table only reveals so much information, however, without a more detailed assessment of the variables that may be involved in influencing Somali policies. As the most important causal influence on Somali dispute initiation, variations in *militant activities among Somali diaspora* were clearly responsible for many of the changes in Somali policy during the period examined. As I argued in the earlier parts of this work, the clear signals sent by self-determination-seeking diaspora during periods of rebellion create strong audience costs at home, creating a crisis-type situation which is largely sufficient to spark aggressive foreign policies regardless of domestic structure. During periods of insurgency in the NFD and the Ogaden, Somali governments, both under parliamentary and military governments, provided “subversive” aid to insurgents. More than any other factor, the presence of diaspora insurgency seemed to be the most necessary condition for aggressive Somali diplomatic and military postures. In the brief

period when little-to-no diaspora rebellion took place, during the early seventies, Somali government priorities turned inward and Somali revisionism was at its lowest ebb of the entire thirty year period covered by this study. However, unlike the civilian government of the sixties, the Somali military government supported rebels in the Ogaden to such an extent that they were drawn into open warfare.

A major finding of the empirical sections of this work concerns the role of *military influence* in foreign policy decision-making in irredentist situations. Military influence over policy in Somalia grew initially under parliamentary government, but burst forth under the military government of the seventies, only to recede somewhat after the shattering defeat sustained at the hands of Ethiopia in 1978. The rise of military decision-making should be viewed as more than simply a reflection of the policies of Barre. Rather, it is clear that Barre was, himself, subject to the influence of other military leaders from “below”. Two important manifestations of military influence were the growth of militant nationalist preferences in foreign policy formulation and the growth of Somali military capabilities – largely a result of the desire of military leaders to divert funds to their own power-base. Unlike civilian authorities confronting rebellion in the Kenyan NEP during the sixties, the military government under Barre escalated its dispute with Ethiopia to full scale war when rebellion broke out there.

The *combination of military influence and diaspora discontent*, as proxied by relative economic and political conditions will also be examined. Ethiopia as a whole, and certainly the Ogaden region as well, was relatively poorer than Somalia throughout the case, and governed under the rule of a series of repressive Ethiopian leaders. Relatively poor economic and political conditions in this region contributed to high levels

of nationalism among the diaspora Somalis within Ethiopia – leading not only to discontent during the period of military rule, but outright rebellion.


In comparison, relations between Somalia and Kenya noticeably improved as a result of the decline in discontent among the Somali diaspora in Kenya throughout the seventies. In essence, the Kenyan diaspora increasing signaled a lack of desire for any change in the status quo or any increase in “self-determination”. Within Kenya the NFD was regarded as a largely neglected region at the onset of the case study. However, unlike Ethiopia’s, the Kenyan economy, which started off at roughly the same level of economic development as Somalia, grew at a more consistent pace throughout much of the period covered by the case study. At the same time, the political system of Kenya was relatively more open and inclusive than Somalia’s (also in contrast to Ethiopia). These factors played a role in muting the discontent of its Somali minority, which largely abandoned violent resistance by the early seventies. As Figure 6.6 shows, the state of the Kenyan economy was, overall, one of growth, while the Somali economy tended to decline over the decades.

Of particular importance is the period in the early seventies, when Somali irredentism within the NEP largely subsided during an era of rapid economic growth. This coincided with the rise of military leaders in Somalia, who were, as a result of the muted nationalism among Somalis in the NEP, not eager to pursue Somali irredentist claims against Kenya. The idea that Kenyan Somalis were relatively advantaged in comparison to their Ethiopian counterparts is seconded by Laitin and Samatar (1987:136), who suggest:

... the Somalis of the northeastern province have not been subject to the same degree of humiliation as have the Somalis in the Ogaden. Many Somalis in Kenya feel they can


become Kenyan citizens and gain from their citizenship. In the Ogaden most Somalis feel that under Ethiopian suzerainty Somalis get little but retribution.

FIGURE 6.6



The degree of economic vibrancy, as proxied by *GDP growth*, was a control variable found in the empirical analysis to be associated with varying levels of dispute initiation. Nationalism has often been hypothesized as associated with modernization and industrialization, as discussed in earlier chapters, while economic decline has been theorized to be associated with encapsulation effects, whereby a weak domestic economy leads to weaker foreign policy stances. When assessing this variable, the Somali case becomes somewhat complicated due to widely fluctuating periods of economic growth and decline. Figure 6.7 shows Somali GDP per capita alongside arrows indicating years within which Somalia initiated MIDs against its neighbors:

FIGURE 6.7



While there is no clear relationship between MID initiation and economic growth, the period leading up to the Somali-Ethiopia war is intriguing. Periods of economic chaos and drought in the early seventies caused the Somali government to focus on internal problems rather than “lashing out” as diversionary theory would suggest. At the same time, the Somali military regime focused on a variety of modernization programs which were coupled with strong appeals to Somali unity intended to mobilize the populace for domestic works projects. One such modernization effort included the introduction of the first Somali written script in history. According to Lewis (1980:236), nationalist sentiments were “stimulated to an unforeseen degree by Somali literacy”, and were manifested as public pressure on Somali leadership during the mid-1970s. During the years immediately before the war, as the chart indicates, the Somali economy had also turned the corner and was witnessing the highest growth rates recorded in this study. Thus, while the relationship between economic growth and MIDs is unclear, the evidence


lends some credibility to the idea that economic modernization can be an important precursor to war waged on nationalist grounds.

Several variables were found to relate not only to irredentist conflicts, but to conflicts in general as well. The first such variable concerns the role of *military feasibility* – and particularly the constraint posed by a lack thereof. As has been noted, this is a straightforward concept based on the idea that a state that faces overwhelming military retaliation from another state will be less likely to embark on aggressive policies towards that state. The initiation of MIDs are considered “feasible” as long as a kin state is less than five times more “capable” than a homeland state (in this case, Somalia). Using this criterion, aggression by Somalia toward Kenya was always “feasible” during the period covered in this study. On the other hand, military threats and aggression by Somalia against Ethiopia did not achieve feasibility until 1972 (see Figure 6.8), after which most years witnessed less than a five-to-one ratio of capabilities between the two states. The fact that Somalia leadership nevertheless initiated numerous MIDs against Ethiopia before 1972 is testament to the high level of domestic nationalist pressures faced by Somali executives during the sixties.

Of the variables affecting states-in-general, two are largely static throughout the study. The first is *strategic territorial claims*, which were found to have an effect on MID initiation levels across cases. While Huth’s (1996) data codes both the Ogaden and NFD regions to be strategically insignificant throughout all years, this coding seems misleading in respect to the Ogaden, in particular. According to Farer (1979: 124), “Somalia’s acquisition of Ethiopia’s southern provinces promised to alter permanently the Horn’s indigenous balance of power.” The long term strategic worth of the region

likely made the preference of Somali leadership to detach the Ogaden from Ethiopia even stronger.

FIGURE 6.8



The second variable indicates important *economic territorial claims* on disputed territory by homeland states. However, while the lack of any major economic resources in the NFD seems fairly clear, the situation has been less clear cut in the Ogaden. While the existence of large-scale gas and oil deposits in the region have never been proven (which is why Huth (1996) likely coded this variable as a '0'), during 1972, Tenneco, a US company, discovered the presence of oil and natural gas deposits in the Ogaden, just thirty miles from the Somali border. A year later the company began drilling, and, by doing so, added an additional instrumental incentive to pre-existing Somali claims on the region. According to Farer (1979: 118), "the spirit of détente, conjured into existence by [Somali leaders in the late sixties] Egal and Shermarke, had begun to whither from the

moment Tenneco first arrived in the area". While Somali leadership never mentioned economic motivations as a factor in Somalia's future militant revisionism, it is certainly possible that the discovery of potentially valuable resources in the Ogaden⁷⁷ figured into calculations of potential gain when decisions were made regarding the scope of intervention upon which Somalia was to embark in Ethiopia. Although Farer seems to overstate the importance of the suspected reserves, which have still to this day not been proven, the discoveries of the early seventies may have provided an extra incentive for war a half-decade later.

Why Ethiopia and not Kenya? Civilian versus Military Government

Thus far, this case study has described how societal nationalist pressures on Somali executives differed during different periods, depending upon events both in Somali-occupied lands in Kenya and Ethiopia as well as events within Somalia itself. During the sixties, Somali politicians adopted aggressive diplomatic postures towards both Ethiopia and Kenya. During the seventies, an initially quasi-isolationist military government turned hostile towards Ethiopia by the middle of the decade, but largely accepted the territorial status quo with regard to Kenya. As Somali society fractured during the eighties, societal interest in Somalia's relations with its neighbors greatly declined, making rapprochement not only a less politically dangerous strategy for Barre's regime, but a sensible one designed to reduce outside interference in internal affairs.

Two major questions that remain, however, are:

⁷⁷ In part due to instability in the region, the presence of wide-spread oil and gas deposits have, to this day, not been verified or developed. Nevertheless, exploration of the region for fossil fuels has accelerated over the recent decade.

1) Why did the uprising in the Ogaden during the seventies lead to war, but not the uprising in Kenya during the sixties?

and

2) Why were Somali irredentist designs on the NEP in Kenya so readily abandoned, while the Ogaden issue remained so salient?

In order to answer these questions, it is useful to consider several of the factors in conflict initiation that have been discussed. First, it is clear that diaspora uprising was the main underlying factor affecting the policies adopted by Somali leadership towards its neighbors. Not surprisingly, relations with Kenya were particularly poor during the mid-sixties when the shifita rebellion was occurring. Similarly, poor relations with Ethiopia became explosive during the period of WSLF rebellion during the seventies and early eighties.

Although not central to the variables discussed, cultural reasons, discussed earlier, explaining differing Somali policies toward Ethiopia and Kenya were clearly important. Somali rivalry with the centuries old Ethiopian state was a more deeply engrained part of Somali culture than rivalry with the newborn state of Kenya. This rivalry also took on somewhat messianic undertones, as the Ethiopia state claimed to represent East African Christianity while Somalia projected itself as a key player in the Islamic world. Clan linkages between Somalis in the Republic and the Somali populations of Ethiopia were also much stronger than those between clans in Somalia and Kenya.

Cultural explanations aside, many of the variables utilized to explain conflict initiation by homeland states also seem relevant to the case as well. The most important structural correlate of war presented in the early models suggests that military dominated

government will be more conflictual than civilian-based rule. In the case of Somalia's foreign policy, the military government under Barre approached growing rebellion in the Ogaden much differently than Somalia's government approached rebellion in the NEP. First, unlike the civilian government of the sixties, which both attempted negotiations with Kenya at the height of tension in 1965 and sought to press its disputes diplomatically through numerous international forums, the military government under Barre was consistently escalatory in its approach to Ethiopia – and was hindered from taking action against its neighbor sooner only by severe drought conditions occurring in the middle of the decade.

Second, by all accounts, the level of aid provided by the civilian regime to NEP insurgents was much smaller than that provided by the military regime to insurgents in the Ogaden. While aid from Somalia is unlikely to have affected the *existence* of insurgency, it likely affected the *level* of insurgency. The level of insurgency in the Ogaden rose to such a level that it was perceived to have a viable chance of success. This presented the Somali a rare window-of-military-opportunity that proved too tempting to pass up. On the other hand, the civilian authorities of the sixties resisted the urge to supply shifta rebels with large amounts of material and training, which helped prevent the uprising from growing beyond the stage of scattered guerilla warfare. According to Lewis (1980: 200), the early civilian authorities consciously avoided escalating disputes with Kenya (and Ethiopia) in an effort to prevent nationalist considerations from derailing other priorities of the Somali state:

Clearly vital though the Pan-Somali issue was to Somali national sentiments, it could not be allowed to override the Republic's other interests. . . success in attract[ing] substantial aid. . . vindicated the government's policy of not allowing the Pan-Somali dispute to affect the Republic's general position.

Overall, the civilian authorities, while pursuing an aggressive diplomatic front, tended to focus more on the domestic problems associated with independence than on military aggression abroad. While a focus on domestic affairs also characterized the policies of the military government in its early years, Barre's regime quickly fell prey to the extremist impulses of nationalism in Somali society.

The connection between military influence over government policy and the feasibility of military aggression cannot be understated. Although thus far military feasibility has largely been stated in terms suggesting the possession of requisite defensive capabilities to deter reprisals by states that are the target of lower levels of aggression, a stricter standard of military feasibility would consider factors leading to the perception that large scale conventional aggression might be successful. Widespread domestic turmoil in Ethiopia represented one factor nursing Somali perceptions that a conventional intervention in the Ogaden was feasible. As was noted above, the propensity of the military to supply large-scale aid to insurgent groups made intervention more feasible by increasing the capabilities of the insurgents of the Ogaden.

Finally, the actual capabilities of the Somali military were influenced by the military control over policy, as the military government obtained and spent high amounts on increasing Somali military capabilities in contrast to earlier civilian authorities. Soviet material support for the Somali military had led to the empowerment of an assertive political actor, an actor that had become the chief policy maker in Somalia. Due to the pro-Western stances of the Shermarke-Egal administration, many suggest that the Soviets helped engineer the overthrow of civilian authorities (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 79; Dualeh 1994: 66). The adoption by the new military government of "scientific

socialism”, meant a closer alliance with the USSR, and opened the floodgate of military aid during the ensuing years.

The Somali military grew quickly during the early seventies. By 1974, the Somali’s armed forces, while smaller in manpower, were equivalent to Ethiopia’s in aircraft, tanks, and other sophisticated weaponry (Henze 1986: 52). According to Samatar (1988: 128), Somalia’s “close embrace” of the Soviet Union, resulted in “the growth and dominance of a military culture in the political economy”. Military rule provided the opportunity for Somali leaders to arm the Somali state to a degree far beyond what normally would have been expected of a state of such limited resources.

The large-scale armament program that had been initiated during this period continued up until the outbreak of hostilities between Somalia and Ethiopia. The Soviet-funded armament program, already at high levels, accelerated even more after 1974. Between 1974 and 1977 the Soviets sharply increased sales to Somalia, selling \$300 million in weapons during this period (Hensel 1986:53). Although on paper the Ethiopian military seemed stronger than the Somali military, the Somali military was better trained and better equipped. Thus, in comparison to the civilian authorities of the previous decade, military governance led to an increase in capabilities for both the insurgent movement and the Somali military itself – each factor enabling perception that the eventual invasion of the Ogaden region might yield success.

At the same time, however, it must be recognized that Somali capabilities of the sixties largely matched those of Kenya and, yet, a large-scale military confrontation was not initiated. Thus, we should not only look at the role of military governance in creating a force capable of challenging Ethiopia, but also the different preferences that led to its

willingness to do so. As has been asserted, military-influenced decision-making tends to be more nationalist-oriented than civilian decision-making – a factor that, unlike the desire to divert increased funds to the military, actively sets military governance in irredentist situations apart from situations within which nationalism plays less of a role. As was noted above, civilian authorities during the sixties, while pursuing an aggressive pattern of diplomacy pressing for Somali diaspora “self-determination”, also tempered foreign policy belligerence with a high degree of restraint in order to assure continued international support for internal development. In other words, despite public pressures, the civilian regime’s general priorities placed internal development over the pursuance of nationalist objectives abroad.

For the military government, on the other hand, nationalist politicking went hand-in-hand with development, as appeals to Somali pride were essential in mobilizing the public for a series of “modernization” efforts. Nationalism, more so than “scientific socialism”, became the chief ideology propounded by the military government, and also represented the guiding principle of elite decision-making. However, inward appeals to Somali unity easily morphed into calls for Pan-Somalism in foreign affairs. Even though Barre himself began to display renewed interest in the national struggle during the mid seventies, it was not merely his preferences, but also the preferences of the military officials below him that drove the march to war. Many reports suggest that a reluctant Barre was increasingly “pressured by his general staff to plan for the liberation of the Ogaden” (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 141) and facing growing calls to action from military leaders “below” (Farer 1979: 126; Selassie 1980: 111; Woodward 1996: 127). The growing perception that a military attack on Ethiopia was possible dovetailed with

nationalist military preferences that such an attack was desirable, despite the potential international repercussions that would even be associated with success.

The course pursued in Somalia's relationships with Ethiopia laid in stark contrast to those pursued towards Kenya during the seventies. A large part of this is due to the fact that Kenyan Somalis no longer seemed desirous of self-determination as they had in the mid-sixties. The improvement of conditions for Somalis in Kenya coincided with the incidence of military rule in Somalia. This work has suggested that military-influenced decision-making tends to breed conflict initiation more frequently when foreign diaspora reside in states that are poorer or more politically repressive than the homeland state. Neither condition characterized Kenya at the time. In the absence of a Kenyan diaspora desirous of liberation, the position of the military government toward Kenya remained rather passive. In the end, the only MID initiated against Kenya during the seventies was "incidental", in that it involved the violation of Kenyan territory only in the context of the conflict with Ethiopia. Thus, in contrast to efforts on behalf of the highly nationalist diaspora in Ethiopia, claims to Kenya were never really pursued after 1970.

Conclusion

This chapter was divided into two parts. The first part explored the roots of the conflict between Somalia and its neighbors, Ethiopia and Kenya, and why good relations existed between Ethiopia and Kenya despite strong ideological differences. Regional politics in the Horn of Africa were influenced far more by the clash of self-determination versus territorial integrity norms than by the clash of Cold War ideology.

Although generally conceived as attributable to a fairly consistent “baseline” of hostility, variations in public pressure on Somali executive decision-makers explain in part why bilateral enmity between Somalia and its neighbors rose and fell during the period examined. The translation of public pressure into aggressive diplomacy was evident during the sixties, when diaspora rebellion in Kenya was occurring. Similarly, public pressure on the Siad Barre was extreme during the period before the initiation of major hostilities with Ethiopia during the seventies. During other periods not witnessing rebellion, such as Ethiopia during the sixties and Kenya during the seventies, relations were tense, but not explosive as they were during times of diaspora rebellion. When the internal situation in Somalia fractured into clanism during the eighties, public attention largely turned away from foreign affairs, enabling Somali leadership to pursue reconciliation with Ethiopia and Kenya.

As a basis of comparison, this chapter also examined relations between Ethiopia and Kenya. Unlike relations involving Somalia, relations between Ethiopia and Kenya were not beholden to any dispute involving a transborder group. While, within the context of the Cold War rivalry, one would have expected relations between the two states to be tense after the rise of a communist regime in Ethiopia, this was not the case. The comparatively peaceful nature of Kenyan-Ethiopia relations reflects the fact that societal pressures on executives agitating for foreign policy aggression are clearly more responsive to issues of nationalism than more abstract issues of political and economic ideology.

Despite the fact that the underlying normative issues were similar in Somalia’s disputes with its neighbors, it must also be noted that relations with Ethiopia were far

more conflictual than those with Kenya. It would seem that the baseline probability of conflict between Ethiopia and Kenya was higher overall due to the presence of many unmeasured factors, including: enmity derived from a long history of dispute during the colonial era; religious differences that overlapped ethnic differences; and closer affiliations between Somali clans and Ethiopian diaspora.

The second part of the study examined factors influencing the degree of aggressive behavior displayed in Somali foreign policy. Part of the utility of the case study approach is teasing out the finer contextual points that are not readily apparent through large-n empirical approaches. In the case of Somali-Kenyan relations, I described how Somali policy was quite aggressive during the mid sixties, due in part to the presence of Somali rebellion in Kenya. As the *shifia* uprising subsided and the apparent acceptance of the *status quo* among Kenyan Somalis increased, Somali policy toward Kenya warmed considerably. The lack of a “discontented” Somali minority in Kenya during the years of military government in Somalia translated into Mogadishu largely abandoning its claim to Kenyan territory.

The factors underlying Somali policies towards Ethiopia are a bit more difficult to tease-out. Somali rebellion in Ethiopia was prevalent through most of the period, making it difficult to assess how relations between Somalia and Ethiopia would have taken shape in the absence of such rebellion. During the lull in rebellion that took place in the early seventies, tensions between Ethiopian and Somali ebbed, but this may have been as much a consequence of the domestic consolidation process of the military government and the previously established *détente* agreements as it was due to lack of rebellion.

Earlier theory suggested that diaspora rebellion creates strong enough audience costs that other factors may be overridden in importance, at least as far as the initiation of MIDs are concerned. During years coded as experiencing diaspora rebellion in Ethiopia, one hundred percent also witnessed the initiation of a MID by Somalia – clearly indicating the role of ethno-national “rescue” policies in influencing international relations.

However, when rebellion in the Ogaden was coupled with a military dictatorship in Mogadishu, the government pursued a course of escalation that led to open warfare. In contrast, while rebellion during the sixties that occurred in Kenya and Ethiopia received a measure of diplomatic and material support from Mogadishu, many of the insurgents, particularly in Kenya, were disappointed that more aid was not forthcoming. While it must be strongly noted that the conclusion is tentative, the case of Somali policy seems to affirm the escalatory tendencies of military influenced governments in irredentist-type disputes. These escalatory tendencies seem both a preference of military governments in irredentist disputes and also a consequence of policies that inflame rebellion to the point at which military governments are drawn into disputes. Although not analyzed empirically in the earlier statistical analysis, the relationship between military government and the initiation of war, rather than simply lower levels of conflict, will be investigated further in the context of the next case study.

CHAPTER 7 – India, Pakistan, and China

The relations between India and its neighbors have been contentious since the withdrawal of the British from the Subcontinent in 1947. India has fought three major wars against Pakistan and one against China. Dozens of smaller scale militarized disputes have occurred between India and its neighbors as well. India's poor relations with Pakistan and China have been soured however, by fundamentally different factors. India's difficulties with Pakistan have revolved around the irredentist Kashmir dispute, resulting in high levels of bilateral enmity and the constant threat of war. India's relations with China, on the other hand, have resembled more of a mini Cold War, characterized by tense relations but only rare instances of military confrontation over the last several decades. A comparison of Pakistani-India enmity with Sino-Indian rivalry illustrates the fact that nationalist-based disputes tend to breed conflict to a degree unmatched by those based on *realpolitik*-type factors.

Politics in both India and Pakistan involve multiple competing identities, with language, region, and local culture competing with religion as alternate sources of allegiance. While identities overlapping the dominant religious affiliation of the majority populations of both states have, at times, had important implications for domestic affairs in these countries, religious differences have represented the prime generator of conflict between these two states. The very existence of Pakistan is predicated on the idea that Hindus and Moslems represent separate nations (Brines 1968: 29) and Islam represents the very basis of Pakistan's nationalist-oriented foreign policies (Jalalzai 2000: 39). In contrast, India has attempted, at least in principle, to avoid reference to religious differences in its policies. This fact helps explain why the focal

point of conflict has revolved around Pakistan's irredentist claims to Kashmir rather than India's concern for the Hindu minority of Pakistan.⁷⁸

As with the previous chapter, this chapter will be divided into two major parts. The first part examines the differing conceptions of legitimate rule that have traditionally guided the foreign policies of India and Pakistan, and why the existence of normative incongruence has created instability and distrust for decades. At the same time, the interactions between China and these two states are examined in order to juxtapose the different nature of the relationships involved when basic normative issues are not at stake. The time period examined during this chapter is longer than that of the previous chapter, spanning the period from the independence of India and Pakistan in 1947 until 1991, with brief note of the period since 1991.

The second part of this chapter will analyze, with respect to Pakistan, the factors derived from the earlier empirical analysis that were found to be related to rates of dispute initiation by irredentist-type homeland states. As with the earlier Somali case, the level of aggression displayed by Pakistani government differs during different time periods. Of particular interest are the differences in policies adopted by Pakistan's leaders under military rule during the sixties and eighties, in comparison to those adopted by civilian leaders during much of the fifties and seventies. Due to the fact that rebellion in Kashmir was largely non-existent until the late eighties, the role of military influence

⁷⁸ According to the rules used to code transborder ethnicity for use in the econometric testing in Chapter 5, India and Pakistan represent one of the few cases which qualify as a double irredentist situation. Not only is India home to a significant Moslem minority (about 12% of the population), but Pakistan is also home to a Hindu population that numbers in the millions and is considered "at risk" by the Minorities-at-Risk project. Neither the territories of non-Kashmiri Moslems in India nor the territories inhabited by the Hindu population of Pakistan, however, have been the subject of significant irredentist politicking. This, in part, is likely a consequence of the fact that the groups are relatively dispersed geographically, despite the fact that most tend to live near the Pakistani-Indian border. The only majority-Muslim state in India is the province of Jammu and Kashmir.

on government decision-making can more easily be assessed than was the case in the previous chapter examining Somalia's policies.

This case offers several contrasts to the earlier case examining the relations of Somalia with its neighbors. In the case of Somalia, variations in societal nationalist pressures on Somali executives accounted for a degree of variation in foreign policy decision-making outcomes and, ultimately, bilateral stability. In the Somali case, however, international pressure, with the exception of a handful of states, tended to weigh heavily against Somali aggression throughout, as Kenyan and Ethiopian rhetoric emphasizing Somali transgressions of international norms met generally receptive audiences.

With the case of the Indo-Pakistani dispute, however, societal pressures within Pakistan were fairly consistent, with no large variation associated with either diaspora uprisings or the fracturing of Pakistani society, as happened in Somalia.⁷⁹ However, international constraints were less consistent than in the Somali case, as the international community, which was initially tolerant of Pakistani aggression, gradually adopted a more balanced approach to the region. Nevertheless, to this day, the international community is rarely united in its opposition to Pakistan's activities in Indian-held Kashmir, allowing Pakistan greater leeway to pursue aggression than most other states with outstanding irredentist grievances.

⁷⁹ One major exception to the characterization of Pakistani public nationalism as fairly "consistent" can be said to have been in the immediate aftermath of partition in 1947, when violence on both sides of the new border created widespread and intense Hindu-Moslem enmity that required several years, at least, to recede to "normal" levels. One might also suggest that events preceding the 1965 Pakistani-Indian war led to a sense of heightened public nationalism, but there is little evidence to suggest that the military leadership of the time was "pushed" into war by public pressures.

International Norms in Transborder versus Non-transborder Situations

As in the previous chapter, it is useful to begin by reviewing the results of the bilateral regression model displayed in Chapter 5 (Table 5.1). The following chart shows how many disputes are predicted by the systemic regression model versus the actual number of disputes within these dyads over the period 1951-1991.

TABLE 7.1 – Predicted versus Actual Bilateral MIDs and FATAL MIDs in Dyads

	MID – actual	MID – predicted	FATAL – actual	FATAL predicted
India-Pakistan	66%	76%	44%	78%
India-China	39%	33%	18%	18%
Pakistan-China	6%	11%	6%	5%

The predictions shown above are quite close to the actual course of events in the cases of India-China and Pakistan-China. The model slightly overestimates the number of MIDS and greatly overestimates the number of fatal MIDs.⁸⁰ One reason the model overestimates MID probabilities is that the model considers both India and Pakistan as potentially irredentist homeland states due to the presence of a significant minority of Hindus within Pakistan. As has been noted, however, India has traditionally pursued foreign and domestic policies that deliberately downplay religious and ethnic differences – a policy which lends itself to a certain distancing from the Hindu diaspora in Pakistan. The first section, below, explores more deeply the roots of the important distinctions

⁸⁰ Strangely, the model actually suggests a slightly higher percent of fatal MIDs than it suggests for all MIDs. This statistical quirk is largely a result of the fact that the peace-years control variable for fatal MIDs yields a much lower coefficient than that for MIDs. Because there are so relatively few years without fatal MIDs relative to other dyads, the baseline value resulting from the combination of other variables, which starts from a very high value, carries almost the entire load in determining the average yearly fatal MID probability without mitigation by the peace-years variable.

between Pakistani policies focusing on ethno-religious identity and those of India, which seek to downplay communal distinctions.

Nationalism and Self-Determination versus “Secular Nationalism” and Sovereignty

Like many of the irredentist disputes in the world, the seeds of future conflict between India and Pakistan were planted with the division of territories resulting from decolonization. Unlike other cases such as within the Horn of Africa, however, the division of territories between India and Pakistan was not imposed from above by unilateral decree of an imperial power or powers. Rather, British officials guided a process by which accession to either India or Pakistan would be determined by local rulers, recommending only that it would be in the best interest of such states to observe the principles of geographical contiguity and to pay due regard to the religion of the majority of their citizens (Varshney 1991: 1007).

The Independence of India Act, which granted formal independence to India and Pakistan on August 15, 1947, also entrusted hundreds of rulers within “prince-states” to decide the fate of their territories. While partition sparked widespread Hindu-Moslem rioting that costs hundreds-of-thousands of lives, the legal process of accession proceeded in a fairly orderly manner. Three cases, in particular, however, were highly contentious. Rulers in Hyderabad, a Hindi majority state with a Moslem ruler, and Kashmir, a Moslem majority state with a Hindi ruler both initially opted for independence). The ruler of Janagarh, a Moslem who ruled a Hindi majority, opted for accession to Pakistan. Both Hyderabad and Janagarh, which were surrounded by Indian territory, were invaded by

and annexed to India in 1948.⁸¹ Geography was not as merciful to the people of Kashmir, who, unlike the people of Hyderabad and Janagarh, reside in a territory adjoining both Pakistan and India – which has facilitated the ability of both states to pursue their claims through force.

The Independence of India Act, which spawned the decades-long Kashmir dispute, was not equally supported by Indian and Pakistan leaders of the time. The very ideological underpinning of the agreement supported the dominant Moslem contention, for which the “father of Pakistan”, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, had long fought – namely, that two separate nations existed on the Subcontinent. This proposition, however, was rejected by the major Indian leaders of the time including Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, both of whom opposed the idea of government division based on ethnic or religious differences. Kashmir became a lasting symbol of the disagreement concerning the very legitimacy of partition based on religious identity.

The dispute over Kashmir, then, is one of clashing ideologies, or, more specifically, clashing norms concerning legitimate governance. On the one hand, for Pakistanis “the creation of their nation through Islamic idealism will be incomplete as long as Muslim Kashmir . . . remains unabsorbed” (Brines 1968: 51). In achieving this goal, Pakistani leaders have “appealed to moral law and mobilized the principle of self-determination” (Choudhury 1971: 69) in order to justify diplomatic, subversive, and outright military action designed to “liberate” the region from Indian control.

On the other hand, Indian leaders have retained control over Kashmir due in part to the idea that “Kashmir is symbolic of secular nationalism and state-building and the

⁸¹ The Moslem majority region of Kalat, in Moslem Baluchistan, located in western Pakistan, also declared independence and was invaded and annexed by Pakistan in 1948.

possibility of a Muslim-majority area choosing to live and prosper within a Hindu-majority country” (Ganguly and Bajpai 1994: 402). Once again, harkening back to the very principle of partition in the first place “many Indians . . . believed that the creation of Pakistan was a rape of Mother India and that the loss of Kashmir would be a further unacceptable violation” (Brines 1968: 7). From a more practical point of view, allowing Kashmiris to decide their own fate via plebiscite would also raise concerns of both “an internal domino effect” whereby other regions of multi-ethnic India might demand similar treatment as well lead to “a Hindu backlash against Muslim communities” (Ganguly and Bajpai, p. 414).

What the Indian government refers to as “secular nationalism” would not be described as nationalism at all by most scholars in the field. Rather, the Indian commitment to liberal values and, particularly, allegiance to the Indian state, much more closely reflects the idea of “patriotism”, a loyalty which is often in fundamental conflict with nationalist sentiments – as is the case in Kashmir where Kashmiri nationalists reject the power and influence of the Indian state. In this sense, the liberal concept of “secular nationalism” is bound to a legalistic interpretation of original consent, a line of argumentation Indian leaders have utilized at various points, as will be discussed, to argue against a more organic concept of self-determination.

The legalistic position of Indian governments also lends itself directly to the norms of territorial integrity and sovereignty which have been discussed at length in this work. Placing state authority as the primary source of legitimate rule over populations inherently means a strong emphasis on the demarcation of the boundaries of that authority as determined by the treaties among states represented in international law.

Indian emphasis on legalistic interpretations of territory, coupled with the traditional liberal focus on individual rather than group rights, translates into less support for Hindu minorities in Pakistan than one might normally expect from a “homeland” state, but greater intransigence on the issue of autonomy or self-determination for minorities within state borders.

However, self-determination, as it has been stressed, offers both a moral and, to a weaker degree, legal, challenge to Indian interpretations of state sovereignty. The legal dimension of the challenge stems not only from international resolutions citing self-determination as a “right”, but also from specific UN resolution that call for a plebiscite to be held in Kashmir in order to assess the desires of its population. While India has denied the validity of early UN resolutions for several decades, the legitimacy accorded to the Pakistani position as a consequence of early UN support has only dimmed, not disappeared, in the intervening years.

The following section offers, in greater detail, the historical development of the normative dispute between India and Pakistan. By understanding the basic ideological incompatibility of the positions of the two sides, and how differing normative understandings have facilitated conflict and mistrust, basic insights may be gleaned as to why the bilateral relations between the two states have tended to be much more violent than those between most other states.

The violent divorce – Moslem nationalism, partition, and communal strife

Like many nationalist movements, the roots of Moslem nationalism in the subcontinent are today imagined to run deeper in history than was actually the case.

While Moslems certainly understood themselves as a separate identity group than the Hindu majority of India since the very introduction of Islam over a thousand years ago, there existed no movement for greater political autonomy until the 20th century. The Moslem League, the first Moslem-based advocacy group, was founded in 1906. However, the party varied widely in its positions in the ensuing decades, at times adopting very similar positions as the Indian National Congress, the primary “secular nationalist” party of the time (and up until the present).

In 1935, Muhammad Ali Jinnah took control of the Muslim League, and began to advocate greater Moslem separatism. Although receiving little support among Moslems during provincial election in 1937, the group began to attract mass public support in 1940, shortly after the outbreak of the Second World War. In part a response to the growing Indian agitation for independence, Moslem fears of trading British rule for Hindu rule increased. At a conference in Lahore in March 1940, Jinnah formally declared for the first time that “Hindus and Muslims were two nations by any definition or test of a nation” (Choudhury 1988: 7).

Jinnah and the Muslim League were to achieve their nationalist goals with the announcement of the Independence of India act on June 2, 1947. However, what had begun as a negotiated process between British authorities, secular Indians, and the Moslem League resulted in massive Hindu-Indian violence and dislocation during the coming years. The road to both partition and communal violence had clearly begun by August 1946, when widespread rioting broke out in Calcutta, necessitating the arrival of six British divisions to quell the bloodshed. The Calcutta violence between Hindus and

Moslems was unprecedented in its scale, but only the beginning of a process through which violence spread throughout much of the subcontinent.

The rioting that broke out in Calcutta occurred as a result of efforts by Moslem nationalists calling for a nationwide strike of Moslems to press for an Islamic state to be created upon independence for Britain. This nationwide strike, labeled “Direct Action Day” was sparked by frustration on the part of the Muslim League, which failed to achieve an acceptable compromise with the Indian National Congress Party over the conditions for the subcontinent’s independence. Although largely intended as an act of peaceful civil disobedience, the violence that ensued and spread in the wake of Direct Action Day ultimately achieved the desired aim of Moslem nationalists, if not through the desired means, by pressuring British authorities to consider partition as the only viable solution to the rising turmoil within the subcontinent.

The highpoint of inter-communal violence occurred during the summer of 1947, although continued long after Independence Day in August. No precise figures exist on the number of people killed in the chaos, with estimates ranging between 200,000 and three million (Hasan 2002). As the largely disorganized violence between Moslems and Hindus began to ebb in the fall, however, new issues arose that were to lead to organized violence between the states home to the majority populations of these communities. The most important of these issues involved the status of the Kashmir region, which was rooted both in the desire of Pakistani leaders to fully actualize the nationalist preferences of domestic audiences by pushing for the self-determination of the majority-Moslem region as well as the rejection by Indian leadership of the principle of utilizing religious demographics to determine legitimate governance.

Shortly before independence, two events occurred that were to have a major effect on Pakistani-Indian relations. The first was the official announcement by the Hindu Maharajah of Kashmir, Hari Singh, which stated that Kashmir intended to pursue “standstill” agreements with Indian and Pakistani. These agreements suggested, at least in the immediate future, that the Maharajah would not accede either to India or Pakistan. Similar to India’s reaction to Hyderabad’s policy of non-alignment, Pakistani leaders were particularly incensed by the decision of the Maharajah, and engaged in a variety of pressure tactics to force accession, including an economic blockade (Park 1952: 265).

Pakistani-Indian Relations – A History of Antipathy

The period immediately surrounding partition was perhaps the only time when one might suggest with assurance that the overall nationalist pressures emanating from Pakistani society were notably higher than other periods. Not surprisingly, the violence surrounding the partition had intensified communal sentiments on both sides of the new border, and Pakistani civilian leaders were forced to deal with the sentiments of a particularly zealous population.

Relative to other regions demarcated by partition over the previous year, relations between Hindus and Moslems in the Kashmir had been remarkably peaceful. However, when a “peasant revolt” in the western Kashmir region of the Poonch began in July-August 1947, the already heightened nationalist sentiments of many Pakistanis were inflamed further. Despite the fact that the initial revolt had little to do with religious identity (Brines 1968: 69), Pathan⁸² tribesman from the neighboring Northwest Frontier Provinces of Pakistan soon began providing material support for the rebellion,

⁸² The Pathan ethnic group is also referred to, more commonly today, as ‘Pashtun’.

interpreting the anti-Maharaja movement as a pro-Moslem *jihad*. In October 1947, thousands of these tribesmen crossed the border in order to liberate Kashmir by force.

Materially abetted by the Pakistani government⁸³, the raiders quickly defeated the state forces of the Maharajah and moved toward the state capital of Srinagar. At this point, the Maharajah sent an emergency plea for assistance to the Indian government and formally agreed to accede to India in exchange for such support. The Indian government responded with an emergency airlift of Indian regular forces, which pushed back the tide of insurgents. By the late spring of 1948, insurgent forces were on the brink of defeat, at which point the Pakistani government decided to intervene directly by sending a large military contingent in order to hold the western areas of Kashmir still under rebel control. The subsequent clash of Indian and Pakistani forces marked the beginning of the first of three interstate wars.

The conflict ended with a ceasefire, drawn up by a special UN Commission sent to investigate the dispute, on December 31, 1948. Under the terms of the ceasefire, the military lines of control⁸⁴ were frozen in place, leaving Kashmir divided along a *de facto* border that separated Pakistani Kashmir (known as Azad Kashmir, or “Free Kashmir” and Indian Kashmir (actually part of the state of Kashmir and Jammu). Further demilitarization was to occur preceding the conduct of a UN supervised plebiscite to determine the whether the people of Kashmir preferred accession to India or Pakistan.⁸⁵

⁸³ Although the full story will likely never be known, it is unlikely that Pakistani officials deliberately organized and initiated the incursion of Pathan raiders into Kashmir. However, once the movement had taken shape, Pakistani security forces clearly acquiesced in their transborder movements and almost certainly provided some level of material support, particularly at the local level.

⁸⁴ The division of Kashmir in 1948 was originally along a “ceasefire line”. Two decades later the “ceasefire line” became known as the “Line of Control”.

⁸⁵ The plebiscite was to determine accession to India or Pakistan. Curiously, the UN never entertained the idea of maintaining an independent Kashmir.

Of particular relevance to international norms is the fact that the international community recognized Kashmir as a “disputed territory”, rather than an integral part of either state. This meant that the Line of Control dividing the territory *was never widely recognized as an international border*. Over the years, this fact enabled Pakistan to commit aggression across the ceasefire line with less international backlash than one would associate with the violation of one’s state’s territory by another.

Despite the bloodshed, the period following the First Kashmir War was hopeful, due to the fact that Pakistan, the United Nations, and even India seemed ready to resolve the issue based on principles of self-determination. Having acceded to the creation of Pakistan despite philosophical opposition to territorial division along religious lines, Indian leaders were initially amenable to one-last-compromise of the principles of secular nationalism, by allowing a plebiscite to take place.

The early years after partition were a clear victory for Pakistan diplomacy, which “consistently attempted to cancel out the military failures of 1947-48 by enlisting the support of the world behind her ‘moral’ right to claim all of Kashmir” while encouraging the UN to adopt “uncritical slogans [such as] the term ‘self-determination’”(Brines 1968: 85 and 87). As is often the case when the rhetoric of self-determination is employed, Pakistani leaders suggested that they did not wish territorial gain for the sake of itself. Rather, the welfare of the Kashmiri people was paramount in allowing a plebiscite – a plebiscite which, if fairly conducted, was likely to result in secessionist-merger type outcome, which the international community would find acceptable. Such an outlook was expressed by the Pakistani representative to the Security Council in 1951, who argued:

It is well known that, although every factor on the basis of which the question of accession should be determined – population, cultural and religious bonds, the flow of trade, the economic situation, communications, the geographical position, strategic considerations – points insistently in the direction the accession of Kashmir to Pakistan, nevertheless we have not asked for the accession of Kashmir to Pakistan on those grounds. We have agreed . . . that the question should be settled through the freely expressed wishes of the people of the state (quoted in *Documents on the Foreign Relations of Pakistan* 1966: 289).

As noted, initially India was receptive to the idea of a plebiscite, despite the widespread belief that the result would not be in New Delhi's favor. However, the actual preparations for such a plebiscite never took place due to India's objections to what was perceived as the continued large-scale presence of Pakistani soldiers in Azad Kashmir and an overly aggressive posture by Pakistan in resolving the dispute (along with a variety of other disputes at the time). Nehru's acceptance of the plebiscite in principle, but not in practice, was expressed in a September 1951 letter to the head of the UN Commission on India and Pakistan:

. . . The Government of India not only reaffirms its acceptance of the principle that the question of . . . the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India shall be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations, but is anxious that the conditions necessary for such a plebiscite should be as quickly as possible (quoted in *Documents on the Foreign Relations of Pakistan* 1966: 303-304).

Nevertheless, the initially conciliatory stance of the Indian government grew increasingly intransigent. Publicly this was explained as a reaction to the continuing hostile stance of the Pakistani government and India's fundamental distrust of Pakistani intentions. Indian decision-makers clearly distrusted the intentions of their Pakistani counterparts, who, facing domestic pressures for continued aggressive policies and international pressures advocating compromise, were "placed in a tragically difficult situation in relation both to outside opinion and political opponents at home" ("India and Pakistan" 1951: 139).

The adoption of a Pakistani-US defense pact in 1953 was largely the “last straw” for Indian governments, as the pact was interpreted as not only a betrayal of the idea of non-alignment that was a cornerstone of India’s foreign relations, but also an indication that Pakistani leaders intended to build up their state’s military capabilities in order to once again attempt a forced solution to the Kashmir issue in the future. According to Nehru in 1954, the Indian state would no longer negotiate the status of Kashmir due to the fact that “the pressure of arms has taken the place of the previous peaceful and cooperative approach” (quoted in *Documents on the Foreign Relations of Pakistan 1966*: 353).

Although there were other reasons for Pakistan’s military relation with the U.S., the irredentist Kashmir issue had become the lens through which India interpreted major Pakistani foreign policy decisions. Indeed, the revisionist desires of Pakistan, combined with the increasingly aggressive “defensive” postures adopted by India, drove the downward spiral of bilateral relations common in such irredentist situations.

The earlier amenability of the India government disappeared completely during the period 1953-1963 as the Indian government developed a line of argumentation intended to justify its disavowal of the earlier UN-backed plans for a plebiscite. The harder Indian line not only stressed the continuing aggression of Pakistan and the occupation of Azad Kashmir by Pakistan, but increasingly focused upon the concepts “sovereignty”; the importance of Kashmir to the existence of India as a secular state; and increasingly described Kashmir as an *integral* part of India.

Shortly after the breakdown of negotiations in 1953, elected representatives of the Kashmiri Constituent Assembly, led by Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, a Moslem favoring

integration with India, passed a resolution affirming Kashmir's status as part of India. Attempting to fend off the normative successes of Pakistan at the UN, the resolution was seized upon by Indian leaders as the authoritative expression of "self-determination" by the population of the region. The general support of elected representatives in Kashmir enabled the Indian government to accelerate the political assimilation of the state.

The early sixties saw the final ending of any hopes for a plebiscite. Upon its initial accession, Kashmir had been granted a special status with a high degree of autonomy under the Indian constitution. In 1964, the Indian parliament passed articles 356 and 357 of the Indian Constitution, which essentially transformed Kashmir into a "normal" Indian state, governed by the same federal rules as other regions. The new measures were symbolically momentous, essentially signaling the preclusion of any further negotiations by India over the now integral state of Jammu and Kashmir. During early 1964, the Indian representative to the Security Council made clear that India would no longer consider a plebiscite when he announced that:

We cannot possibly contemplate with equanimity the threat to the integration of our country and the danger to our cherished principle of secularism by the holding of a plebiscite in Kashmir. . . under *no circumstances* can we agree to the holding of a plebiscite in Kashmir (quoted in *Documents on the Foreign Relations of Pakistan 1966*: 381).

The events of 1964 outraged public opinion in Pakistan, leading the Pakistani Foreign Minister (and future president) Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to write to the President of the Security Council denouncing the "sinister design of the Government of India to obliterate the special status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir" as a "gross breach of the India's commitment to the principles of the resolutions of the United Nations" involving the purge of officials "whose only fault was that they were in some small measure

conscious of. . . the right of self-determination”(quoted in *Documents on the Foreign Relations of Pakistan* 1966: 427-8). Subsequently, *the degree of support shown by the international community for the Pakistani cause of Kashmiri “self-determination” provided an important measure of justification for policies of aggression that were subsequently pursued.*

By integrating Kashmir with India and removing the issue from the negotiating table, India essentially froze the status quo situation in place, guaranteeing continued bilateral enmity for decades to come. A frustrated Pakistani leadership turned again to a strategy of forcibly ejecting India from the territory of perceived co-nationals.

During the spring of 1965, Indian forces attempted to occupy a Pakistani outpost in the Rann of Kutch, a largely unpopulated marshland area bordering on the Arabian Sea. Pakistan responded with military force that was “clearly greater than required by the tactical situation” and rather decisively defeated Indian forces in the area (Brines 1968: 289). According to Feldman (1972: 135), Ayub Khan interpreted the victory as a clear signal that Pakistani soldiers clearly outmatched their Indian counterparts, an impression reinforced by the earlier rout of Indian forces at the hands of the Chinese several years earlier.

The Pakistani plan to seize Kashmir involved two stages. The first stage, codenamed “Operation Gibraltar” involved an infiltration of approximately seven thousand armed guerillas across the border. These guerillas were to take advantage of the perceived discontent and unrest among the local population, and to help fan the flames of rebellion. The anticipated local uprising was to be supported by a second phase, known

as “Operation Grand Slam”, a conventional attack by Pakistani forces intended to cut off the region from the rest of India.

Operation Gibraltar was launched on July 24th. The infiltrators quickly ran into serious problems, lacking both the training and local knowledge of terrain to effectively confront Indian security forces. More important, the infiltrators largely failed in their primary goal, as local Kashmiris not only refused to assist the “Mujahadeen”, but in many cases aided Indian security forces in the apprehension of the guerillas (Jalalzai 2000: 118). On August 14, Pakistani forces made a series of limited moves across the Line of Control, to which India responded the next day by launching their own limited strikes in Azad Kashmir. This tit for tat escalation continued until September 1, when Pakistan struck in force with armored divisions in southern Kashmir, quickly pushing back the Indian forces in the region.

The international community’s overall response to the conflict once again demonstrated how weakly international norms of non-aggression and non-interference were being applied to Pakistan. India responded to Pakistani attacks by launching an attack across the international border in the state of Punjab to the south, a move that brought more international condemnation than the Pakistani attack in Kashmir. According to Brines (1968: 333), India’s insistence that the Jammu-Kashmir line had represented an inviolable international border was, in the eyes of the international community, a “controversial” defense of the concrete violation of the international border in the Punjab. The Indian attack achieved its desired effect, however, with Pakistan suddenly forced on the defensive. After weeks of intense fighting, a ceasefire was

reached on September 22, and the two sides once again withdrew into their own territories and behind the Line of Control.

The conflict of 1965 was followed by a Soviet-brokered accord known as the Tashkent Declaration. The accord, which focused on the principle of mutual non-intervention, represented an attempt to normalize relations between India and Pakistan. However, with continuing Pakistani designs on Kashmir and continuing Indian suspicion of Pakistani intentions, little qualitative change occurred in the relationship between the two states as the Kashmir issue remained unresolved. In 1970, on a visit to the region, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi reasserted the Indian position that “The accession of Kashmir is part of our history, and history cannot be reversed or changed” (Hasan 1998).

Although Pakistani aggression was somewhat muted during the late sixties, lingering suspicions of Pakistani intentions remained among Indian leadership. Similar to Ethiopia’s invasion of Somali territory and support of insurgents within Somalia during the eighties, lasting mistrust and enmity on the part of the “target” state in the Indo-Pakistani dispute manifested itself during the early seventies as the internal weakness of Pakistan offered an opportunity for Indian retribution and weakening of the Pakistani state.

During 1971, the military government of Pakistan, under General Yahya Khan, attempted to restore a measure of democracy by conducting elections during the spring to a new National Assembly. The Awami League, representing the voice of Bangladeshi nationalism, won 160 of the 162 seats in East Pakistan (and a majority of seats overall), setting the stage for confrontation with central authorities as negotiations for a new constitution became deadlocked. This deadlock, in turn, led the government of Yahya

Khan to postpone the formation of the National Assembly. In response, the Awami League led a general strike in East Pakistan, while inciting growing demonstrations in the region. In turn, Yahya Khan suspended all political activity, outlawed the Awami League, and had Rahman arrested at the end of March 1971. In a further effort to quell instability, Yahya Khan ordered the military to arrest the Bangladeshi political elite and eliminate any political unrest. The heavy-handed military crackdown led to massive defections within Bangladeshi units, fostering the rise of armed rebellion that increased throughout 1971.

The Indian government seized upon the crisis in the East quickly. On March 31, Indira Gandhi announced in Parliament that Bangladeshi's would receive "wholehearted Indian support" in their efforts and called upon the world community to stop their "decimation" (quoted in Afzal 2001: 443). Diplomatic attacks launched against Pakistan were accompanied by a consummately *realpolitik* diplomatic initiative that led to the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship in October 1971. The solidification of ties with the Soviet Union meant that India could more freely act against Pakistan by reducing the chance of Chinese intervention. After a three-week trip abroad in the fall of 1971 to assess the diplomatic mood of Western leaders, who were in no great hurry to defend the increasingly repressive Pakistani government and its tactics, Indira Gandhi ordered the invasion of East Pakistan on November 22nd. On December 3rd, Pakistani leadership finally ordered a counter-attack in Kashmir, but the situation was irreversible, and little ground was gained in Kashmir. Under heavy diplomatic pressure, the two antagonists agreed to a ceasefire on December 17th, leaving India in possession of the newly "liberated" eastern half of Pakistan. Three days later, Yahya Khan resigned in

disgrace and was replaced by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who became the first civilian leader of Pakistan in over a decade.

Indian leaders utilized the victory in the 1971 conflict to strengthen their hitherto vulnerable international claim to Kashmir in postwar negotiations. The Simla Accord, similar to the Tashkent Declaration, attempted set relations between India and Pakistan on a new course. The fear of future Pakistani aggression on the part of India is noticeable in the fact that three of the first six articles mention the value of “territorial integrity”. Similarly, respect for non-interference and sovereignty are explicitly mentioned in earlier provisions of the document.⁸⁶ However, the most important long-term implications of the accord involved clauses which obligated the sides to resolve their disputes “bilaterally”. Conscious of early receptiveness of UN bodies to the normative appeals of Pakistan, Indian leaders were to utilize the mantra of “bilateral” talks, as contained in the Simla Accord, as a cornerstone of future diplomatic efforts designed to resist outside pressures on the matter.

Bilateral negotiations on the Kashmir issue, not surprisingly, were largely non-existent during the ensuing years. Although the remainder of the seventies was notable for the absence of military conflict (the reason for this will be described below in a section examining internal determinants of Pakistani policies) there was no resolution for continuing India-Pakistani enmity. During the eighties, Pakistan largely resumed many of its previously aggressive policies, but to the extent that it had during the sixties. As has been mentioned, the Simla accord helped create the conditions by which India could

⁸⁶ At the time of this writing, the text of the Simla Accord may be found at: <http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/spedition/pak-india/accord3.htm>

claim the matter a “bilateral” dispute, which helped reduce international sympathy and involvement for Pakistan’s cause.

The hallmark of military government during the eighties laid not in outright aggression, as it had in earlier military regimes, but rather in the execution of covert operations within Afghanistan, India, and Kashmir. This is largely a consequence of the loss of international support for Kashmiri “self-determination”, and the requisite desire of Pakistani decision-makers to limit any potential international backlash caused by more blatant transgressions in Kashmir. Covert operations, including supplying and training militants for cross-border infiltration were conducted by the Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI),⁸⁷ which was granted a high degree of influence over policy making during the eighties.

The relationship continued in a tense stasis until the late eighties, when rebellion erupted in Kashmir. Not surprisingly, the rhetoric surrounding the insurgency that ensued in Kashmir mirrored that of earlier decades, with Pakistan framing the uprising as a spontaneous revolt by native Kashmiris seeking self-determination. India has criticized the uprising as a manifestation of Pakistani aggression and militant revisionism and repeatedly asserted the indivisibility of the Indian state. Soon after the outbreak of rebellion, the two houses of the Indian parliament met and, in an “unprecedented move” approved a unanimous resolution repeating that Kashmir was an “inalienable” part of the Indian State (Ganguly and Bajpai 1994: 409).

⁸⁷ Closely tied to the military, and composed largely of military officers, ISI cultivated an increasing degree of autonomy from the military during the eighties and nineties. The responsibilities of the ISI include military intelligence, similar to the American Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), but also international and domestic surveillance (like the CIA and FBI combined).

As the political situation in Kashmir deteriorated during this period, the ISI was able to take many of the experiences learned from Afghanistan and apply them to Kashmir. The instability following elections in Kashmir during 1983 were indicative of events to come, and elections in 1987 went even more poorly, with opposition groups claiming wide scale electoral manipulation and fraud on the part of the pro-Indian National Conference and Congress parties, former rivals which had cooperated heavily during the election. Due in part to the “first-past-the-post” system used in the state, these parties won only 53% of the popular vote, but garnered 87% of the legislative seats. The sense of disenfranchisement experienced by many supporters of the opposition, led to a large increase in the number of recruits seeking training, organization, and material aid across-the-border in Pakistan (Ganugly and Bajpai 1994: 405; Widmalm 1997: 1022) . By this point, the ISI was well structured and equipped to handle the type of training and support that Kashmiri militants sought, and proceeded to fan the flames of insurgency by doing so. By the time of military leader President Zia’s death in August 1988, the insurgency and ISI support of militant activities was well underway.

According to one eminent scholar on the Kashmir issue, “we may never find out the whole truth about Pakistani involvement”, which is to say that the *extent* of Pakistani involvement remains cloaked in the secrecy one would expect to surround such covert activities. Nevertheless, the fact of Pakistani intervention remains unquestioned, even if at times exaggerated by the Indian government.⁸⁸ In the end, internal events can be said

⁸⁸ One such exaggeration concerns the development of a hypothetical situation known as “Operation Topac” by a group of retired military officers that was first published in the *Indian Defence Review* in 1989. Although admittedly “part fact, part fiction”, the existence of an Operation Topac continues to be propagated as reality by many Indian writers and the Indian government itself (see, for instance, http://www.indianembassy.org/new/NewDelhiPressFile/Kargil_July_1999/Fundamentalist_Challenge_July_16_1999.html)

to have sparked the grievances underlying the outbreak of militancy in the region. However, without the organizational capabilities, training, material support, and safe haven provided by the ISI initially under the military government of President Zia, the insurgency may never have become as widespread.

After the death of Zia, civilian governments under Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif oversaw the continuation of covert activities in Kashmir. In response to the Pakistani role in supporting insurgent activity in Kashmir, the Indian government massed troops along the line of control in the spring of 1990. Although the situation did not escalate to war, the pattern of Pakistani-assisted infiltration and border tensions and skirmishes continued throughout the nineties, resulting consistent clashes throughout the nineties. Soon after the accession of yet another military government under Pervez Musharraf, the situation escalated into a brief “war” when Indian troops clashed with Pakistani infiltrators in the Kargil gap region. This situation will be examined in somewhat greater depth below when I examine the relationship between military government and conflict.

Summary – Indian-Pakistani relations

Clearly, the differences between India and Pakistan changed little during the course of their history. This is because the number one issue coloring their relationship with one another, the irredentist dispute involving Kashmir, remained unresolved from independence up until the present day. The presence of the Moslem majority state of Jammu and Kashmir under Indian rule lied at the heart of what was essentially a normative and ideological dispute pitting Pakistani calls for self-determination against the

Indian stress on “secular nationalism” and territorial integration. Within this cyclical rivalry, Indian policies were often assertively and aggressively defensive in response to the perceived continuation of Pakistani revisionism, leading to the forced dismemberment of the Pakistani state. The tough line presented by India, on the other hand, contributed to continued Pakistani militarism by cultivating a continuing frustration of the nationalist goals of Pakistani leaders, who resorted to aggressive tactics in many cases due to the perceived lack of progress on the political front.

While the degree of nationalism within Pakistani society can be said to have been fairly constant through the period examined, the real normative story underlying Pakistani-Indian relations involves India’s desire to limit the involvement of an international community that was surprisingly muted in its criticisms of Pakistani actions. During the earliest years of the dispute, the UN essentially advocated many of the same positions as Pakistan when it called for self-determination for Kashmiris and the conducting of a regional plebiscite. When Indian subsequently turned away from the holding of a plebiscite, Pakistani leaders perceived international constraints to aggressive action as weak, and felt justified in launching an invasion across the Line of Control in 1965. Later, Indian leaders were able to diminish international involvement in the dispute with the acceptance by both parties of the Simla Accord, which stressed that future negotiations ought to best be conducted exclusively on a bilateral basis.

The existence of a sizeable Moslem population in Kashmir created a baseline level of bilateral hostility between India and Pakistan. However, during what was largely a consistent state of mistrust and tension, Pakistani policy manifested periodic increases and decreases of aggression associated with changing international and domestic factors,

which will be addressed in the second half of this chapter. Now I turn to relations between India and China, which, in contrast to India and Pakistan, were characterized by aggravating *realpolitik* factors that caused frequent bilateral instability, but never presented the intractable barriers faced in the Indo-Pakistani relationship.

Chinese-Indian Relations – Realist rivalry contrasted to Nationalist rivalry

While Indian-Pakistani relations were dominated by a regional irredentist situation, Indian-Pakistani relations fell largely in the realm of power politics. As such, the relationship between China and India was marked by consistent rivalry. However, that rivalry never reached near the level of instinctive animosity coloring relations between India and Pakistan. Disputes between India and China involved arguments of territory; but not territory that evoked any strong nationalist-type sentiment in either country. Furthermore, what may have appeared as simple border disputes on the surface actually involved strong elements of prestige politicking as both India and China jostled for leadership in the eyes of the Third World.

Some realist scholars might suggest that Indian-Chinese relations should be expected to have been more peaceful than those between India and Pakistan due to the fact that the military capabilities of India and China, at least during the early decades after the Second World War, were more balanced. On the contrary, however, it was the very balance of capabilities that occasioned a more tense state-of-affairs between India and China than might otherwise have been expected. In comparison to Chinese-Indian relations, Chinese-Pakistani relations were exceedingly warm, despite the fact that China and Pakistan also shared a common border that provoked similar border disagreements in

the fifties and sixties. Brines (1968: 198) argues the *realpolitik* outlook of Chinese leaders in particular conditioned heightened bilateral instability in the India-China relationship, particularly in view of long-term Chinese Premier Zhou En-lai's outlook that "large powers can grant concessions to smaller ones without losing face, but to do so to a nation of comparable size would be the gravest sign of weakness." Rather than the questions of national preservation and protection that arose in the India-Pakistani disputes, China and India militancy committed lives in the name of issues involving state prestige and pride-of-place in the Third World movement.

The immediate issues between China and India involved the post-colonial demarcation of the border between China and the northwestern and northeastern borders of India. The northeast sector of the dispute involved the Chinese contention that the McMahon line, which established a border between Tibet, India, and China, was invalid. According to the Chinese view, the Tibetan representatives to the Simla conference of 1914, which established the border, were not competent to conclude treaties due to the quasi-independent status of Tibet vis-à-vis China at the time. In the northwest, Chinese claims involved the Aksai Chin region of Kashmir, which was regarded as strategically important in terms of Chinese control of Tibet. Particular after uprisings in Tibet during the late fifties, the salience of the Aksai Chin claim increased even more so for Chinese leadership.

The Chinese government pressed its "historical and cultural" claims to the border areas throughout the late fifties and early sixties, and small-scale skirmishes along the border began to mount. During 1960, a summit conference between Nehru and Zhou En-lai was unsuccessful in resolving the bilateral territorial issues between the two states,

and gradual preparation for the upcoming conflict began soon thereafter. In 1961, India adopted a "Forward" Policy, establishing several bases in the Aksai Chin. The following year China initiated a limited strike across the McMahon Line in September 1962, followed by a full scale assault across both fronts in October, which quickly overran ill-trained and ill-supplied Indian troops.

On November 21, Beijing declared a unilateral ceasefire and withdrew behind the original borders. This surprise move on the part of Beijing was conducted largely for its prestige value, and reflected how the specific territorial issues involved were superseded by the larger picture of influence in the Third World. The territorial issues involved were secondary to the opportunity presented to China to assertively flex its muscles, and "by inflicting a humiliating defeat on India, China sought to show that India was not much of a rival for the leadership of Asia (Syed 1974: 105). By announcing the unilateral ceasefire, China "had broken off the action at the moment of India's deepest humiliation" (Brines 1968: 195).

The border issues between India and China continued throughout the decades, although 1962 represented the only major conflagration concerning the dispute. Nevertheless, bilateral relations remained cool, and a consequence of the 1962 war included "dramatically heightened suspicions of Chinese intentions" on the part of Indian leadership, which came to view subsequent Chinese policy through the "prism" of "humiliation and resentment" (Elkin and Fredericks 1982: 1129).

After the 1962 war, China chose to pursue its diplomatic offensive against India through less direct means by cultivating closer ties with India's gravest enemy, Pakistan.

As the relationship between India and China after 1962 was intimately tied to that of China and Pakistan, we will continue to explore India-Chinese relations in the next section, which focuses on Chinese support for the Pakistani cause in Kashmir.

In terms of the specific bilateral border disputes between China and India, no attempt to address the issue was made for the two decades following the 1962 war. Finally, in December 1981, formal border negotiations between the two states were re-initiated, motivated in part by Indian desires to reduce its dependence on the Soviet Union and achieve greater diplomatic flexibility (Elkin and Fredericks 1983: 113). A series of vice-ministerial talks occurred between 1981 and 1987, producing few concrete results but enhancing overall India-Sino relations. In 1987, Rajiv Gandhi instituted a new course in Indian policy by dropping Indian insistence that the normalization of relationships depended on the final resolution of the territorial question (Garver 1996: 325). In response, Beijing noticeably moderated its position in support of Pakistan over the Kashmir issue, a move of no little importance considering mounting tensions in the area at the beginning of the nineties. After the end of 1988, when Rajiv Gandhi undertook a visit to China, relations between the two states could be characterized as warmer than any period since the mid fifties (Garver, p. 323). A final sign of the new relationship between the two states became evident with the reestablishment of military exchanges between the two countries in the mid-nineties.

Although maintaining a close relationship with Pakistan, China increasingly reached out to India during the nineties. Although China's continuing relationship with Pakistan will continue to present barriers to warmer relations with India, it is clear that the Chinese-Indian disputes of the past no longer carry the salience that they once did. In

the absence of an outstanding nationalist conflict, relations between India and China have been “free” to improve. This lies in contrast to the conflict between India and Pakistan, wherein leaders have been constrained by societal nationalist impulses from fundamentally altering the underlying relationship between the two states. While territorial disputes between China and India remain outstanding, border questions have not prevented a gradual upgrade in relations between the two states – a result largely unthinkable within the context of the irredentist Indian-Pakistani dispute.

Pakistan-China Relations – Realist Alliance contrasted to Nationalist Rivalry

This chapter turns now to the topic of Pakistan-China relations, a relationship based heavily around the Kashmir issue and the wedge that it has driven between India and Pakistan. Politics often does make strange bedfellows, and no better example exists than the entente existing between ideologically and philosophical incongruent states of Pakistan and China since the early sixties. Even though the two states could hardly have differed more in terms of the dominant principles shaping domestic governance, their interests in the international arena converged due to their mutual antipathy towards India. Just as Pakistan’s friendship strengthened China’s position within the context of China’s *realpolitik*-type rivalry with India, China’s goodwill allowed Pakistan to adopt a more aggressive posture in pursuance of that state’s nationalist oriented policies towards Kashmir.

Chinese and Pakistani leaders grew increasingly close after it became evident that no plebiscite would take place in Kashmir and after the Soviet Union openly allied itself with the Indian position in 1955. In a 1956 visit to Pakistan, Chinese Premier Chou En-

lai stressed that there were “no conflicts of interest between the countries [and that] ideological differences should not prevent them from strengthening their friendship (Syed 1974: 68). By 1961, with mounting border disputes between China and both Indian and Pakistan, Ayub Khan, in contrast to the Indian position, reached out to Chinese leaders by declaring:

The Chinese have their ideology, and we have our ideology. They have no faith in our ideology and we have none in their ideology. But we are neighbors and we would like to live as good neighbors. We have no cause to quarrel over our undemarcated border and all we have said is: let us define it and let us see what comes out of it (quoted in Syed 1974: 84).

As if to further snub India in the wake of its defeat in 1962, China and Pakistan announced in December of that year that they were in ‘complete agreement’ on their common border issues. Shortly before Indo-Pakistani talks the next year, the border agreement between China and Pakistan was made official. Because the border agreement turned Pakistani-held areas of Kashmir over to China, an infuriated India government charged that Pakistan had “no *locus standi* to . . . conclude agreements with any country regarding the boundaries of Jammu and Kashmir (Razvi 1971: 177).

China openly came out in support of Pakistan’s position on Kashmir in 1964, the year widely considered the beginning of the Chinese-Pakistan “entente” (Garver 1996: 324). Although China’s motives were clearly self-interested and had little to do with sympathy for the people of Kashmir, Chinese leaders viewed India’s “vulnerability on the question of Kashmiri self-determination” as “a golden opportunity to cement its relations with Pakistan and to discredit India further in the eyes of the Afro-Asian world” (Simon 1967: 180). After 1964, Chinese leaders frequently employed normative appeals based

on self-determination to antagonize India, frequently citing earlier “promises” made by India to the United Nations.

Chinese support for Pakistan was unambiguous during the subsequent wars of 1965 and 1971, even if Beijing was unwilling to intervene militarily. By stationing troops along the northeastern border of India in 1965, China effectively prevented India from deploying several divisions to the theater of battle in Kashmir. Although unable to respond as aggressively in 1971, due to the threat of Soviet retaliation in the north, China maintained a singular position throughout both wars, casting India as the “aggressor” and harping on the denial of self-determination in Kashmir.

Consistently close during the seventies, small cracks began to appear within the Sino-Pakistani entente during the eighties as Sino-Indian relations began to warm somewhat. In June 1980, Deng Xiaoping stated that the Kashmir issue was a *bilateral dispute*, although “balanced” this “nod to New Delhi” in December when he stated the desire for the dispute to be resolved “according to relevant United Nations resolutions” (Garver 1996: 327). Nevertheless, the comments marked the beginning of a slow warm-up in Chinese-Indian relations throughout the decade.

By 1990, against the backdrop of renewed conflict in the region, it became clear that Beijing had noticeably moderated its position on Kashmir (Garver 1996: 329). No longer did Beijing allude to the United Nations, assenting to India’s “bilateral” position in earnest. Rather than labeling India a guilty party, as it had in the past, the Chinese government responded to the growing Kashmir crisis of the nineties mainly by expressing a desire for peace (Garver, p. 332).

Relations between China, India, and Pakistan have become more nuanced than they have in the past. China and India have a warmer relationship than decades past, but the structural considerations of *realpolitik* will likely continue to prevent these rapidly developing, nuclear armed, rivals from completely dispelling their mutual suspicions for some time to come. On the other hand, while losing a measure of support on the Kashmir issue, Pakistan still regards China as a key ally and supporter, while China views Pakistan as an important hedge against future disputes with India. Relations between India and Pakistan are sadly the easiest to characterize, and remain based on the mutual suspicion and bilateral enmity that is fueled in large part by the unresolved Kashmir dispute.

Domestic Influences on Pakistani Dispute Initiation

Factors hypothesized to affect varying levels of Pakistani militant revisionism

This section, which examines the domestic variables conditioning levels of Pakistani military aggression, differs slightly in structure from the previous chapter's analysis of Somali revisionism. Because many of the relevant variables are theorized to be significant solely within the context of an irredentist dispute, this section exclusively examines Pakistani policies toward India (as opposed the previous chapter which examined Somali relations toward both Kenya and Ethiopia).

Unlike the Somali example, examination of the role of military influence in Pakistani policy is facilitated by the lack of *militant activity among the Moslem "diaspora"* in Kashmir. The only period witnessing an indigenous uprising in Kashmir was the period 1988-1989 and after. One might also argue that an uprising took place during the period surrounding partition during 1947, when a revolt against local leaders


took place in the Poonch. However, most of the subsequent insurgency was not attributable to local forces, but rather to Islamic “jihadists” originating from within Pakistan. The uprising of the late eighties, was, however, primarily homegrown, and will be discussed later within the extended section that describes the effect of military governance on policy.

The most important variable determining levels of Pakistani aggression is that of *military influence* over policy. Even more clearly than in the Somali case, Pakistani governments characterized by higher levels of military influence over policy were associated with higher levels of militarized dispute initiation. Furthermore, the only major war initiated by Pakistan during the period 1951-1991 occurred in 1965 at the high point of military influence over policy. Since military rule characterizes a majority of the years of Pakistani rule covered in this case, it might be even more to the point to note that the years of civilian rule (1951-1957; 1973-1978; 1989-1991) were noticeably more peaceful than those under military rule. Only the last set of dates, 1989-1991, could be viewed as a strong conjunction of civilian rule and Pakistani aggression, but, as will be explained, this is due in part to lingering legacies of the eleven-year Zia military regime.

The *combination of military influence and diaspora discontent* will also be examined in greater detail in the extended section discussion of the effects of military governance on policy. The highpoint of discontent in Kashmir occurred during the period immediately before Pakistan initiated the war of 1965, as several internal crises sparked a rise in disorganized violence. As will be discussed, this discontent played a major role in the decision by the military government at the time to launch major hostilities against India.

The degree to which *the Pakistani economy* rises or declines during each temporal period will be examined, but there appears to be little correlation between Pakistani economic growth/decline and foreign policy behavior. Unlike the Somali economy, the Pakistani economy has generally displayed impressive stable characteristics. While the 1950s experienced several (relatively small) upward and downward swings in economic growth, during the twenty-six year period from 1965 until 1991, Pakistan only experienced economic decline during five years. At the same time, growth rates generally hovered around a consistent 3-5% per year, as displayed in the table below. Perhaps the main conclusion that can be drawn is that Pakistan was better able to maintain an overall aggressive policy in part due to the lack of major economic crises at home that would have otherwise diverted the energies of the government.


FIGURE 7.2



Lastly, the question of *military feasibility* is important in understanding the high level of revisionism directed by Pakistan at India. Pakistan's military capabilities never came close to matching those of India. The impossibility of doing so was recognized by policy-makers in Pakistan, however, and the long term Pakistani strategy revolved around

ensuring that Pakistani capabilities were strong enough to deter any major Indian attack undertaken in retribution for Pakistani subversion – the very definition of “military feasibility” as employed in this study. The table below shows that, after a divergence in capabilities during the early years after independence, Pakistan was largely successful in preventing India from “running away” with a larger gap in military capabilities than what existed during the mid-sixties. Nevertheless, the gap was large enough for India to drive into Pakistan during the 1965 war and to dismember the strategically exposed region of East Pakistan during 1971.

FIGURE 7.3



Turning again to the first of the two “static” variables in this study, Kashmir clearly took on additional value to the Pakistani government due to its *strategic importance*. Including both sides of line of control, Kashmir extends to within 30 miles of the Pakistani capital, and borders not only on India, but also on China and Afghanistan, which, at its narrowest separated Kashmir from the Soviet Union by a mere forty miles (Brines 1968:3). Choudhury (1971: 54) goes so far as to compare Pakistani

fears concerning Indian control of Kashmir to that of “Czechoslovakia after Hitler’s [conquest] of Austria”. The prospect of Pakistani control over all of Kashmir would allow Pakistan to take up strategic positions to the north of India, similarly threatening that state from two different directions.


As far as the *economic importance* of Kashmir is concerned, there is little about Kashmir to distinguish the territory as economically crucial to either India or Pakistan. Certainly, natural resources including timber and the prospect of hydroelectric development separate Kashmir from territories such as the barren Rann of Kutch, over which the two states fought in 1965, but few readily lootable resources exist in the territory. Clearly, the importance of Kashmir as a source of natural resources or national revenue has been superseded by many other factors, including its strategic value, in terms of its influence in promoting conflict.

Military versus Civilian Decision-making in Pakistan as a Major Determinant of Foreign Policy Aggression

The Pakistani case is difficult to explain from a normative perspective alone, as the intensity nationalist sentiment within Pakistani society did not noticeably change throughout the decades. Although, as suggested, this presents a certain sense of indeterminacy when attempting to predict specific periods of peace or conflict, several factors were suggested above that do help one understand why Pakistani policies were more-or-less aggressive during different eras.

The chart below depicts how the demographic-normative model retroactively predicts the potential a bilateral MID initiation between the dyads involved in this case study throughout the years. Not surprisingly, the line depicting the Pakistani-India dyad

is predicted to be generally more conflictual throughout the years due to the presence of irredentist-type demography. Overlaying the Pakistani line, however, are stars depicting the years in which Pakistan actually initiated a dispute. As will be argued, the periods in which disputes are initiated correlate extremely well with the presence of military-based decision-making, whereas the periods of peace correlate with the presence of civilian authority.



Schofield (2000) suggests as well that a direct line of causality exists between the presence of militarized decision-making and Pakistani dispute behavior during crises.⁸⁹ He first notes that under civilian decision-making during the fifties war was largely averted due to the subservient role of the military in the decision-making process. During this period, the diplomatic acrimony surrounding the plebiscite issue and the future status of Jammu and Kashmir was accompanied by a high level of instability along the Line of Control. According to an article in *The Economist* (“India and Pakistan” 1951: 139) at the time, “The danger of war between India and Pakistan, has, once more, become acute.” Similarly, Schofield (p. 138) describes the summer of 1951 as the summer of the “war

⁸⁹ The main thesis presented by Schofield is that the military actually acts as a restraining force when civilian leadership is present, but acts aggressively when provided the reigns of power itself.

scare.” In light of an Indian decision to convene the first Kashmiri Constituent Assembly, both countries increased their deployment along the Line of Control and the neighboring Punjab region. In response to heavy public pressure, the Pakistani Prime Minister of the time, Liaquat Ali Khan, pursued a hard line during the crisis of 1951. Khan, however, never initiated full-scale hostilities against Pakistan, and the crisis had begun to lose steam when Khan was assassinated under mysterious circumstances during the fall of 1951. Unlike the military government which took power at the end of the decade and led the country to war in 1965, the civilian authorities of the early fifties pursued a sustained policy of aggressive diplomacy toward India, but stepped back from the brink rather than escalating the dispute into full fledged armed conflict.

Instability accompanying civilian rule helped pave the way for the growth of military influence in policy-making, a process which ended in military takeover in 1958. In a process that mirrored the rise of military government in Somalia, the failures of civilian leadership were accompanied by an enhanced role for the military due as a consequence of material assistance provided by a superpower – in this case the United States. As civilian leadership became increasingly paralyzed, an elite composed of high level civil service and military officers increasingly dictated policy (Choudhury 1988: 19). Schofield (2000: 138) sets the date of “significant” military influence over Pakistani policies at approximately 1954, with 1958 representing the culmination of a process through which military leaders exercised increasing control over policy.

President Iskandar Mirza opened the door to military rule when he suspended the democratic processes of Pakistan in response to continued economic and political instability, including rising regional and sectarian opposition to processes of political

centralization, particularly in East Pakistan. Mirza selected Army Chief Ayub Khan as the Chief Martial Law Administrator. Khan, in turn, utilized his position to depose Mirza two weeks later, assuming the presidential post for himself.

As was the case in Somalia, the rise to power of military rule was brought about more by domestic than international factors. According to Akbar (1997:44) the coup was essentially fostered by “a general feeling of political malaise, by a near consensus among the politically aware segments the population that the politicians had somehow failed in their duty to provide the country with a workable political system.” Although the rise to power of military governments generally involves domestic political failures on the part of civilian leadership, the consequences of military leadership on foreign policy formulation within irredentist situations can be profound.

The decision-making process under Ayub Khan was, not surprisingly, dominated by top generals and bureaucrats. Reminiscent of the decision-making in Somalia and Barre, Ayub Khan also relied heavily on informal consultations with an “inner-circle” of fellow military leaders, whose advice was often favored over more formal decision-making processes. Thus, decisions within the Ayub Khan regime were “insulated from domestic politics”, and based primarily on the preferences and views of military officers (Schofield 2000: 139).

At first, it seemed that the accession of Ayub Khan would exacerbate India-Pakistani relations even further. Nehru responded to Ayub Khan’s seizure of power by referring to the new regime as a “naked military dictatorship” without parallel in the ‘wide world today’” (Syed 1974: 27). For his part, Ayub Khan shored up his domestic position with threats of “extreme action” against India unless the Kashmir dispute was

resolved (Afzal 2001: 297). Nevertheless, during the early years of the Ayub Khan regime, tension over Kashmir was largely de-escalated as a result of surprisingly conciliatory policies adopted by Pakistan's military leadership. Particularly impressive was the ability of the Ayub Khan regime to reach agreement on a variety of border issues with India, culminating in the Indus Basin Treaty of 1960, which involved the division of waters from the Indus River Basin for (primarily) irrigation purposes. Furthermore, during this period, Ayub Khan offered, on several occasions, to negotiate a "joint-defense" agreement with India – an offer which understandably suspicious Indian authorities ultimately rebuffed.

The brief period of accommodation pursued in the early years of the Ayub Khan administration turned around abruptly in 1962. According to Brines (1968: 226), 1962 marked the year that Ayub Khan "turned his country with increasing vigour towards fierce . . . jingoism", a move that was accompanied by a relentless "hate India" campaign, which was pursued daily" through the press.

A series of events may have triggered the turnabout in the military government's policies. First, a series of definitely worded statements by the Indian government suggesting the final end of negotiations on the issue and the rejection of any further notion that a plebiscite might someday be held. 1962 also marked the year war took place between India and China, which presented the Pakistani government an opportunity to solidify its growing relationship with China through a series of diplomatic attacks on India. Also aware of the growing capabilities of the Pakistani military, Ayub Khan may have been laying the groundwork for the future invasion of India, an invasion that was being increasingly perceived as feasible.

An unusual incident within Kashmir itself encouraged the new, more aggressive stance of the Pakistani government. As has been discussed, military governments seem particularly likely to engage in hostilities when signs of discontent are present among a diaspora population. On December 27, 1963, a sacred relic, reputedly a hair of the Prophet Mohammed, was stolen from a mosque in Srinagar, prompting widespread rioting and unrest. Although the relic was recovered the following month, demonstrations continued until the spring (Brines 1968: 213). The instability surrounding the incident, seized upon by Pakistani propagandists, also influenced Pakistani leaders, who perceived anti-Indian demonstrations as a clear sign of discontent among Moslems in Kashmir.

In December, 1964, another impetus to war was provided by the Indian government when it initiated the policy of assimilating Kashmir into India at the same constitutional level as other Indian states, stripping the region of the special status it had held earlier. Faced with the prospect of Kashmir becoming even more tightly tied to India, military aggression was increasingly perceived by Pakistani leadership as the only method through which the territory might be “liberated”.

The perceptions of the Pakistani military concerning growing discontent among Moslems in Kashmir were further intensified with the arrest of regional leader Sheik Abdullah in May 1965. Once again, widespread anti-government violence ensued – violence that Brines (1968: 247) describes as “unprecedented in Kashmir’s history”. According to the Indian government, the instability claimed the lives of 153 members of Indian security forces (Feldman 1972: 143). According to Afzal (2001: 306), the go-ahead for an invasion of Kashmir was given by Ayub Khan during the same month.

For the first time since independence, it can be said that military rule, diaspora discontent, and military feasibility were all simultaneously present. Although “diaspora discontent” likely did not exist in the sense that locals preferred Pakistani rule to Indian rule, such preferences were attributed by Pakistani leadership to the local population due to the anti-government demonstrations associated with the Hair of the Prophet incident. The theoretical importance of diaspora discontent lies less with the objective conditions of a diaspora group than with the perception among homeland states that such groups are desirous of liberation. Buoyed by the growing capabilities of the Pakistani army, military leaders in Pakistan saw anti-government violence as a signal that an invasion would be supported by the Moslems of the region.

At the height of his support among the armed forces, Ayub Khan initiated war against India. Although normally viewed as a cautious man (Afzal 2001: 306), Ayub Khan perceived war to be the only way to resolve the Kashmir issue in the face of growing Indian intransigence. The dearth of diplomatic progress on the issue combined with the widespread perception in military circles that a short window-of-military-opportunity existed combined to exert a high level of political pressure on Ayub Khan to take assertive action in order to “weaken India’s resolve and bring her to the conference table” (Afzal, p. 306). In the end, the military government not only formulated a policy of aggressive warfare, but Ayub Khan himself assumed a dominant role in the strategic planning of the conflict (Schofield 2000: 141).

The Tashkent Declaration that followed the fighting was generally ill received among the Pakistani public, which had been led to believe that victory had been at hand in the 1965 war. Particularly among the armed forces, Ayub Khan lost a great deal of

support (Razvi 1971: 1958), and a long downward slide in the legitimacy of the military government had begun. The Tashkent Declaration turned out to be the turning point in the political life of Ayub Khan, who never recovered the status he had enjoyed prior to the 1965 conflict (Akbar 1997: 45). Partly a result of the Tashkent Declaration, a “generally militant attitude” prevailed between the two states for the remainder of the decade (Feldman 1972: 166) as Khan sought to placate those below who viewed the settlement as a sell-out.

The loss of support for Ayub Khan’s government was made evident with the resignation of Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (father of later Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto), who was seen as a chief opponent of the Tashkent Declaration. Following his resignation, Bhutto founded the Pakistan People’s Party, which supported a series of student demonstrations beginning in 1968. Violence surrounding the growing demonstrations erupted in early 1969, and within three months Ayub Khan resigned, handing the reigns of power over to the Army Chief of Staff, Mohammed Yahya Khan. Khan reinstated martial law soon thereafter, restoring a measure of political order by the summer. This order, however, would be short-lived, as a growing autonomy movement in East Pakistan began to make itself heard.

Despite his initial resort to martial law, Yahya Khan sought to set Pakistan back on the path to democracy from the onset of his tenure. In the Legal Framework order of March 1970, the conditions for elections for a National Assembly were established. However, as described earlier, the elections that took place quickly degenerated into a separatist rebellion in East Pakistan.

The military government was ill-equipped to handle the civilian separatist forces unleashed during the aborted process of democratization. According to Hayes (1984: 96), “while Yahya’s ultimate intention may have been to establish a regime based on democratic principles, he relied almost entirely on the military in the meantime” – thus fostering a more militant posture among separatists in East Pakistan who felt frustrated in their abilities to work through democratic channels. Similarly Schofield (2000: 142) notes how pressure from within the army isolated Yahya Khan from civil institutions and advisors during a period when their advice was most greatly needed.

India initiated the war of 1971 by providing material support for separatists within, and later invading Bangladesh. Thus, in this case, one cannot hold the military leadership within Pakistani responsible for international aggression. However, it is interesting to note that policies instituted by the military government at the time, and during the past, did contribute to the eventual secession of Bangladesh. According to Awami League leader, Mujibur Rahman, the aggressive policies pursued by Pakistani leadership towards India “served the interests of the military and certain capitalists in West Pakistan” (Hayes 1984: 109). A central point in the platform of the Awami League called for the diminishment of the influence of the military over political policy to be brought about by a drastic reduction in military expenditures. The continuation of military rule was also viewed by India as likely to perpetuate the aggressive Pakistani policies of the past and provided an even greater impetus for India to deal a blow to the security threat on its borders.

Unlike the aftermath of the Tashkent Declaration, however, the “spirit of Simla” took hold for much of the decade, as Bhutto’s government turned away from its

aggressive stance on the Kashmir issue in order to pursue a series of agreements with India in other areas. Bhutto initiated a policy of greater non-alignment, similar to that which had been advocated by India for decades, and removed Pakistan from the British Commonwealth and SEATO. These moves, although certainly not undertaken to placate India, served a powerful signal to the Indian government that Pakistan would no longer utilize its relationship with Western powers as a source of financial, military, or diplomatic backing in its efforts to reclaim Kashmir. The warming atmosphere also led to various trade, shipping, travel, and cultural exchange agreements that emerged from the Simla process (Jalalzai 2000: 108). Perhaps most symbolic of Bhutto's desire to depart from the past was his final announcement at the Organization of Islamic States' conference of 1974 that Pakistan would recognize Bangladesh, thus acknowledging the consequences of India's military conquest.

Clearly, the Pakistani government under civilian rule adopted less aggressive policies toward India than past and future military leaders. This fact is reflected in the data utilized for this project, which indicates that Pakistan did not initiate a single militarized dispute during the last five years of civilian rule (1973-1977), the only such stretch during the fifty years covered by this study. The civilian regime under Bhutto worked with India to bring about amicable settlements of issues surrounding the 1971 war (prisoner exchanges, recognition of Bangladesh, etc.), while restoring postal and telecommunication links by 1975 and full trade relations in 1976. As foreign minister, Bhutto had gained prominence for his hard-line nationalist rhetoric and promises of a "thousand year war" with India. As Prime Minister, however, Bhutto, "repeatedly called

for an end to the era of confrontation with India” Syed (1974: 190). Similarly, Mughal (1976: 110) noted the “cautious détente” occurring during the Bhutto administration.

Furthermore, Bhutto actively sought to reduce the role of the military in politics through a variety of organizational restructuring measures. Ultimately, however, Bhutto fell short in securing the loyalty of the officer corps, who readily supported a military coup led by Mohammed Zia al-Haq in the aftermath of disputed elections during 1977.

General Zia, or President Zia as he officially preferred to be called after 1978, fanned the flames of Islamic nationalism in order to legitimate military rule. Jalalzai (2000: 108) draws comparison between the former civilian leadership of Bhutto and Zia by suggesting that:

Bhutto had realized and initiated the process of environment building, necessary for normalization between India and Pakistan. . . With the advent of General Zia, this process came to a halt.

Under Zia, the armed forces would once again “determine all the major aspects of Pakistani foreign policy” (Shah 1997: 216). An early sign that the era of “détente” largely ended with the reassertion of military control over foreign policy occurred in 1978, when Zia’s new government refused to renew the landmark trade accord signed three years earlier, instead prohibiting most private industries from dealing with India.

Although his policies were not as overtly aggressive as those of Ayub Khan during the years preceding the 1965 war, Zia pursued covert, low-levels of aggression against India throughout his tenure. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 fostered a sense of Islamic unity and common cause in Pakistan that Zia utilized to his advantage in maintaining power. Without the “outlet” for Islamic militancy in Afghanistan, it is very possible that Zia would have been forced by the same Islamic

militants with whom he sought to ally himself into even more aggressive policies towards India.

Not long after the initial invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, the United States agreed to provide Afghanistan 3.2 billion dollars in military aid over five years in exchange for Pakistani assistance in supporting the mujahadeen insurgency against the Soviets. While this aid solidified Pakistan's relations with the United States, turning the country away from its dalliance with non-alignment during Bhutto's administration, the threat from the Soviets in Afghanistan was in fact intensified by Pakistan's stance against Moscow. Fearing the possibility of conflict on two fronts, however, President Zia pursued a "peace offensive" toward India, which was intended to reduce the possibility of future Indian aggression. At the same time, however, Zia's military government began pursuing a variety of covert policies meant to destabilize India from within.

The idea that Pakistan's policies were duplicitous, with soft diplomacy being coupled with aggressive subversion within India, is generally accepted by most modern scholars. Dixit (2002: 248), a former Indian diplomat, describes the policies of Pakistan at the time as an "apparent" peace offensive, which masked "covert moves to erode India's unity, influence and strength." A somewhat more objective source, Jalalzai (2000: 108-109), an Afghani, similarly describes the peace offensive as "a strategic move", adopted as part of a "war on all fronts, barring the actual battle front". Part of the peace offensive entailed a "no-war" pact offer by Zia similar to that offered by Ayub Khan during his early tenure. The offer would mainly have benefited Pakistan by dissuading Indian reprisals undertaken in response to Pakistani subversion. The subsequent rejection of the offer by India, however, provided Pakistan a public propaganda victory. Although

the diplomatic efforts of the day, culminating in a face-to-face meeting between Zia and Indira Gandhi in 1982, smoothed bilateral relations to so some degree, it is clear that Zia ultimately pursued such policies in order to shore up Pakistan's short-term position, rather than as an effort to achieve a new understanding with India. The return to the pattern of annual Pakistani initiated MIDs during this period attests to the aggressive nature of covert policies pursued by Pakistan, particularly within Kashmir and the Punjab.

Pakistani policies under Zia were clearly dominated by the influence of the military. Zia himself led the nationalist charge by stressing Pakistan's Islamic roots, and promoting the idea that "the armed forces bear the sacred responsibility for safeguarding Pakistan's ideological frontiers" (quoted in Jalalzai 2000: 1). Those "ideological frontiers" clearly centered on Kashmir and the desire to extended control over the region in the name of Islamic solidarity. While publicly pursuing peace with India, Zia quietly pursued policies of subversion in Kashmir (and the Punjab) similar to those pursued by Ayub Khan's military regime when Operation Gibraltar was initiated. Unlike Ayub Khan's policies, however, Zia's were much more gradual, and focused on supporting indigenous discontent without the visible presence of large numbers of armed infiltrators.

The legacy of militarized government under Zia influenced the course of events under the Pakistani civilian leadership of the nineties. First, the strengthening of the ISI through numerous covert operations during the eighties allowed the military to retain a strong influence over policy – influence that was cloaked in secrecy but very much real. Second, the support given by the Zia administration to the burgeoning insurgency during

the late eighties helped intensify the rebellion to a degree that civilian leaders could not ignore without imperiling their political support.

The Kashmiri Insurgency and the Kargil Gap War

Although this work primarily focuses on events occurring before the early nineties, some discussion of the Kashmiri insurgency is useful as a basis for continuing the discussion of the earlier chapter concerning the response of civilian and military governments to diaspora rebellion. As has been asserted, the type of government within a homeland state seems largely irrelevant when considering the initiation of lower levels of conflict with a kin state that is home to diaspora rebellion. No matter the government, public pressures dictate that a heightened policy of aggression be undertaken. The civilian governments in Pakistan from the late eighties into the mid-nineties clearly felt beholden to domestic pressures, and thus maintained policies of controlled aggression against India. With the rise to power of military governance once more under General Musharraf, however, Pakistan initiated an invasion of Kashmir that claimed over one thousand lives.

The roots of the Kashmiri uprising can be traced to 1982, when the longtime figure of stability in the region, Sheikh Abdullah, died. Elections in 1983 were marked by acts of violence that had not been witnessed in the previous elections held in 1977. In October 1983, disturbances by adherents to the future militant party Jamaat-e-Islami following an international cricket match ratcheted up tensions in the region. The level of violence in the state was notable increasing in 1984, and “increasing reports of insurgency” were evident by 1985 (Widmalm 1997: 1017).

Although most scholars mark the beginning of the Kashmiri insurgency as 1988 or 1989, it is clear that militant activities had been escalating since the mid-eighties. The insurgency, however, became most visible under the government of Benazir Bhutto, who had few domestic political alternatives but to continue the policy of support that had existed in the past. The subversive activities of the Zia military government had helped spark a long string of small-scale border clashes with India throughout the eighties, clashes which escalated during the latter half of the decade and, particularly, in the nineties. By this point, civilian leaders had become political hostages to the events in Kashmir that had already been set in motion. It required the return of military government during 1999, however, to facilitate the escalation to war which occurred in during that year.

Although many of the factors leading to the decision of the military government to send forces into the Kargil remain as yet unknown, Musharraf's track record on the Kashmir issue when he was a general had been one of unwavering support. As the Director General of Military Operations under the civilian governments of the nineties, Musharraf personally played a large role in planning the operation and, according to Former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, had presented the plan to her with a promise to "put the flag of Pakistan in the Srinagar assembly" (*The India Express*, January 22, 2002). The General, however, was not free to enact his plan in full until the removal of civilian authority and the rise of military governance.

Despite recent overtures to India, militarized government in Pakistan does not have a positive track record when it comes to the promotion of sustainable peacemaking efforts. Bhutto, referring to Musharraf's post 9/11 "makeover" as a moderate

peacemaker, warned that he might yet represented another military leader whose legacy is one of aggression towards India:

General Musharraf needs to dwell on the principles of a society that can breed a violence-free generation. Such a challenge can be difficult for a regime which has gone from one crisis to another. Hardly had the noise of guns thundering on the Afghan border died down then arose the thunder of guns between Indo-Pak troops. In jumping from crisis to crisis, Musharraf is fulfilling the legacy that history dons military dictators with. War is always historically avoided under Pakistan's democratic leaders (*The Indian Express*, January 22, 2002).

Historical developments in both Pakistan and Somalia seem to suggest that military governments tend to escalate violence to a level that most civilian governments will not, particularly given the presence of diaspora rebellion. Although once again this conclusion remains tentative, the conduct of the military government of Pakistan during the nineties contrasts sharply with that of earlier civilian governments, which had also been forced to contend with the Kashmiri rebellion, but had not initiated the large-scale aggression as that witnessed in Kargil. Similarly, in the Somali case, the military government of the seventies brought the country to war during a period of rebellion in Ethiopia, whereas early civilian governments had refused to pursue high levels of aggression when faced with rebellion in Kenya. This connection between military governance and the escalation of irredentist-type interstate disputes to full-scale war will be addressed again in the next case study concerning relations between Greece and Turkey.

Conclusion

This chapter was divided into two main parts. The first dealt with the nature of the Indian-Pakistan rivalry as a normative dispute, and compared this irredentist-type situation with that of the Sino-Pakistani and Sino-Indian relationships. Continuing

disputes between India and Pakistan, which involved nationalist issues, were shown to be much more conflictual overall than the other bilateral relations examined, which were based on considerations that can best be described as *real-political*.

Nevertheless, even within the India-Pakistan dispute, there was some variation in the explanatory power of norms on bilateral relations. After India successfully framed the Kashmir issue as a “bilateral” affair, thus reducing the influence of an international community that had been surprisingly receptive of Pakistani rhetoric calling for self-determination, Pakistani aggression became less overt.

Although the normative-demographic model suggests that a higher overall baseline of hostility should likely exist between India and Pakistan in comparison to the other dyads, the real variation in conflict can best be explained by looking at structural and situational factors. In particular, Pakistani policies were most aggressive during periods when military leaders controlled policy, and least aggressive during periods when civilians were in control. The most extreme manifestations of this phenomenon were witnessed in 1965 and 1999, when military regimes actually initiated large-scale warfare against India. In comparison, the civilian regime of the seventies under Bhutto pursued a series of goodwill gestures with India, and represented the most peaceful era of Pakistani foreign affairs. Similarly, while not as accommodating as the Bhutto government, the civilian governments of the fifties and early nineties were comparatively more restrained in their foreign policy adventures than those military regimes which preceded or followed them.

CHAPTER 8 – Greece and Turkey

Over the last five years, relations between Greek and Turkey have warmed considerably. While lingering distrust from their many years of rivalry continues, and disputes over important strategic and economic areas of the Aegean Sea remain, the future of relations between these two states looks comparatively bright in contrast to their often contentious past. In 1999, major earthquakes in both countries resulted in quick responses of aid by the other, setting off a series of goodwill gestures that became known as “seismic détente”. A poll taken less than a year later revealed that two-out-of-three Greeks held a “friendly and positive sentiments” toward the Turkish people (Purvis 2000). Athens dropped its objection to Turkish candidacy to the European Union in 1999, and has only increased its support of Turkey’s membership over the past half decade. How is it possible for such long time adversaries to turn the corner in their relations so quickly, and is it possible for this interstate rivalry to fade away once-and-for-all? This chapter addresses both these question by examining the nature of past Greco-Turkish disputes through the framework of the theories presented thus far in this work.


The design of this case study differs somewhat from the previous two chapters. Unlike the earlier studies, which contrasted relations within dyads characterized by irredentist demographics versus those without, this study focuses primarily on the question of transborder nationality as related to Greece and Turkey and the consequences for interstate peace and conflict. The role played by Cyprus, home to Greek and Turkish diaspora, will also be analyzed. The relations of Greece and Turkey, and of both in regard to Cyprus, provide numerous cases within which transborder nationality did and

did not foster conflict in the region, including: 1) The role of irredentism in relations between and the Ottoman Empire (1832-1923); 2) A period when transborder nationalist issues were largely absent between the two states (1923-1954); 3) Greek and Turkish responses to the issue of Cyprus, which involved a somewhat tangled web of different degrees of irredentism and even “contending government” nationalism (between the Greek and Cypriot governments), which has hitherto remained unaddressed within the case studies presented (1954-1974); and 4) an era when issues of transborder nationality largely disappeared as a factor involved in the Greco-Turkish relationship, only to be replaced by a series of clashes over strategic issues that, in time, are expected to decrease in salience as an important source of interstate conflict (1975-present). Table 8.1 provides a glimpse of the patterns of interstate disputes between Greece and Turkey, and how the frequency of such disputes varies during the different eras mentioned above.

This chapter represents one of the closest representations of a “natural experiment” that can be found in international relations, as transborder nationality rarely appears or disappears as a primary factor influencing interstate affairs between two specific states. The fact that Greece and Turkey experienced periods within which both the presence and near absence of transborder groups, as well as the treatment of those groups, affected the relations between these two states presents a unique “test” of the ideas presented thus far.

The first section of this chapter, similar to the previous case studies, focuses primarily upon the role of demographics in conditioning relations between Greece, Turkey, and (to a lesser extent) Cyprus, and how leaders faced varying levels of domestic and international pressures that affected the overall state of interstate conflict. This first

FIGURE 8.1 – Greco-Turkish Bilateral Relations during Different Eras



section is divided into four major historical periods – each characterized by distinct demographic situations within which the presence or (relative) absence of transborder nationality ultimately affected interstate relations. At the end of each section is a summary of the role of transborder demographics and the role played by domestic and international normative considerations in the period covered.

Following the historical discussion involving the interplay between demographics, domestic nationalism, and international constraints, the role of specific domestic and situational factors involved in initiation of irredentist disputes are analyzed in the second part of this chapter. The three key domestic factors that are examined in regard to dispute initiation by Greece and Turkey concern the influence of the military over politics; the perceived condition of diaspora groups; and whether or not military aggression is “feasible”, will be examined most closely. Once again, one finds that

familiar patterns of military influence and diaspora discontent lead to higher levels of dispute initiation in irredentist situations. Considerations of military feasibility, however, were surprisingly absent during many of the conflicts initiated by Greece, perhaps indicating in part that nationalist considerations often overrode realist rationality in foreign policy-making, particularly during the 19th century.

Greece and Turkey: The rise and fall of Transborder Nationality

I. The Era of the “Great Idea”

Greek irredentist designs on the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century

Just as the dissolution of European empires in Africa and the Subcontinent led to an “incompletely realized” state of independence for Somalia and Pakistan, the withdrawal of Ottoman forces from Greece brought about the birth of a newly independent, and strongly irredentist state. By the finalization of Greek independence in 1832 under the Treaty of Constantinople, Greek irredentist designs on the lands of the Ottoman Empire were already evident. As a point of reference, the Greek War of Independence had been conditioned on the idea that revolutionary activity by Greek populations was to be the chief determinant of the future borders of the state, or, in other words, “Greece would consist of the districts that had taken up or would take up arms against Ottoman rule” (Koliopoulos 1987: 307).⁹⁰ The presence of diaspora rebellion became an informal, but powerful, influence that largely determined which territories would become the primary focus of Greek irredentist designs.

⁹⁰ Koliopoulos makes this point based on review of transcripts of Greek National Assemblies during the 1920s. Of particular importance was the Third National Assembly held at Epidaurus, which set the conditions by which Greek representatives desired the British ambassador of the time to open negotiation with the Porte. Foreshadowing the ethnic cleansing and transfers that would eventually take place, the same assembly stressed their wish that “the Greeks and the Turks would no longer live together”.

What developed over the coming decades among Greek leaders and scholars was a formulation of nationalistic goals that became known as the Great Idea, or *Megali Idea*. According to Smith (1973: 4), distinct strands of the Great Idea existed, stressing greater or lesser ambitions of how a Greek empire might be carved from Ottoman lands. The more radical ambitions stressed the Byzantine identity of Greeks, and focused on the wholesale collapse of the Ottoman Empire and a revival of a Byzantine-Greek Empire centered on Constantinople. Somewhat less, and eventually dominant, interpretations saw the “progressive redemption” of Greek diaspora through the series of head-on collisions with the Porte that came to pass. The “Great Idea” was perhaps most famously articulated by Ioannis Kolettis, who declared before the Greek National Assembly in 1844 that:

The Greek kingdom is not the whole of Greece, but only a part, the smallest and poorest part. A native of Greece is not only someone who lives in this kingdom, but also someone who lives in Ioannina, in Thessaly, in Serres, in Adrianople, in Constantinople, in Crete, in Samos, and in any land associated with Greek history or the Greek race (quoted in Peckham 2000: 85).

What developed during the last half of the nineteenth century was a classic case in which a government, faced with a stronger adversary, engages in, or turns a blind eye to, systematic subversion of the diaspora-inhabited lands of its stronger neighbor (i.e. secessionist-merger strategies). During this period, small local militias mounted frequent raids into Ottoman lands, ostensibly in the name of Greek liberation, but often with the less noble goal of obtaining plunder in the form of livestock and other portable goods. Nevertheless, “irredentism provided the necessary ideology to justify the plundering raids issuing from the frontier” and over time the “the irregular forces came to be regarded as the proper armed forces of the nation, to be kept in reserve for the liberation of

unredeemed Greeks across the border” (Koliopoulos 1987: 318 and 7) – especially when the international circumstances were ripe.

The demographics-normative model upon which much of this work is based considers public pressures and international constraints to be the two main forces in determining the general course of bilateral relations between states. The course of events in the nineteenth century between Greece and the Ottoman Empire can be viewed through this framework as well, as Greek leaders, having cultivated a sense of nationalism among the public, were ultimately faced with the need to balance the pressures of public nationalism with the ebb and flow of constraints from the international community. During much of the latter half of the century, the Great Powers, particularly Britain and France, sought both to guarantee Greek independence, which they had fought to achieve, as well as disallow “the extension of Greece’s frontiers by force of arms at the expense of the Ottoman Empire” (Koliopoulos 1987: 320). Thus, while Greek authorities could attempt to foster instability within the Porte in the hope that members of the Greek diaspora might successfully liberate themselves, there was little chance for overt military action by the Greek government during this period.

One such opportunity arose, however, during the Crimean War when France and Britain were occupied in their efforts against Russia. According to Woodhouse (1986: 167), the Greeks were “delighted” by this turn of events, and felt that the moment for the realization of the Great Idea had arrived. Despite the remonstrances of these states, Greece committed its regular army against the Ottomans, and was quickly defeated. This defeat under some of the more auspicious circumstances for which Greek nationalist could hope, led to a temporary waning of nationalism and a Greek-Turkish treaty, signed

in 1856, brought about the temporary suppression of activities by Greek raiders along the border.

Although the Great Idea remained a “grand theme running through . . . this period” (Veremis 2002: 53), the next thirty years presented few opportunities for active aggression against the Ottoman Empire, despite uprisings in both Crete and Thessaly during the late 1860s. No better example of constraints on Greece policy during this period existed than the aborted attempt of Greece to enter the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 – a move that was met by threats by Britain to blockade Greek ports.

Although the Greek government and public continued to actively and passively support subversive activities in the more rebellious areas of the Ottoman Empire, the overall policy of the Greek government as the turn of the century neared was one in which:

The Greek authorities followed an ambivalent policy which was the result of conflicting pressures: from public opinion, which called for action to liberate the unredeemed Greeks, and from the great powers of Europe, which counseled avoidance of such action on pain of intervention (Koliopoulos 1987: 218)

Public pressure, however, ultimately overwhelmed international considerations in 1897, when renewed rebellion broke out in Crete. The rebellion in Crete was fomented in part by the influence of the “National Society”, or *ethniki Etairia*, an Athens-based group that also worked to renew nationalist sentiment among the Greek public. With nationalist pressures at home at a boiling point, Greek authorities disregarded concerns about international reaction and moved against the Ottoman Empire in support of the Crete separatists. The predictable reaction by the international community, which included a blockade that prevented effective support of the rebels, helped defeat a Greek invasion that seemed to have little hope from the start. The Thirty Days War made it

clear once again that, if the Great Idea were to be furthered, it would have to be under favorable international circumstances. Those opportunities, however, laid only a decade-and-a-half away as the Balkans were to become the scene of the great nationalist wars of the early twentieth century.

The Great Opportunity: The Balkan and First World Wars

In the wake of the defeat of 1897 and subsequent events in Macedonia in the first decade of the twentieth century, the Greek government came under heavy criticism for its impotent stance on the diaspora question. In Macedonia, Greek irregulars battled Bulgarian, Serb, and Ottoman forces for control of the territory, while the Greek state formally distanced itself from the struggle. Seeking to placate Ottoman authorities, while facing a perceived threat from Bulgaria, Greek leaders proclaimed a policy of cooperation with the Porte during this period (Triandafyllidou and Paraskevopoulou 2002: 81). Disenchantment with the state was such that the idea of Greeks as a “stateless nation” became a slogan of government opponents of the time.

The government returned to a path of irredentist nationalism in 1909 when a bloodless revolt, known as the Goudhi coup, led by military officers under the banner of the “Military League”, paved the way for the ascension of the pro-expansionist Cretan politician, Eleftherios Venizelos. While the League itself disbanded quickly, Venizelos, its civilian political leader, subsequently won the backing of the Greek public and was overwhelmingly elected Prime Minister in elections held in 1910 and 1912. Once again, as has been witnessed in much of the twentieth century, military intervention in politics,

later supported by a strong public mandate, led to the adoption of strong nationalist preferences in an irredentist states' foreign policy.

The first opportunity for the realization of Greek territorial ambition took place in 1912, when, as a result of deft diplomacy, Venizelos managed to secure an alliance with Bulgarian and Serbia (and later Montenegro) that was clearly aimed at the Ottoman Empire. In October 1912, Montenegro declared war on Turkey, and Serbia and Bulgaria followed suit. The Ottoman Empire declared war on these states, but not Greece – which nevertheless declared war on the Ottomans soon thereafter. Unable to act to restrain such a broad alliance of states, the Great Powers were forced to stand by as the Balkan League quickly, and surprisingly, overran the Ottoman army. This First Balkan War was followed a mere three months later by the Second Balkan War, wherein an alliance of the former allies, along with the Ottoman Empire, defeated Bulgaria and divided up that state's spoils of the previous conflict. For the Greeks, this meant, most importantly of all, securing possession of southern Macedonia and the long sought-after island of Crete. Nevertheless, the irredentist desires of many within the Greek polity had not yet been satiated.

Despite the assistance of the Ottoman Empire in the Second Balkan War, relations between Athens and Constantinople returned to a tense state of affairs in the year preceding the First World War. Particularly inflaming Greek nationalism was the treatment of Greek minorities under the Young Turk regime, whose "Turkification" policies seemed likely to suppress the relative cultural freedom enjoyed by Greeks within the empire for centuries. Although many Moslems had been driven from former Ottoman territories during the Balkan Wars, Greek public anger was inflamed by the deportation

of 30,000 Greeks from Anatolia and Thrace in late 1913. The potential for renewed warfare on behalf of the Greek diaspora was made stark when Venizelos warned the Greek parliament in June 1914 that Greece might soon be forced to renew violence against the Porte in order to protect Greeks from further persecution (Stephens 1966: 90). Before the issue reached a head, however, the First World War broke out in August 1914.

Unlike the Balkan Wars, a venture in which “the nation had been united and had supported the government wholeheartedly in its nationalist enterprises” (Triandafyllidou and Paraskevopoulou 2002: 83), the public and its leaders became deeply divided about whether to enter the First World War, a divide that became known as “The Great Schism.” Venizelos, as the voice of Greek nationalists, strongly supported joining the Entente powers as a means through which further Greek territorial ambitions, particularly in Asia Minor, might be accomplished. He was opposed by a loyalist camp, however, led by King Constantine I, who supported a neutralist policy and the acceptance of a “small, but honorable” Greece. After Constantine dismissed Venizelos in 1915, Venizelos established a provisional government in Thessalonica and, by 1916, full-blown civil war seemed a distinct possibility.

Allied pressure, which included an embargo and a limited invasion of parts of Greece, eventually forced the abdication of Constantine and led to the reinstatement of Venizelos as Prime Minister. Having been freed of the bonds of the royalist camp, Venizelos brought the country into war within days of his return to Athens. In the face of a silenced domestic opposition and an international climate that not only permitted Greece to enter the war against the Ottoman Empire, but ultimately demanded it,

Venizelos' actions brought Greece a seat at the victory table and a share of the spoils of war.

Occupation and defeat in Asia Minor – 1919-1923

What for Greeks became the “Asia Minor Catastrophe” and for Turks a War of Independence was not so much a separate incident from the First World War as it was an extension of it. As a result of the Treaty of Sevres of 1920, the Ottoman Empire was carved up among the victorious powers, including Greece, which was granted much of the coastline of Asia Minor, particularly around the heavily-Greek populated port of Smyrna. The Greek administration of the Smyrna region, which was to be followed by a plebiscite to determine its status in five years' time, was accepted by the defeated Ottoman government of the time, and the stationing of Greek forces there could hardly be considered an invasion in any traditional sense. However, the Greek presence in Asia Minor was viewed as such by the revolutionary forces of Mustafa Kemal (later Kemal Ataturk), which posed a growing threat to the moribund Ottoman administration and the Greek position alike.

Almost immediately after the First World War ended, scattered Turkish resistance fighters began harassment of allied forces in the region. During 1919-1920, the question of resistance to allied forces led to increasing friction between the forces of the Ottoman Sultan and the growing movement of nationalists led by Kemal. By April 1920, the nationalists had established a revolutionary government in Ankara, while the Sultan ordered the deaths of Kemal and any of Kemal's followers. With the leaking of the terms of the Treaty of Sevres in May 1920, recruits flocked to Kemal's cause and Turkey

became embroiled in a civil war within which the nationalists quickly gained the upper hand against the Sultan's forces.

At the same time, the growing discontent of an increasingly war-weary Greek public was manifested in elections in 1920 in which Venizelos', the face of Greek nationalist ambitions, was heavily defeated by royalists, who advocated the "small but honorable" concept of a Greek state. Nevertheless, the return of King Constantine to power did not represent a break from aggressive Greek policies in Asia Minor.

Due to the presence of the large Greek diaspora in the remaining Ottoman lands, Greece had a greater stake in the outcome of the civil war than any other state, and offered to intervene against the Kemalist forces mobilizing in the interior. With the strong encouragement of British Prime Minister Lloyd George, Greek divisions advanced from Smyrna, and, by the end of 1920, had moved deep into Anatolia and seemed in striking distance of Ankara itself. Time was on the side of the Turkish nationalists, however, who seemed to gain strength with every Greek advance. During 1921, Greek forces met much stiffer resistance than they had the previous year, making only limited advances. The following year in 1922, the situation turned completely around as Turkish armies managed to break through the Greek lines, leading to a chaotic retreat by Greek forces. Within a month of the breakthrough, the Turks had retaken Smyrna and completed the conquest of the entire peninsula.

The conflict took a heavy toll on the civilian populations of Asia Minor. As each side advanced, first the Greeks, and then the Turks, abuses against civilians of the other nation were commonplace, culminating in the destruction of Smyrna (renamed Izmir) at the end of the Turkish campaign. When the conflict ended, the large majority of Greeks

in Asia Minor had fled or been forced to evacuate from their homes, greatly reducing the size of the Greek diaspora in the region. Rather than seeking to reverse the ethnic cleansing that had taken place, negotiations surrounding the Treaty of Lausanne, signed in 1923, not only sanctioned the population transfer, but, also, in the name of peace, sought to further diminish the presence of transborder nationalities in each state.

Normative-Demographic Implications of the Era of the Great Idea

Public support for irredentism in Greece was strong throughout much of this period, causing a series of Greek leaders to attempt to placate nationalist sentiment at home through provocative policies and rhetoric. The degree of international constraints encountered by Greek leaders varied much more widely, and helps explain quite a bit of the variation in Greek militarism during this period.

During certain periods, such as the Crimean War, the major powers that sought to dissuade Greek irredentist policies toward the Ottoman Empire, Great Britain and France, were occupied in major warfare that hindered their ability to monitor and influence Athens' policies. During other periods, such as the Russo-Turkish War, heavy allied pressure largely succeeded in preventing meaningful Greek intervention. During yet other periods, such as the Thirty Days' War of 1897, the Great Powers actively dissuaded Greek irredentist moves, but were ultimately rebuffed as public nationalism overrode international considerations (due, in large part, to the presence of rebellion in Ottoman Crete). Nevertheless, even during the 1897 War, Greece was defeated, in part, by Great Power moves designed to thwart the Greek War effort.

For most of the period, however, Great Power support for the continued sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire dampened the enthusiasm of Greek leaders for overt policies of aggression against the Porte. The role of international constraints in Europe at the time is partly reflected in the fact that, before the Balkan Wars, the only territorial gains achieved by Greece were granted by international conferences convened by the Great Powers. *The only major irredentist military actions taken by Greece were during times of diaspora rebellion or short periods during which international constraints were weak.* At the same time, the overwhelming superiority of the Ottoman military offered Greek leaders pause as well and represented an additional reason why policies of supporting internal subversion were generally the preferred path through which irredentism was pursued.

The Balkan Wars represented an auspicious circumstance for Greek revisionism due to the deft diplomacy of Venizelos, who allied the state with other revisionist countries in the region. While warned by the Great Powers, including Russia, against the initiation of conflict against the Ottomans, the alliance was too broad and the conflict over too quickly for outside powers to intervene. Following the wars, relations with the Ottoman Empire remained tense due to the perceived mistreatment of the remaining Greek diaspora, and war threatened again in 1914. However, the outbreak of the First World War, ironically, placed the Greek-Turkish conflict on hold for several years.

The Ottoman decision to side with the Central Powers during the First World War not only removed the traditional international constraints on a Greek attack on Turkey, but actively encouraged Greek intervention. The traditional guarantors of the Ottoman Empire, Great Britain and France, now actively sought to destroy the sovereignty of the

Empire and placed heavy pressure on Greece to intervene. Only the views of “Prussofile” royalists prevented the quick entry of Greece into the war sought by Venizelos. Eventually, the active intervention of the Entente powers in Greek politics swept away King Constantine and his supporters, opening the door for Greek intervention.

Allied pressure for Greek intervention against the Ottoman Empire continued into the post-war period. British Prime Minister Lloyd George pressed for the Greek occupation of Smyrna and the subsequent invasion of the interior launched under Constantine. As indicated by the defeat of Venizelos at the polls in 1920, the Greek public no longer could be viewed as an important force advocating retrieval of Greek populations abroad. In fact, in a reversal of the normal expected chain-of-events leading to irredentist conflict, international pressures for conflict were essentially pitted against an increasingly war-weary public. Nevertheless, “at no time in Greek history had the international situation been so favorable to Hellenic aspirations” (Dakin 1972: 223), and international factors became the paramount deciding factor for Greek leaders reticent to pass up a historical opportunity. In the end, it was the unusual state of international affairs prevailing at the time surrounding the events of the First World War, whereby the traditional international order seeking to preserve state borders and state sovereignty completely broke down, that paved the way for the disastrous irredentist interventions of the Greek government during this period.

II: Lausanne and its Aftermath: 1923-1955

The defeat of the Greek military in Asia Minor opened the way to negotiations, which began under the auspices of the League of Nations in October 1922, for a new

treaty intended to supersede the Allied dictated Treaty of Sevres. Lasting over eight months, the negotiations culminated with the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in July 1923. The Greek delegation was led by Venizelos, who had been appointed as chief negotiator in the wake of a military coup which had forced the abdication of Constantine in the wake of the Greek defeat. Ironically, the man most associated with early 20th century Greek irredentism was to negotiate terms which largely put the Great Idea to rest.

As the last comprehensive settlement stemming from the First World War, the Treaty dealt with a variety of issues unrelated to Greece, such as the status of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, the disposition of former Ottoman territories, and a multitude of economic and property issues. In defining the borders between Turkey and Greece, the treaty stipulated that Turkey would receive all of Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace, the area of Europe directly west of Constantinople. Greece received most of the Aegean islands. Turkey agreed to abandon any future claims to Cyprus and recognize the island's annexation to the British Empire.

During the course of the Lausanne negotiations, both states agreed to a population exchange in a separate Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, which was signed by Greek and Turkish representatives in January 1923. The Convention stipulated that any *religious* minorities⁹¹, with the exception of Moslems in Western Thrace and the Greek Orthodox population of Constantinople, were to be forcibly evicted to the opposite country if they did not voluntarily leave by May 1923. Members of each minority group who had already fled or been forced out as the result of earlier conflicts were to constitute the "first installment" of minorities transferred

⁹¹ The use of religion as the primary determinant of nationality was particularly unfortunate for many on both sides. Turkish-speaking Christians in Anatolia and the Greek-speaking Moslem of Crete were particularly reluctant to leave.

according to the Convention (Articles 3 and 4). A Mixed Commission of Greek, Turkish, and League of Nations representatives was formed to oversee the transfer.⁹²

Devised under the leadership of the League of Nation's High Commissioner for Refugees, Fridtjof Nansen, both Greece and Turkish representatives alternately expressed support and reservations for the exchange. Ultimately, support from both sides was secured because both states perceived that the treaty was in the interest of their people. Greek officials were the first to suggest the idea as a method of preserving the lives of the approximately half million (out of a pre-war population of about 1.6 million) Greeks that remained in Asia Minor when it became clear that Allied troops would not intervene to prevent continuing abuses, some would suggest "genocide"⁹³, against the diaspora population (Barutciski 2003: 26). Turkish officials, on the other hand, saw the exchange as a necessary security measure that would permanently remove the *casus belli* that had been utilized by the Greek state against the Ottoman Empire numerous times over the last century. The deputy-head of the Turkish delegation in Lausanne is said to have declared during the negotiations that "as there would be no minorities in Anatolia, there would be no foreign intervention" (Aktar 2002: 87).

The relatively orderly population transfers under the Lausanne agreements were relatively small compared to the forced evacuations that had taken place during hostilities (particularly for Greeks). While over a million Greeks fled during the Turkish advances of 1922, the population exchange witnessed the transfer of slightly under 200,000 (Hirschon 2003a: 14). The Moslem population transferred to Turkey after 1923

⁹² An example of the role of the Mixed Commission occurred when a dispute arose concerning which Greeks in Constantinople were to be considered "established", and thus excluded from the population exchange. The issue caused a rupture in Greek-Turkish relations, which were not fully restored until 1925.

⁹³ Many historians and scholars have come to refer to the ethnic cleansing of Greeks in 1922 as the "Pontian genocide". Not surprisingly, many in Turkey object to the use of this term.

numbered about 350,000 (p. 15). Altogether, the impact on Greek society was much greater than that on Turkish society, as the population of Greece swelled by about twenty percent during a very short period, while emigrants to Turkey totaled a much more manageable four percent. The total size of the Moslem minority population after the transfer was about six percent while the Greek Orthodox population of Turkey was reduced to approximately two percent.⁹⁴ These small percentages gradually became much smaller during the remainder of the century due to emigration.

The impact of the population transfer on Greek-Turkish relations was not immediate, but the eventual effect was profound. Although the morality of forcibly evicting hundreds-of-thousands of people from their homes based on their religion is more than questionable, the effect that the elimination of large transborder minority groups was to have on interstate relations is undeniable. For several years, outstanding disputes from the settlement of the war and the population exchange kept the rival states from reconciling, but, by the end of the decade, most of these issues had been resolved. Because, “for the first time in modern Greek history the ethnological limits of the Greek people coincided, in general, with the territorial limits of the Greek state” (Psomiades 1968: 106), and because the new Turkish state recognized Greek sovereignty of Western Thrace, the uncertainty and suspicion that had characterized relations between Greece and the Ottoman Empire was replaced by a more stable relationship between Greece and Turkey. Psomiades (p. 108) notes the impact of the events following the conflict in Asia Minor thusly:

⁹⁴ Bahcheli (1990: 12) notes that even these small minorities, and their subsequently treatment at the hands of Greek and Turkish authorities, “did cause irritations in the future” – a subject that will be addressed later in this chapter.

The exchange of populations and the new boundary realignments had removed the major irritants in the long history of the two peoples and transformed the conflict between a decaying empire and one of its chief adversaries in a stable arrangement between two non-imperial, non-expansive nation states.

Relations between Greece and Turkey grew particularly warm between the period 1928 and 1955 – almost thirty years of peace that would have been almost unfathomable had the presence of large transborder minority groups still existed. During this period, Greece and Turkey became “the closest partners in the Balkans” (Oran 2003: 103). While the reduction of the transborder ethnic presence enabled the development of closer ties during this period, common security concerns provided the impetus. The initiation of closer ties began with the return of Venizelos to power in 1928, who, in a set of policies reminiscent of “Nixon going to China”, risked and endured a public backlash (especially among the émigrés from Asia Minor) in order to cultivate a new relationship with Ankara.

The relationship began with a series of letters between Venizelos and Prime Minister Ismet of Turkey, and resulted in a groundbreaking trip by Venizelos to Turkey in 1930, where he and his counterpart signed the Treaty of Friendship, Neutrality, Conciliation, and Arbitration, which resolved most of the outstanding issues of the previous decade. According to the treaty, any further disagreements that could not be resolved were to be submitted to the League of Nation’s Permanent Court of International Justice. In 1933, the two countries signed another Friendship Pact, which guaranteed “the inviolability of their borders and committed them to consult each other on matters of common interest (Bahcheli 1990: 14)

The growing stability of relations between Greece and Turkey allowed both states to lead the way in attempting to create a new, more stable environment in the Balkans as

a whole. At the same time, the rise of Italian revisionism led both states to pursue a policy of common security, and both states, together with Romania and Yugoslavia⁹⁵, formed the Balkan Entente of 1934. The Entente failed to achieve its goals, and was destroyed with the occupation of Yugoslavia and Greece in the Second World War. During this conflict, both Greece and Turkey declared neutrality, although only Greece suffered the unfortunate fate of being invaded by Italy in 1940.

The Second World War replaced the fascist threat with the Stalinist threat, which provided the impetus for continued warm relations between the two states. The highpoint of postwar cooperation was reached in 1952, when both states became full members of the newly formed NATO alliance. At the end of this year, official visits by the Greek King and Queen to Istanbul and Ankara and the Prime Minister of Turkey to Athens were hailed as a continuing sign that the difficulties of the past had been finally overcome and that the cooperation between the two states that had characterized the interwar period would continue in the postwar period.

Such hopes were overly optimistic, however. As the threat from Russia receded somewhat with the death of Stalin the following year, and as the decolonization movement began to receive greater attention world-wide, the seeds for renewed tension began to germinate on the island of Cyprus. Once again, the issue of foreign Greek diaspora would become a major issue in Greco-Turkish relations. This time, however, the Turkish government was also to advocate a series of positions on behalf of its own foreign diaspora. The Cypriot situation would degenerate into a tangled diplomatic and military imbroglio based upon unification nationalism and stronger and weaker forms of

⁹⁵ Known as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes at the time.

irredentism, leading eventually to a *de facto* exchange of Greek and Turkish populations in 1974 comparable to that which had occurred in the twenties.

Normative-Demographic Implications of the Period after Lausanne

The defeat in Asia Minor led to a mass exodus/expulsion of Greeks living in the region. The ethnic cleansing of Greeks was sanctified in the Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations that was signed by Greece and Turkey during the Lausanne negotiations. During the ensuing years the process of ethnic cleansing took place under the formal auspices of the League of Nations. In the end, the effect of the war and the subsequent population exchanges was the “establishment of a new status quo after a decade of war”, which represented the start of a new era of interstate peace between the two formal rivals (Coufoudakis 1985: 186). Barutciski (2002: 27) describes how a process that in the contemporary world might be viewed as a travesty of human rights abuse actually contributed to interstate peace:

Despite the great human hardship engendered by population exchanges, the improvement in regional stability cannot be ignored. The unmixing of populations in Asia Minor helped put an end to hostilities and secure pacification of the warring parties.

After a difficult start, the following three decades represented the warmest period of Greek-Turkish relations in history. As displayed in Table 8.1, bilateral militarized disputes came to an abrupt halt after 1925. With the removal of the Greek diaspora, the irredentist element which had characterized Greek foreign policy since independence was largely removed. The Great Idea vanished from the public imagination, and Greek leaders were no longer pressured, and longer desired, to challenge the status quo. At the same time, Turkish leadership under Ataturk quickly foreswore that state Ottoman past,

and settled for a “Turkified” state that was as free from outside national influences as possible.

III. The Return of Transborder Nationality as an Issue between Greek and Turkey

The Cyprus Question Arises: 1954-1963

On September 6, 1955 Greek mobs in Istanbul rioted and looted homes and businesses owned by Greeks. The riots were ignited by the announcement that a bomb had exploded next to the house in which Kemal Ataturk had been born in Thessaloniki, Greece. Several years later it was discovered that Turkish authorities had been behind the bombing, which represented an attempt to draw international attention to the Turkish position on Cyprus (Coufoudakis 2000: 190). The incident, fostered by recent claims made by Greece on the island, caused “a quarter-century of Greek-Turkish détente to collapse overnight” (p. 194).

The desire of Cypriot Greeks to unite with the Greek state did not suddenly develop during the mid-fifties, although the active pursuit of this goal by the Greek government represented a new policy. Ever since the transfer of the island from Ottoman to British hands in 1878, Greek representatives on the island expressed a frequent desire for *enosis*, or unification with Greece (Woodhouse 1986: 270). Shortly after Turkey renounced any claims to the island as a condition of the Treaty of Lausanne, a delegation of Cypriot representatives traveled directly to London to formally petition the British government for Cyprus’ unification with Greece. They were swiftly rebuffed. Little notice of Cyprus was taken on the mainland, for as long as the mighty British Empire, longtime ally of the Greeks, controlled the island, there “could be no question of international pressure” (Tsoucalas 1969: 157). Although the desire for unification may

have been strong among Greek Cypriots, and grew much stronger after the Second World War, the international infeasibility of pressing the case for enosis translated into silence on the part of governments in Athens.

This changed during the fifties as norms of decolonization in the name of “self-determination” began to take hold in international circles. Unlike the situation of other colonial territories, however, the Cyprus case was somewhat unique, in that the dominant population of Greeks, who made up approximately 80 percent of the population compared to approximately 20 percent Turks, sought the absorption of the territory by another state rather than outright independence. Necatigil (1996: 23) notes that the Cypriot case was actually more reflective of “irredentist nationalism of the nineteenth century” rather than the mid-twentieth century notion of self-determination, which emphasized an “ultimate objective of achieving independence”. In a plebiscite organized by the Orthodox Church in Cyprus during 1950, voters almost unanimously supported the choice of enosis with the mainland.

In 1954, Greece finally decided to become involved in the Cyprus issue and assert its irredentist claims vis-à-vis the British government under the banner of “self-determination”. The link with the norm of self-determination was important, as Greek officials, and the influential Archbishop Makarios, Cypriot leader of the enosis movement, perceived correctly that, although Greek Cypriots were primarily motivated by a desire to unite with Greece, the international community would be much more receptive if the issue were framed as one within which an occupied people sought freedom from a colonial power (Attalides 1979:34). By internationalizing the issue, the

Greek government laid both the first steps to Cyprus' independence and future conflict with Turkey over the governance of the demographically heterogeneous island.

The Turkish Cypriot community reacted strongly toward the prospect of enosis, and anti-union pronouncements and demonstrations became widespread (Bahcheli 1990: 39). The main Cypriot party of the day, KITEMP, rather than joining with the Greeks in attempting to secure a British withdrawal, demanded a continued British presence. The Turkish government, which had up to that point been "content for the British to rule the island indefinitely" (p. 31), supported the demands of Turkish Cypriot leaders until it became evident that continued British rule was no longer a possibility.

The Turkish reaction to the situation was somewhat unusual in the context of the theories of transborder nationalism presented in this work. Unlike the Greek government, the Turkish government held few designs on Cyprus, having forgone any irredentist aspirations permanently with the Treaty of Lausanne. More important than the legal arrangement, however, Turkish history played a role in creating a Turkish identity that associated the acquisition of multi-ethnic territories with the decay of the Ottoman Empire, while the creation and preservation of a relatively ethnically homogeneous homeland was seen as the bedrock upon which the modern state rested. Thus, the modern Turkish state could be seen as particularly resistant to the interjection of nationalist irredentism into its foreign policy preferences compared to other putatively irredentist states.

Nevertheless, the presence of the diaspora, in the end, did become an important issue for Turkey, as the threat of Greek rule – from Athens or Nicosia – over the Turkish minority was viewed much less benignly than that of British rule. In some ways it is

puzzling that Turkish Cypriots would hold such strong preferences for one foreign ruler over another – especially since inter-ethnic relations on the island had been peaceful throughout its history until 1955 (Hitchens 1983: 47). However, the British presence had been viewed as a way of preventing the domination of the island by the Greek Cypriots, and, therefore, the British authorities were seen as rather neutral arbiters. More importantly, although relations between the Greek and Turkish governments had steadily improved over the previous decades, twenty-five years of intergovernmental good will had not been enough to heal all the wounds and suspicion that a century of Greco-Turkish enmity had created. The historical Greco-Turkish rivalry held relevance not only for the competing nationalisms of the Cypriot communities, but also for the Turkish government, which, from a strategic viewpoint, viewed the potential occupation of Cyprus by Greek forces much more ominously than the continued use of the island as a British base in the Eastern Mediterranean. As it became clearer that British rule would no longer continue over the island, the Turkish government came to support partition of the territory between Greece and Turkey – a position unacceptable to the Greek government or Greek Cypriots.

Both the Greek and Turkish governments lent support to underground paramilitary movements on the island in an effort to influence the enosis debate through covert violence. The Greek government provided materials for a movement known as EOKA, whose objectives were both nationalist and anti-communist.⁹⁶ Ultimately, the organization sought to promote enosis by fomenting instability and making continued occupation costly for British forces. Although the group utilized assassinations and bombings against British forces and officials, it focused primarily on the intimidation of

⁹⁶ Unlike in Greece, where, in the wake of the civil war, Communist sympathizers were largely suppressed, the Communist Party remained an influential political force on Cyprus.

Turkish Cypriot leaders and sections of the Turkish Cypriot population. The Turkish government helped create the Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT), which similarly targeted the Greek (but not British) population of the island in pursuit of its anti-enosis objectives.

By 1958, these two proxy insurgencies had contributed to and facilitated inter-communal strife that escalated to the extent that a state of emergency was declared on the island by the British government. The period 1957-1958 witnessed a series of clashes which culminated in large-scale rioting and the evacuation of ethnic minorities from several villages (Bahcheli 1990: 41). The turmoil served the goal of EOKA in that it hastened the process of British withdrawal. The Turkish government, however, refused any future status for the island that might include the possibility of enosis, and thus the parties began negotiation on the nature of Cypriot independence and how such independence would incorporate the demands of both the Greek and Turkish governments – both of which had largely assumed the role of representative for their respective national kin on Cyprus.

In August 1958, the British announced the framework for the future governance of Cyprus. The state was to become “independent”, but independence was to include a complicated set of arrangements that provided a shared role for Britain, Greece, and Turkey in the country’s administration. Although reluctant to forgo the goal of enosis, the Greek Cypriots of the island, led by Makarios, felt compelled to participate in a process that the British made clear would have continued even in their absence (Woodhouse 1986: 278).

The negotiations yielded the Zurich-London agreements of 1959. The agreements established a corporatist-type, power-sharing government that guaranteed a large role for Turkish Cypriots in policy-making and important government posts. Furthermore, the agreements included the Treaty of Guarantee, which was included at the insistence of Turkey, in order to ensure protection of the Turkish diaspora. Article IV of the Treaty stated that:

In so far as common or concerted action may prove impossible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs established by the present treaty.

The Zurich-London arrangements held out the possibility for a renewal of stable relations between Greece and Turkey. By providing for the ability of both the Greek and, particularly, Turkish communities to block any unwanted legislation over their respective communities, the issues that traditionally cause transborder nationality to provoke international conflict were temporarily resolved, as neither side was able to project significant political power or control over the other community. However, the inability of the state to repress the Turkish community was also a symptom of a state that was unable to govern, as the Turkish “veto” was used frequently, essentially creating a state of government paralysis by 1963. The brief return to normalized relations that existed between Greece and Turkey from 1959-1963 (Coufoudakis 2000: 198) degenerated thereafter when the Cypriot leader Makarios unilaterally abrogated the Zurich-London agreements, stripping the Turkish Cypriot community of the constitutional guarantees that they had enjoyed during the first years of the Republic.

Cyprus: Two diaspora, one state, 1963-1974

Demographically speaking, the newly independent Cyprus became part of a “majority-majority” (contending government) dyad in conjunction Greece and a “minority-majority” (irredentist-type) dyad in conjunction with Turkey upon independence in 1960. The earlier constitutional arrangements of the Zurich-London treaties had mitigated the inflammatory influence of transborder demographics on Greece-Turkish-Cypriot relations through an intricate power-sharing arrangement that prevented any side from exercising strong control over any other. With the breakdown of the power-sharing arrangements, however, the next decade witnessed an era when Greece and Turkey behaved in a manner similar to what this work has theorized they would given the presence of Cyprus’ dual diaspora.

By the end of 1963, it had become increasingly clear that the power-sharing arrangement between the two communities on Cyprus was extremely ineffective, if not unworkable⁹⁷. Disagreements over taxation, the division of municipal borders in towns, the ethnic composition of the armed forces, and a host of smaller issues led to a breakdown in cooperation between Greek and Turkish leaders and raised again the question whether an independent Cyprus was viable. In response to the continuing governmental crisis, President Makarios proposed, in late 1963, a set of changes to the Cypriot Constitution known as the “thirteen points”. This plan would have created a “integrated, unity state, where Turkish Cypriots had no veto rights” (Bahcheli 1990: 59).

⁹⁷ Whether the Zurich-London agreements provided a workable framework for governance is a debatable issue. Bahcheli (1990: 59) argues that “notwithstanding its complexity and its limited amending power, the Constitution was as workable as Greek and Turkish-Cypriots wanted it to be” and further notes, placing the blame on Greek Cypriot leaders who sought to undermine the legitimacy of the accords, that “some Greek-Cypriot leaders have publicly acknowledged that the Accords could have been made to work.”

The threat of Greek domination in Cyprus led to a series of events that insured such an outcome. On December 23, 1963, full-scale intercommunal conflict broke out, leading to the removal/withdrawal of Turkish politicians from the government. The intense conflict, spearheaded by paramilitary groups, lasted three months before the United Nations authorized a peacekeeping force (UNFICYP), which arrived in Cyprus in late March. While the 6,500 strong UN force helped dampen hostilities to a certain degree, fighting continued for months after the deployment, only slowing once the large majority of Turkish residents of the island had retreated into numerous “enclaves”.

In the face of massive public pressures emanating from “Turkish-Cypriots, opposition parties, and public opinion”, the initially reticent Turkish Prime Minister, Ismet Inonu, relented to pressures from below and informed the U.S. government on June 4, 1964, that he intended to send the state’s armed forces to intervene in Cyprus (Bahcheli 1990: 63). However, nationalist pressures from below were met with even stronger pressures from above, as U.S. President Johnson warned in no uncertain terms that if Turkish actions precipitated Soviet intervention against Turkey that NATO obligations would no longer be applicable. The U.S. warning had the desired effect of dissuading the Turkish government from invading, but, later in the year (August 1964), Turkish jets bombed the island in a successful effort to head off the invasion of Turkish Cypriot enclaves by Greek Cypriot paramilitary forces.

By the end of 1964, events on the island had largely calmed, as Turkish Cypriots, now separated from the Greeks of the island within protected (but still geographically interspersed) enclaves, achieved a modicum of security, despite an economic blockade put in place on the enclaves by Nicosia. The tense peace lasted from the end of 1964

until November 1967, when the Greek-Cypriot National Guard, only marginally under the control of the Makarios government, launched an offensive against two Turkish enclaves in an action which claimed over a dozen lives. Once again, the Turkish government threatened to intervene, only to turn back when the Greek government offered concessions that included the withdrawal of 12,000 Greek troops stationed on the island in violation of the Zurich-London agreements. Although the Turkish government was “widely criticized by many Turks for losing a favourable opportunity to use force”, the concessions made by the Greek government allowed Turkish leaders to weather critical opinion at home (Bahcheli 1990: 75).

Altogether, the conflict between the two communities was to claim approximately a thousand lives during the period 1963-1967 (Bercovitch and Jackson: 1997). The loss of life, coupled with several regional war scares, led to renewed efforts for a settlement in the late sixties and early seventies. Partly facilitating the effort were the newly moderated views of President Makarios, who reversed himself after two decades and stated that enosis was no longer a possibility. The democratic government of Greece had been overthrown by a military junta led by George Papadopoulos, who, despite complicity in the late 1967 attacks on the Turkish Cypriot enclaves, increasingly sought accommodation with Turkey over the Cyprus issue, in part due to heavy U.S. pressures. Turkish and Turkish Cypriot officials, for their part, hoped for changes to the status quo that would alleviate the economic deprivation experienced by the “enclaved” Turkish Cypriot population (Attalides 1979: 99).

The talks that began in 1968 under auspicious circumstances, however, dragged on for five years. Despite the long time frame, however, progress seemed to be made

during these “intercommunal talks” and “the gap between the two positions seemed easily within range of possible bridging” (Attalides 1970: 102). By 1973, a variety of compromises seemed within reach that would have moved Cypriot governance from the corporatist-type arrangements of the early sixties to a more federal type arrangement, whereby Greek Cypriots would largely control the national government, but would be constrained by strong local governments, including those in Turkish Cypriot dominated areas. Although the parties involved seemed amenable to comprise on many of the large issues by the end of 1973, several issues concerning security forces and the judiciary, in particular, remained unresolved (Attalides, p. 103). At the same time, the unwillingness of Greek Cypriot leaders to formally and permanently abandon the goal of enosis became an important stumbling block (Bahcheli 1990: 87).

Perhaps the most important overarching factor that eventually signaled the end of the talks, however, was the growth of a heated rivalry between Makarios and the military government in Athens. Makarios was seen by Athens as becoming dangerously independent, and warned the leader in 1972 that he was “breaking the common front” and that the “center of Hellenism” lied in Athens (Bahcheli 1990: 79). Furthermore, the strongly anti-communist regime in Athens viewed Makarios’ views as dangerously leftist, referring to him from within as the “red priest”.

While Makarios attempted to placate different segments of the Greek Cypriot community by claiming support for enosis while, at the same time, stressing that it was not feasible, the junta in Athens steadily increased its support for enosis – even if enosis meant heavy concessions to Turkey, including the possibility of partition. Thus, Makarios, the original leader of the modern enosis movement, became the voice of an

independent Cyprus, while the military government increasingly sought to bring Cyprus under its control. The Athens' junta was also suspected of supporting EOKA B, a resurrected form of the underground extremist paramilitary group, in order to undermine Makarios and derail the intercommunal talks. Support for EOKA B became much more blatant in 1974, when, after the death of EOKA's notorious leader, General Grivas, Athens assumed more direct control of the group (Attalides 1979: 163).

The newly aggressive stance of the Greek government derived in large part from a coup which replaced the moderately nationalist junta leader, Papadopoulos, with the extreme nationalist, Dimitrios Ioannides, in late 1973. In comparing the two leaders, Hitchens (1983: 77) suggests: "If Papadopoulos was a Fascist in the Mussolini mould, Ioannides was more like an authentic Nazi. . . a believer in military cultism". While disputes between Athens and Nicosia had simmered under the previous military government, they came to a quick boil under the new junta. In an act of defiance, Makarios sent the Greek junta a letter in early July, 1974, which demanded the withdrawal of officers of the Greek military from Cyprus and accused the Greek government of "following a policy calculated to abolish the Cyprus State" (Necatigil 1990: 89). Makarios' letter turned out to be both provocative and prescient, as Greek officers on the island led a coup against him shortly thereafter, on July 15th, installing a extremely nationalist, pro-enosis President, Nicos Sampson, in his place.

The Turkish government was clearly alarmed by the turn of events on the island, and preparations for intervention, justified according to Turkish authorities under the Treaty of Guarantee, began to take place. Turkish Prime Minister, Bulent Ecevit came under intense pressure to act to protect the Turkish minority in Cyprus from the new

threat. Strong pressures emanated specifically from the military, which had acted three years ago to remove a civilian leader from power, According to Hitchens (1983:141), the military played a key role in pressing for swift action, suggesting that:

The written record of 1974 shows that it was the armed forces which pushed, at every stage, for a policy of force . . . It was the Turkish Security Council and not the cabinet or the parliament, which took the major decisions and which issued the crucial orders.

On July 20th, the Turkish military landed on Cyprus, and met intense resistance from the Cypriot National Guard and EOKA fighters. The much stronger Turkish forces, however, overwhelmed the local forces, and eventually went on to secure almost forty percent of the island. In the wake of the invasion, a massive population transfer occurred, as Greek Cypriots fled south from the invaders, while Turkish Cypriots moved north into areas controlled by their would-be protectors. When the fighting ended, the formerly ethnically heterogeneous island was divided into two territories populated by largely demographically homogeneous populations of Turks in the north and Greeks in the south.

Normative-Demographic Implications of the Troubles in Cyprus

As Table 8.1 indicates, bilateral disputes became frequent once again around 1960, when Cyprus was granted independence. This unusual situation yielded a somewhat unique irredentism-by-proxy state of affairs, whereby Greek governments sought to reduce the influence of Turkey over Greek Cypriots, while Turkey attempted to do the same for Turkish Cypriots vis-à-vis Greece. Although Cyprus became an internationally recognized state, it was accorded only partial sovereignty during the sixties and early seventies as a result of the Treaty of Guarantee and other stipulations of the Zurich-London agreements, which gave Britain, Greece, and Turkey the legal right to

intervene in the island state's affairs. Most citizens of Cyprus itself regarded the state as a somewhat artificial creation, and identified more with their "homelands" than with any greater Cypriot identity. According to Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash, writing in 1972: "Cypriots are (and continue to be) the extension of Greece in Cyprus through Greek Cypriots, and the extension of Turkey in Cyprus through Turkish Cypriots" (quoted in Attalides 1979: 102).

The interstate rivalry that was rekindled over Cyprus was, thus, intricately related to the presence of Greek and Turkish transborder groups on the island. Although these groups had been present when Great Britain controlled the island, the lack of any armed rebellion against the colonial occupants coupled with the sheer military infeasibility and undesirability of challenging one of the most powerful states on earth, essentially rendered Cyprus a non-issue until Greece questioned Cyprus' status before the United Nations. After that point, the main goals of Greece, Turkey, and the two rival communities of the island involved mitigating the power of the "other" nationality over their own national group. Intercommunal fighting on the island, in particular, aroused public nationalism in Greece and Turkey, leading to a series of near conflicts that were avoided, in large part, due to the perceived heavy constraints posed by the international community – particularly the United States.

The invasion of Cyprus by Turkey in 1974 led to ethnic cleansing and population transfers reminiscent of the events in Asia Minor during the twenties. The *de facto* partition of Cyprus, however, also eliminated the intercommunal warfare that had threatened to drag Greece and Turkey into armed conflict on several occasions. Cyprus no longer poses the same problems arising from transborder nationality that it did during

the sixties, as the Cypriot Greek and Turkish communities now live in largely homogeneous territories that are effectively under the control of separate governments.

IV. Greece and Turkey as Strategic Rivals: 1975-present?

The *de facto* partition and population transfer on Cyprus eliminated the last major outstanding “nationalist” issue between Greece and Turkey. While the Cyprus issue continued to play a role in souring relations between the two countries, it no longer contributed to interstate instability in the same manner as it had in the past. This is due to the fact that, with the populations of the island separated, neither community possessed the interest or ability to forcibly exercise political control over the other. Rather, the Turkish north of the island, which declared itself the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983, was subsumed under the direct protection of the Turkish military, while the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus, composed almost entirely of Greek Cypriots, was largely alleviated of the threat of Turkish intervention. As Greek Cypriot leaders had never accepted the idea of a “double enosis”, whereby part of the island would be annexed to Greece and part to Turkey, the established Turkish presence in Northern Cyprus contributed to the dissolution of public preferences for unification with Greece. At the same time, the Turkish display of resolve headed off any future calls for enosis from future leaders in Athens, who adopted a “Cyprus decides, Greece supports” (Coufoudakis 1985: 206) policy during the coming years. Thus, after 1974, both the irredentist and contending government angles of the conflict came to an end.

Nevertheless, the strategic importance of Cyprus, which lies only forty miles off the Turkish coast, continued to make the region an important element of Turkish-Greek

relations. However, Cyprus was only one of several strategic areas of contention between the two states, and several issues continued to cause friction over the coming decades. Demands by Turkey to revisit its rights to the Aegean continental shelf and the control of air transit over the Aegean became increasingly central to the strained relations of the two rivals.

As defenders of a status quo that favored the interests of their state, Greek leaders sought throughout the seventies and eighties to convey an impression of peaceful intentions in the face of Turkish revisionism. Shortly after the forced “resolution” of the Cyprus issue, Greek Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis suggested, in a speech given in April 1976, the conclusion of a mutual non-aggression pact with the Turkish government. Not surprisingly, leaders of Turkey, the stronger and more revisionist power at this point, saw little to gain from such an agreement and declined. Shortly afterward, Greece and Turkey nearly became involved in armed conflict during the summer of 1976 over the conduct of oceanographic research by a Turkish vessel in a region of the Aegean continental shelf claimed by Greece as its own.

Ongoing negotiations over strategic-economic issues surrounding the Aegean took place throughout the late seventies and eighties, interrupted several times by events such as the Turkish recognition of the independence of Northern Cyprus. Once again in 1987, the two countries approached the brink of conflict over an oil-drilling dispute. Later, in 1996, conflict again threatened to break out over the control of a small, uninhabited Aegean island. In January 1998, the decision of the Cypriot government to purchase Russian anti-aircraft missiles brought about threats of invasion from Turkey, whose leaders saw the delivery and installment of such missiles as a serious strategic

threat. While all of these crises were resolved peacefully, the underlying issues that fostered them remained a hindrance to improved relations between Greece and Turkey.

Nevertheless, these strategic-economic issues did not and do not represent the same type of underlying problem that issues surrounding transborder nationality did in Cyprus and earlier times between Greece and the Ottoman Empire. Neither economic nor strategic issues prevent the type of indivisible, largely zero-sum type of conflict that surround problems involving co-national diaspora. Strategic issues, in particular, often arise as a reflection of underlying suspicion and distrust between states – a state of affairs brought about by the pre-existence of rivalries often associated with transborder nationality. It is no accident that the first challenge to the status quo in the Aegean was made by Turkey in 1973, as events surrounding Cyprus fostered a strong sense of ill will between the two states.

In the absence of underlying revisionist fears surrounding other issues, however, strategic issues affecting the balance-of-power between two states become less salient. Mutual suspicions between Greece and Turkey represented a legacy of the Cyprus dispute, and, to a lesser degree, the historical record of conflict stretching back to Greek independence. Even when transborder issues are mitigated or resolved, it takes time for the mutual enmity which they engender to dissipate. During this period of “dissipation”, other issues between the states remain magnified in their importance, and public pressures on politicians make compromises with national rivals difficult. However, as has been the case with India and China as described in the previous chapter, the salience of strategic issues, even unresolved ones, tends to diminish as memories of conflict fade and the perception of mutual threat is reduced.

Disagreements over territories based solely on economic or strategic considerations do not represent the permanent underlying baseline of hostility engendered by transborder nationality. With the elimination of the transborder issue following the separation of the two communities of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey became freer to pursue closer relations once more, hindered only by the politics of historical memory that sometimes animate public pressure groups.

By the late eighties there were signs that the disputes of the past would no longer present an insurmountable obstacle to contemporary compromises and warmer relations. At the end of January 1988, the prime ministers of each state met in Davos, Switzerland, initiating a series of negotiations that became known as the Davos Process. The talks produced two key committees, the “Joint Committee on Cooperation”, which oversaw a variety of cultural exchanges and pursued advances in economic cooperation, and a “Greek-Turkish Political Committee”, which sought to advance political dialogue on the strategic issues dividing the two states. A former Turkish ambassador to Greece (Akıman 2000) notes that the talks represented “[the first time] since the Venizelos-Ataturk era . . . that the two countries seriously laid down their mutual problems before them in full recognition that it was to their benefit to work together and cooperate.” Although no bold resolution of any of the more serious bilateral problems was achieved through the Davos Process, the “spirit of Davos” became the cornerstone of a new attitude of rapprochement adopted by both sides during the late nineties.

A clear attempt to break from the past began in 1999, when a new Greek Foreign Minister, Georgios Papandreou, took office in the wake of revelations concerning Greek support for the recently apprehended Turkish separatist leader, Abdullah Ocalan.

Papandreou worked closely with the Turkish government in managing events surrounding the NATO bombing of Kosovo during that year. In August and September, two serious earthquakes inflicted heavy damage and loss of life in each country. The quick response of each in providing aid to the other in the wake of the catastrophes helped mitigate nationalist sentiment among the respective publics. At the end of the year, in December 1999, it became clear that Greece would no longer pose the barrier to Turkey's membership in the EU, as it had in the past, when it offered support for Turkey's candidacy at the European Council's conference in Helsinki. Greek leaders became active supporters of Turkey's accession to the EU in coming years, especially during the Copenhagen Conference of 2002 and the more recent EU summit of December 2004, which confirmed the initiation of negotiations for Turkey's accession.

Greek-Turkish relations are perhaps closer today than they have ever been – which is not to say that important stumbling blocks in their relationship do not still exist. Aside from the strategic issues described, there also remains a small, but important transborder ethnic presence in each country as a legacy of the Treaty of Lausanne. A small minority of Greeks, numbering in the tens-of-thousands, remains in Istanbul. This group has largely been hostage to the rise and decline of relations between the two states, and has suffered harassment and expulsion during periods of conflict. As long as Turkey continues to take steps to improve its human rights record, it is unlikely that Istanbul's Greek community will become an issue in interstate relations – but a shift in the direction of Turkey's internal politics could bring about renewed concern, and renewed tension, if the status of this group is threatened.

Similarly, Moslems, approximately half of which might be considered Turks, make up about one percent of the Greek population, and are concentrated in the border region of Western Thrace (Dokos and Tsakonas: 2003: 12). Once again, the group's small size means that it is unlikely to become a vocal minority, but the potential that Turkey would eventually use the treatment of this group as a pretext for an attack on the strategically important region remains a worry for some analysts. According to Dokos and Tsakonas (p. 15) "Turkish territorial aspirations vis-à-vis Greek Thrace could eventually become the most important challenge to Greek security". In this sense, the presence of even a small transborder group can be seen as elevating the baseline of hostility between Greece and Turkey – if only to a small extent and with the expectation that a variety of other factors will likely mitigate the influence of this factor.

Normative-Demographic Implications of the Post Cyprus-Partition Era

Even after the presence of transborder nationality as a factor in interstate relations is mitigated, lingering interstate distrust associated with public remembrance of past conflict may linger on and influence the salience accorded strategic territorial interests. Only a short distance from the Turkish coast, Cyprus represents an extremely important strategic territory. Although transborder issues involving the island have been lessened, no better example of the strategic rivalry surrounding Cyprus exists than the crises of the late nineties precipitated by the Cypriot purchase of anti-aircraft missiles from Russia.

At the same time, a myriad of issues surrounding economic and strategic claims in the Aegean arose almost simultaneously with the Turkish invasion of the island. However the importance of these issues is largely a function of the past relations between

Greek and Turkey, which were soured by the Cyprus issue. Rivalries over strategic territory generally require the perception of a present or potential threat among the states engaged in the rivalry. The threat perception that exists between Greece and Turkey did not reach fruition until the aftermath of the Cyprus conflict. At the same time, given that only a small transborder presence exists in each country, the underlying source of conflict, instability, and mistrust has largely been eliminated. This suggests that, as memories of past nationalist-based international conflict recedes, the strategic issues between the two states will similarly diminish in importance. Although there remains a strong economic component to the disputes as well, agreements over economically valuable land and sea territories exist between many democracies, and rarely lead to armed conflict. The recent détente between Greece and Turkey illustrates the potential for a new era of warmer relations that is likely to become more robust as long as neither state is allowed to exercise strong influence over large numbers of the other's dominant nationality. This suggests further that were the re-integration of the communities of Cyprus to take place, that it would have to be done in a manner that satisfied both communities on the island. Otherwise, the international repercussions arising from the presence of transborder demographics might, once again, be severe.

Domestic Influences on Greek and Turkish Dispute Initiation

Military Influence

One of the chief assertions of this work has been that governments conducting foreign policies that are heavily influenced by military officers act more aggressively when an irredentist situation exists. The 20th century history of relations between Greece

and Turkey seem to reflect a similar tendency whereby military intervention in politics leads to higher levels of conflict initiation when irredentism was an issue. Furthermore, the Greek junta during the early seventies, when faced with a heated “contending government” situation with Makarios’ Cyprus acted similarly aggressive, pursuing an “overthrow-merger” strategy similar to the “secession-merger” strategy often associated with irredentist disputes.

Table 8.2 lists the direct military interventions taking place in Greek and Turkish politics during the 20th century and whether those interventions took place during a period characterized by transborder nationalist disputes. Furthermore, the table summarizes the nature of policies initiated by the military-influenced state either during or within five years following the intervention of the military in politics.

TABLE 8.2
Military Interventions and Subsequent Greek and Turkish Foreign Policies

Greece

<i>Year</i>	<i>Event</i>	<i>Transborder Issue</i>	<i>Foreign policy outcome</i>
1909	Goudhi coup	Large diaspora	Installment of Venizelos; Balkan Wars 1912-1913
1916	“National Defence” Revolt	Large diaspora	Support from Entente powers; Constantine forced to resign; Venizelos assumes power; Entry into First World War
1922	“Venizelist” coup	Small diaspora ⁹⁸	Negotiations at Lausanne
1925	Pangalos coup	Small diaspora	Little Aggression (although Pangalos launched a small invasion of Bulgaria in 1925, ostensibly to protect mistreated Greek diaspora)
1936	Mextaxas dictatorship	Small diaspora	No aggression

⁹⁸ As has been explained, British rule over Cyprus was hardly considered an issue worth raising at this point in history, and played no role in Greek policy. Although other factors played a role, one could argue that the question of ‘military feasibility’ (namely, an extreme lack thereof) is the theoretical element of this work that best explains why Greece did not challenge Great Britain on the issue.

1967	Military junta under Papadopoulos	Cyprus question	Little aggression – some negotiations
1974	Military junta under Ioannides	Cyprus question	Overthrow of Mikarios provokes Turkish intervention
<u>Turkey</u>			
1960	Gursel coup	Cyprus question	Long period of military influence in Turkish politics initiated – invasion plans initiated in 1963 and 1967, but called off under heavy international pressure
1971	Military forces Demirel Resignation	Cyprus question	Ecevit gains power as first post-coup civilian leader in 1974 ; orders invasion of Cyprus soon thereafter
1980	Military overthrows Demirel	Small diaspora	Frequent conflicts over the strategic Aegean issues
1997	Intervention against Islamists	Small diaspora	1998 dispute over Cyprus missiles; followed by contemporary detente

In terms of the Greek government, the intervention of the Military League in 1909 led to the installment of Venizelos, who became one of the most notable nationalist leaders in Greek history. The nationalist preferences of the military, therefore, paved the way for future irredentist endeavors initiated by Venizelos, including the Balkan Wars and Greek intervention in the First World War and the subsequent Asia Minor debacle.

Although the Greek military largely withdrew from politics following the rise of Venizelos, the “Great Schism” that developed during World War I led to renewed political action by the military. After the removal of Venizelos by Constantine, segments of the Greek military revolted during August 1916, forming the “National Defence” movement that supported Venizelos’ return to power. Supported by these elements of the armed forces, Venizelos was able to establish a provisional government in September 1916, which subsequently declared war against the Central Powers in November 1916. With the intervention of Entente forces against Constantine the following year, it was

Venizelos' heavily-military influenced provisional government that took power, and quickly made Greek entry into the conflict official. According to Veremis (1997: 69), the intervention of the military into Greek politics in 1916 opened a "Pandora's Box" that "mark[ed] the beginning of systematic military involvement in Greek politics". Although the domestic implications of high levels of military influence over policy-making were not to (temporarily) subside until the 1950s, the importance of military actor influence over foreign policy changed dramatically after 1922.

With the reduction of the Greek diaspora following 1922, military interventions in politics affected foreign policies towards Turkey to a much lesser degree. When Greek leadership was again assumed by the military in 1967, however, the Cyprus issue was at the forefront of the foreign policy agenda. While the nationalist instincts of military leadership during this period were initially restrained by a desire for close relations with United States, the desire for a decisive reckoning of the Cyprus situation led to the ill-fated overthrow of the Cypriot government by the military junta. Although certainly not the only reason for periods of Greek aggression in the twentieth century, several of the more prominent instances of Greek intervention abroad were fostered by the desire of Greek military leadership to pursue nationalist goals abroad.

The high point of Turkish military intervention in politics came at a time when relations between the two states were already facing a period of instability due to the Cyprus situation. After 1960, the influence of the Turkish military on Turkish domestic and foreign policies has been strong, if not always overt. During one of the "highpoints" of Turkish military influence over civilian leadership during the sixties and early seventies, the Turkish government initiated plans to invade Cyprus during at least three

separate years: 1963, 1967, and 1974. As has been noted, this period also represented peaks in intercommunal violence, which one would have expected, in any case, to have led to military threats on the part of Turkey even in the absence of military influence over policy. Nevertheless, it has been argued in previous case studies that the presence of military influence over policy not only seems to foster aggressive foreign policy behavior in irredentist situations, but also the escalation of disputes into full-scale warfare – as was the case for Somalia in 1977-1978; and for Pakistan in 1965 and 1997. In the case of Turkey, only strong American warnings and certain logistical weaknesses kept Turkey from invading during the sixties. During 1974, however, no such factors were important enough to dissuade the Turkish state from invasion – an invasion, prompted in part, by strong pressures on Prime Minister Ecevit emanating from Turkish military circles.

Turkish governments during the eighties and nineties were also influenced by a weak (and non-existent between 1981 and 1983) civil-military divide. However, with the *de facto* partition of Cyprus after 1974, the source of friction between Greece and Turkey shifted to more strategic-oriented differences. The intervention of the Turkish military in domestic politics as late as 1997 indicates, at least until recently, that foreign policy decision-makers must at least take into considerations the preferences of military leaders. Nevertheless, with issues of transborder nationality largely resolved, it is unlikely that policies that take into account the influence of the military would be any more systematically aggressive than civilian policies. Therefore, despite the last half-century of Greco-Turkish rivalry, there is little reason to believe that a reassertion of the Turkish military's influence over civilian leadership, which is becoming increasingly unlikely as Turkey seeks entry into the EU, would necessarily initiate a more aggressive Turkish

foreign policy and represent an end to the recent period of détente enjoyed between the two states.

Diaspora Discontent

The connection between military influence over policy and irredentist-type aggression is most clear when diaspora groups can be described as discontented. Within the context of each of the irredentist-type situation examined in this study, there is reasonable evidence to suggest that diaspora groups were highly discontent with their foreign rulers – with the exception of the Turkish diaspora of Cyprus under British rule. The degree of discontent within Greek-inhabited areas of the Ottoman Empire is difficult to assess empirically, but it is clear that such discontent existed. It seems fair to surmise that, based on the relatively frequent uprisings by Greeks within the Empire and the assistance provided by resident Greeks to the Greek army in Asia Minor during the post-war intervention, Greek citizens of the Ottoman Empire looked favorably upon the idea of incorporation into a politically democratic and relatively economically prosperous Greek state as opposed to minority status in a decaying Sultanate. At the very least, there was a perception among Greek leaders and publics that the redemption of Greek areas was a goal desired by its inhabitants – which is the main point of including this concept in the analysis. During the strongly-military influenced tenure of Prime Minister Venizelos, efforts to retrieve the perceived oppressed diaspora of the Ottoman Empire led to the Balkan Wars, the First World War, and the ensuing Asia Minor intervention.

As evidenced by the overwhelming support of enosis offered in the 1950 referendum, it is clear that Greeks within Cyprus were similarly discontent with their

status as citizens of a foreign empire. However, because that empire was the British Empire rather than the Ottoman Empire, Greek governments, including military governments, steered clear of confronting London until the diplomatic situation became favorable with the spread of the decolonization movement. Clearly, the overwhelming military superiority of the British Empire, combined with the longstanding entente that existed between the two countries, both contributed to the silence of Greek leaders on the Cyprus issue during the interwar period.

The Turkish case is slightly more varied. As described earlier, Turkish Cypriots actively fought to retain British rule on the island and clearly accepted that the island would not revert to Turkish rule. The discontent of this group following independence, however, was clearly evident. Especially after being shut out of politics and economically blockaded after 1963, it is no surprise that Turkish residents of the island welcomed Turkish intervention on their behalf when it arrived. Although the data used in analyzing this case would suggest that Cyprus was relatively more prosperous than Turkey (with a GDP approximately 25% higher through most of the period 1960-1990), the average level of income of Turkish Cypriots was substantially lower than that of the Greek population of the island. Thus on multiple grounds – economic, political, and in terms of physical security – the Turkish diaspora on Cyprus clearly represented a discontented nationality. During the sixties and seventies, when the involvement of the Turkish military in politics was strong, the perceived desire of Turkish Cypriots for liberation led to near wars on numerous occasions and culminated in the invasion of 1974.

Military Feasibility

As indicated in the charts below, Greek aggression against the Ottoman Empire was not feasible until after the First World War. The point at which Greek capabilities finally became “feasible” came about after the Empire’s collapse following the First World War and its subsequent reduction to the rump state of Turkey. Very similar to the balance of power existing between Pakistan and India, Greece possessed approximately 25-40% of the capabilities of Turkey throughout the twentieth century (according to the capabilities index utilized in this study). Unlike the nineteenth century, however, the primary revisionist power in the late 20th century Greek-Turkish rivalry was Turkey. Thus, despite the certain level of deterrence presented by the Greek military, Turkey still possessed the ability to credibly threaten military action against the Greek state over Cyprus and later strategic disputes.

FIGURE 8.3





FIGURE 8.4



Thus, the real period of interest as far as the question of military feasibility is concerned is the 19th and early 20th century. Contrary to the expectation that realist considerations would play a systematic role in restraining aggressive behavior when a putatively revisionist state faced an overwhelmingly stronger adversary, Greece adopted fairly consistent hostile policies toward the Ottoman Empire – even though those policies tended more toward the subversive than overtly aggressive most of the time. Clearly, the military might of the Ottoman Empire strongly outweighed that of the Greek military, which largely relied on irregular forces until the late nineteenth century (the data utilized in this work suggest a ten-to-one advantage in manpower for the Ottoman Empire in 1875, for instance). Nevertheless, at certain junctures, Greek actions in the 19th and early 20th century, particularly the ill-conceived invasion of the Empire launched in 1897, seem to defy any realist considerations and attest to the strength that public nationalism sometimes places on foreign policy decision-making.

Greek aggression during this period partly bespeaks the faith of Greek leaders that the Great Powers would continue to guarantee Greek sovereignty were the Ottoman Empire to retaliate against their state – faith that seems justified based upon the reticence of the Ottoman Empire to initiate disputes against Greece during the 1800s. However, it was also an impressive indication of the strength of Greek irredentist preferences that the Greek government adopted a fairly consistently hostile stance towards the much-more-powerful Ottomans from Greek independence until the First World War. As was the case with Somalia and Pakistan, the willingness of Greece to maintain hostile policies against the Empire attests to the willingness of smaller states to confront larger states over nationalist issues that are central to those states' foreign policies and very national identities.

Conclusion

More than any other factor, the nature of relations between Greece and Turkey/Ottoman Empire has been conditioned by the presence of transborder national groups. When these groups were large and politically active, relations between the two states were characterized by high levels of interstate conflict. When transborder groups were small and politically dormant, relations between the two states improved.

Due to mutually agreed upon and forced population exchanges, these states experienced four distinct eras related to the presence or relative absence of the transborder question. The first era existed before the population exchanges and expulsions related to the conflict in Asia Minor and subsequent Treaty of Lausanne negotiations. Between independence and 1923, Greek leaders pursued rather constant

policies of subversion and outright military aggression against the Ottoman Empire. While public nationalist sympathies and pressures were widespread and strong through much of this era, two factors in particular sparked the pursuance of overt aggression by Greek governments. The first was the presence of diaspora rebellion, with the most noteworthy example of the uprising in Crete during the 1890s which sparked the Thirty Days' War of 1897. The second factor was the relative weakening or "inversion" of international constraints presented by the great powers. Greek leaders took advantage of the preoccupation of Great Britain and France during the Crimean War, for example, while, during the Russo-Turkish War, when these powers were not engaged elsewhere, Great Britain restrained Greek action by initiating a naval blockade. Eventually, during the First World War and its aftermath, international pressure was "inverted" such that the Great Powers actually intervened in Greek affairs to ensure that policies of irredentist aggression were initiated against the Ottoman Empire.

The second era occurred between the population exchanges of 1923 and the emergence of the Cyprus issue during the mid-fifties. During this period relations between Greece and Turkey grew increasingly warm as the memories of their past rivalry faded. The relative absence of the transborder nationality issue paved the way for this détente by removing the source of instability and friction that had earlier led to a century of instability and distrust between the Ottoman Empire and Greece.

The third era involved the emergence of the Cyprus issue that occurred after Greece openly challenged Great Britain's claim to the island before the United Nations. During early decades the Cyprus question had failed to capture the imagination of Greek and Turkish leaders and publics due to the sheer military infeasibility of challenging

Great Britain on the matter. However, with the strengthening of norms of self-determination that occurred on the international level during the fifties, Greece was able to challenge Britain on the diplomatic level. Once this occurred, it led Cyprus on the path to independence, but also raised questions concerning the power structures under which Greek and Turkish Cypriots were to be governed. Initially, these power structures were shared between Turkey, Greece, Britain, and the Cypriot government, which, in turn, was constituted in a corporatist manner that provided veto “protection” for both communities. Once this arrangement broke down, however, rivalry between Greece and Turkey intensified greatly as a result of the newfound vulnerability of the islands’ distinct communities, and both states repeatedly threatened one another militarily on behalf of their national kin on the island. Only the separation of the islands’ nationalities, as a result of *de facto* partition following Turkish invasion in 1974, ended this era that had been characterized by great instability fostered by public pressures on leaders of each state to protect the perceived rights of national kin within Cyprus.

The last era is the current era, within which, once again, the issue of transborder nationality has not been particularly salient. Although, since 1974, Greece and Turkey have clashed on multiple occasions, these clashes were primarily a result of conflicting strategic and economic claims rather than issues of transborder nationality. As such, the issues involved are more amenable to compromise, and more likely to decrease in salience as the nationalist rivalries of the past fade from public memory. The recent period of rapprochement between the two states is evidence that, without the presence of underlying issues of transborder nationality, leadership in both states are much freer to

pursue peaceful policies without having to deal with strong nationalist pressures from below.

Lastly, this chapter addressed the issues of domestic-type political factors and their role in promoting state aggression within already unstable situations involving transborder nationality. Coupled with diaspora content, which was evident in each of the irredentist situations described (with the exception of the Turkish diaspora on Cyprus during British rule), military influence served to encourage aggressive foreign policy strategies. During the twentieth century periods when transborder issues were at stake and a military government (or, more commonly, a civilian government strongly influenced by military leadership) was in power, strongly aggressive policies were adopted by states with revisionist goals or were only deterred by strong international constraints.

The military-installed Greek leader, Venizelos, led the state into the Balkan and First World Wars. The Greek military leadership of the late sixties and early seventies, after a period of attempted negotiations, helped spark the Turkish invasion by overthrowing the Cypriot government in a policy that appeared designed to lead to enosis. Greek military influence or control over policy during the interwar period when transborder issues had largely disappeared, however, did not noticeably affect Greek relations towards Turkey.

Turkish military influence over policy was strong during the period after 1960. On multiple occasions during the sixties, Turkish leadership decided to invade Cyprus and risk war with Greece only to be dissuaded by international actors, particularly the United States. Eventually, it was a civilian leader in Turkey, Prime Minister Ecevit, who

actually invaded the island. However, as the first civilian prime minister following a period of direct military intervention in politics, Ecevit relied heavily on the preferences of military leaders when executing foreign policy decisions.

Thus, relations between Greece and Turkey have been strongly influenced by the key factors hypothesized in this work to affect interstate relations. The interplay of public nationalist pressures and international constraints explain much concerning the general state of bilateral relations during the various eras mentioned. At the same time, military influence over policy correlates well with the initiation of particularly aggressive policies by one side or the other during periods when transborder nationality was a salient issue.

At present, the future of relations between Greece and Turkey looks particularly promising. The main danger to future relations ironically lies with the potential for peace and communal reintegration in Cyprus. Were this to occur, it is particularly important that the outcome include the presence of commonly acceptable political structures which are both workable and mitigate the threat perceptions of the two communities. At the same time, it is important that an integrated government promote a common Cypriot identity that, in time, might facilitate a certain lengthening of the strands-of-identity that bind the islands' communities to their respective motherlands. Only such a fundamental shift in identity would assure that a reintegrated Cyprus would cease to be a future threat to relations between Greece and Turkey.

CHAPTER 9 – Conclusions and Implications

This work has argued that in order to understand the frequency of conflict between many states in the international system; one must begin by understanding the destabilizing role of nationalism. While the relations between all states are, to some degree, influenced by liberal and realist-type considerations, an important, and often highly violence-prone, subset of states in the international system faces challenges associated with the issue of transborder nationality. Leaders within these states are confronted with normative pressures emanating from the international community, which tend to favor the preservation of state sovereignty as a primary constituent norm of the state system, and from domestic constituents, who often favor the pursuance of nationalist policies in an effort to “protect” national kin abroad by minimizing or eliminating the influence of a foreign government’s policies over the group.

Three major situations exist when assessing normative causality – with each related to the presence or absence of transborder demographics and the existence or absence of violent resistance on the part of national kin in states outside of the homeland state. In the first instance, international pressures supporting international sovereignty affect the decision-making process of homeland state leadership more than nationalist pressures from below. This is generally the case when no significant transborder presence exists, as is the case among the majority of state pairings in the international system. These dyads will tend to be more systematically peaceful than dyads in which a transborder presence exists.

A second possibility is that international pressures proscribing the transgression of another state’s sovereignty will exist at roughly the same level as nationalist pressures

from within society that demand the elevation of national kin self-determination abroad. This may result because nationalism in society is elevated within society, as is often the case in irredentist situations, or because international norms supporting sovereignty and territorial integrity are weaker than usual, as is often the case in contending government dyads. In situations within which international and societal normative pressures approach parity, a state of foreign policy “indeterminacy” is realized. When this state-of-affairs is brought about, it is unclear how potentially revisionist states will behave – creating an almost Hobbesian-type environment within which it is unclear whether international norms will be respected or not. The difficulty inherent in predicting the actions of such states lends itself further to bilateral instability as the potential targets of aggression will, in turn, pursue their own policies of “defensive revisionism” in an effort to counter future threats to their own state sovereignty and security. These dyads will, thus, tend to be more systematically conflictual than dyads lacking a transborder nationality.

Last, it is possible for a situation to exist when domestic nationalism reaches such a point that the imperative of domestic political survival is clearly contingent on the willingness of a state leader to pursue nationalist goals almost regardless of international prescriptions and consequences. This occurs most frequently when co-nationals abroad rebel against their government – whether that government is actively controlled by a foreign nationality or, in rarer cases, perceived as beholden to a foreign occupier or possessing a political system viewed as foreign and oppressive. The presence of co-national rebellion abroad can be expected to result in decision-making that largely disregards respect for norms of state sovereignty, thereby fostering the most systematically conflictual subset of bilateral relations.

Against this normative backdrop, this work also examines several other factors associated with the initiation of disputes in potentially irredentist situations. These factors are particularly relevant in cases of “foreign policy indeterminacy” (i.e. irredentist situations lacking diaspora rebellion), when it is unclear upon what bases a leader will choose a course of action. Leaders are faced with several key considerations, including: the degree of military influence over policy; the level of nationalist preferences among diaspora groups; and relative military balances of power vis-à-vis other states.

Military influence over policy was shown to frequently tip-the-balance toward aggressive policy-making within irredentist-type situations. Decision-making under military regimes (or civilian regimes likely to be beholden to strong military influence) often results in the pursuance of subversive or overtly militaristic nationalist policies designed to support the self-determination of diaspora groups abroad. Such policies are particularly frequent when it is clearer that a diaspora group is desirous of self-determination. Furthermore, realist-type considerations play a certain role in determining whether or not aggressive actions are actually “feasible” – with feasibility defined as the ability to mount a stiff enough defensive effort to make retaliation by states targeted by aggressive or subversive policies highly costly.

The next section re-examines the quantitative and qualitative evidence underlying the findings of this work. The implications for international relations theory and future research directions will also be discussed. After examining the implications for political science scholarship, a further section will examine the implications for international policymaking. Based upon the findings of this work, I present several possible

prescriptions for dealing with situations involving transborder nationality and the subsequent interjection of nationalist preferences into international relations.

Generalized Findings – The Quantitative Analysis

The quantitative analysis found in Chapter 5 showed that dyads that share a national group tend to have more militarized interstate disputes than dyads lacking such a group if that national group makes up the majority of the population of at least one state. This includes minority-majority dyads, which are associated with the rise of irredentist-type nationalism, and majority-majority dyads associated with contending government conflicts. Dyads within which a significant same-national minority exists in both states were not generally found to be more systematically conflictual than other dyads.

The existence of militant diaspora rebellion was shown to be particularly inflammatory for interstate relations in minority-majority dyads. A smaller effect was also noted for the presence of nationalist rebellion in minority-minority dyads. Majority-majority dyads did not display any increase in intradyadic hostility given the occurrence of nationalist rebellion.

The analysis further explored the role of demographic variables in three specific types of disputes. The first type involved territorial disputes. Here it was found that demographic variables played a particularly important role, as the characterization of a dyad as minority-majority or majority-majority provided the only systematic link out of all the variables, with the exception of relative capabilities, with territorial disputes. Particularly striking in this instance was the weakness of joint-democracy in predicting territorial disputes.

Disputes involving the destruction and replacement of one state's government by another state were also examined. These "regime change" disputes were most associated with the presence of majority-majority demographics and a lack of joint-democracy. In other words, the expected rise of contending government nationalism may lead to the attempted destruction of one state by another. At the same time, this phenomenon is less associated with states that are jointly democratic as such states pose less of a threat to the legitimacy of one another (and, if they are characterized by majority-majority demographics, may choose peaceful merger over conflict).

The analysis also revealed the types of disputes that are unlikely to involve transborder dyads any more often than non-transborder dyads – namely, policy-based disputes. Militarized disputes involving issues not related to territory or governance are best explained by liberal democratic peace variables. Peaceful resolution of potential policy disputes, which tend to present more room for negotiations than territorial or regime change disputes, is most closely associated with the presence of jointly-democratic states, which offer structural and normative incentives for compromise.

Finally, the quantitative analysis examined the role of specific factors affecting the foreign policy formulation of decision-makers in potentially revisionist homeland states within minority-majority (irredentist-type) dyads. Two different models were utilized in assessing these factors. The first was a standard regression model that assessed the individual variables while controlling for the other variables. This model revealed a strong role for military influence over foreign policy and diaspora uprisings in promoting the unilateral aggression of irredentist state leaders. The presence of military

feasibility was also found to influence the initiation of disputes, although, curiously, not in cases of dispute initiation involving fatalities.

The second model sought to establish patterns emerging from the interaction of key factors involved in foreign policy formulation. Within this analysis, diaspora uprisings were found to affect dispute initiation largely independently of other factors. Other domestic factors (in combination) primarily influence conflicts under conditions of expected “foreign policy indeterminacy” – whereby transborder nationality exists, but diaspora groups remained military passive. Given the absence of diaspora rebellion, it was shown that the combination of 1) military influence over policy, coupled with 2) the presence of a diaspora group residing in a state with relatively poor political or economic conditions as well as 3) the presence of military feasibility, best explains why conflictual policies are initiated by homeland states.

Case Study Findings and Corroborative Evidence – Normative-Demographic Aspects

The case studies found in Chapters 6-8 focus primarily on irredentist-type nationalist situations that have arisen when minority-majority demographics have existed between states. These cases provided a variety of corroborative evidence suggesting that the theoretical underpinnings and findings of the quantitative research provided a great deal of explanatory power in understanding the interactions among the states examined.

The case studies provided evidence suggesting that public pressure on executives to act aggressively was higher in homeland irredentist states than within states lacking a foreign transborder group. When comparing bilateral state relations of within transborder dyads compared to non-transborder dyads, the studies clearly bears out the assertion that

interstate relations suffered greatly due to outstanding nationalist issues. The plight of diaspora groups left outside the homeland due to the perceived misalignment of post-independence borders captured public imaginations and was manifested as Greater Somalism, Islamic jihadism, and the “Great Idea”. Leaders of states that were home to such diaspora, facing uncertain threats emanating from homeland states, often pursued aggressive policies of their own. While stressing the importance of state sovereignty and territorial integrity through diplomatic channels, states targeted by irredentist neighbors often took aggressive measures with the intention of increasing their own security at the expense of their neighbor’s, such as the limited Ethiopian invasion of Somalia during the eighties and India’s invasion of Bangladesh during the early seventies.

Throughout the case studies, the rise and decline of international normative constraints based on the preservation of state sovereignty were also described. While international constraints on Somali behavior were fairly high throughout, shifting superpower alliances and international sanction of territorial annexations in the Western Sahara and East Timor fed the perception of Somali decision-makers that they might weather the diplomatic storm resulting from the Ogaden invasion. In the case of Pakistan and India, the ability of Pakistan to appeal to UN resolutions in support of a Kashmiri plebiscite as well as Kashmiri’s continued status as a disputed territory lessened international opposition to Pakistani intrigues in a region divided not by state borders, but, rather, lines-of-control. The Greek case leading up until 1923 most poignantly displays the role played by international normative constraints, as the presence or absence of Great Power pressure for and against Greek irredentist policies represented the

decisive factor, in most cases, concerning whether or not overtly militant policies were pursued against the Ottoman Empire.

A fairly consistent willingness to transgress international norms was displayed throughout the case studies when diaspora rebellion erupted in foreign states. In the Somali case, diaspora rebellion in Ethiopia helped draw Somalia into war during the seventies. Diaspora rebellion in Kenya led to the pursuance of subversive policies in support of *shifita* rebel groups by Somalia, but public support for such policies began to wane in response to reports of rebel excesses, contributing to a diminished level of aggression towards Kenya. Kashmir was an interesting case in that diaspora (i.e. Islamic Kashmiri) rebellion was noticeably absent until the late eighties. However, once the insurgency began, Pakistani and Indian relations suffered accordingly, resulting in the Kargil Gap conflict of 1999, as well as a variety of more limited military incursions by each state into the other's region of control. Last, the presence of diaspora rebellion was a main causal factor in influencing Greek irredentist policies during the 19th century. When coupled with favorable international circumstances for intervention, such as the Crimean and Russo-Turkish war, diaspora rebellion in regions such as Thessalonica and Crete roused public opinion and subsequently pressured executives to pursue aggressive policies on numerous occasions. Most noteworthy was the War of 1897, when public nationalist pressures in response to the rebellion of Greek diaspora became so manifest that Greek decision-makers launched an invasion of the much more powerful Ottoman Empire in the face of Great Power opposition and witnessed the swift defeat of a Greek army that was doomed from the outset. The fact that leaders have continued to pursue aggressive irredentist-type policies throughout the Cold War, despite the very fact that no

successful irredentist annexations have occurred since the Second World War, attests to the power of public nationalism in forcing decision-makers into risky foreign endeavors despite the likelihood of defeat.

In contrast to bilateral relations between states sharing a diaspora group, bilateral relations between other state pairings that were examined tended to be less conflictual. Despite severe ideological differences and different superpower alliances through much of the period studied, Kenya and Ethiopia enjoyed warm relations in comparison to the relations of either state with Somalia. The fact that the warmth of this relationship was partly attributable to the mutual Somali threat each state faced does not detract from the fact that it was the question of transborder nationality, not questions of governance or ideology, which represented the defining issue within the Horn of Africa.

Similarly, relations between China and Pakistan, were extremely close throughout the period studied. This was despite the fact that each state, once again, possessed a radically different ideological view and, before the advent of Sino-American *détente*, represented natural geopolitical adversaries. Clearly, the presence or lack of a significant transborder nationality largely defined the state of relations among three of Asia's largest states.

The example of Greece and Turkey is useful because two periods have existed when the transborder question was largely absent. The first period, which existed after the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne and before the Cyprus issue arose, was characterized by continually warming relations between the two states. However, in the wake of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the *de facto* partition of the island after which the transborder question once again was rendered largely mute, relations between the two

states remained tense as a consequence of numerous quarrels over strategic and economic land and sea territories that had arisen during the years of conflict over the Cyprus question. As a point of comparison, India and China, states for which transborder nationality is not a salient issue (with one another), went to war over strategic territorial issues in the early sixties and experienced several decades of tense relations thereafter. Unlike relations between India and Pakistan, however, the Sino-Indian relationship has gradually improved throughout the years and strategic territorial issues, while still outstanding, have become less salient. The same might be expected in the future for Greece and Turkey. Given the relative absence of transborder ethnicity as a salient issue, as collective recollections of past conflict fade, one might expect the saliency of strategic and economic disagreements to decline – or at the very least, be addressed by more diplomatic, and less militaristic, interstate policies.

Case Study Findings and Corroborative Evidence — Foreign Policy Formulation

The main findings of the statistical analysis suggest that military influence over government decision-making within potentially irredentist homeland states tends to increase the propensity for the initiation of aggressive policies towards states that are home to national diaspora. This trend was perhaps witnessed most clearly in the case of Pakistan, which witnessed much more aggressive policies during periods of military rule than during periods of civilian rule. In particular, the civilian Bhutto administration, which took power during the seventies, pursued policies of active *détente* towards India, while civilian administrations in the early nineties seemed to restrain the potential for Pakistani aggression when insurgency erupted in Kashmir. Similarly, civilian

governments in Somalia acted with greater restraint toward Kenya and Ethiopia during the sixties, despite the presence of Somali insurgent activity, than the military government of Siad Barre during the seventies. In the twentieth century history of Greek-Turkish relations, the influence of military leaders over policy was strong much of the time that irredentist issues were present, and seemingly contributed to the aggressive policies pursued by each state. At the same time, military governments that came to power during periods when transborder nationality did not represent a significant issue were no more likely to pursue aggressive policies than their civilian counterparts.

An interesting pattern that emerged from the case studies involved the willingness of military-influenced homeland state governments not simply to initiate aggressive policies with a higher frequency, but also to escalate disputes to a higher level than their civilian counterparts. The presence of military influence in decision-making and the initiation of major wars were found to be linked in each of the case studies. The Somali invasion of Ethiopia in 1977 and the Pakistani invasions of Kashmir in 1965 and 1999 all occurred under military governments. The high point of Greek irredentist militarism, which occurred in the period surrounding the First World War, occurred as the result of policies pursued by Eleftherios Venizelos, who, despite having been approved by a democratic electoral process, maintained close ties with military leaders. The Turkish invasion of Cyprus was initiated at a time when the influence of the Turkish military over policies was notably strong, and undertaken in response to aggressive policies initiated by the military government of Greece.

Aggressive policies pursued by military governments were most evident when it was perceived that a desire for liberation existed among discontent “diaspora”. The

Pakistani invasion of Kashmir in 1965 was undertaken, for example, partly in response to perceptions that civil unrest that occurred in the region indicated a growing current of anti-government sentiment. Along the same lines, but with the opposite outcome, the growing acceptance of Kenyan rule displayed by Somalis of that state after the sixties served to mute aggressive policies pursued by Mogadishu under Barre's military government.

Although the revisionist states examined in the case studies were all militarily inferior to those states upon which they had territorial designs, during most periods they were not so inferior as to completely discourage the pursuance of subversive or overtly militarist policies. The concept of "military feasibility" was assessed quantitatively in order to control for cases in which this was not so – i.e. a homeland state was so militarily inferior to a kin state that it dare not risk military retaliation due to an inability to credibly defend itself to any great length. Throughout most of the periods covered within the case studies, homeland states saw greater or lesser levels of militant behavior as feasible. However, the states analyzed were only willing to risk large scale invasion of diaspora-inhabited lands when unusual constellations of international events made it possible or the possibility of assistance from militant members of the diaspora was thought to make such aggression more likely to succeed. However, small-scale attacks and subversive policies, thought less likely to provoke a costly retaliation, were common. The major exception to the expected constraining influence of military feasibility concerns Greek policies toward the Ottoman Empire during the 19th century, which were rather consistently aggressive despite the massive imbalance of power. Although these policies rested largely on the expectation that Great Power influence would restrain Ottoman

retaliation, the presence of such risk-acceptant policies over such a long period attests to the strength of Greek irredentist preferences during this era.

The Implications of Transborder Nationality for International Relations Theory

Over the last several decades, international relations scholarship has been largely built around variations in four major approaches. The first approach focuses upon realist-type considerations, which stress the relative capabilities of states and assume that the common desire of states and foreign policy decision-makers lies in increasing state power and/or security. The second approach focuses upon liberal-type factors, which stress internal state preferences that are guided by transnational interest group linkages, state structures, and domestic normative preferences. Liberal scholars are most associated with democratic peace theory, which suggests that joint-democratic governance plays a key role in mitigating international disputes. A third approach focuses upon international institutions as organizations that convey information, aid interstate coordination of policies through reduced transaction costs, and establish rules-of-the-game through repeated state interactions that make transgression of these rules (some would say norms) more costly. The fourth, and most recent, approach to international relations found in constructivist literature focuses primarily on the role that normative considerations play in decision-making – and views normative considerations derived from “intersubjective understandings” as key causal influences on actor behavior. This work has drawn from each of these paradigms, while, at the same time, revealing the limitations of each approach.

The realist-type concept of “military feasibility” was utilized in the domestic foreign policy model in order to control for situations when relative military weakness presented a clear constraint on executive decision-making. The concept rested on the realist notion that a state with revisionist goals could only rationally and credibly pursue those goals if there existed a balance of military capabilities that would render potential military reprisals costly. In a sense, this turns realist theory on its head by suggesting that balance-of-power situations are often more conflictual because it provides revisionist states greater latitude in pursuing various levels of aggression. Similarly, in the case of the bilateral normative-demographic model, the control variable indicating relative capabilities showed that *increasing* levels of power disparity promoted peace. Thus, while capabilities seem to matter, as suggested by realist theory, the nature of balance-of-power considerations operate much more closely to that suggested by “power transition theory”, which takes into account how state capabilities and state preferences (i.e. revisionist-seeking or status quo-oriented) are related.

The models incorporate much of the spirit of liberal scholarship, if not necessarily confirming all of the findings. The focus of liberal scholarship on domestic politics and foreign policy preference formation is key to the two major models employed in this study. However, this study also found also that the central liberal tenet regarding the relationship between peaceful interstate relations and joint-democracy may operate less systematically when issues of transborder nationality arise. The relative importance of national group linkages, for example, was found to provide a better explanation for international disputes based on territorial considerations than democratic peace theory. In addition, the presence or absence of an oppressive government beholden only to a

“narrow selectorate” did not seem to affect the initiation of disputes in irredentist situations.⁹⁹ Nevertheless, in the case of most types of disputes, the presence or absence of joint-democracy was found to be important, and thus, its role in mitigating conflict in general should not be ignored.¹⁰⁰

The role of international organizations was explored in Chapter 2 in the context of the development of international norms of self-determination and sovereignty. As was emphasized, the international community has never arrived at a simple and parsimonious formula for determining when the more generalizable emphasis on international respect for sovereignty should yield to more specific considerations of self-determination for national groups. In respect to the ability of the international community and associated interstate organizations ability to transmit appropriate rules-of-the game to state actors in situations involving transborder national ties, the “neo-institutional” approach to international relations “assumes too much” (Saideman 2001: 217). However, the fault of over-assumption lies not in the fact that the creation of international norms lacks a causal impact on state behavior, but, rather, that other factors arising from domestic political imperatives may override abstract international proscriptions. In this sense, Ambrosio (2001) is correct in associating the presence or absence of irredentist aggression with the selective application of international normative pressures – but this fact only captures part of the picture.

⁹⁹ The relevance of democratic peace theory for the unilateral initiation of conflict has, however, not received the same degree of theoretical or empirical support as “joint-democracy” mechanisms.

¹⁰⁰ The role of democratic peace theory was found to be related to contending governments dyads, for example, due to the more central role played by conflicting state ideology in these cases. Furthermore, intradyadic conflict among transborder dyads is not merely restricted to questions of territory and governance. Like other dyads, interstate relations can be expected to improve in these situations given the presence of joint-democracy due to its strong association with conflict resolution in policy-related disputes.

Constructivist scholarship benefits from its ability to generalize the processes leading to the formulation of actor preferences, but often suffers from the lack of specificity concerning the nature of causal inference. The work draws upon constructivist literature to explain the development of domestic nationalism and how it often places decision-makers in a difficult position by forcing them to reconcile the political demands of constituents for whom nationalism is an important element of political culture and international institutions and actors, who tend to favor the preservation of norms of state sovereignty. Unfortunately, constructivist theories are often difficult to measure empirically, and thus, serve as underlying theoretical constructs to more tangible phenomena. In this case, the tangible phenomenon is the presence of transborder demographics. However, due to the intangibility of the normative aspect of the theory, the linkage with demographics remains speculative – despite compelling evidence presented in the case studies attesting to the causal impact of such norms.

Central Asia - Flashpoint of the Future?

Although this work has focused on the role of transborder nationality in sparking past conflict, the consistency of such conflict over long periods between states sharing national groups suggests that many of the findings may apply to the future of interstate relations. Although periods of bilateral enmity may wax and wane, the usual flashpoints of international crisis continue to revolve around situations characterized by transborder nationality, including relations between countries such as Indian and Pakistan; Taiwan and China; Israel and its Arab neighbors; and North Korean and South Korea. These traditionally dangerous dyads have been joined by more recent rivalries involving

transborder nationality in areas such as the former Soviet Union (in Moldova, for instance) and Central Africa (Rwanda's involvement in the Republic of the Congo).

The findings of this work suggest that one of the most likely regions to experience nationalist-driven conflict in the future is Central Asia. Since independence, the former Soviet republics of Central Asia have maintained a close eye on potential Russian revisionism in light of the large Russian diaspora groups still scattered throughout the region. At the same time, former Soviet Central Asian states have all experienced unstable relations with Afghanistan, a state sharing significant transborder national ties with most of the former Soviet Republics. In total, the former Republics of Central Asia experienced 13 militarized disputes with Afghanistan during the (pre 9/11) period 1992-2000 alone.

Relations among the former Central Asian republics have been surprisingly peaceful, perhaps in part to the common threats that Soviet revanchism and Islamic militancy have posed to all governments in the region. Nevertheless, this work has suggested that common security interests often fail to supersede nationalist considerations in defining the course of bilateral relations. Although militant conflict has thus far not erupted, experts on Central Asia have focused upon the future threat posed by transborder nationality in the region since the dissolution of the Soviet Union (see, for instance, *Central Asia* 2002; Raman 1999; and Fuller 1994). Analyzing recent data (2001-2003) with the normative-demographic model employed in Chapter 5 results in predictions of near-future militarized interstate disputes that range from approximately 10 percent annually between Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan to approximately 35 percent annually between Uzbekistan-Tajikistan and Uzbekistan-

Kyrgyzstan.¹⁰¹ Significantly, most of the transborder demographics in the region include Uzbekistan – as either a homeland or kin state. According to Raman (1999), the “politics of Central Asia is . . . always marked by a subterranean fear of Uzbek hegemony and irredentism”. While it is possible that the states of Central Asia will continue to co-exist in the relative harmony that has characterized the past decade, the history of relations among transborder states suggests that policymakers ought to pay close attention to this region in the future.

Implications for Policymaking – Some Suggestions

The findings of this study suggest several types of policies that might be adopted by outside actors if they are to mute the destabilizing influence of transborder nationality on the relations between states sharing national groups. The following policy suggestions imply that the mitigation of interstate disputes is desirable, although a strong argument can be made that in some cases interstate conflict might actually be preferable to other alternatives. Unfortunately, the difficulty in making such a distinction brings me to the first point:

1) Work toward strengthening international normative constraints supporting state sovereignty and non-interference.

This first suggestion is the most difficult and potentially treacherous in its implications for international peace. The difficulty inherent in this suggestion lies in the fact that few states would readily accept an international system based solely on the

¹⁰¹ The major difference in dispute rates between these dyads involves the role of the peace-years control variable. The last two dyads have a markedly higher prediction of conflict than the first two in large part due to MIDs that did occur between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan during 1999.

inviolability of state sovereignty. The desire of state leaders, often prodded by public interest groups, to selectively weigh human rights and group interests against traditional considerations of state sovereignty will continue to encourage particularistic transgression of traditional international norms. This is particularly true with the growth of telecommunications that facilitate the conveyance of images of “oppressed” peoples abroad. More than pure sensationalism, however, it is difficult to argue, for instance, that the preservation of Cambodia’s territorial integrity under the Khmer Rouge should have represented an inviolable deterrent to a Vietnamese invasion that halted a genocide that claimed millions, including many within the Vietnamese diaspora.

State interests and biases further prevent the adoption of absolute norms proscribing interventions abroad. The interest of the United States, for instance, in maintaining close ties with Indonesia during the Cold War led to the sanctioning of Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor. The support of Iran and Egypt of Somalia provided the Somali state with a limited measure of support for undertaking the Ethiopian invasion. Similarly, the support of many Islamic nations for Pakistani designs on Kashmir has encouraged the continuation of a militant approach.

Perhaps the most one can ask in terms of the international community is for the development of a common normative consensus under circumstances that represent a particular threat to international peace and stability. The international community led by the United States conveyed a strong message during the Gulf War that the invasion of one Arab state by another would not be condoned internationally (the perceived weakness of international norms by Saddam Hussein, not coincidentally, contributed to the original invasion of Kuwait). On the other hand, the lack of international response to Armenia’s

invasion of Azerbaijan sent the opposite message. What is clear is that if international pressures are to be effective, they must be clearly stated in anticipation of possible interstate aggression and involve a united resolve on the part of the international community to condemn, sanction, or even respond militarily to aggression. The alignment of such factors, however, tends to be rare.

2) Promote economic development and inclusive democratic processes in “kin” states

One of the better long-term strategies for mitigating irredentist conflict may lie in elevating the economic and political status of diaspora groups. The implication for international conflict lies in the idea that a diaspora group that is increasingly content with its political status will be less likely to seek secession or incorporation by a homeland state. At the same time, nationalism among domestic audiences in homeland states can be expected to wane as material conditions improve for diaspora groups – placing less pressure on executives to take foreign policy stances.

At the very least, scholars of domestic conflict have suggested that states that are more economically developed are less likely to experience domestic rebellion, while states that are more democratic are more likely to contain ethnic-type rebellion. As has been shown, the prevention of nationalist rebellion by diaspora groups is perhaps the single biggest step that can be taken to avoid high levels of interstate conflict.

Unfortunately, there is strong disagreement among scholars as to the appropriate form that democratization efforts should take when the goal is to minimize the alienation common among diaspora groups. Nevertheless, this should not detract from the willingness of the international community to promote democratic governance in kin

states. Although democratization carries risks for domestic stability, government repression of diaspora groups presents almost certain negative implications for international stability when a homeland state lies near.

3) Negotiate solutions to such disputes on an international, not intercommunal level

This work has argued that diaspora groups play a strong role in influencing the level of nationalism displayed among the polity of homeland states. This in turn influences the preferences of foreign policy makers toward states in which diaspora reside. While the second policy suggestion advocates paying close attention to the social and economic conditions of diaspora groups, it is the international community, not a state with national ties to the diaspora, that ought to spearhead efforts to improve conditions for diaspora groups. All too often, such pressure applied by co-national states spills over to increasing demands and threatening behavior that leads to bilateral distrust and instability.

The leadership of states that are home to transborder groups can best improve bilateral relations by seeking to reduce the political influence of local communal groups on policy. Rather than fan the flames of nationalism at home, homeland state leaders, in particular, should seek to cultivate domestic patriotism – or loyalty to the state – while downplaying imagery of a greater national community. The first step that an executive can take to improve bilateral relations is to, at the very least, not seek to further restrict his or her foreign policy options by fanning domestic nationalism and creating a stronger domestic political impetus for interstate aggression.

Rhetoric distancing the interests of the state from the interests of the nation helps alleviate domestic nationalism, and may create enough policy space for a leader to pursue more productive relations with another state that is home to a co-national group.

Reducing the influence of diaspora groups on domestic policy helps promote negotiated solutions not only by reducing the degree of nationalist pressures on an executive, but also by reducing the number of key actors involved in negotiation. Negotiating compromises in nationalistically-charged situations is extremely difficult between two parties – adding additional local parties, who are possibly even more extreme in their nationalist preferences, makes negotiation exponentially more difficult.

While bypassing local diaspora groups in negotiation processes may result in such groups rejecting the legitimacy of the negotiations altogether, such an outcome becomes less likely the more clearly a homeland state leadership signals its intentions to revoke its support for such groups were they took act in an intransigent manner. Recent examples of negotiations in which local parties were bypassed include the Dayton Accord negotiations, which were only successful due to the willingness of Slobodan Milosevic to overlook Bosnian Serb objections, and the Northern Ireland peace process, which occurred mainly as a joint U.K.-Ireland initiative, with local Protestant and Catholic parties largely excluded (Woodwell 2005). Similarly, as was described in Chapter 8, negotiations over Cyprus in the late fifties were only concluded due to the willingness of Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain to bypass local leaders in the negotiation process. The subsequent breakdown of the Zurich-London agreements in 1963, however, points to the importance of continued cooperation among international actors when inevitable setbacks to regional peace agreements are encountered.

4) Encouragement of Civilian Control over the Military

After the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe, some of the earliest initiatives taken by Western Powers involved efforts to promote a stricter divide between civilian and military authority in the region. The findings of this work suggest the wisdom of such a strategy, particularly in a region with numerous potential irredentist conflicts. While stronger civilian control over policy-making is not likely to bring an end to outstanding nationalist grievances, the reduction of military authority over policy-making diminishes the influence of a strong, frequently militantly nationalist domestic lobby. When a government is primarily or exclusively controlled by military leadership within a homeland state, it is particularly important for outside powers to encourage a transition to civilian authority. Otherwise, it should be expected that nationalist aggression will eventually, if not immediately, increase and quite potentially escalate to war.

5) Do not encourage the military build-up of revisionist states

This suggestion might seem obvious, but, nevertheless, has often not been observed in practice. Somalia's invasion of Ethiopia was preceded by a large Soviet supplied military buildup and modernization effort. Similarly, Pakistan's 1965 invasion of India was preceded by American efforts to similarly modernize and assist the reorganization and growth of the Pakistani military. The targets of nationalist revisionism rarely have cause to adopt aggressive policies against revisionist states except in their own defense. Thus, the main consequence of enhancing the military capabilities of states desiring to pursue irredentist-type policies is to provide such states with a credible military apparatus that helps shield them from potentially retaliatory

consequences of more limited aggression or enables them to conduct their own large-scale military operations abroad. Neither potentiality has positive consequences for interstate stability.

6) Encourage Supranational Institutions that promote the formation of alternate identities

In order to simplify and facilitate analysis of the political impact of nationalism, this work has generally treated nationality as a fixed, immutable source of in-group motivation. Nevertheless, while identification with a particular nationality represents a deep-seeded form of identity, its very nature as a voluntarist association means that, given time, perceptions of nationality may be alternately conceived such they are viewed less through the narrow lens of ethno-linguist type ties than through an emphasis on the commonalities existing within a region's history, culture, and common ideals.

Although no parallels exist in the rest of the world, the role of an expanding and deepening European Union has begun to reshape the context through which state borders and national identity in Europe are viewed. Such shifts in identity may take generations, however. In the case of Somalia's relations with its neighbors, for example, rhetoric of Pan-Africanism that emanated from outside parties seeking to contain regional conflict quickly fell on deaf ears and was viewed merely as a philosophical abstraction rather than the source of joint common identity that it claimed to represent. Common identity must arise from repeated interactions, common interests, and longer term socialization processes associated with institutions that come into direct contact with mass populaces – in other words, they can not simply be forced upon pre-existing nations in a short period

of time. Nevertheless, the slow growth of a common European identity suggests that redefining national identity may be possible and desirable from the standpoint of international peace.

Final Word

The findings of this work inevitably raise the question of whether partitions and population transfers represent a potential avenue that ought to be considered by the international community when faced with intractably conflictual situations involving transborder nationality. Kaufmann (1996 and 1998), for instance, argues that the alteration of state borders and transfer of national populations has historically lent itself to the reduction of both interstate and intrastate violence.

The findings of this work in many ways might seem to support the contention of Kaufmann's thesis – at least as it relates to interstate relations. At the same time, however, this work has also presented theoretical reasons why partition and population transfers should generally be avoided as a method of conflict resolution. First, it is clear that population transfers that occur during the course of interstate conflict will likely involve a high degree of brutality and violence in an attempt to eliminate or coerce civilian populations into fleeing a particular region – as was the case with Greek citizens inhabiting Asia Minor in 1923 or those inhabiting Northern Cyprus in 1974. Kaufmann himself recognizes that “outside powers or institutions” must offer “protection, transport, subsistence, and resettlement” as an alternative to allowing forced resettlement of civilians “at the mercy of their ethnic enemies and of bandits” (1998: 124).

However, the involvement of the international community in partitions and population transfers presents an important problem aside from the obvious difficulty of mustering international will to partake in an endeavor that represents an infringement of traditional human rights norms. As this work has argued, the presence of international norms supporting the maintenance of state sovereignty and territorial integrity represent an important constraint on executives of potentially revisionist transborder states. International sanctioning of border alterations or population transfers might, in the long term, alleviate interstate tensions in a particular situation, but at the cost of weakening international norms that serve to dampen international aggression in other cases. Perhaps Kaufmann is correct in suggesting “when all else fails” that partition and population transfer might merit consideration in a dire situation involving the potential for extreme destruction or genocide, but such a threshold of potential violence must clearly be set very high in order to mitigate the trade-off that would be entailed in weakening future international normative constraints on interstate aggression.

As a last note, even though this work has established the intractable nature of conflict based on transborder nationality, the establishment of relatively peaceful relations between transborder states should not be viewed as impossible. Exceptions exist to even the most determinate patterns and human agency often fosters outlying outcomes. This work presents few answers, for example, for the historical pattern of peaceful relations between Thailand and Malaysia, two states with a major transborder presence (Malays and Moslems in southern Thailand). At the same time, while the influence of military influence over policy has been offered as a powerful correlate of aggressive nationalist behavior, the olive branch extended to Israel by Anwar Sadat, who

rose from a military background and remained strongly influenced by military leadership, remains one of the genuinely courageous examples of peacemaking within the context of a vicious nationalist-oriented interstate rivalry.

Although fortunate exceptions to the general state of conflict existing between states sharing national groups exist, the path to managing problems of interstate nationalist conflict will need to focus more upon the prospect of conflict mitigation rather than often overly optimistic hopes for the rapid elimination of inter-state and international suspicion. The role of outside actors in promoting political inclusiveness, economic growth, the weakening of military control over policy, and other measures designed to reduce levels of bilateral enmity between transborder may serve to reduce the incidence of conflict to some degree. However, the single best manner of mitigating the influence of nationalism in international relations is for the international community to send the clearest signals possible that the forcible attempt to actualize a reorganization of state borders represents an unacceptable threat to international peace and will be met with strong international condemnation and resistance. At the same time, it may be necessary under situations of ethno-national oppression for the international community to realize that inaction cannot necessarily always be justified in the name of interstate peace. Unfortunately, there is no magical philosophical formulation to resolve the tension inherent between the search for international peace and the need to protect those threatened upon the basis of their nationality.

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